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ABSTRACT 
The influence of corporate governance on labour management is one of the key topics of the 
contemporary academic debate. In particular, there is a growing interest in better 
understanding the employment effects of takeovers. We investigate this issue in four empirical 
chapters.  
The first empirical chapter shows that acquired firms‟ prior performance is the key variable in 
explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments: acquired firms‟ poorer performance leads to 
greater workforce reductions post-merger. Industry relatedness also leads to higher levels of 
workforce adjustments. However, the results show that hostility does not lead to higher 
workforce reductions after controlling for other relevant variables. In contrast to prior research 
conclusions, the results show that high premiums do not induce workforce reductions. These 
results imply that workforce reductions are undertaken for efficiency improvement purposes.  
The second empirical chapter shows that acquiring firms‟ performance decline may also 
induce workforce reductions post-merger. At the same time, the results show that workforce 
reductions are inversely associated with subsequent performance change. This implies that 
post-merger workforce reductions positively affect firm performance. 
The third empirical chapter shows that takeover announcement shareholder gains do not 
explain job losses and wage cuts, although there is some evidence of rent expropriation after 
hostile and cash-paid acquisitions. In contrast, there is a strong positive association between 
acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns and post-merger employee wealth concessions. This 
association suggests that post-takeover jobs and wage growth depends on value created by 
takeovers: if shareholders gain from takeovers, then employees also benefit from such 
transactions; if shareholders lose from takeovers, then employees also suffer from them.     
Finally, the fourth empirical chapter shows that mergers reduce demand for labour. A 
contribution of this chapter is that it confirms that decline in labour demand is larger after 
acquisitions that involve layoffs than after acquisitions that do not. This greater decrease in 
labour demand in layoff-involving acquisitions may justify workforce reductions post-merger. 
The general conclusion of the thesis is that mergers do not always negatively affect labour and 
that post-merger employee layoffs are usually undertaken for efficiency improvement 
purposes. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the research 
World economies have different labour management practices, depending on their finance, 
ownership and corporate governance systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Gospel and Pendleton, 
2005). It is suggested that the reason for this variation is that corporate governance systems 
prioritise differently the interests of various stakeholders (Armour et al., 2003). For example, 
the shareholder value oriented corporate governance system (hereafter „the market model‟) 
observed in liberal market economies (LMEs) places shareholders‟ interests over those of 
employees, pressurising managers to create short-term returns for capital at the expense of 
labour. In contrast, the stakeholder value oriented corporate governance system (hereafter „the 
stakeholder model‟) observed in coordinated market economies (CMEs) balances the interests, 
and is concerned with the maximisation of the welfare, of all stakeholders. The labour 
management outcome of the market model is one of the main topics of the contemporary 
corporate governance debate. In particular, a key research question is whether corporate 
governance mechanisms in LMEs push managers to act as agents only of shareholders, 
creating value for them at the expense of labour, or whether managers are still capable of 
acting in the best interests of their company, balancing the interests of all stakeholders, as 
required by company law. This is the fundamental issue of this thesis. 
In LMEs shareholders are seen as the primary risk takers and therefore entitled to receive 
residual gains. However, as in these economies corporate ownership is widely dispersed, 
shareholders are weak vis-à-vis managers, mainly due to the „free rider‟ problem. In this 
regard the main concern of corporate governance evolved around the issues of protecting the 
rights of dispersed shareholders (principals) from entrenched managers (agents) (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997)
1
. The adoption of the ideology of shareholder value maximisation and the rise 
of institutional investors contributed to the development of an active market for corporate 
control (MCC). Within the MCC framework, shareholders can use the „exit‟ disciplining 
method rather than „voice‟, threatening managers with replacement if they do not act in the 
best interests of shareholders (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). In this context, it is argued that 
                                                 
1 Under this principal-agent view, the corporate governance problem is how to protect the interests of dispersed „weak‟ 
shareholders from „entrenched‟ management, and how to make managers work in shareholders‟ best interests. 
2 
the market model excessively pressurises managers to undertake corporate restructuring to 
maximise shareholder returns when further growth opportunities are limited. In this process 
employees may incur some losses, as in many companies labour is the largest and most easily 
controllable cost component, and its restructuring may contribute to boosting short-run returns 
for shareholders (Froud et al., 2000). Thus, when other options for delivering higher capital 
returns are limited, employees may incur additional risk shifted onto them by shareholders and 
managers.  
It is suggested that, in LMEs, widely dispersed shareholders mainly use market mechanisms of 
management disciplining. As a result, in these economies, the MCC becomes a distinguishing 
feature of the corporate governance system, which puts pressure on managers to continuously 
increase shareholder value. From the theoretical point of view the main role of the MCC is to 
protect shareholders‟ interests by disciplining under-performing managers and materialising 
the synergy. Thus takeovers should improve efficiency by re-allocating assets to their most 
efficient users. However, at the same time, a strong MCC may enable shareholders to gain 
power vis-à-vis other stakeholders and to press managers to adopt those strategies that create 
short-term returns for them. In order to meet investors‟ short-term expectations, managers may 
need to sacrifice some long-term strategies such as human capital investments that may lead to 
inefficiencies. In particular, it is argued that the MCC may push managers to favour the 
interests of capital over labour, and to facilitate wealth transfer from workers to owners 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988). If true, this claim would imply that the market model will 
generate a negative outcome in the long run: it may discourage long-term human capital 
investments by both managers and employees, and thereby prevent efficiency improvements. 
Employees, expecting a „breach of trust‟, may be discouraged from making firm-specific 
human capital investments and this may lead to long-term inefficiencies. 
At the same time some other commentators argue that employees also bear residual risk by 
making firm-specific human capital investment (Blair, 1995; Roe, 2003). In this regard, it is 
argued that corporate governance should be concerned not only with getting returns on the 
investments of finance suppliers, but also with ensuring appropriate returns on the long-term 
investments of all stakeholders, including employees. 
Therefore it is important to understand the effects of takeovers on labour: whether labour 
suffers from such transactions and whether labour management decisions are influenced by the 
3 
shareholder value creation requirements of the market model of corporate governance. The 
results could be used to make some inference on the validity of the claim that this model of 
governance negatively affects labour. In this relation, this thesis contributes to the corporate 
governance debate by providing new empirical evidence on the effect of corporate takeovers 
on jobs and wages. In particular, the empirical results of the thesis clarify whether employees 
are subject to „unfair‟ layoffs and pay cuts post-merger and whether such layoffs and pay cuts 
are undertaken to create short-term shareholder returns.  
Although the effect of takeovers on shareholders‟ wealth is well documented in voluminous 
research, it is only recently that researchers have started to investigate systematically the 
effects of takeovers on labour. Therefore systematic empirical research on this issue is limited 
to a few papers only. However, recent UK based empirical work by Conyon et al. (2001, 
2002a, 2004) represents a significant addition to the early US based work on the issue. This 
thesis differs from the previous research in a number of ways. First, it uses a new empirical 
approach in analysing the role of several factors in explaining post-merger workforce 
adjustments in one framework. These factors include prior performance of acquired firms, 
prior performance of acquiring firms, relatedness of the merging firms‟ industries, hostility in 
takeovers, premium paid to target firm shareholders and post-merger operating performance 
change of acquiring firms. Secondly, the thesis is one of the first studies which empirically 
analyse the effect of post-merger workforce adjustments on acquiring firms‟ operating 
performance. Thirdly, using a large dataset, the thesis directly tests “the breach of trust” 
hypothesis (Shleifer and Summers, 1988) by investigating the direct association between 
merger-related shareholder gains and post-merger employee wealth change, which was 
somewhat neglected by prior empirical research. Finally, the thesis uses a new hand-collected 
dataset on merger-related employee layoffs, constructed on the basis of a media search, to 
investigate whether such layoffs were motivated with the post-merger labour demand decline 
in merging firms. Then the employment effect of corporate takeovers is assessed based on the 
combination of these empirical results obtained from the above described four different 
research perspectives.       
There is no generally accepted theory explaining the effects of takeovers on labour. Therefore 
the inferences on the labour effects of takeovers are made on the basis of general theories 
explaining the occurrences of such transactions. It is difficult to predict the employment 
effects of takeovers by reference to a specific theory of takeovers, as different theories predict 
4 
different outcomes for jobs and wages. However, on the basis of these theories some 
inferences as to the employment effect of corporate takeovers could be made. For example, the 
value-creation theory of takeovers states that the primary motive for mergers is to improve 
efficiency through synergy and management disciplining (Manne, 1965). This implies that 
takeovers may initially negatively affect labour, with substantial workforce reductions in the 
short run, although the long-run employment effects are more likely to be positive. On the 
other hand, the value-destruction theory (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Jensen, 1986) suggests 
that takeovers initiated by „empire-building‟ managers  may destroy jobs in the long run due to 
the inefficient use of assets, although these types of takeovers may not negatively affect labour 
in the short run, as empire-building managers are not interested in cost controls. Takeovers 
undertaken by „over-optimistic‟ managers may also eventually lead to job losses, because of 
the need to cover the high premiums paid to target shareholders. Finally, the value-
redistribution theory suggests that takeovers facilitate rent transfer from employees to 
shareholders by causing a breach of implicit contracts between them (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988). Thus, takeovers undertaken with the purpose of rent transfer from employees to 
shareholders may negatively affect jobs and wage growth.  
The extant empirical evidence on the employment effects of takeovers is inconclusive, 
providing only partial support for the theories above discussed. For example, on the basis of 
the evidence on the labour effects of takeovers it can be concluded that the prior research 
provides some support for the value-creation theory of takeovers. Analysing the relationship 
between productivity and ownership change, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) conclude that “… 
asset redeployment is an important mechanism for correcting lapses from inefficient producer 
behaviour”. McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) report that plants that change ownership 
significantly improve their performance, measured by labour productivity. Analysing the 
labour demand and productivity effects of mergers in UK financial sector Haynes and 
Thompson (1999a, 1999b) conclude that merger activity enhance efficiency. Recent work 
investigating the labour demand effect of mergers in related versus unrelated and hostile 
versus friendly mergers concludes that job losses are purely due to efficiency improvements in 
labour utilisation post-merger (Conyon et al., 2001, 2002a, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
At the same time, there is some empirical evidence both supporting and rejecting the value-
redistribution theory of takeovers. In support of this theory, some researchers have shown a 
negative relationship between shareholder gains around takeover announcements and post-
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takeover employee wealth change (Rosett, 1990; Becker, 1995). Rejecting this theory, other 
researchers show no association between the shareholder gains and employee wealth 
concessions post-merger (Gokhale et al., 1993; Beckmann and Forbes, 2004).  
1.2 Research questions 
As previously discussed, comparative corporate governance literature indicates the labour 
management outcome of LMEs as one of its main weaknesses: the market model may 
discourage long-term human capital investment on the part of both managers and employees, 
which may lead to long-term inefficiencies. In this regard, the academic debate is concentrated 
on the issue of whether takeovers lead to unfair job losses and slower wage growth. To 
contribute to this debate, the thesis empirically analyses the following four specific research 
questions:  
Q1. What are the factors associated with post-merger workforce reductions? 
In an analysis of the effects of takeovers on labour, the starting point is to understand the 
underlying factors that trigger post-takeover workforce adjustments. Various things may 
prompt such adjustments, as predicted by different takeover theories. First, ownership change 
in under-performing firms may lead to workforce reductions, as turning around such business 
may require a higher level of restructuring. Thus, the level of post-merger employee layoffs 
may be a function of acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance. Next, the disciplining of an 
inefficient incumbent management and/or realisation of synergy created by mergers may lead 
to post-merger workforce reductions, as these are two primary sources of takeover gains. The 
incumbent managers may be inefficient, as they may be following the strategy of enjoying a 
„quiet life‟ and, as a result, may be not exerting enough effort into labour management. The 
replacement of managers who do not manage resources as efficiently as expected may result in 
cost savings. Similarly, realisation of merger-related synergies may require elimination of 
duplicative activities, which may involve short-term job losses, although the effect of such 
efficiency enhancements may be positive for employment in the long run.  
Alternatively, staff cost cuts may be undertaken to maximise takeover gains and to cover high 
premiums paid for targets (Sirower, 2000; Krishnan et al., 2007). Roll (1986) argues that 
acquirers pay a high premium for their acquisitions as a result of managerial over-confidence. 
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Workforce reductions may be necessary to create short-term shareholder value and to protect 
acquiring firm managers‟ own jobs.  
New empirical evidence on the various underlying factors in post-merger employee layoffs 
clarifies whether mergers negatively affect labour by creating opportunities for „unfair‟ job 
losses. Specifically, this clarifies whether post-merger employee layoffs are undertaken to 
deter further performance deterioration or to re-distribute wealth from employees to 
shareholders.  
Q2. What is the association between post-merger performance change and workforce change? 
Another factor that may lead to workforce adjustments could be the performance change 
following mergers. Most researchers agree that corporate takeovers do not positively affect 
post-merger performance, as there is growing evidence showing performance deterioration 
post-merger (Martynova et al., 2007). Furthermore, as previous discussion implies, post-
merger employee layoffs could be undertaken in response to performance deterioration and to 
improve operational efficiency. In this regard, operating performance decline could be 
considered as one of the reasons for post-merger workforce reductions.  
A related issue is the performance consequences of workforce adjustments post-merger. 
Workforce reductions are expected to affect firm performance positively or at least arrest 
further performance deterioration by enabling synergy extraction or by disciplining inefficient 
managers. However, if layoffs are undertaken with the purpose of maximising shareholder 
returns or to cover high premiums, then such layoffs may negatively affect firm performance, 
as suggested by recent literature (Sirower, 2000; Krishnan and Park, 2002; Krishnan et al., 
2007). This literature suggests that managers overpay for acquired firms as a result of over-
optimism and subsequently undertake excessive layoffs to cover such overpayments, which 
may lead to operating performance decline post-merger. Specifically, the excessive layoffs 
may destroy acquired firms‟ human capital by affecting employee morale and leading to poor 
employee performance. 
In sum, understanding the role of post-merger operating performance deterioration in 
explaining workforce adjustments may further clarify the factors triggering such adjustments. 
More importantly, this empirical research provides new evidence on the performance 
consequences of post-merger employee layoffs. With this new evidence this research 
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contributes to the literature on the question of whether such layoffs positively or negatively 
affect performance.   
Q3. Do merger-related shareholder gains explain changes in jobs and wages? 
Another factor that may lead to post-merger workforce adjustment is the strong requirement to 
create shareholder value within the market model of corporate governance. Therefore the 
labour effect of takeovers could be explored by testing the direct relationship between 
shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions. Evidence on this relationship clarifies 
whether shareholder gains come at the expense of employees, as suggested by the value-
redistribution theory of takeovers (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).   
In the finance literature it is well documented that target shareholders capture most of the 
takeover gains. However, the question of where those gains come from still remains 
unanswered. One of the suggested sources of these gains is the rent transfer from employees to 
shareholders, as first theorised within the value-redistribution theory of Shleifer and Summers 
(1988). According to this theory, post-takeover workforce and wage changes should be 
inversely related to target firm shareholder gains.  
In contrast, according to the value-creation theory, takeovers should benefit all stakeholders, 
including both shareholders and employees, through operational synergy or by disciplining 
inefficient management. There is growing evidence showing that even within the market 
model of corporate governance managers apply friendly labour management practices and 
work for the success of their company, as required by company law. In other words, managers 
consider the interests of both shareholders and employees (Pendleton, 2009). In this case, post-
takeover workforce and wage changes should depend on the success of mergers, where 
success is measured by the long-run abnormal returns of acquiring firm shareholders. 
Therefore according to this theory, post-takeover employee wealth concessions should be 
positively related to acquiring firm shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns.  
Additionally, new evidence on this question clarifies whether the market model urges 
managers to put shareholder interests over those of labour. Evidence showing a negative 
association between short-run shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions would 
imply that managers act to create shareholder value at the expense of labour. Alternatively, a 
positive association between post-takeover long-run shareholder gains and employee wealth 
8 
concessions would imply that the market model of corporate governance still allows managers 
to work for the success of their companies, balancing the interests of all stakeholders. 
Q4. Does post-merger decline in labour demand cause employee layoffs?  
According to Cappelli (2000) it is possible to reduce demand for labour by changing the input 
mix within a given production function. Decline in demand for labour could be one of the 
main factors leading to post-takeover workforce reductions. Takeovers, as a major business 
strategy, may be used to introduce changes to the input of the production function. For 
example, takeovers may eliminate duplicative activities or discipline inefficient management 
(Haynes and Thompson, 1999a), which may move the employment level to another, optimal 
level. In other words, in both cases, the organisation of labour may change, as suggested by 
Conyon et al. (2002a). This means that takeovers reduce labour demand and managers 
undertake post-merger workforce reductions on the basis of the level of decline in labour 
demand. In support of this argument, Conyon et al. (2001, 2002a, 2004) show that merging 
firms use a significantly smaller labour force in comparison to non-merging firms, after 
controlling for output and wage changes, which can be interpreted as a consequence of 
rationalisations in the use of labour. To contribute to this literature, first we analyse labour 
demand changes in both merging and non-merging firms, holding the initial output and 
employment conditions constant, and using panel data estimation methods.  
As a main question of interest in this chapter, we investigate whether post-merger decline in 
labour demand leads to workforce reduction. Post-merger workforce adjustments may be 
undertaken to materialise the decline in labour demand, which implies that there is some 
association between decline in labour demand and post-merger changes in the absolute 
number of employees. There may be different underlying factors leading to rationalisations in 
labour usage, such as synergy or more efficient use of labour. Whatever is the underlying 
factor in the efficiency improvement in labour utilisation, employee layoff decisions should be 
based on the extent of such decline in labour demand. It follows that labour demand decline 
should be greater in mergers that involve layoffs than in mergers that do not. On the basis of 
this, we test whether there is any link between decline in labour demand and post-merger 
reductions in the absolute number of employees. 
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Efficiency improvements through decline in labour demand and cost savings should also 
benefit employees in the long run, in the form of better jobs and faster wage growth. Therefore 
we also examine the wage effects of takeovers.  
1.3 Sample and research methods 
As discussed, the UK corporate governance system is a „flagship‟ market model of 
governance, where the MCC is very active in the UK (along with the US). Therefore, it is 
ideal for investigating the employment effect of shareholder value oriented corporate 
governance using a sample of domestic takeovers from this economy. We select a sample of 
235 takeovers of UK publicly listed companies, which took place between 1990 and 2000. 
Due to data availability restrictions, we had to limit the sample period to this period. However, 
this period includes some of the most merger-intense years during the last – fifth merger wave 
in the late 1990s. At the same time, Pagano and Volpin (2005b) report that during this period 
in the UK (along with the US) the shareholder protection index was the highest, but the 
employment protection index was the lowest among 21 OECD countries. Therefore this 
sample would be the most appropriate sample for analysing the employment effects of 
restructuring for shareholder value. 
We compare the performance of this sample to the performance of a sample of 470 non-
merging control firms, selected using a matching firm selection methodology, advocated by 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1996). This methodology specifies how to 
select matching control firms in analysing share price and operating performance changes in 
an event study framework. The full description of the matching firm selection methodology is 
given in the section 4.2.7. Using this methodology, we select a matched firm for each acquired 
and acquiring firm. In addition to this we use also industry median performance to assess the 
performance of merging firms. 
Data has been collected from a number of sources. Transaction-related data on mergers and 
acquisitions has been hand-collected from the Acquisitions Monthly journal
2
. This data has 
been merged with the accounting and financial data downloaded from Datastream. As the 
thesis is concerned with the performance change in the merged firms, we collect accounting 
                                                 
2 Transaction-related data includes the names of acquired and acquiring firms, announcement date and completion date of 
takeovers, transaction value, size of premium, payment mode and takeover mode.  
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data (including employment data) for 7 years, three years before and three years after the 
takeover event year. Data on Board composition and Board ownership has also been hand-
collected from Hemmington-Scott Corporate Registers.  
To analyse the post-merger workforce change we created pre-takeover pro-forma workforce of 
merging firms by combining pre-takeover workforce of acquired and acquiring firms. 
Comparing this pre-takeover pro-forma workforce with the acquiring firms‟ post-takeover 
workforce we compute the post-merger (percentage) workforce change. Detailed analysis of 
Datastream data shows that 127 acquirers reduced their workforce during t+1, out of which 87 
acquirers further reduced their workforce during the second or third years, while 23 acquirers 
increased their workforce (which means that they temporarily reduced workforce after 
acquisitions) and 17 acquirers were taken over or liquidated during this period. Datastream  
data also shows that 108 acquirers increased their workforce during t+1, only 10 of them 
reduced workforce during t+2 or t+3 relative to pre-takeover level, while 13 of them were 
taken over during this period. In overall, according to Datastream, out of 235 sampled 
acquirers, 115 acquirers had lower workforce during t+2 in comparison to the pre-takeover 
workforce level and 111 acquirers had lower workforce in comparison to the pre-takeover 
workforce level during t+3. 
Theory suggests that merger-related employee layoffs usually happen in the acquired firms 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988). However, when Datastream information is used such layoffs 
may be hidden in the acquired and acquiring firms‟ combined workforce change, as there may 
be some workforce growth in other segments of business, while acquired business segments 
experience employees layoffs. Therefore, in order to gain more accurate information on the 
actual employment effects of takeovers, we have also collected data on publicly announced 
merger-related employee layoffs by screening national and regional newspapers, downloaded 
through the Nexis
®
 database. We were able to find media reports of employee layoffs in 101 
(43%) acquisitions out of 235. Percentage employee layoffs are computed in comparison to 
the pre-takeover pro-forma workforce of merging firms, computed by combining pre-takeover 
workforce of acquired and acquiring firms. In these acquisitions on average 7.5% (the median 
is 5.6%) of the combined workforce were laid off within a period of two years after mergers 
(in these percentage calculations we use the pre-takeover pro-forma workforce of merging 
firms, created by combining pre-takeover workforce of acquired and acquiring firms, as above 
explained). Data on the announced employee layoffs include only straight redundancies, not 
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workforce reductions related with divestments or other sell-offs. If no press release on merger-
related employee layoffs were found, then we assume that no employee layoffs were made 
during post-merger period.  
The analysis reveals that the number of firms which make public announcements on merger-
related employee layoffs (101 acquirers) and the number of firms which reduce workforce 
according to Datastream (115 acquirers) are similar. The analysis shows that there is about 
36% correlation between announced layoffs and Datastream workforce adjustments and this 
correlation is similar to the correlation (32%) reported by Krishnan et al. (2007). Datastream 
workforce adjustments also include changes due to unrecorded divestments, other unrecorded 
acquisitions and unannounced layoffs. Furthermore, newspaper based employee layoff data 
does not take into consideration employment growth. Therefore the correlation between these 
two variables may not be very strong. 
However, a weakness of this dataset is that not all employee layoffs may be announced or we 
may have missed some announced layoffs during the newspaper screening process. In spite of 
these shortcomings of the employee layoffs data, we believe that this hand-collected dataset 
represents a fairly accurate picture of the employment effects of corporate takeovers, on the 
basis of the following arguments. First, during the media search process we noted that several 
newspapers simultaneously report merger-related employee layoffs and usually the reported 
number of laid off workers are similar. We have compared the newspaper reports from 
different sources in order to construct a credible dataset. Secondly, as above analysis of 
Datastream workforce change data indicates, there is a significant correlation between the 
number of firms who reduce their workforce post-merger according to Datastream and the 
number of firms who make employee layoffs according to the media search. Therefore, we 
believe that the hand-collected merger-related employee layoff data is reliable. 
To investigate the research questions we use both univariate analysis and multiple regression 
research methods. In analysing the first two research questions, we divide the full sample into 
two sub-samples: in other words, we compare the performance of „the workforce reduction‟ 
sub-sample (hereafter the WFR), where post-merger employment declines, and „the workforce 
growth‟ sub-sample (hereafter the WFG), where post-merger employment increases relative to 
the pre-merger level. The benefit of this comparative analysis is twofold. First, it provides 
further verification of the full sample results. In other words, we want to see whether the 
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results of these two sub-samples confirm the full sample results. Secondly, using these sub-
samples we should have a clearer picture on the factors that contribute to the workforce 
reductions (in the WFR sub-sample) and on the factors that contribute to the post-merger 
workforce growth (in the WFG sub-sample) post-merger. 
1.4 Thesis structure and summary of findings  
The remainder of the thesis consists of two literature review chapters, one methodology 
chapter, four empirical chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
corporate governance and corporate takeovers as well as the literature on the influence of 
takeovers on labour management practices. This chapter states the general research issue of 
the thesis and discusses the literature on the employment effects of takeovers. Chapter 3 
discusses the prior literature in order to derive four specific research questions to be 
investigated in the empirical chapters. Chapter 4 describes appropriate research methods to be 
applied in this thesis.  
Chapter 5 investigates the causes of post-merger workforce adjustments (Q1). Specifically, it 
focuses on the role of four factors – merging firms‟ prior performance, management 
disciplining, synergy created by mergers and high premiums – in explaining post-takeover 
workforce adjustments. We analyse pre-takeover operating performance of both acquired and 
acquiring firms, using the full sample as well as the WFR and WFG sub-samples. 
Univariate analysis shows that employee layoffs are made in under-performing firms. 
Regressions show that acquired firms‟ prior performance explains both post-takeover 
workforce reductions and workforce growth. Specifically, post-takeover workforce 
adjustments are positively associated with the acquired firms‟ prior performance. This means 
that the poorer the acquired firms‟ performance, the greater the workforce reductions. In 
contrast to this, acquirers‟ pre-takeover performance only explains post-takeover workforce 
growth. Although the coefficient of the hostility dummy is negative as expected, it is not 
significant. However, the results show that related acquisitions lead to slower workforce 
growth in comparison to unrelated acquisitions. The results also reveal that higher premiums 
are not associated with greater workforce reductions. In contrast, high premiums are 
associated with slower workforce growth, possibly due to the scope of synergy in those 
acquisitions where high premiums have been paid. Thus, high premiums do not necessarily 
lead to employee layoffs. In sum, the results imply that employee layoffs are undertaken when 
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there is a need for efficiency improvement, not to create shareholder value at the expense of 
labour.  
Chapter 6 investigates post-merger performance decline as another important antecedent of 
workforce adjustments and performance consequences of such adjustments (Q2). The 
univariate analysis indicates the WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ performance does not differ from 
the pre-takeover levels during the first two post-takeover years, but significantly declines 
during the third post-takeover year. In contrast, the WFR sub-sample acquirers‟ performance 
declines during the first two post-takeover years, but does not differ from the pre-takeover 
levels during the third post-takeover year. The regressions reveal that post-merger 
performance changes have significant power in explaining workforce changes: both full and 
sub-sample regressions show a significant positive association between performance change 
and workforce change. This positive association implies that a negative performance change is 
more likely to lead to workforce reductions. 
Furthermore, the regression results show that workforce adjustments are inversely related to 
operating performance change. Therefore it can be concluded that post-merger workforce 
reductions positively contribute to operating performance or at least arrest further performance 
deterioration. This contradicts prior research results suggesting that post-merger employee 
layoffs destroy acquired firms‟ human capital and negatively affect firm performance. 
One of the limitations of the literature in this area is that the economic role of takeovers is 
assessed through operating performance (accounting studies) or the shareholder wealth effect 
(finance studies) of such transactions. Most prior research does not investigate the real factors 
that may lead to positive or negative performance change. The research that empirically 
investigates the sources of takeover gains is limited and we do not know much about the real 
underlying sources of takeover gains (Becht et al., 2003). One economic factor that may 
explain post-takeover operating performance change is post-merger change in employment. 
Thus the results of this chapter increase the knowledge on the real sources of value created by 
mergers. At the same time, the chapter contributes to knowledge on the motivations of 
corporate takeovers and the economic role of the MCC through a better understanding of the 
reasons for employment-related decisions. 
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Chapter 7 directly investigates the association between shareholder wealth change and 
employee wealth change in order to clarify whether takeovers involve any rent transfer from 
employees to shareholders (Q3). For this purpose we measure short-term takeover 
announcement share price abnormal returns using the Cumulative Abnormal Returns method 
and post-takeover long-term abnormal returns using the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
methods. In contrast to the predictions of the value-redistribution theory, the results show that 
around takeover announcements the WFR sub-sample shareholders earn lower abnormal 
returns than the WFG sub-sample shareholders. 
After measuring the abnormal gains, we analyse the association between shareholders‟ gains 
and employee wealth concessions, using regression techniques. In addition to the wealth 
transfer from employees to shareholders, takeover announcement share price gains may also 
indicate merger-related efficiency improvements resulting from synergy realisation or better 
management, which eventually should lead to operating performance improvement. However, 
such efficiency improvements should be reflected in the acquiring firms‟ share prices. In this 
regard, we only use target firm shareholders‟ abnormal returns and premiums paid to target 
firm shareholders as merger-related wealth transfer measures. The regressions show that target 
firm shareholders‟ share price abnormal returns are positively associated with post-takeover 
workforce growth. Similarly, premiums are positively associated with post-takeover wage 
growth. These results contradict the predictions of the value-redistribution theory, but support 
the predictions of the value-creation theory. However, the results also indicate some support 
for the value-redistribution theory: in cash-financed acquisitions, shareholders‟ higher 
abnormal returns are associated with lower wage growth; in hostile takeovers higher premiums 
are associated with lower wage growth.  
Similarly, in the long run the WFR sub-sample acquirers earn significant negative abnormal 
returns, while the WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ performance does not differ from non-merging 
firms‟ performance. Regressions show that there is a significant positive association between 
acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns and post-takeover workforce and wage changes. These 
results imply that if shareholders gain from takeovers, then employees also benefit from such 
transactions; if shareholders lose from takeovers, then employees also suffer from them. On 
the basis of these results, it could be concluded that even under strong pressure from the MCC 
management decision-making is not influenced by shareholder value creation objectives. In 
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contrast, corporate decisions are made, balancing the interests of shareholders with the 
interests of other stakeholders, including employees. 
The empirical results of this chapter directly contribute to academic literature on the labour 
management outcomes of the market model of corporate governance. They also contribute to 
the debate on the underlying motives of takeovers. As there is no evidence of a direct negative 
relationship between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions, we conclude that 
takeovers do not involve rent transfer, but employee welfare depends on the success of 
mergers: if shareholders suffer from takeovers, employees also suffer, if shareholders gain, 
employees also gain. Thus the results of this chapter do not support the market model 
predictions on the negative labour effect of restructuring for shareholder value.  
Chapter 8 investigates whether employee layoffs are caused by decline in labour demand 
(Q4). In other words, it investigates whether acquisitions that involve employee layoffs lead to 
greater decline in labour demand than acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. Prior 
research examines labour demand change in the context of related versus unrelated and hostile 
versus friendly mergers, and concludes that one of the main reasons for post-takeover 
employee layoffs is significant rationalisation in the use of labour, leading to labour demand 
decline during post-merger years (Conyon et al., 2001, 2002a, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2004). Applying the same estimation method, we compare labour demand change in 
acquisitions that involve layoffs to that in acquisitions that do not. In other words, we divide 
the sample into „layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ sub-samples and estimate the dynamic labour 
demand estimation model as in Conyon et al. (2002a).  
Panel data based Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) regressions reveal that decline in 
labour demand is greater after acquisitions that involve employee layoffs than after 
acquisitions that do not: acquisitions that involve employee layoffs reduce labour demand by 
about 18%, while acquisitions that do not involve layoffs reduce labour demand by 6%. 
Furthermore, the results also indicate that wage growth after acquisitions that involve layoffs 
is not significantly different from wage growth in non-merging control firms, whereas wage 
growth after acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs is significantly higher relative 
to wage growth in non-merging control firms.  
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This chapter contributes to the academic debate started by Haynes and Thompson (1999a, 
1999b) and Conyon et al. (2001, 2002a, 2004), providing new evidence on the employment 
and wage effects of takeovers. In particular, the results of this chapter show that employee 
layoffs are undertaken based on the extent of labour demand decline during post-merger years.   
Chapter 9 summarises the major findings of the three empirical chapters and draws a general 
conclusion on the basis of these findings. It also discusses specific contributions of each 
chapter as well as the overall contribution of the thesis. Then the chapter discusses the policy 
implications of the results. In addition, limitations of the study will be discussed and 
recommendations for future research will be made.  
1.5 Conclusions  
The aim of the thesis is to assess the influence of takeovers on labour management. The 
following are the main findings: (1) workforce reductions are undertaken for efficiency 
improvement purposes; (2) workforce reductions have a favourable impact on firm 
performance; (3) not all takeovers involve wealth transfer from employees to shareholders, 
while only some opportunistic takeovers (such as hostile and cash financed) may involve 
employee layoffs; (4) labour demand decline is one of the main reasons for employee layoffs 
and wage growth is higher in merging firms than in non-merging firms. On the basis of these 
results, it can be concluded that mergers do not always lead to a negative employment 
outcome. Instead employee layoffs are undertaken to achieve success for the company, not to 
transfer wealth from workers to shareholders. Although there is some short-run negative 
effect, such rationalisation may benefit labour in the long run. Thus, the results imply that 
shareholder value primacy is not deeply institutionalised, as is assumed by prior research 
(Deakin, 2005). Thus it can be concluded that post-merger labour management decisions are 
made to enhance efficiency in labour utilisation (Conyon et al., 2002a). 
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2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND 
LABOUR MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter first reviews the literature on the relationship between corporate governance 
systems and labour management practices. It briefly discusses the corporate governance and 
labour management practices in LMEs and CMEs in order to highlight the role of corporate 
takeovers in organising employment relations in both systems.  
Then the chapter introduces the MCC and discusses different alternative theories that explain 
the occurrence of takeovers, including the empirical evidence on these theories. These theories 
can be grouped into three main areas. The value-creation theory of takeovers suggests that 
takeovers create value through management disciplining and synergy (Manne, 1965). The 
value-destruction theory considers takeovers as transactions that lead to decline in acquiring 
firm shareholders‟ value by paying high premium as a result of agency problems or 
managerial overconfidence (Roll, 1986). The value-redistribution theory of takeovers argues 
that takeovers only facilitate wealth redistribution between different business stakeholders, in 
particular by transferring wealth from employees to shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988). Particular attention will be paid to derive the short-term labour effects of mergers, as 
predicted by each of these theories. In addition to this the chapter briefly summarises prior 
empirical research findings on employment and wage effects of takeovers.  
Finally, based on the literature review, the chapter states the general research issue of this 
thesis and identifies four specific research questions to be investigated in the empirical 
chapters. Empirical answers on these questions contribute to the clarification of the general 
research issue.   
2.2 Corporate governance systems and labour management practices 
2.2.1 Theories of the firm and corporate governance 
When ownership and control are separated, there is a potential for conflict of interest between 
capital providers and enterpreneurs, which creates an agency problem (Berle and Means, 
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This problem arises because managers do not always act in 
the best interests of shareholders and, at the same time, it is impossible to make contracts that 
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fully monitor all future activities of managers. Shareholders trust agents to manage their 
assets, bearing some risk related to the uncertainty of their cash inflows from those assets. 
Therefore, shareholders are considered primary risk bearing residual claimants, who receive 
returns on their investments only after other claims have been satisfied and whose rent 
involves some uncertainty. It is argued that since shareholders incur all risk, power should be 
in their hands. All other stakeholders interact with the firm on the basis of contracts and 
receive their rents according to these contracts, assumed to be „complete‟. Consequently, the 
firm is viewed as a „nexus of contracts‟, which exists solely with the purpose of creating 
wealth for its owners. 
In financial economics the currently dominant view of the firm – the „nexus of contracts‟ view 
– was developed on the basis of the insights first suggested by Coase (1937). This author 
argues that while, in the marketplace, price movements coordinate production relations, in the 
firm, central authority may coordinate resource allocation more efficiently with lower 
transaction costs. Therefore it is more efficient to undertake certain activities within the 
boundaries of a firm, coordinating them by an entrepreneur. Using price mechanism for every 
exchange may be costly for both sides of trading, while the entrepreneur may carry out the 
resource allocation function at less cost
3
. Coase (1937) defines the firm as „the system of 
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an 
entrepreneur‟. Further developing this idea, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stress the importance 
of contractual relations for the existence of firms. They define the firm as the legal fiction 
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships. Under the „nexus of contracts‟ view of 
the firm, all parties deal with each other based on implicit or explicit agreements that may 
create different problems due to incompleteness of the contracts. However, the main agency 
problem is between shareholders and managers, as when ownership and control is separated, 
managers may not always act in the best interests of widely dispersed shareholders.   
Political economy and industrial relations scholars suggest that the „nexus of contracts‟ view 
of the firm is too narrow, disagreeing with the exclusion of labour from the main sets of actors 
in corporate governance. These authors also argue that this view ignores the potential conflicts 
as well as possibilities of forming different alliances among shareholders, managers and 
labour (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Gospel and Pendleton, 2003). The literature provides 
                                                 
3 Such costs may include discovering relevant prices, negotiating and concluding contracts and paying sales and income tax. 
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several arguments outlining the need to consider labour as a main actor in firm governance. 
For example, Blair (1995) argues that the main assumption of the finance view – that 
dispersed shareholders are residual owners of large corporations – is problematic, as such 
corporations not only involve physical assets but also intangible assets and, therefore, the 
various rights and responsibilities of shareholders are ill-defined. 
Another core assumption of the principal-agent view is that employment contracts are 
complete and fully compensate for all investments made by employees. However, as 
suggested by Blair (1995), firms may not honour wage growth promises or jobs may be lost in 
the case of ownership change or firm bankruptcy, resulting in loss of firm-specific capital 
investments made by employees. Promises of higher wages and permanent employment are 
contingent on the firm‟s performance. Therefore this strand of literature argues that employees 
should also be considered as residual risk bearers. 
Criticising the „nexus of contracts‟ view of the firm, an emerging strand of literature proposes 
to define a firm as an independent social and institutional entity, which is defined and 
protected by corporate law (Blair, 1995; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). Having incomplete 
contracts, other stakeholders also bear some risk. Therefore, this entity should serve to protect 
the investments of not only shareholders, but also other stakeholders. In this entity labour is 
one of the main actors, along with managers and shareholders, who make firm-specific 
investments and bear residual risk (Blair, 1995; Gospel and Pendleton, 2003).  
Blair (1999) argues that the asset-specific character of firm-specific human capital investments 
creates a contracting problem. In human capital investments, asset specificity arises as 
employees may not be able to use their skills outside the firm. As discussed in Blair (1999), 
Becker (1964) argues that „human capital‟ investments have higher value in some particular 
employment relationships than in others
4
. Therefore, when employees make firm-specific 
investments contracting becomes more difficult, because employees not only have generic 
skills, whose value can be determined using similar work relations, but also have tacit 
knowledge, which is only valuable in this firm and brings future cash flow streams only in this 
in this specific context. In such cases, „the hold-up‟ problem may arise. When this problem 
                                                 
4 Becker (1964) defines “human capital” investment as the investment made in time and resources to acquire the required 
skills and knowledge to do a job.  
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arises, workers may only gain partial returns for their firm-specific investments, which are 
made privately by them (Chemla, 2005). 
Thus, similar to shareholders, employees can also be considered as residual risk bearers as 
they make human capital investments to develop firm-specific skills that are crucial for the 
wealth-creating activity of the firm. As discussed above, this human capital investment is also 
risky, as this investment may not bring the expected benefits as a result of employment 
relations breakdown. At the same time, employees‟ sense of ownership can be enhanced by 
offering ownership stakes to workers, through various schemes such as employee share 
ownership plans. In such circumstances the main corporate governance problem becomes how 
to distribute the wealth created by corporations and give the right incentives to all stakeholders 
who make investments to create this wealth. Appropriate corporate governance mechanisms 
should encourage such firm-specific investments and develop institutions to protect firm-
specific investment made by all parties and create incentives to make such investments
5
.  
Consequently, it was suggested that corporate governance is the outcome of the power 
relations among three main groups of stakeholders: shareholders, managers and employees 
(Blair, 1995; Gospel and Pendleton, 2005; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). For example, 
according to Gospel and Pendleton (2003) „corporate governance is concerned with who 
controls the firm, in whose interests the firm is governed and the various ways thereby control 
is exercised‟. They argue that within-firm conflict of interest is among owners, managers and 
employees, who may oppose each other and form alliances. Similarly, Gourevitch and Shinn 
(2005) argue that corporate governance is the result of the interaction of economic preferences 
of the main stakeholders (owners, managers and employees) and political institutions that 
promote policies reflecting those economic preferences. All three groups of stakeholders have 
claims against the firm‟s cash flows and these conflicts among them are settled outside the 
firm – by laws and regulations. Each stakeholder group has preferences. Owners want 
investment protection and higher cash flows, managers want autonomy in decision making 
and private benefits from controlling shareholders assets, while employees want high wages 
and job stability. Each group of stakeholders forms interest groups to promote its preferences 
                                                 
5 In this regard, Blair (1995, 1999) proposes the “entity” view of firm, according to which firm is set up as a separate legal 
entity under corporation law and fiduciary responsibilities are assigned to directors (or managers) to protect both shareholders 
and employees investments. She suggests that the corporate governance mechanisms should be developed based on this view 
of the firm.   
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and to fight over rules and regulations to protect their rights. The enforcement of these laws 
and regulations shapes corporate governance practices. Therefore, the authors argue that 
corporate governance is the result of political processes, which are shaped by policies and 
stakeholder preferences. This conflict of interest is settled through the interactions of political 
forces outside the firm. As a result of such interaction laws and regulations are adopted to 
protect all stakeholders‟ rights and define their responsibilities. In sum, Gourevitch and Shinn 
(2005) conclude that corporate governance is the product of policies, which in turn are the 
product of preferences of three important groups of stakeholders – owners, managers and 
employees. In other words, corporate governance is about power relations and responsibilities 
of the main stakeholder groups. 
2.2.2 International corporate governance systems and their effect on labour 
Different countries have different ownership and corporate governance systems, which 
substantially differentiate labour management practices around the world. On the basis of 
ownership and corporate governance patterns, economies are divided into two major groups: 
outsider (market based) versus insider (bank based) systems (in the financial economics 
literature) or „LMEs‟ versus „CMEs‟ (in the political economy literature) (Franks and Mayer, 
1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001)
6
. In outsider systems/LMEs equity ownership is dispersed 
among many investors, but minority investor protection laws and their enforcement are strong. 
At the same time, in these economies employment protection laws are weak and labour‟s role 
in governance is limited. Given that owners are dispersed, and employees are weak, managers 
become more powerful (Franks and Mayer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). Consequently, in 
these economies, corporate governance practices include strong laws on protecting minority 
investors and the enforcement of such laws is considered to be high priority. In contrast, in the 
insider systems/CMEs governance is negotiated with other stakeholders, such as the state, 
employees, creditors and others. In these economies, ownership is concentrated in the hands of 
blockholders, who closely monitor management behaviour. At the same time, employment 
protection laws are strong and labour has board representatives
7
.  
                                                 
6 In the political economy (or varieties of capitalism) literature LMEs include the US and UK, while CMEs include Germany 
and Japan as representative countries.  
7 Some commentators point out that two polar systems do not cover all corporate governance systems worldwide. At the same 
time recent developments in the LMEs, such as relationship-based investment and decline in capital market liquidity give rise 
to other forms of corporate governance (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003). Growth of institutional ownership in the LMEs allows 
such investors to apply relationship-based governance.  
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What factors lead to cross-country differences in governance systems? There are several views 
on the origins of corporate governance differences around the world. La Porta et al. (1999) 
propose the legal origin effect (civil law versus common law), arguing that a high degree of 
minority investor protection in English common law countries created market-based systems, 
whereas in countries with a low degree of investor protection blockholder-based systems were 
favoured. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) argue that differences in the legal systems create 
differences in ownership structures, which in turn differentiate corporate governance practices 
around the world. However, other authors argue that it is difficult to establish causality 
between legal environments and corporate governance outcomes (Roe, 2003; Franks et al., 
2009). For example, Franks et al. (2009) argue that mergers and acquisitions based on 
informal relations between directors and shareholders, not investor protection, influenced 
ownership dispersion in the UK during the first half of the 20
th
 century. As an alternative to 
the legal origins explanation, Roe (2003) proposes a political environment explanation for the 
differences in ownership. He argues that two major corporate differences – the degree of 
separation of ownership from control and the degree of labour influence – play significant 
roles in differentiating corporate governance practices. Similarly, Gourevitch and Shinn 
(2005) propose a political intervention explanation for corporate governance development 
processes. These authors argue that political forces and the interaction of different parties 
played an important role in changing corporate governance systems around the world.     
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) explain the corporate governance patterns (ownership diffusion 
versus concentration) by the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions of 
the main stakeholders. The stakeholders may form coalitions and the „winning‟ coalition will 
be able to reflect their preferences in rules and regulations. For example, owners and managers 
may form a coalition against workers and if they win, this may lead to diffused ownership. 
Alternatively, if workers win, then this may lead to blockholding ownership. Managers and 
workers may form a coalition against owners which, whether they win and lose, may lead to 
blockholding ownership. Another possibility is that owners and workers may form a coalition 
against managers, where both winning and losing lead to a diffused ownership outcome. 
Therefore, changes in economic preferences and political institutions, which result from the 
changes in economic conditions, shape governance rules and regulations (Gourevitch and 
Shinn, 2005). 
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In LMEs, when labour is excluded from governance and employment protection is low, under 
strong market pressure managers may do what shareholders want. In particular, managers 
place the interests of shareholders above the interests of labour. Acting in the best interests of 
shareholders, managers may transfer risk onto labour during hard times, by laying off 
employees. Similarly, being under pressure to create short-term profit for shareholders, 
managers may avoid long-term human capital investments. In sum, under pressure to 
maximise shareholder value, managers may favour shareholders‟ interests over labours‟.   
In contrast, in CMEs the conflict of interest is triangular – it is among shareholders, employees 
and managers, although the role of employees differs across economies. In CMEs employees 
are powerful and can participate in decision-making at board level, being able to protect their 
rights in corporate restructuring
8
. Thus in LMEs labour may suffer from economic shocks, 
while in CMEs most of the losses may be incurred by capital. 
2.2.3 Labour management in liberal market economies 
Recent developments in LMEs are seen as the power shift from labour to shareholders and 
managers. Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000) discuss several reasons for this shift. From the 
1970s and 80s onwards the ideology of shareholder value maximisation began to become a 
prominent corporate governance principle. The main governance issue was how to urge 
managers to serve the best interests of shareholders. Agency theorists argued that it was not in 
managers‟ interest to act in the best interests of shareholders and the market was always better 
to push managers to act for shareholder value maximisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, agency theorists advocated an active MCC as an effective corporate governance 
institution that can efficiently allocate resources by replacing under-performing managers. 
Furthermore, as discussed by Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000), the rise of institutional 
investors and deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s in the US also contributed 
to the development of the MCC. Due to the „free rider‟ problem, widely dispersed 
shareholders are more inclined to discipline underperforming management through an „exit‟ 
strategy, which could lead to the replacement of an inefficient management team. Under a 
                                                 
8 In Germany employees sit on the boards, while in Japan the employees‟ voice is significant in firm-level decision-making.  
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strong MCC managers had to adopt a „downsize and distribute‟ strategy to create value for 
shareholders at the expense of labour
 9
.  
One of the main characteristics of LMEs is that they have active capital markets with a large 
number of publicly listed companies, where ownership is widely dispersed among investors. 
Liquidity in these capital markets allows shareholders to discipline poorly performing 
managers through the „exit‟ mechanism, rather than the „voice‟. Such capital markets allocate 
resources efficiently, expanding investment, production and employment. However, efficient 
re-allocation also means that inefficient firms are closed, resulting in job losses. Pagano and 
Volpin (2008) also stress the dual effect of finance on labour in LMEs. First, financial markets 
efficiently reallocate resources, which cause production and employment expansion in 
efficient companies, but also shutting down and restructuring in inefficient companies. This 
latter effect may create employment risk.  
Gospel and Pendleton (2003) point out that there are three main conditions that facilitate a 
negative effect of takeovers on labour in LMEs: (1) the relative weakness of statutory 
employment protection rules, (2) required post-merger rationalisations and (3) the absence of 
labour from corporate governance. As a result of these three conditions employees may not be 
able to protect themselves.  
Gospel and Pendleton (2003) discuss various ways that finance can influence labour 
management in different systems. For example, in LMEs the rise of the shareholder value 
maximisation ideology has increased the pressure on managers to place shareholder interests 
above those of labour, as weak statutory employee protection rules allow this. Similarly, in 
LMEs the corporate governance mechanisms (for instance, takeover threat) encourage 
managers to pursue short-term returns rather than long-term objectives through limited R&D 
and human capital investments. Accordingly, managers undertake those business strategies 
that provide short-term financial returns, rather than broader objectives, such as increase in 
market share. Furthermore, firms are more likely to adopt financial measures to assess the 
performance of business units, resulting in a disconnection in the decision-making process 
                                                 
9 Under the “downsize and distribute” strategy managers cut labour forces to provide a higher return for shareholder equity. 
Thus the primary role of downsizing is to create shareholder value. However, empirical evidence on the reasons for 
downsizing and its consequences are limited: whether managers undertake downsizing to stop performance deterioration 
(which may be essential for firm survival and for the welfare of labour) or to further improve returns, even if it is not required 
for firm survival. 
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between senior management and production or service delivery units. Finally, employee 
commitment is achieved through market-based systems, such as stock options and employee 
share ownership plans. All these suggest that in LMEs labour management is less favourable 
and managerial actions will be driven by the dictates of the market.  
However, within LMEs the power relations between managers, shareholders and workers are 
not as simple as predicted by the market model. Gospel and Pendleton (2003) present „the 
managerial discretion model‟, which shows that „managers can be active participants in 
governance systems rather than just passive victims or agents of shareholders and other 
claimants‟. Gospel and Pendleton (2003) argue the available evidence is not clearly consistent 
with the predictions of the market model and in fact labour management is less deterministic 
than suggested by the prior literature. In particular, due to recent developments governance 
systems differ from the market model. Such developments include a growing concentration of 
ownership and the adoption of a relational form of governance by institutional investors. 
When ownership is widely dispersed, small investors bear the full costs of management 
disciplining actions, but secure only some of the benefits of such actions. Therefore, in this 
case „exit‟ may be their preferred option. However, when institutional investors have more 
concentrated ownership (but not large blockholdings), they may use more relational forms of 
governance rather than a market-based form of governance, as the latter may be costly. These 
give managers a greater degree of „strategic choice‟ vis-à-vis shareholders and managers use 
this autonomy to determine their labour management strategies. As a result managers become 
active participants in the corporate governance, not passive victims of shareholders. Gospel 
and Pendleton (2005) also conclude that „firms may determine their labour strategies and seek 
investor support for them‟. Similarly, Armour et al. (2003) argue that although core corporate 
governance practices (such as takeovers, board structure and directors‟ duties) are shareholder 
value oriented, there are other non-core governance rules (such as insolvency and employment 
law) that enable other stakeholders to express their voice. In addition to this, the raise of 
institutional investors has allowed managers to adopt long-term investment strategies rather 
than opt short-term returns. Therefore, Armour et al. (2003) also suggest that „the shareholder 
value model is less deeply rooted than is generally supposed‟.  
Reviewing prior literature, Pendleton (2009) concludes that although there is some support for 
the liberal market model predictions (such as shorter job tenure, higher levels of downsizing 
and more flexible employment) from comparative empirical results, these results are at best 
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„suggestive‟ due to data problems. At the same time, studies comparing labour management 
practices of listed and non-listed firms provide no evidence showing that markets pressure 
managers to institute „harsher‟ employment relations in public companies. In contrast, this 
review reveals that labour management is more „employee friendly‟ in public companies. 
Pendleton (2009) suggests that benefiting from relational monitoring and a greater autonomy 
from shareholders, managers exercise more friendly labour management practices. Managers 
may do so because they may seek a „quiet life‟. In addition, because public companies are 
required to be more transparent, managers prefer to take into consideration employees‟ 
interests in making corporate decisions.      
2.2.4 Summary and the research issue of the thesis 
On the basis of above discussion, it can be concluded that corporate governance is about 
power relations between three groups of stakeholders – shareholders, managers and 
employees. It has been suggested that in LMEs, where shareholder-oriented corporate 
governance systems prevail, the balance of power has shifted towards shareholders (Lazonick 
and O'Sullivan, 2000) and towards managers (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003). This power shit 
makes labour vulnerable to various risks. In particular, the development of the MCC gives 
some power to shareholders to shift risks onto labour during critical times and redistribute 
wealth in a way favourable to them. Therefore Pendleton (2009) suggests that understanding 
the extent of the influence of these occasional, but powerful, events – takeovers – on 
management decision-making is the key to understanding the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance systems in LMEs.   
In this regard, the employment effects of takeovers have attracted much interest during the last 
decade. However, the research on the influence of the market model of corporate governance 
on labour management decision-making has not reached a conclusive point (Armour et al., 
2003). To contribute to this literature, this thesis examines the following general question:  
What are the effects of mergers and acquisitions on labour? 
To answer this general question, in the next chapter we develop some specific research 
questions that can be empirically investigated. For this purpose, first we review the literature 
on corporate takeovers and their employment effect in the remaining part of this chapter.  
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2.3 Theories of corporate takeovers 
2.3.1 The Market for Corporate Control  
The MCC is defined as competition among different management teams to gain control of 
shareholders‟ assets (Manne, 1965; Fama, 1980). In this market one management team, an 
outside raider, believing that it can manage the assets more efficiently, makes an offer to the 
shareholders of the target firm, whose assets are not being deployed to their best use. The 
event of transferring ownership and corporate control to this outside management team is 
known as a corporate takeover. Takeover transactions can be implemented in different ways, 
including mergers, acquisitions, management buyouts, management buy-ins and divestures
10
. 
In practice business combination transactions can take place in a number of forms, but the two 
most used ones are mergers and acquisitions through tender offers
11
. Mergers are usually 
negotiated between the two companies‟ managements and submitted for shareholders‟ 
approval. Tender offers are made directly to the shareholders at a specified price and do not 
require the agreement of the target company‟s board of directors, sometimes resulting in the 
replacement of its incumbent management.  
Tender offers can be made in two forms: (1) friendly tender offers, which are negotiated and 
agreed by the management of two merging companies and where the target management 
recommends acceptance of the offer; and (2) hostile tender offers, in which case there will not 
be any prior negotiations between the incumbent and outsiders, and the incumbent 
management will initially advise the target shareholders to reject the bidding firm‟s offer.  
If the management of the target firm does not agree with the acquirer‟s offer, the acquirer may 
make a direct tender offer to the shareholders of the target firm, in which case the takeover 
becomes „hostile‟. As the degree of hostility differs from deal to deal, the definitions of hostile 
                                                 
10 Other forms of corporate takeover are proxy fights, internal management buy-outs (MBOs) or external management buy-in 
(MBIs), leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), private equity takeovers, spin offs, sell-offs, private equity funded acquisitions and 
divestures. 
11 In mergers two companies combine their businesses to create a new business entity. In an acquisition one firm acquires 
another, resulting in the disappearance of the latter. However, closer examination of mergers reveals that, as in the case of 
acquisitions, one firm dominates another and one management team quits the combined business, meaning that one firm takes 
over another firm. Therefore, the academic literature tends to use the terms “mergers and acquisitions” and “takeovers” 
interchangeably. This thesis uses the term “takeover” to include both mergers and acquisitions. Similarly, the terms “target” 
and “bidder” mean “acquired” and “acquiring” firms, respectively.  
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takeovers differ for different commentators
12
. Generally accepted definitions of hostile and 
friendly acquisitions are as follows: a hostile (contested or solicited) bid is a bid not 
recommended by the management of the target firm on first approach by the bidder, whereas a 
friendly (uncontested, unsolicited) bid is accepted by management on first approach by the 
bidder. 
2.3.2 The value-creation theory of takeovers 
It is suggested that takeovers create value through two major sources of gains: (1) performance 
improvement through economies of scale and economies of scope (synergy); (2) performance 
improvement through replacing under-performing target management and re-allocation of 
corporate assets to more efficient users (management disciplining). 
The synergistic efficiency motive supporters state that economic gains from takeovers come 
from rationalisation of production processes as a result of combining the resources and 
operations of two companies. In particular, efficiency may come from economies of scale and 
economies of scope or diffusion of know-how. When production can achieve increasing 
returns to scale, then there are economies of scale, which could be achieved by reducing cost 
per unit, either by increasing production or reducing the input. Economies of scope are cost 
savings that arise when a firm produces two or more outputs using the same set of resources. 
In addition, it may come from rationalisation in the form of optimal utilization of assets, such 
as unique production lines or plants. Rationalisation of production occurs when cost savings 
are achieved through reallocating production across plants within merged firms. Also, when 
firms with different characteristics merge there may be diffusion of know-how across firms, 
related to production processes, management systems or R&D. Synergy may come from many 
different sources, including operational economies, managerial economies, financial or 
capital-raising economies, bulk buying or marketing economies, tax economies and so on.  
Rumelt (1974, 1982) shows that superior performance can be achieved by exploiting 
economies of scale through acquisition of businesses from related industries: firms that follow 
                                                 
12 Schwert (2000) reports that researchers use different measures to define “hostility” in takeovers. For example, the Wall 
Street Journal and Dow Jones News describe an offer as hostile when the initial bid is rejected by the target management. The 
Securities Data Company describes an offer as hostile when the target firm resists an unsolicited offer. The second definition 
is when the initial or winning bid is unsolicited. The third definition of hostility is based on whether the target is in play 
(someone has filled in a stock exchange form declaring their intention to acquire control of the firms) or the subject of a 
takeover rumour reported by the media. The author reports that although there is some positive correlation among these 
measures, the degree of correlation is not especially high. Based on empirical analysis Schwert (2000) concludes that most 
hostile deals are not distinguishable from friendly deals. 
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the strategy of diversifying into related industries achieve the highest levels of profitability, 
while the firms that follow the strategy of diversifying into unrelated industries achieve the 
lowest profitability levels. In other cases, merged companies may maximize their tax savings.  
The management disciplining motive supporters state that takeovers create value by 
disciplining under-performing management through continuous takeover threat or by replacing 
it with another management team, who employ the assets more efficiently (Manne, 1965). 
Fama (1980) argues that even though primary management disciplining comes from the 
managerial labour market (both within and outside the firm), the MCC provides the last resort 
of management disciplining. In this regard, it is generally believed that takeovers take place 
when other internal and external management monitoring devices are not as effective as 
expected and when there is still an opportunity to improve management efficiency 
(Scharfstein, 1988).  
According to Manne (1965) the MCC provides a valuable asset – improved managerial 
efficiency – that is separate from economies of scale and market monopoly power. The MCC 
provides two distinct disciplinary roles: actual replacement of under-performing management 
and providing continuous threat of replacement. Scharfstein (1988) argues that the MCC plays 
an important disciplinary role by correctly identifying the reasons for declining shareholder 
value. This is especially important when ownership and control are separated and shareholders 
are widely dispersed. The MCC provides dispersed shareholders with the power to protect 
their investments by enabling them to express their opinion with an „exit‟ voice. When internal 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, executive compensation or 
shareholders‟ activism are not sufficient to align managers‟ interests with shareholders‟ 
interests, the MCC provides an external governance to solve the agency problems. In this 
context, the literature indicates the MCC as a last resort to discipline badly performing 
management whose actions diminish shareholders‟ wealth. 
As there is a high positive correlation between a firm‟s market value and its management 
performance, relative share price decline provides information about the under-performance of 
the management team, creating a necessary condition for the replacing of this team. In this 
way, stock markets perform an asset pricing function and re-allocate existing assets to their 
most profitable users through corporate takeovers (Singh, 1971). 
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In addition to replacing under-performing management, the MCC provides a takeover threat, 
which encourages management to concentrate on maximising shareholder value. By providing 
a continuous takeover threat, the MCC forces managers to focus on efficiency enhancement. 
Under a strong MCC, under-performing firms become subject to corporate control auctions. 
Even if a firm‟s performance is not bad, as long as it is not as efficient as it should be its 
managers are under threat of losing their jobs (Franks and Mayer, 1996). In this regard, the 
MCC is seen as a necessary institution of the market economy that provides the required 
corporate sector restructuring to improve efficiency. As a result of these two important 
functions of the MCC – actual replacement and continuous takeover threat – shareholders‟ 
assets are employed by the most efficient users, thereby enhancing overall economic growth.  
Grossman and Hart (1980) state that at the time of contract design both shareholders and 
managers are symmetrically informed. However, changes in the business environment over 
time give rise to asymmetric information: managers become better informed than shareholders 
about the overall business prospects. In this new environment better-informed managers may 
not employ the required level of managerial effort that satisfies shareholders‟ interests. In this 
case a potential acquirer observes the new environment and, using the takeover mechanism, 
proposes a new contract to the shareholders, thereby improving efficiency in the deployment 
of the shareholders‟ assets. 
Scharfstein (1988) argues that asymmetric information between shareholders and managers is 
the main source of contractual inefficiency. To explore the role of asymmetric information in 
takeover operations, he distinguishes two causes of the target firms‟ low market value: (a) 
management inefficiency; and (b) an unfavourable business environment. As uninformed 
shareholders are unable to make a distinction between these factors, managers are not 
penalized even though low market value is due to their inefficient performance. This creates 
incentives for informed managers not to spend the required management effort even if the 
business environment is favourable and they may derive private benefits using the inability of 
the shareholders to distinguish the true reasons for the low market value of their assets. This 
creates a necessary condition for a takeover – a rival management team, being informed about 
the firm‟s business environment, may propose to the shareholders a better contract that 
mitigates the observed inefficiency. In this case takeover occurs, because the informed 
potential acquirer values the shares at a higher price than uninformed shareholders agree to 
tender. In contrast, when the state of the world is unfavourable, takeovers do not take place, 
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because informed potential acquirers do not value the target‟s shares at a higher price than 
their contemporaneous market value.  
Scharfstein (1988) points out that only under these circumstances:  
“the takeover mechanism provides a means of penalizing the manager 
precisely when he should be penalized – when firm value is low because the 
manager shirked and not because the environment was unfavourable. 
Takeovers are beneficial because they make compensation depend not just 
on managerial performance, but also on the privately observed state of the 
world”.  
Therefore Scharfstein (1988) argues that if shareholders are also able to observe the state of 
world relative to their investment, then takeovers have no disciplining role, because the 
shareholders are aware of the true reasons for the low market value. In this case they expect 
high market value for their shares under the acquiring firm‟s management. Anticipating share 
price rises, target firm shareholders do not tender their shares, which leads to a „free-rider‟ 
problem.  
A fundamental requirement for a firm to be taken over is that its market value should be lower 
than its true market value. Gort (1969) proposed a neo-classical theory of target asset under-
valuation, which suggests that takeovers occur when there are discrepancies in valuation of 
assets by owners and outsiders. These discrepancies in valuation determine variations in 
merger rates both among industries and over time. According to Gort (1969) these valuation 
discrepancies arise due to (1) differences in expectations about future income stream and (2) 
differences in the risks. Economic disturbances such as rapid changes in technology and 
movements in security prices generate high variances in valuations by making the future less 
predictable, because information about the past becomes less useful in estimating the expected 
income stream and related risk. High variances in valuation raise the likelihood that some 
outsiders will value assets higher than do the owners who control these assets and in these 
periods many takeovers occur. The author explains that rapid technological changes contribute 
to high valuation discrepancies because it is difficult to predict demand volume for new 
products and production cost (as it depends on the production volume) from past experience. 
Similarly, rapid changes in share prices also make it difficult to value the shares correctly and, 
therefore, valuation discrepancies increase. Harford (2005) also supports the view that 
industry shocks lead to efficient re-allocation of assets through takeovers. But in order to 
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facilitate economic expansion after industry shocks there should be sufficient capital liquidity 
and fewer financing constraints to reduce transaction costs.  
In sum, supporters of the active MCC conclude that the existence of an informed outside 
raider leads to greater management efficiency by exerting a continuous takeover threat. 
Furthermore, within the MCC, acquirers choose precisely those targets where the performance 
of firms is bad because of under-performing managers, not because of unfavourable business 
conditions (Manne, 1965; Scharfstein, 1988). When product markets and input markets fail, 
the MCC corrects the consequences of this failure (Marris, 1964). Therefore takeovers are 
regarded as efficient and a mutually beneficial exchange of ownership and control.  
2.3.3 Empirical evidence on the value-creation theory of takeovers 
According to the value-creation theory of takeovers, acquirers choose those targets where 
asset management is inefficient or those companies where synergy will be created by merging 
two businesses. Therefore, it is expected that firm performance will improve post-merger. In 
this regard, the related empirical research analyses the pre- and post-takeover operating and 
stock price performance as well as management turnover to assess the effectiveness of the 
MCC.  
Summarising early empirical work, Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that takeovers generate 
value for shareholders, but this value does not come from market power. Therefore, takeovers 
are considered as positive net present value projects, which justify paying large premiums to 
target shareholders (Jensen, 1988). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) show that in 75% of 
takeovers there is a positive correlation between target firm gain and total gains, suggesting 
that in these takeovers synergy was the main motive. Andrade et al. (2001) also support the 
idea that the target gains to shareholders accurately reflect real economic improvements in the 
form of improved cash flows resulting from effective use of assets after takeovers and 
conclude that takeovers facilitate an economically beneficial transfer of assets. Similarly, 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) conclude that the MCC facilitates redeployment of assets 
from low productivity firms to high productivity firms, meaning that well-managed firms 
acquire badly-managed firms. In sum, a growing number of authors conclude that 
synergy/efficiency gains motivate takeovers and mergers can be considered as an efficient 
means of reallocating resources within the economy, creating value for all stakeholders 
(Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Weston et al., 2004). 
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However, there is no clear cut evidence on whether synergy or management disciplining is the 
main source of takeover gains. Bhide (1989) concludes that in friendly takeovers „synergy‟ 
and „portfolio management‟ were the major motives of acquirers, while in hostile takeovers 
gains come from selling the businesses of which target companies are constituted. 
To prove the management disciplining role of corporate takeovers two conditions should be 
met: targets should be under-performers and their management should be removed during the 
post-takeover period. Evidence on target firm under-performance is mixed. Industrial 
economics scholars Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) show 
that acquirers target better performing firms and their performance gets further improved after 
ownership change, suggesting that there are synergetic gains arising as a result of merging 
target and acquiring firm businesses
13
. Therefore, these authors cast doubt on the management 
disciplining role of corporate takeovers. 
Similarly, financial economics studies do not provide much evidence on targets‟ under-
performance. Using both operating and stock return performance measures, Agrawal and Jaffe 
(2003) find little evidence that targets were under-performing before acquisitions. Franks and 
Mayer (1996) examine the prior performance of takeover targets using four different measures 
(share price, dividend changes, cash flow rates and Tobin‟s Q). Comparing the long-run pre-
takeover performance of successful and unsuccessful hostile takeovers, friendly mergers and 
two non-merging matched firm samples, this study finds no difference in the performance of 
these samples for all performance measures. Only Tobin‟s Q indicates relative (but not 
absolute) poor performance for hostile takeover targets. On the basis of these findings the 
authors conclude that the targets of the hostile takeovers were not poorly performing firms and 
their performance was not distinguishable form the performance of the friendly takeover 
targets. In this connection some researchers conclude that the main motive of hostile takeovers 
is the corporate strategy of acquiring companies to achieve economies of scale, not creating 
value through correction of managerial failure (Franks and Mayer, 1996). Acquirers may want 
to expand into new markets or they may expect to gain economies of scale by improving the 
performance up to optimal level, even though financial failure has not occurred in the past. On 
the basis of these results Franks and Mayer (1996) conclude that hostile takeovers do not 
                                                 
13 In industrial economics performance is usually measured by labour productivity. 
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perform disciplinary functions. Instead, the authors conclude that hostile takeovers arise as 
targets reject bids to oppose the redeployment of assets or to negotiate over the terms of bids
14
. 
Consistent with this, Schwert (2000) argues that target firm managers reject takeover offers 
(i.e. make takeover offers hostile) in order to get improved bid premiums (bargaining 
hypothesis) and to avoid being taken over (management entrenchment hypothesis). Pre- and 
post-bid share prices and accounting indicators of both bidding and target companies are used 
to determine the difference between hostile and friendly takeovers. Schwert (2000) finds that a 
target‟s prior poor performance, measured by low Market/Book ratio and Return on Equity, do 
not explain the occurrence of hostile takeovers. 
On the other hand, the existing empirical evidence shows high management turnover after 
takeovers. In particular, CEO resignation after hostile takeovers is significantly higher than the 
CEO resignation rate after friendly takeovers (Bhide, 1989; Franks and Mayer, 1996; Kini et 
al., 2004). Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that most post-merger job losses are mainly in 
central offices, involving senior level managers. Martin and McConnell (1991) report that 
after takeovers target firm top management turnover is nearly four times higher than the 
average annual turnover rate during the 5-year period preceding the tender offer. When the full 
sample is divided into disciplinary (where target management is removed) and non-
disciplinary (where target management is not removed) takeovers, the results show significant 
pre-takeover under-performance for the disciplinary takeover targets in comparison to the 
targets of non-disciplinary takeovers as well as in comparison to average industry firms. The 
authors interpret these results to be consistent with the view that the MCC plays an important 
role in disciplining top corporate managers.  
In addition to actual removal of inefficient management, the MCC disciplines managers 
through continuous takeover threat. Only a few studies investigate the effectiveness of this 
disciplinary role of the MCC. Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) report that after adoption of 
anti-takeover legislation uncontrolled managers raise wages by 1-2%. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) provide further evidence showing that when takeover threat declines 
managers increase wages to workers and the wage increase is higher for white-collar workers. 
                                                 
14 Specifically, Franks and Mayer (1996) argue that hostility in takeovers arise due to disagreement over the offered price and 
restructuring plans of the acquiring company, which better understands the business opportunities for superior future 
performance. 
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At the same time, managers do not destroy old plants and do not create new plants, leading to 
overall productivity and profitability decline. In other words, when takeover threats are 
reduced managers start enjoying a „quiet life‟, forming coalitions with workers against 
shareholders. Thus, an outside takeover threat helps to restrain managerial self-entrenchment.   
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) show that under-performing firms become takeover targets. 
They argue that low productivity indicates a poor match between a plant and its current owner 
and, therefore, it induces ownership change. Using probit regression analysis, these authors 
find that low levels of initial productivity are associated with the high probability of 
subsequent ownership change. In other words, the performance of acquired plants continued in 
deterioration during the pre-takeover period. In contrast, during the post-takeover period, 
plants changing ownership achieve 0.5% higher productivity growth relative to plants that do 
not change ownership. Therefore, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) conclude that „ownership 
change or asset redeployment is an important mechanism for correcting lapses from 
efficiency…‟ and support the argument that the main motive of mergers is to correct 
managerial failure
15
. In contrast, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) argue that „the motive for 
ownership change is not simply lapses from efficiency‟, but that the existence of synergies 
between combining businesses and related efficiencies triggers takeovers. Their results show 
that ownership changing plants were plants whose performance was above average (except in 
the case of the largest firms) and they experience further productivity improvement after 
acquisitions. This is consistent with the findings of Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), who 
conclude that acquired plants were highly profitable before acquisitions and experience no 
improvement after acquisition. Although these authors support the notion that mergers 
generate productivity gains, they reject the management disciplining theory. Using a sample of 
bank mergers Haynes and Thompson (1999b) conclude that within the MCC „less efficient 
firms are acquired and reorganised‟, as firms experience significant productivity gains 
following acquisitions.         
In sum, prior research suggests that takeovers occur to create value for shareholders (Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983). However, views on the sources of takeover gains diverge: synergy through 
economies of scale and scope and management disciplining have been suggested as the main 
                                                 
15 Using a large sample of UK management buy-outs, Harris et al (2005) also find that ownership changing plants were less 
productive in comparison to other no-ownership changing plants and experience significant productivity improvement under 
new management.  
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sources of takeover gains. Some authors conclude that takeovers are not motivated by 
disciplinary concerns, arguing that hostile takeover targets are not poorly performing firms but 
remove the incumbent management regardless of performance level (Franks and Mayer, 
1997). Therefore, these authors argue that the disciplinary role of hostile takeovers is weak. 
Other researchers argue that the MCC enables effective re-deployment of assets. However, in 
spite of this, the MCC may still provide a disciplinary role, as in this market, assets are 
transferred to their most efficient users and managers are kept under continuous takeover 
threat. 
2.3.4 The value-destruction theory of takeovers 
Another strand of literature argues that takeovers occur as a result of managerial objectives to 
achieve private benefits from controlling corporate assets. In particular, takeovers may be 
undertaken by empire-building managers (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Mueller, 1969) or 
over-confident managers (Roll, 1986). It is believed that such takeovers do not create value, 
but destroy acquiring firm shareholders‟ wealth. In value-destruction takeovers managers may 
pay more than the true value of targets because of two main factors. In the first case managers 
knowingly overpay as a result of agency problems between managers and shareholders: 
managers want to use shareholders‟ assets to derive private benefits, for example to secure 
their jobs by enlarging the firm through diversification. In the second case managers 
unintentionally overpay as a result of over-optimism: they systematically overestimate merger-
related synergies and their own ability to generate returns. Also cultural clashes between 
merging firms may cause inefficiencies and preclude the realisation of synergies (Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh, 1988; Weber, 1996). 
 The ‘managerial entrenchment’ hypothesis  
The literature has long argued that managers pursue firm growth maximisation objectives, 
rather than shareholder value maximization objectives (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Mueller, 
1969). When control is separated from ownership and owners are widely dispersed, takeovers 
may be motivated by managerial objectives or agency problems between acquiring firm 
shareholders and managers, in the manner suggested by Berle and Means (1932). If 
governance mechanisms are weak, unmonitored managers may use shareholders‟ assets for 
their own welfare by accelerating firm growth, even though returns on the investments are low 
in comparison to opportunity cost of capital. In this way acquiring firm managers may want to 
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use shareholder assets to derive private benefits, such as to build „corporate empires‟ and to 
protect themselves from being taken over by other companies. They may have preferences for 
accelerated firm growth, power, leisure, prestige and executive compensation.  
Jensen (1986) proposes the free cash flow hypothesis of takeovers, suggesting that 
unmonitored managers use free cash flow for „corporate empire‟ building rather than returning 
such extra funds to shareholders. The availability of large unused free cash flow in a company 
creates the most serious conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when it is used 
to fund acquisitions. As the payment of cash to shareholders reduces the recourses controlled 
by the managers (as well as compensation and promotion opportunities), they prefer to invest 
the free cash flow even in projects with negative net present value. Thus, some value-
destroying mergers may occur due to agency problems in the acquiring firms. 
Furthermore, managerial self-entrenchment objectives may create takeover gains for target 
shareholders in the form of overpayment, thereby facilitating wealth transfer from acquirer 
shareholders to target shareholders. If this is the case, we should observe wealth transfer from 
bidder shareholders to target shareholders, supported with evidence of significant positive 
abnormal returns for targets and negative abnormal returns for bidders, assuming that the 
financial markets are efficient. However, there is no empirical evidence supporting this claim. 
The ‘managerial hubris’ hypothesis  
In addition to the above, acquiring firm managers may destroy shareholder value by 
overpaying to target firms as a result of managerial over-confidence and over-optimism
16
. Roll 
(1986) proposes the „hubris‟ hypothesis of takeovers, suggesting that self-confident managers 
over-estimate the expected synergies and their ability to manage the combined businesses and, 
therefore, make systematic valuation errors in their decision-making. According to Roll 
(1986), the market prices of targets should represent their true prices and any offer above this 
price should be considered as a valuation error. He argues that even though an average market 
price reflects rational behaviour, in fact markets are populated by instances of irrational 
individual behaviour. Irrational individuals may make valuation errors that cancel out in the 
aggregate. Further he suggests that takeovers reflect decisions made by individuals, who 
                                                 
16 In contrast to the “managerial entrenchment” hypothesis, the “managerial hubris” hypothesis predicts that acquirers may 
overpay unintentionally as a result of over-optimism: they systematically overestimate their gains from expected synergies 
and efficient management.   
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presume that their valuations are correct. Roll (1986) terms such bidders „hubris-infected‟ 
bidders, who may make valuation errors, paying too much for their targets
17
. Therefore, the 
premium is regarded as a mistake made by bidders
18
.  
As takeover is an open auction process, where other firms may also bid for the target, the 
bidder with the most optimistic valuation wins in this process. However, because of the 
„winner‟s curse‟ problem, the winner of this process turns out to be the loser, as a result of 
overpayment for the auctioned object. Therefore, Roll (1986) argues that the MCC reflects the 
„winner‟s curse‟: the bidder with the highest expectations wins the bid, but the payment is on 
average higher than the true value of the target.  
As a result of „hubris‟ acquiring firm managers make mistakes in evaluating the expected 
gains from synergies and more efficient management of combined businesses. However, due 
to information asymmetries it may be difficult to estimate such gains correctly. Furthermore, it 
may be difficult to predict problems arising as a result of strategic or organizational mis-match 
and poor post-takeover integration. Therefore acquirers, who believe that they are buying 
undervalued assets, may be systematically wrong, as efficient markets value assets correctly, 
incorporating all publicly available information.  
Roll (1986) argues that like other markets, labour markets are efficient and therefore managers 
are employed in their best operational positions, meaning that target firm management 
replacement should not create value. Similarly, it may be argued that both target and acquiring 
firms employ an optimal level of workers immediately before takeovers. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that takeovers undertaken by hubris-infected managers may negatively 
affect employment, as they need to provide higher returns to cover overpayments. In contrast, 
takeovers motivated by management entrenchment objectives may not alter employment and 
wages, as such managers may not need to cut costs to create shareholder value.  
                                                 
17 Hayward and Hambrick (1997) cites that hubris is defined as “exaggerated pride or self-confidence, often resulting in 
retribution”. 
18 Takeover premium is defined as the difference between takeover offer (bid) and market value immediately before the 
takeover announcement.  
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2.3.5 Empirical evidence on the value-destruction theory of takeovers  
As discussed, „empire building‟ or over-optimistic managers take decisions that may transfer 
wealth from acquirers to targets and thereby destroy shareholder value. Such managers 
overpay when internal corporate governance mechanisms are weak. Therefore, prior research 
analyses the relationship between takeover premium and acquirers‟ corporate governance 
characteristics, such as board size and composition, ownership, Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) - Chairman duality and large shareholdings.  
Analysing short-run market reaction to different types of acquisitions Morck et al.(1990) 
conclude that managerial objectives drive value-destruction acquisitions. Their results show 
that unrelated acquisitions, buying growing firms and under-performing targets, produce 
negative abnormal share price returns for acquirers. Mueller and Sirower (2003) find 
considerable support for the managerial entrenchment and/or hubris hypotheses, based on 
short-term market reaction to a takeover announcement. 
According to the „hubris‟ hypothesis overpayment occurs as a result of managerial self-
confidence and overestimation, even when there are no takeover gains. Thus, higher 
managerial hubris should lead to higher overpayment. As there is no direct measure of CEO 
hubris, different studies use different indirect measures of overconfidence
19
. Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) test the direct association between CEO hubris and overpayment, measuring 
hubris by recent firm performance, recent media praise for CEOs and CEOs‟ own perceptions 
of their self-importance. They find a strong association between CEO hubris and size of 
premium. Also, the results indicate that the greater the CEO hubris and size of premium, the 
greater the shareholder losses. Therefore, the authors argue that takeover premiums reflect an 
overvaluation error.  
Seyhun (1990) and Billett and Qian (2005) analyse private stock trading around the time of 
takeover announcements by acquiring firm managers using their personal accounts. As their 
evidence does not show that managers knowingly overpay, they reject „the managerial 
entrenchment‟ hypothesis. Consistent with the „hubris‟ hypothesis, Billett and Qian‟s (2005) 
                                                 
19 Hayward and Hambrick (1997) use recent firm performance, media praise for the CEOs and CEOs‟ own opinion of their 
self-importance, while Malmendier and Tate (2008) also use media characterisation of CEOs as “confident” or “optimistic”. 
In addition, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) use CEOs‟ personal over-investment in their own companies, measured by 
executive stock options exercise dates: optimistic managers hold their incentive stock options longer, expecting better 
performance of their companies. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) measure over-confidence with high order acquisition deals and 
insider trading.  
40 
results show that acquiring firm managers become more confident after successful acquisitions 
and therefore they tend to undertake more new acquisitions. However, over-confident 
managers will do worse in their subsequent acquisitions. The evidence shows that first deals 
result in insignificant negative abnormal earnings (-0.10%), but second and further deals 
provide negative abnormal earnings ranging from –1.21% to – 1.96%, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that over-confident managers overestimate returns to their 
investment projects and conclude that such behaviour leads to corporate investment 
distortions. In the mergers and acquisitions context this implies that over-confident managers 
systematically overestimate their managing capabilities and merger-related synergies. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) report that over-confident managers make significantly more 
acquisitions than non-over-confident CEOs, but the acquisitions made by over-confident 
CEOs produce significantly more negative market reactions than the acquisitions made by 
non-over-confident CEOs. The findings of Doukas and Petmezas (2007) also support the 
„hubris‟ hypothesis predictions, showing that multiple acquirers generate lower announcement 
period abnormal returns in comparison to single acquirers
20
. Multiple bidders perform poorly 
and generate significantly lower wealth gains than single acquirers in the long run, suggesting 
that over-confident managers undertake value-destruction mergers. 
Girma et al. (2006) report that CEO pay is determined based on the increases in firms size, not 
on the basis of improvements in firm performance. In addition to size effect, merger event 
itself also increases CEOs remuneration by about 6-7% annually in the years following 
mergers. CEOs completing hostile takeovers may experience negative pay growth, as such 
takeovers involve assets divestments (Conyon et al., 2001), which decreases firms size. All 
these pay raises suggests that managers have important incentives to undertake mergers and 
acquisitions. However, their results also show that markets distinguish between the value-
creation and the value-destruction takeovers: in the latter case CEOs pay raise is significantly 
lower than the pay raise in the former case. This suggests that markets punish „empire 
building‟ managers.  
                                                 
20 Doukas and Petmezas (2007) define multiple acquirers as those firms acquiring five or more companies within a three-year 
period. 
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2.3.6 The value-redistribution theory of takeovers 
Takeovers could be undertaken to re-distribute wealth among different business stakeholders. 
This view was first put forward by Shleifer and Summers (1988), who informally introduced 
„the breach of trust‟ hypothesis to explain target shareholders‟ gains in hostile takeovers. 
According to this hypothesis a substantial part of the shareholder gains in hostile takeovers 
could come at the expense of other stakeholders, including employees
21
. As writing a 
complete long-term contract among all stakeholders of a corporation is costly, usually in 
practice such contracts are implicit and most of the relationships are based solely on trust. Ex-
ante such implicit contracts are valuable for both shareholders and other stakeholders, as they 
force business participants to make long-term capital investments. However, Shleifer and 
Summers (1988) argue that even though ex-ante these implicit contracts are beneficial to all 
parties, ex-post it may be beneficial for shareholders to breach these contracts by replacing 
incumbent management through hostile takeovers. Therefore, shareholders agree to sell assets 
to an outsider management team, capturing substantial gains from such transactions. Outsiders 
replace the incumbent management, who are responsible for carrying out long-term 
relationships with other stakeholders. The new management, who are not responsible for 
implicit long-term contracts made by their predecessors, may re-negotiate these implicit 
contracts, to cover the high premium paid to target shareholders. This may substantially 
reduce other stakeholders‟ wealth in the form of price negotiations or salary cuts. Thus, 
takeovers just facilitate redistribution of rents from other stakeholders to shareholders. 
Consequently, this hypothesis argues that even though the combined total gain for target and 
bidding firms increases as a result of successful takeovers, at least a part of this gain comes at 
the expense of other stakeholders. Thus, this hypothesis argues that the main source of 
takeover gains is wealth redistribution, not wealth creation
22
. 
Chemla (2005) predicts that even friendly mergers may involve a breach of trust between 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and therefore, the author suggests, the existence of a 
takeover threat reduces the ex-ante investments of other stakeholders. In particular, such 
                                                 
21 In the literature this hypothesis is known as the “breach of trust”, “wealth transfer” or “rent transfer” hypothesis. Therefore 
this thesis uses these terms interchangeably.  
22 A recently proposed new theory of takeovers – stock market mis-valuation theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) – suggests 
that relatively over-valued firms acquire relatively under-valued firms. This theory is the opposite of the “hubris” theory 
(Roll, 1986) in the sense that the market could be mis-valuing companies and managers rationally use this opportunity. Under 
this theory wealth is transferred from target firm shareholders to acquiring firm shareholders. Appendix 1 provides a brief 
discussion of this theory and related empirical evidence.   
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transactions may affect long-term labour relations. Later Hellwig (2000) and Pagano and 
Volpin (2005a) further reinforce the idea that managers and workers are natural allies against 
non-controlling shareholders and therefore they have incentives to make implicit contracts. 
When incumbent managers have a small stake, they prefer to pay high wages to workers and 
do not monitor their activities. The reason is that the cost of high wages is borne by non-
controlling shareholders, whereas the cost of monitoring is borne by managers: they have to 
forgo the private benefits of a „quiet life‟. In contrast, the outside raider or new management, 
who has a controlling stake, has incentives to cut wages as much as possible and step up 
monitoring to improve efficiency. It may be beneficial for the raiders to breach such implicit 
contracts with labour. Pagano and Volpin‟s (2005a) model predicts that takeovers that protect 
shareholders negatively affect employee welfare: after mergers wages decline. Therefore, 
employees may enter into an agreement with incumbent managers in order to restrict takeover 
activity and to balance shareholder protection and employee protection.  
In sum, the above theoretical models suggest takeovers cause ex-post redistribution of wealth 
by allowing owners to breach the implicit contracts with other stakeholders and thereby 
enabling them to capture the net present value of future expected extra-marginal wages. This 
may lead to the waste of workers‟ firm-specific human capital investments, as they may not be 
able to use then in other work relations. This is considered as ex-post inefficiency caused by 
takeovers. In addition to this, takeovers may also cause ex-ante inefficiencies: expecting 
breach of trust employees may not invest in the development of firm-specific capabilities.    
2.3.7 Empirical evidence on the value-redistribution theory of takeovers  
Most studies in the area of the value-redistribution theory of takeovers investigate the rent 
transfer from employees to shareholders
23
. Summarizing prior literature on rent transfer to 
shareholders from other stakeholders, such as tax authorities, bondholders and labour, Jarrell 
et al. (1988) state that after takeovers these stakeholders do not incur enormous losses that 
offset shareholder gains. Therefore, these authors reject the value-redistribution theory of 
takeovers and conclude that takeovers reflect economic restructuring of productive assets. 
Using accounting analysis Froud et al. (2000) argue that labour is the first causality in 
restructuring for shareholder value. As labour is the largest and easily controllable cost 
                                                 
23 Section 3.4.1 discusses in more detail the empirical literature on the “breach of trust” hypothesis.  
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component, its restructuring may contribute to achieving performance targets, when other 
growth opportunities are limited. These authors argue that especially horizontal mergers 
provide labour cost cutting opportunities, through the removal of duplicated functions and 
overlapping activities. However, they conclude that it is difficult to predict the outcome of 
such restructurings: the expected benefits for shareholders may not materialise and even if 
some workers suffer from such events, in the long run, such restructurings may benefit other 
workers. In sum, on the basis of accounting evidence on the labour effect of restructuring for 
shareholder value, Froud et al. (2000) argue that corporate restructuring that works for 
shareholders may work against labour, although the outcome depends on the macro context, as 
in many companies labour is the largest cost component that can be easily controlled. 
If takeovers facilitate wealth transfer from employees by reducing their number and wages, 
then there should a positive relationship between the changes in employee losses and takeover 
gains. To measure this relation, Rosett (1990) uses a simple ratio of union wealth change to 
shareholder wealth change. Union wealth change in target companies was measured as „the 
divergence of real wages from the level that would have prevailed without takeover‟, by 
comparing union contracts in the companies for the periods before and after takeover. The 
results of this study show that only 1-2% of shareholder gains are explained by the union 
wealth change during the 6 years after takeovers. In the hostile takeover sample, unions‟ 
wealth change increases to 3% of shareholders gain in the 6-year period (10% in an 18-year 
period). Rosett (1990) concludes that only a small fraction of shareholder premiums can be 
explained by union wage concessions and post-takeover wage concessions are not a source of 
shareholder gains. Similarly, Gokhale et al. (1995) report little evidence that takeovers are 
motivated by the expropriation of extra-marginal wages. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) argue that their empirical evidence may be consistent with the 
„breach of trust‟ argument, as takeovers completed through tender offers (hostile in nature) 
reduce labour demand more than mergers do. Amess and Wright (2007) show that in 
leveraged buyout transactions undertaken through management buying (where new 
management teams takes over control) employment and wage growth is lower than in 
management buyouts (where the incumbent management retains control). Such differential 
employment effects of control changes may be interpreted as an evidence consistent with the 
„breach of trust‟ argument.  
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However, in spite of significant decline in employment post-mergers, empirical researchers 
are inclined to conclude that the results are inconsistent with the „breach of trust‟ argument, as 
both profitability and wages rise following acquisitions (Conyon et al., 2001, 2002a, 2004; 
Margolis, 2006; Amess et al., 2008).  
In sum, although there is a large discursive literature suggesting that losses to labour (through 
layoffs, wage and other benefit cuts) generate all or most efficiency gains, the direct empirical 
evidence on the value-redistribution theory of takeovers is limited (Girma and Thompson, 
2007). However, the issue of wealth distribution from workers to shareholders is a key issue in 
understanding the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in LMEs. Therefore in the 
next section we discuss some predictions of the takeover theories on labour market outcome 
and summarise empirical evidence on the job and wage effects of takeovers.    
2.4 Labour market outcome predictions of the takeover theories and 
related empirical evidence 
2.4.1 Theoretical predictions on the employment effects of takeovers  
The previous discussion indicates that opinions on takeover motives are diverse. 
Consequently, it is difficult to predict takeovers‟ effect on firm performance in general and on 
jobs and wages in particular. Different takeover theories predict different labour market 
outcomes. However, none of these theories are generally accepted and consequently the 
impact of takeovers on jobs and wages is unpredictable.  
In general the MCC may provide two distinct effects on labour management. First, ex-ante 
takeover threats may reduce labour efficiency by discouraging workers from making long-
term firm-specific human capital investments. Being under takeover threat pressure managers 
may pursue short-term profits and limit long-term investments (such as staff training) that may 
be vital for the firm‟s competitiveness. Secondly, ex-post takeovers may actually lead to job 
losses or create uncertainties for workers regarding their job prospects. However, in the long 
run if takeovers lead to efficient use of assets, employees may share improved profits as a 
result of business expansion.  
The above literature suggests the value-creation takeovers are undertaken by profit 
maximising managers through synergies and management disciplining. Then the labour 
market outcome of such takeovers depends on complementarities of the merging businesses. 
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Synergetic takeovers should lead to workforce reductions, as merged firms need to adjust their 
labour input. Disciplinary takeovers should be followed by corporate turnaround, which may 
result in post-merger employee layoffs that are required to improve firm performance. In fact, 
hostility may have been aroused as a result of the incumbent‟s opposition to such 
restructurings, which may include corporate downsizing. However, in the long run such 
workforce adjustments should lead to long-term efficiency improvements, resulting in higher 
profitability and accelerated firm growth, which may create new jobs (Holmstrom, 1988). 
Consistent with this, Conyon et al. (2002a) suggest that short-run workforce reductions may, 
in the long run, prevent bigger job losses resulting from bankruptcy. 
The employment effect of value-destruction takeovers depends on managerial objectives. If 
managers undertake takeovers for „empire building‟ purposes, such takeovers may destroy 
jobs in the long run due to inefficient use of assets, although this type of takeover may not 
have a negative effect in the short run, as these managers are not interested in cost controls. 
Managers may overpay knowingly to pursue their own private benefits at the expense of non-
controlling shareholders‟ wealth (managerial self-entrenchment) and in this process they may 
make employees their allies (Hellwig, 2000; Pagano and Volpin, 2005a). Although empire-
building takeovers do not have a negative effect in the short run, they may destroy jobs in the 
long run. As empire-building managers are not interested in maximising shareholder value the 
company may eventually become bankrupt or may be taken over by another firm. Similarly, 
takeovers occurring due to agency problems as described by Jensen (1986) do not need to lead 
to workforce reductions in the short-run either. (Conyon et al., 2002a) suggest that such 
acquisitions may be undertaken in unrelated industries to diversify the firm and consequently 
may not involve any workforce reductions. However, the long-term employment effects of 
such takeovers are uncertain.  
Alternatively, takeovers undertaken by „over-optimistic‟ managers, who may overpay 
unintentionally as a result of over-estimation of expected synergies or their own managerial 
abilities, may lead to immediate job losses and slower wage growth, as they need to cover the 
high premiums paid to target shareholders (Sirower, 2000; Krishnan et al., 2007). After such 
takeovers managers are required to provide high returns to cover the high premium paid to 
target firm shareholders. One of the frequently cited sources of takeover gains is the cost 
savings to be achieved by merging two businesses. There are many options of cost savings, 
such as eliminating duplications, tax optimisation and so on. However, one of the easily 
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controllable cost variables is the employment cost – managers may at any time change the 
number of employees and their wages depending on labour demand (Froud et al., 2000). 
Finally, value-redistribution takeovers may negatively affect employment by leading to 
dismissal of employees and slowing down wage growth. Firms pay lower wages for younger 
employees, promising to pay higher wages when they are older. Employees agree to work 
harder during the early stages of their career, expecting higher wages than their marginal 
productivity during later stages of their career. They also expect pensions. It is desirable for 
the outsider to re-negotiate such implicit contracts by replacing the incumbent management in 
hostile takeovers. 
2.4.2 Theoretical predictions on the wage effects of takeovers 
The value-creation theory predicts that takeovers positively affect wage growth. If takeovers 
improve efficiency through synergy realisation or management disciplining, then this also 
should accelerate wage growth. Mergers may cause improvements in efficiency as a result of 
post-takeover operating performance rationalisation, elimination of duplicative activities and 
cost savings, which should increase firm profitability. Both decline in labour demand and 
increase in labour productivity may lead to a higher level of profitability per employee. For 
example, Conyon et al. (2004) suggest that post-merger labour usage efficiency causes change 
in firm profitability. In the long run employees may have a share in the higher profitability 
through faster wage growth and improved work conditions (Holmstrom, 1988).  
The value-destruction theory predicts that takeovers undertaken by „empire building‟ 
managers do not necessarily negatively affect wages in the short run, although in the long run 
employees may also suffer from inefficiencies brought about such takeovers. Even such 
takeovers may increase wages, as managers may want to create coalitions with employees 
against shareholders. In contrast to the above, takeovers undertaken by over-optimistic 
managers may lead to slower wage growth, in which case managers may want to cover high 
premiums as soon as possible.   
However, the value-redistribution theory predicts that takeovers lead to slower wage growth 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988). One of the main arguments of this theory is that takeovers 
create value by reneging on implicit contracts promising to pay higher wages to workers at 
later stages of their career and encouraging them to invest in firm-specific human capital. 
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Ownership change may facilitate the firing of older workers, whose wages exceed their 
marginal product, and hire young workers who are underpaid.  
Table 2.1 briefly describes the short term employment and wage effects of takeovers, as 
predicted by takeover theories. In addition to this, similar predictions could be made on their 
long-run effects. However, such predictions would be purely hypothetical, as we could not test 
them due to data availability. Concentrating on the short-run labour effects of takeovers, it 
could be concluded on theoretical grounds that such effects are indeterminate. Therefore it is 
necessary to empirically analyse the effect of takeovers on jobs, wages and labour efficiency.  
 Table 2.1 Theoretical predictions on the employment and wage effects of takeovers  
Takeover theories Sources of takeover gains Employment effect Wage effect 
The value-creation theory of 
takeovers 
Synergy Negative in short term Positive in short term 
Management disciplining Negative in short term Positive in short term 
The value-destruction theory of 
takeovers 
„Empire-building‟ objectives Positive in short term Positive in short term 
Over-optimism in acquisitions Negative in short term Negative in short term 
The value-redistribution theory 
of takeovers 
„Breach of trust‟  Negative in short term Negative in short term 
Notes: Prepared based on the inferences from the literature review. 
 
2.4.3 Prior empirical evidence on the employment effects of takeovers 
Brown and Medoff (1988) use a regression method to analyse post-ownership change in wage 
and employment growth. This method asks whether ownership change leads to significantly 
different employment (wage) growth, using employment (wage) as a dependent variable and 
the ownership-change dummy as a main independent variable, controlling for the changes in 
wages and employment before the ownership change. The ownership-change dummy indicates 
the difference between actual employment (wage) growth and estimated growth that would be 
observed in the case of no ownership change. They estimate that mergers lead to 2% higher 
employment than the estimated employment in the absence of mergers. However, this is 
statistically insignificant and therefore seen as a very small change.  
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) estimate that employment growth in ownership-changing 
auxiliary establishments is 17% lower than employment growth in those not changing 
ownership, while employment growth in production establishments which change ownership 
is 4.5% lower than in those not changing ownership. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report that 
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ownership change leads to greater employment reduction in auxiliary establishments than in 
production establishments. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b, 2001) conclude that takeovers 
positively affect wages, employment and labour productivity, when plant level data is used. 
However, these authors show no significant post-merger employment change, when firm level 
data is used.  
Haynes and Thompson (1999a) results show that mergers in the UK mutual sector initially 
positively affect acquirers‟ labour demand with subsequent negative effect during three years 
following mergers. This negative labour demand effect suggests that mergers enhance 
efficiency in the long run. Furthermore, recent research shows that mergers reduce 
employment as a result of rationalisations in the use of labour. In particular, the results of 
Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) indicate that during the first two 
years mergers reduce labour demand by about 12-20%, holding wages and output constant. 
The authors conclude that this is a result of efficiency improvements. These authors interpret 
this as being a result of significant rationalisations in labour use and efficiency improvement. 
At the same time, the employment consequences of mergers depend on the relatedness of 
businesses. The results of Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) show 
that related acquisitions lead to higher levels of workforce reduction due to higher levels of 
scope for rationalisation. In contrast, the results of Amess et al. (2008) show that related and 
unrelated acquisitions have a similar magnitude of employment reduction: both types of 
acquisitions reduce employment by about 16% during the first post-takeover year. Using a 
French sample, Margolis (2006) reports that the long-run effect (three years after mergers) is 
positive, although in the short term there may be some job losses. Using a sample from 
Finland, Lehto and Böckerman (2008) show that both cross-border and domestic mergers lead 
to employment losses.  
In sum, prior research shows that in the US mergers and acquisitions do not negatively affect 
employment, whereas in Europe they significantly reduce employment. Consistent with this, 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) do not find any significant adverse effect of mergers on labour in 
the USA, but in Europe they reduce employment by about 10%. The authors relate this 
differential effect of takeovers to the rigidity of the labour markets in European economies.  
The employment effects of hostile takeovers are much debated. In the UK Conyon et al. 
(2001) find no difference between labour demand effects of friendly and hostile takeovers, 
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although hostile takeovers steeply reduce employment levels by about 15% immediately after 
takeovers. These authors suggest that this reduction in absolute number of employees is due to 
the fall in output levels resulting from post-takeover divestments. Controlling for output and 
wages, Conyon et al. (2001) find that both hostile and friendly takeovers reduce the labour 
demand similarly at the same level by about 7.5%. Thus, hostile takeovers are not associated 
with significant job destruction and job losses are related to the lower labour demand due to 
output fall.   
2.4.4 Prior empirical evidence on the wage effects of takeovers 
Brown and Medoff (1988) show mergers were associated with 4% slower wage growth in 
comparison to non-merging firms‟ wage growth. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that wage 
growth in the ownership-changing auxiliary establishments is 9.2% lower than the wage 
growth in the auxiliary establishments not changing ownership. Similarly, in production 
establishments ownership change leads to 2.9% lower wage growth, meaning that the negative 
effect of ownership change on wages is about 3 times higher in auxiliary establishments than 
in production establishments. In contrast, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) report that the US 
firms which change ownership experience accelerated wage growth. In a later study 
McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) report that in a „typical‟ (average) plant which experiences 
ownership change wages increase 3% faster than in non-ownership-changing plants.  
However, wage growth in the ownership-changing large plants (top 10
th
 percentile size 
distribution) is slower than the wage growth in non-ownership-changing large plants. As these 
large plants employ a substantial portion of the workforce, in their sample 76% of employees 
had lower wage growth and therefore they conclude that a „typical‟ worker experiences wage 
reduction after takeovers.  
In the UK Conyon et al. (2004) report that mergers increase wages by 11% within a two-year 
period, while increase is higher in related acquisitions (14%) than increase in unrelated 
acquisitions (5%). Amess et al. (2008) find that only acquisitions in the same industry cause 
20% wage increases, whereas unrelated acquisitions do not change wages.  
Overall, prior research concludes that takeovers do not negatively affect wage growth. In 
particular, prior studies conclude that there is no evidence of wealth transfer from employees 
to shareholders, supported by wage deterioration after takeovers. In contrast, takeovers cause 
faster growth in wages, especially in smaller acquiring firms. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on general corporate governance issues. It has been 
noted that in LMEs the shareholder-value-oriented model of corporate governance may 
negatively affect labour. In this respect, the chapter has also discussed the related literature on 
corporate governance in general and corporate takeovers in particular.  
The literature points out that the MCC is an effective corporate governance institution that 
enables efficient reallocation of existing assets. Takeovers are described as an efficient and 
mutually beneficial exchange of ownership and control, which can bring efficiency 
improvements through economies of scale and/or replacement of under-performing 
management. Furthermore, the MCC contributes to efficiency improvement by exercising 
continuous takeover threats as an external governance mechanism. As shareholders are unable 
to distinguish the true reasons for the low market value of their assets as a result of 
information asymmetries, the takeover mechanism facilitates punishment of failing managers, 
thereby providing timely protection for shareholders.  
However, it has been noted that the MCC may excessively pressurise managers to prioritise 
shareholders‟ interests over those of labour (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). Therefore the 
issue of the interaction between shareholders, managers and employee in shaping corporate 
governance practices has attracted significant interest. In this regard, recent research has 
concentrated on the question of how capital providers may pursue management to maximise 
their returns at the expense of other stakeholders.  
There are several ways that governance may influence labour management. For example, 
governance may influence the balance of interest promoted by managers, pressurising them to 
prioritise shareholders‟ interests over those of labour (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003). In 
particular, the threat of „exit‟ and the possibility of subsequent replacement of the managers 
become a powerful disciplinary mechanism to keep them under continuous pressure to create 
shareholder value even if it is at the expense of other stakeholders.    
However, reviewing the extant evidence on labour management practices, an emerging strand 
of literature concludes that in practice labour management in publicly listed companies is not 
as simplistic, as the above discussion implies (Armour et al., 2003; Gospel and Pendleton, 
2003, 2005; Pendleton, 2009). These authors‟ main argument is that the recent developments 
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in the corporate world are modifying the market model of corporate governance. Such 
developments include increase in ownership concentration, growth in insider ownership and 
the strengthening of company directors‟ duties in the company laws. At the same time, some 
institutional investors make long-term investments, which are governed by the relationship 
forms of governance. Overall, this literature suggests that corporate governance is exerted by a 
relationship form of governance in addition to market-based mechanisms. This mix of 
governance gives managers some autonomy from shareholders in decision-making and 
managers may use this autonomy to exercise enlightened labour management. Labour 
management decisions are made to provide success for companies, not to transfer wealth. In 
sum, in practice corporate governance may operate differently and its influence in labour 
management may be different from that described by the market model. In this respect the key 
question concerns the extent to which takeovers cast a shadow over managerial behaviour in 
the longer term (Pendleton, 2009).  
In terms of employment effect, prior research reports a steep decline in the absolute number of 
workers immediately after takeovers (Conyon et al., 2002a). However, most researchers 
consider this as an essential step to improve efficiency and conclude that this short-run pain 
may also benefit labour in the long run by creating the necessary conditions for „better‟ jobs 
and higher wages. Otherwise, their firm may go bankrupt, leading to long-term negative 
effects for labour. Therefore it is important to understand whether job losses occur due to 
labour efficiency improvement purposes or whether they occur due to other factors. 
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3 LABOUR EFFECTS OF CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, this chapter identifies the following 
four major areas of contemporary research where the employment effects of takeovers could 
be empirically investigated. This chapter critiques specific literature in these four areas in 
order to identify limitations of the prior research and to formulate clear research questions.  
One of the main objectives of the thesis is to understand the reasons for post-merger layoffs. 
In this regard this chapter first identifies several factors that might prompt post-takeover 
workforce adjustments. We concentrate on four factors, including pre-takeover poor 
performance of acquired and acquiring firms, the disciplinary role of takeovers, synergy 
created by mergers and the high premium paid to targets. In this area the main research issue is 
to examine why do layoffs often happen post-takeover. 
Another factor that may lead to workforce reductions could be the post-merger performance 
decline. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the consequences of workforce adjustments 
for operating performance: do such adjustments negatively or positively affect performance? 
We discuss a small, but growing, body of literature on the performance consequences of post-
merger layoffs. As post-merger layoffs are a part of wider corporate downsizing activity, we 
also discuss the literature on performance consequences of downsizing in the wider context. In 
this area the main research issue is to assess whether there is any cause and effect relationship 
between post-merger performance change and workforce change. 
Thirdly, one of the main reasons for layoffs could be the wealth transfer from employees to 
shareholders. In this regard we discuss the literature on the short- and long-run shareholder 
wealth effects of takeovers. We also review the literature which investigates the association 
between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions post-merger. In this area the 
main research issue is to test whether shareholder gains come at the expense of labour. 
Finally, post-merger workforce reductions could be undertaken to materialise synergies arising 
as a result of decline in labour demand. Therefore we review the relevant literature on the 
labour demand effects of takeovers. The main issue to be investigated in this area is whether 
labour demand decline causes employee layoffs.  
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3.2 Causes of post-merger workforce adjustments 
Prior research shows that mergers involve job losses. For example, Black et al. (2007) show 
that higher levels of mergers and acquisitions activity leads to shorter job tenure, which means 
that such transactions may result in employee layoffs. Deakin and Slinger (1997) and Lehto 
and Böckerman (2008) conclude that almost all changes in ownership lead to job losses. 
Conyon et al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b) show that mergers significantly reduce the absolute 
number of workers. However, the factors that may lead to post-takeover employee layoffs are 
not well understood. On the basis of the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, we 
identify several factors that might explain post-merger employee layoffs. 
Before discussing these factors we need to define workforce downsizing. According to 
Cornfield (1983) downsizing is “a temporary or permanent termination of an employee from 
the payroll of an organisation, which results from a decline in labour demand”. Thus, an 
employee layoff incidence differs from other types of employee dismissal and usually results 
from a decline in labour demand. In the layoff case a job is eliminated from the payroll as a 
result of change in the external and internal business environment, while in other cases a job is 
still available on the payroll, but an employee is replaced. Thus, employee layoffs involving 
mergers may lead to permanent job losses. Freeman and Cameron (1993) define downsizing as 
a reduction in organisation size, undertaken by the management of an organisation, to improve 
efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. Cappelli (2000) distinguishes downsizing from 
more traditional employee layoffs undertaken to respond to external factors, such as shortfalls 
in product demand and defines downsizing as “reductions in jobs driven by the desire for 
operating efficiencies”. Therefore, according to Cappelli (2000), downsizing undertaken to 
improve operating efficiency is driven by internal factors, developed inside the firm, such as 
changes in production function or employment and management practices.  
Haynes and Thompson (1999a) discuss four possible ways that may enhance efficiency in 
bank mergers, namely: the exploitation of economies of scale, the elimination of duplicated 
capacity, the transfer of control over assets to better management and the opportunity to 
renegotiating explicit and implicit contracts post-merger. Each of these possible methods of 
efficiency enhancement may involve employee layoffs. Following this, we argue that post-
merger employee layoffs may be undertaken in under-performing acquired firms in order to 
arrest further performance deterioration, to discipline inefficient management and to 
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materialise synergy created by mergers. Furthermore, layoffs could be undertaken to cover 
high premiums, which may be paid as a result of managerial over-optimism or to transfer 
wealth from employees to shareholders. Below we discuss prior literature on the role of these 
factors in explaining post-merger employee layoffs
24
.  
3.2.1 The need for performance improvement 
When firms perform poorly shareholders expect managers to undertake employee layoffs 
(Morck et al., 1989). In fact, researchers agree that prior poor firm performance is an 
important factor in downsizing decisions. The extant evidence shows that layoffs are often 
undertaken when performance declines (Hillier et al., 2007). Elayan et al. (1998), Espahbodi 
et al. (2000), Chen et al. (2001) report significant improvement in firm performance after 
downsizing. Therefore Chen et al. (2001) argue that when firms can be viewed as a „nexus of 
contracts‟, layoffs can serve to optimise such contracts, which otherwise become sub-optimal 
as a result of changes in the external and internal business environment.  
In the mergers and acquisitions context, Froud et al. (2000) argue that labour cost cuts provide 
relatively easy and unproblematic gains to increase shareholder value, when other growth 
opportunities are limited. O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) investigate the role of several 
factors in explaining post-merger layoffs, including relatedness, target revenue per employee, 
target financial performance and use of borrowed funds in financing mergers. Their results 
show that among these factors only relatedness and target employee profitability explain 
layoffs post-merger. Therefore, they conclude that layoffs are undertaken in labour-intense 
target firms in order to deal with labour inefficiency. 
Another piece of evidence on the positive performance effect of mergers comes from 
industrial economics literature investigating the labour productivity effect of takeovers. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) show that the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of acquired 
plants improves post-acquisition. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) show that ownership change 
causes further improvement in productivity: acquired plants had 3 to 10% points higher labour 
productivity in comparison to non-acquired plants. McGuckin et al. (1998) report 16% points 
                                                 
24 Post-merger asset divestments and cash payments for targets may be other factors that may explain workforce reductions. 
However, we do not consider the asset divestment factor, as we do not have enough data to investigate its role empirically. 
Another possible factor that might lead to a higher level of workforce reduction – cash payments – has not attracted much 
attention in the literature.    
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higher productivity increase in ownership-changing plants relative to the non-ownership-
changing plants for the US food industry.   
3.2.2 Hostility in takeovers 
Prior research shows that hostile takeovers lead to a higher level of job losses. There are 
several reasons for higher job losses after hostile takeovers.    
First, the main objective of hostile takeovers is to discipline underperforming managers. 
Target firms' prior performance could be poor due to inefficient incumbent management, who 
enjoy a „quiet life‟ without making enough effort to monitor employees. In target firms 
inefficient managers may have employed sub-optimally high levels of staff due to „empire-
building‟ or preferences of a „quiet life‟. At the same time, unmonitored managers may have 
paid high wages to workers and not put enough effort into improving overall productivity and 
profitability (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999, 2003). Efficiency improvement may require 
optimisation of employment levels among other restructurings, the achievement of which may 
involve some employee layoffs. 
However, as discussed above, hostility may occur even if targets are not necessarily 
underperforming firms. Hostility may arise to secure high premiums or due to the incumbent‟s 
disagreement with the proposed restructuring measures, such as employee layoffs. In support 
of this argument, Franks and Mayer‟s (1996) results show that directors may be replaced 
regardless of targets‟ prior performance. This implies that hostility may arise not to correct 
managerial failure, but to materialise other synergetic gains.  
Additionally, managers may make employee layoffs to protect their own jobs, as suggested by 
Hillier et al. (2007). Under the strong MCC, takeover threats may push managers to cut labour 
costs: managers may undertake layoffs to secure control over their firms and their own jobs. If 
they do not undertake layoffs, their firms may become a takeover target and an external 
management team may use this opportunity to cut costs. In such cases hostility may arise as 
incumbents expect staff cost cuts and therefore they oppose such takeovers to protect workers 
(Franks and Mayer, 1996).  
At the same time, hostile takeovers are more likely to facilitate wealth transfer from 
employees to shareholders and therefore, they are more likely to reduce employment levels 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Pagano and Volpin, 2005a). These commentators argue that 
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long-term contracts between shareholders and employees could be implicit. Although ex-ante 
such implicit contracts are valuable for both shareholders and employees, ex-post shareholders 
may derive some benefit from reneging on such contracts by firing more senior workers, 
whose wage exceeds their marginal product, although they were underpaid when they were 
young. As these implicit contract holders are mainly incumbent managers, shareholders can 
replace them with new management who are not responsible for adhering to implicit contracts 
and who may layoff older workers. 
Finally, hostile takeovers may involve higher levels of asset divestments post-merger, which 
may lead to higher levels of workforce reductions. Conyon et al. (2001) provide evidence 
showing that hostile acquisitions lead to higher levels of workforce reductions. However, they 
conclude that this could be due to high levels of post-merger asset divestments. Conyon et al. 
(2002a) suggest that mergers undertaken by profit maximising managers are more likely to be 
followed by employee dismissals, suggesting that workforce reductions should be higher after 
hostile acquisitions than after friendly acquisitions.  
Supporting the efficiency enhancement role of hostile takeovers, Conyon et al. (2002a) show 
that hostile takeovers cause greater reductions in labour demand: hostile takeovers reduce 
labour demand by 17%, while the decline is 9% after friendly mergers. Similarly, Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004) report that tender offers (hostile in nature) produce significantly different 
labour demand effects from other mergers. However, the findings of Conyon et al. (2001) 
indicate that both hostile and friendly takeovers are associated with a similar decrease in 
labour demand, averaging 7.5%, after controlling for output and wage changes. Although 
hostile takeovers cause a steep decline in the absolute number of workers, these authors 
suggest that such a steep employment reduction is the consequence of a high level of 
divestments after hostile takeovers.  
3.2.3 Synergy realisation  
It is widely accepted that synergy is one of the primary sources of takeover gains. Mergers 
may create synergy in many ways, including rationalisations in labour use, economies of scale 
and scope, diffusion of know-how, reductions in production, marketing and other costs. In 
addition to this synergy could be created through the elimination of duplicative activities and 
through consolidation of business operations. The realisation of such synergies requires wide-
scale corporate restructuring, which may involve employee layoffs during the post-merger 
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business integration process. Thus, managers may undertake employee layoffs to achieve 
synergy. Supporting this view, empirical research shows that a substantial portion of takeover 
gains comes from labour cost savings-related synergies (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001) and 
that mergers lead to rationalisations in labour use (Conyon et al., 2002a). 
The higher the similarity of the merging businesses, the higher the synergy. Rumelt (1974, 
1982) shows that related acquisitions have a higher level of synergy. Therefore, it is expected 
that related acquisitions lead to higher workforce reductions than unrelated acquisitions. 
O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan‟s (1998) results confirm this prediction: the probability of layoff 
announcements is higher after related acquisitions than after unrelated acquisitions. This is 
further confirmed by other studies, which conclude that in related acquisitions workforce 
reductions are necessary to realise synergy (Conyon et al., 2002a; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
3.2.4 Managerial hubris 
As previously discussed, Roll (1986) argues that most mergers occur as a result of managerial 
hubris, where acquirers may overpay for targets, while Hayward and Hambrick (1997) show 
that there is a positive association between managerial hubris and the premium paid to targets. 
This overpayment necessitates higher returns during the post-takeover period. Sirower (2000) 
suggests that high premiums require “performance improvements that are virtually impossible 
to realize, even by the best executives in the best industry conditions”. During the post-
takeover period workforce reductions could be undertaken to justify the large premiums, as 
reducing labour cost is the only available option for managers needing to cut costs 
immediately (Froud et al., 2000).  The results of Krishnan and Park (2002) and Krishnan et al. 
(2007) show that managers pay a high premium and consequently undertake excessive 
employee layoffs in order to cover such high premiums.  
3.2.5 The breach of trust 
Another explanation for post-merger employee layoffs is that they may be undertaken to 
transfer wealth from employees to shareholders by breaching long-term implicit contracts 
between stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). The literature provides evidence showing 
that firms pay lower wages during the earlier years of employment, promising to pay higher 
wages to those workers who invest in firm-specific human capital in later years of 
employment. Thus, workers are underpaid relative to their marginal productivity during the 
earlier years of employment and overpaid relative to their marginal productivity during their 
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later years of employment. Existing empirical evidence shows that extra-marginal wage 
payments exist (Lazear, 1979). Ownership change and a possible change of the management 
team creates conditions for breaching such implicit contracts: new managers may lay off older 
workers who are paid extra-marginal wage payments or they may reduce wage growth. Thus, 
the breach of trust may be a reason for post-merger employee layoffs. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu‟s (2004) results show that (although mergers do not reduce employment 
in the USA) tender offers lead to around 8% job losses in LMEs. The authors interpret this to 
be consistent with the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis. In contrast, Beckmann and Forbes‟ (2004) 
results show no significant association between shareholder gains and job losses post-merger. 
3.2.6 Limitations of prior research and further research issues 
The literature suggests several reasons for post-merger employee layoffs. However, prior 
research is inconclusive on the role of these factors in explaining post-takeover workforce 
adjustments. In its turn, academic research on the labour effect of the market model of 
corporate governance is indecisive.   
As there are only a very few studies investigating the prior performance of merging firms in 
post-takeover workforce adjustments (O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan, 1998), we do not know 
whether post-merger employee layoffs are undertaken in under-performing firms. Similarly, 
evidence on the role of other determinants of post-merger employee layoffs is scarce: there are 
only a few studies that investigate the role of industry relatedness, hostility and target firm 
revenue per employee in explaining post-merger employee layoffs.  
It is suggested that hostile takeovers re-allocate assets to efficient users. However, hostile 
takeovers are also seen as the main restructuring exercise that redistributes wealth from 
workers to shareholders. Although it is well documented that hostile takeovers lead to steeper 
job losses, the underlying causes of such workforce reductions are unknown. Conyon et al. 
(2001) suggest that one reason is that post-takeover workforce reductions occur as a result of 
high levels of divestments. 
Prior research shows that acquirers pay high premiums due to managerial over-confidence 
(Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). However, evidence on the association between high 
premiums and post-merger workforce reductions is limited. The extant evidence suggests only 
that high premiums may lead to excessive layoffs in related mergers (Krishnan et al., 2007). 
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On the other hand, managers may pay high premiums for high synergy bearing acquisitions 
that may lead to a higher level of decline in labour demand, arising as a result of the wider 
scope for the elimination of duplicative activities. This means that such higher premiums lead 
to higher workforce reductions or slower workforce growth post-acquisition. Therefore, the 
role of premiums in explaining post-merger workforce adjustments should be further 
investigated.   
Understanding the factors that may lead to post-merger employee layoffs is important as it 
clarifies the efficiency enhancement implications of takeovers and related layoffs. If takeovers 
negatively affect employment, two different types of inefficiencies may arise: Ex-ante such 
transactions may reduce the incentives for employees to invest time and effort in improving 
their company-specific skills, thereby reducing efficiency (Blair, 1995; Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan, 2000). Thus, employees may not have the required skills to properly undertake 
their responsibilities. They also may not enter into long-term trust-based implicit contracts. 
Ex-post takeover may increase employee anxiety, stress and uncertainty related to their 
working future. This may lead to inefficiencies. 
This thesis investigates the role of all four of the above discussed determinants of layoffs in 
one system. This enables a better understanding of the role of each factor, while controlling 
for other relevant factors. This thesis empirically investigates the following research question:  
Q1. What are the factors associated with post-takeover workforce adjustments? 
Evidence on this question would provide the answer to whether post-merger labour 
management decisions are influenced by market based mechanisms of corporate governance 
or whether managerial discretion plays a role in making efficiency-enhancing decisions. 
Furthermore, new evidence on the causes of post-merger layoffs contributes to the knowledge 
on the motivations behind corporate takeovers and consequently the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
3.3 Association between post-merger performance change and workforce 
adjustments 
It is mostly agreed that acquirers‟ performance declines during post-merger years (Martynova 
et al., 2007). However, it is not known whether this performance decline may lead to 
workforce reductions. A related issue is the operating performance consequences of post-
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merger employee layoffs. Empirical evidence on this issue would clarify the effect of 
workforce adjustments on performance change, in addition to the wider effect of takeovers on 
firm performance. This evidence would also provide some implications on the causes of post-
merger layoffs. Therefore, the thesis also investigates whether there is any association 
between post-merger firm performance change and workforce adjustments. 
If post-merger employee layoffs positively affect performance, then it could be concluded that 
layoffs are undertaken with the purpose of improving performance. If post-merger employee 
layoffs negatively affect performance, then it could be concluded that layoffs are undertaken 
with the purpose of covering the high premium paid to shareholders. Therefore we investigate 
prior literature on the performance effect of post-merger employee layoffs. We concentrate on 
three areas of literature: literature on the operating performance effect of takeovers, literature 
on corporate downsizing and literature on performance consequences of post-merger 
employee layoffs.   
3.3.1 Evidence on post-takeover operating performance change 
As we need to relate post-takeover operating performance change to workforce adjustments, 
we briefly discuss prior research findings on the long-run performance consequences of 
takeovers. Accounting studies provide mixed evidence on this issue: there is no consensus 
agreement on the positive impact of takeovers on operating performance. In fact, some studies 
report modest performance improvement, other studies report performance decline, while 
other studies report no performance change in comparison to non-merging benchmark firms, 
over a two-to-five year period following acquisitions. For example, Martynova et al. (2007) 
summarize that 14 out of 25 studies report significant performance decline, 6 studies report 
insignificant change in performance, while 5 studies report significant improvement in 
performance after takeovers. 
In the US, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find no performance improvement after takeovers, 
while other researchers conclude that performance improves significantly post-takeover 
(Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Healy et al., 1992; Switzer, 1996). For example, using a sample 
of 50 mergers, Healy et al. (1992) find significant improvement in asset productivity and cash 
flow performance. Using a larger sample of 324 mergers, Switzer (1996) confirms the Healy 
et al. (1992) results, arguing that mergers are motivated by synergies. These authors claim that 
these results are robust for sample size, sample period and other factors, such as payment 
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mode and industry relatedness. In contrast, using more robust research methods, Ghosh (2001) 
finds insignificant performance improvement post-merger. 
In the UK, Manson et al. (2000) report performance gains, using a sample of 44 takeovers, as 
their regressions of post-takeover operating performance on pre-takeover operating 
performance provide positive and significant constant terms. Manson et al. (2000) also report 
that estimates of post-takeover performance changes have significant ability to explain the 
takeover-announcement shareholder gains. Similarly, Powell and Stark (2005) report 
significant performance improvement, when cash flow return on market value of assets is used 
as a performance measure. However, their results show no performance improvement, when 
cash flow return on book value of assets is used as a performance measure. Martynova et al. 
(2007) report that industry-adjusted profitability declines significantly, while matched firm 
adjusted performance does not show underperformance.  
On the basis of this review of the literature, it can be concluded that the research in this area 
has not reached a clear conclusion on the long-run operating performance effect of takeovers. 
3.3.2 Operating performance effects of corporate downsizing 
A related issue is the effect of employee layoffs on firm operating performance in general. It is 
suggested that the primary objective of corporate downsizing is to improve operating 
performance (Cappelli, 2000). However, downsizing may also negatively affect firm 
performance. In fact, empirical evidence in this area is also inconclusive. Palmon et al. (1997) 
show that downsizing negatively affects firm performance and Denis and Kruse (2000) find no 
significant change in industry-adjusted operating performance for layoff firms. Other authors 
report that downsizing does not alter firm performance (Cascio et al., 1997; Love and Nohria, 
2005). In contrast, Elayan et al. (1998), Espahbodi et al. (2000), Chen et al. (2001) report 
significant improvement in firm performance after downsizing. For example, Elayan et al. 
(1998) show that after layoffs firms start to earn significantly higher return on equity, while 
net income per employee and sales per employee also significantly increase. Therefore these 
authors conclude that layoffs increase the efficiency of labour.  
In the UK Hillier et al. (2007) report that, although layoffs are undertaken following 
significant performance decline, layoffs do not improve performance: the results suggest that 
layoffs only halt the decline in operating performance by improving efficiency in 
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performance, measured as sales per employee and operating profit per employee. In spite of 
this, Hillier et al. (2007) conclude that the impact of layoffs on operating performance is 
marginal and the sample firms under-perform their industry benchmarks three years after the 
layoff announcement.  
In short, previous research agrees that workforce downsizing benefits firms by arresting 
further performance decline (Chen et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2007). However, downsizing is 
more likely to lead to better performance when firms have higher levels of employment than 
the optimal, because in this case workforce reductions are less likely to cause organisational 
disruption (Cappelli, 2000). But it is more likely that downsizing will lead to performance 
decline when excessive workforce reductions are undertaken, leading to substantial 
organisational disruptions. Therefore it can be concluded that the effect of downsizing is curve 
line and contingent on the underlying factors, and firms only improve performance when they 
move towards the optimal level of employment (Love and Nohria, 2005).  
3.3.3 Operating performance effects of post-merger employee layoffs 
Similarly, in the mergers and acquisitions context, the performance effect of workforce 
reductions depends on the actual employment levels relative to the optimal employment 
levels. Prior research suggests that managers pay a high premium and consequently lay off 
employees (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Krishnan et al., 2007). In this process managers may 
make excessive employee layoffs, as it is difficult to estimate correctly the optimal level of 
workforce reductions due to information asymmetries and also due to managerial hubris. In 
addition, in this process talented workers with firm-specific human capital may leave the firm. 
All these may lead to decline in firm performance.  
Krishnan et al. (2007) results confirm these predictions: (1) layoffs are positively associated 
with the size of premium; (2) the size of premium is inversely related to post-takeover 
performance, meaning that the higher the premium, the lower the performance, which is 
consistent with Hayward and Hambrick (1997). Therefore, Krishnan et al. (2007) conclude 
that workforce reductions play a mediating role in the association between premium and 
performance. Consequently, they argue that excessive workforce reductions following large 
premiums may lead to performance decline. 
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There are several reasons to believe that post-merger employee layoffs may negatively affect 
firm performance. First, in this process the target‟s key staff – „white collar‟ managers – 
usually leave. Franks and Mayer (1996) show that management turnover is significantly 
higher during a post-merger period than during normal periods. Walsh and Ellwood (1991) 
show that target managers are not poor performers or „entrenched managers‟. Their analysis 
reveals that the pre-acquisition performances of these top executives do not determine their 
post-acquisition prospects. Instead, the best performing incumbents leave during the first year 
after acquisition, because they could easily find better employment opportunities elsewhere 
and sometimes they do not want to be associated with poorly performing acquirers. The results 
of this study also indicate a significant correlation between poor performance and low 
management turnover in the second and later years, which suggests that acquirers only retain 
„deadwood managers‟, who may not be able to find other employment opportunities.  
Secondly, the merger event itself and related layoff incidents may negatively affect the 
employees‟ work attitudes. Cultural clashes between merging firms may also cause 
inefficiencies. Weber (1996) and Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) argue that acquired firm 
employees feel reduced fit in the combined organisations as a result of cultural conflicts 
between two merging firms and changing business goals. In addition acquired firm employees 
may perceive a violation of their psychological contract (Rousseau, 1995). In sum, scholars 
have also argued that increased job insecurity and uncertainty may negatively affect employee 
profitability. Post-merger anxiety, uncertainty and job insecurity causes employee stress levels 
to increase, which in turn negatively affects employee performance and accelerates employee 
turnover (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Houghton et al., 2003). 
Similarly, cynicism arising because of layoffs may cause employees to act unethically 
(Andersson and Bateman, 1997). Overall, even though downsizing is undertaken to improve 
operating performance, in the mergers and acquisitions context its real effect may be negative, 
as shown by Krishnan et al. (2007).  
3.3.4 Stock price performance effects of employee layoffs 
In addition to operating performance, employee layoffs may affect stock price performance
25
. 
Prior research has shown that layoff announcements may have two different effects on firm 
                                                 
25 Layoff making acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns may differ from the long-run abnormal returns of acquirers who do not 
make employee layoffs due to market reaction to the layoff announcements. In other words, there may be share price changes 
due to layoff announcements made during post-merger period.  
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value, depending on the context of the announcement. Most studies find that, overall, layoff 
announcements negatively influence firm value (Worrell et al., 1991; Lin and Rozeff, 1993; 
Lee, 1997; Elayan et al., 1998). For example, Lee (1997) reports that layoffs reduce firm value 
by 1.78% in the US and 0.56% in Japan. In the UK Hillier et al. (2007) show that firms 
making redundancy announcements under-perform the market by 0.81% during  a three-day 
event window around the announcement date. Only a minority of layoffs, which are motivated 
by restructuring-related efficiency improvements, provide positive abnormal returns (Worrell 
et al., 1991; Palmon et al., 1997). The short-run market reaction also depends on the 
magnitude (small or large) and duration (temporary or permanent) of the job losses. For 
example, Worrell et al. (1991) report that large and permanent layoffs cause stronger negative 
returns than other layoffs.      
Lin and Rozeff (1993) and Elayan et al. (1998) use the declining investment opportunities and 
efficiency hypotheses to explain downsizing. According to the declining investments 
hypothesis, redundancy announcements reveal that the company‟s growth opportunities are 
reaching their limit and, therefore, the market reaction to such announcements should be 
negative. According to the efficiency hypothesis, cost cuts through employee layoffs improve 
future expected profits and, therefore, such cost cuts should increase shareholder value. 
However, the market may not react at all to layoff announcements, if the announcements 
provide no new information. Worrell et al. (1991) suggest that, in addition to the negative or 
positive market reaction to layoff announcements, the market could be neutral if „the financial 
problems of a company were well known prior to an announcement and both the company‟s 
employees and security analysts expect layoffs‟. Furthermore, Worrell et al. (1991) report that 
although, overall, investors‟ response to job losses is negative, further classification of layoff 
reasons clarifies the actual market reaction to different types of layoffs. These authors find that 
the market reaction to layoffs motivated by financial reasons is much more negative than the 
market reaction to layoffs motivated by other factors. At the same time, the market reaction is 
positive if job losses are associated with consolidation and restructuring that are not caused by 
financial distress. Overall, these authors conclude that stock market reaction to layoff 
announcements is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis.  
Similarly, Palmon et al. (1997) suggest that investors use managers‟ explanations cited in the 
layoff announcements to form their opinion regarding the impact of these events on firm 
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value. These authors empirically demonstrate that investors consider managements‟ reasons 
cited in the layoff announcements as reliable signals of future performance. If managers cite 
adverse market conditions, such as demand decline or input price increase, as the main reason 
for job losses, then the market reaction to such job losses should be abnormally negative, as 
these adverse market conditions should eventually lead to decline in operating performance. If 
managers cite cost reduction as the main reason in layoff announcements, then the market 
reaction to such announcements should be abnormally positive, as investors consider such 
actions as efficiency-enhancing actions. Consistent with this hypothesis, Palmon et al. (1997) 
find negative abnormal returns for firms which eliminate jobs as a result of adverse market 
effects and positive abnormal returns for firms which eliminate jobs to achieve efficiency 
improvements.  
The prior research also shows that the markets may identify the companies with expected 
redundancy announcements well before the announcement date. Collett (2002) reports that the 
abnormal returns gained by layoff-making firms during a 30 day pre-announcement period are 
significantly negative (-3.4%). Hillier et al. (2007) report that during a window of (-750, -2) 
firms making layoffs earn 15 % (11%) mean (median) negative abnormal returns. However, 
post-layoff long-run stock price performance is not significantly different from the average 
market return (Chen et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2007).  
Collett (2002) argues that the market reaction to a redundancy announcement depends on the 
level of innovation in the announcement. If the announcement reveals no information about 
declining trading opportunities, then the market may consider the announcement as new 
information which reveals the expected poor performance. In this case the market receives this 
as the first confirmation of future expected under-performance and revises its expectations 
based on this announcement. In contrast, if the company has already informed the market 
about declining trading opportunities by issuing profit warning(s), then the announcement may 
be viewed by the market as a necessary action to improve the company‟s performance.  
In sum, layoff announcements may affect firm value, as they provide new information to the 
market about the changes in future expected cash flows. However, the direction of the market 
reaction to layoff announcements may vary, depending on whether layoffs are permanent or 
temporary, small or large, a single announcement or a part of series of announcements, 
proactive or reactive. Thus, downsizing may have two different effects on firm value, 
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depending on the underlying reasons for the employment layoff. On one hand, the market may 
negatively react to the layoff announcements if the reason for this event is the decline in 
product demand or adverse market effect. On the other hand, employee layoffs caused by the 
need to cut costs positively affect share price. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the 
differences in abnormal returns of layoff-making acquirers from the abnormal returns of the 
acquirer that does not make layoffs. 
3.3.5 Limitations of prior research and further research issues  
One limitation of the prior research in this area is that it does not consider post-merger 
performance decline to explain workforce reductions following mergers. Furthermore, 
although the effect of downsizing on firm performance is well researched, the evidence on the 
performance consequences of post-merger employee layoffs is limited. Such limitations 
preclude researchers from making some decisive conclusions on the motivations behind post-
merger employee layoffs. One of the main reasons for this inconclusiveness is that there are 
simply very few studies investigating the performance consequences of post-merger layoffs. 
Investigating performance consequences of post-merger layoffs using a regression analysis, 
Krishnan et al. (2007) conclude that in related acquisitions workforce reductions negatively 
affect firm performance. However, a limitation of this study is that it uses performance levels 
as the dependent variable in the regression and investigates the association between 
performance levels and workforce reductions. There may be an association between 
performance levels and workforce reductions. However, this association does not prove the 
direction of the causality between the performance levels and workforce reductions: firms may 
reduce employment after poor performance or, alternatively, workforce reductions may lead to 
poor performance. In both cases, the firms which experience higher levels of workforce 
reductions may have lower levels of performance than the firms which experience lower 
workforce reductions. Therefore, it may be more informative to investigate the association 
between operating performance change and workforce changes post-merger.  
Another limitation of the prior research in this area is that accounting-based studies only 
measure the post-takeover performance change relative to the pre-takeover performance. 
Although methodologies for measuring the performance change are comprehensive, these 
studies do not investigate the possible determinants of the acquiring firm‟s underperformance, 
which is well documented in the literature (Martynova et al., 2007). Specifically, research 
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mainly focuses on deal-specific characteristics, such as payment method (cash versus stock), 
deal method (tender versus merger) or takeover mode (hostile versus friendly), as the possible 
determinants of post-merger performance differences. Although these characteristics are 
important factors, they are not capable of fully explaining the question of why some mergers 
fail, while others succeed. Empirical research that investigates the real economic factors that 
may lead to merger success or failure is limited. Therefore, as Becht et al. (2003) point out, we 
do not know much about the underlying real sources of takeover gains. In other words, the 
factors that lead to superior or poorer post-takeover performance are not known.  
Post-takeover workforce adjustments can be considered as one of the factors that may alter 
operating performance change through efficiency enhancement and synergy realisation. 
However, there has been no study that examines the association between performance changes 
and workforce adjustments within the mergers and acquisitions context. We empirically 
investigate the following question:  
Q2. What is the association between post-merger performance change and workforce 
adjustments? 
Although post-takeover operating performance change is well researched, the evidence on the 
relationship between post-merger performance change and workforce adjustments is limited. 
Therefore new evidence on this question would clarify whether workforce reductions 
positively or negatively affect performance. Furthermore, this evidence could be used to make 
some inference about the underlying factors that may lead to workforce reductions. In other 
words, some conclusions could be made on the issue of whether post-merger workforce 
reductions contribute to synergy realisation or destroy human capital of acquired firms.  
3.4 Shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions 
Rent transfer from employees to shareholders has been suggested as one of the main sources 
of takeover gains in the literature. In this connection, this thesis investigates whether there is 
any association between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions post-merger.   
Shleifer and Summers (1988), who propose the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis, base their 
arguments on the idea that corporations represent a „nexus of contracts‟ among different 
stakeholders, where some of the contracts could be implicit. In particular, long-term contracts 
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between shareholders and employees could be implicit. Although ex-ante such contracts are 
valuable for both shareholders and employees, ex-post shareholders may derive some benefit 
from reneging on such contracts by firing older workers, whose wage exceeds their marginal 
product, although they were underpaid when they were young. As these implicit contract 
holders are mainly incumbent managers, shareholders can breach these contracts by replacing 
the incumbent management through ownership change. 
3.4.1 Evidence on the association between shareholder gains and employee wealth 
concessions  
A number of studies have empirically tested the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis, with early studies 
considering the relationship between changes in union wealth and shareholder gains. The basic 
assumption of these studies is that unionism facilitates high rent capture for employees 
through higher wages, higher staffing levels and greater influence for management than in 
other non-unionised firms. Ownership change may enable new management to strike a bargain 
with unions on rent-sharing agreements, re-distributing some of the gains from employees to 
shareholders.  
Some of these studies support the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis. Becker‟s (1995) results show 
significant additional gains to target firm shareholders when the target firm is unionised, 
meaning that those gains come at the expense of unionised labour
26
. Rosett (1990) investigates 
the role of union wealth concessions in explaining a rise in share prices, using a sample of 
unionised targets. Union wealth concessions are estimated on the basis of the changes in real 
wage growth from a point in time two contracts before takeover to two contracts after 
takeover. The regression analysis indicates that hostile takeovers do not cause lower real wage 
growth than friendly takeovers, while coefficients on both takeover and hostility dummies are 
insignificant. However, Rosett (1990) concludes that rent transfer from employees could be a 
significant source of shareholder gains: in friendly takeovers unions lose 5% of what 
shareholders gain within 18 years, while in hostile takeovers unions‟ losses account for 10% 
of shareholders gain. The findings of Peoples et al. (1993) show that mergers do not affect to 
wage levels of non-union members, as there is no difference in wages of non-union workers in 
                                                 
26 Becker (1995) uses a regression analysis to study the relationship between unionism in target firms and target shareholder 
gains. The dependent variable is the target shareholder gains and the main independent variable is either a dummy variable 
indicating whether any of the firm‟s employees were represented by a union or a continuous variable indicating the percentage 
of the total workforce enrolled in a union sponsored pension plan. Both variables indicate statistically significant additional 
gains to target shareholders. 
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merger-intense and merger non-intense industries. In contrast, the union members‟ wages in 
merger intense industries is 18% lower than wages in other industries. 
However, some other studies reject the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis. Gokhale et al. (1995) 
argue that in testing for the wealth transfer hypothesis extra-marginal rent earned by 
employees is more relevant than the simple changes in employment or wages. The study 
particularly looks at two types of extra-marginal rents, defined as employer-specific wage 
differentials and steeper-than-average wages growth for older workers, constructed on the 
basis of data from an employer salary survey. Several empirical studies (for example, Krueger 
and Summers (1988)) report that unexplained wage differences exist among the firms even 
within the same industries with similar financial indicators. The second type of extra-marginal 
wage – higher than average wage for long-tenured workers – is based on Lazear‟s (1979) 
long-term incentive contract. (Lazear, 1979) suggests that it is preferable for both firms and 
workers to agree to a long-term wage stream that pays workers less than the value of their 
marginal product when they are young and higher than the value of their marginal product 
when they are old. Such an extra-marginal wage provides a long-term incentive contract that 
encourages workers to make firm-specific human capital investment. 
Based on these two types of extra-marginal wage, Gokhale et al. (1995) investigate whether 
firms with high extra-marginal wage payments are more likely to be targets of hostile 
takeovers (ex-ante analysis). Further, the study analyses whether extra-marginal wage 
payments decline after hostile takeovers (ex-post analysis). Ex-ante tests show no evidence of 
the relationship between extra-marginal wage payments and the probability of takeovers‟ 
being hostile. However, ex-post tests show that only hostile takeovers reduce one form of 
extra-marginal wage payments: they lead to less employment and flatter wage payments to 
more senior workers, while other types of mergers do not negatively affect more senior 
workers. Although these results are consistent with the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis, employer-
specific higher than average wages continue to rise after hostile takeovers, which contradicts 
this hypothesis. Therefore these authors suggest that in the long run an active corporate control 
market may diminish the effectiveness of the Lazear-type solution to the problem of 
monitoring workers‟ effort.  
Neumark and Sharpe (1996) examine the relation between the probability of being the target 
of a hostile takeover and the existence of extra-marginal wage payments, in the form of a high 
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wage premium and a steeper-than-average wage profile. However, this study is limited to ex-
ante analysis alone: i.e. it attempts to predict hostile takeover targets on the basis of extra-
marginal wage payment variables. As the results do not show that these variables are 
unrelated, the authors do not support the wealth transfer hypothesis. Similarly, Fallick and 
Hassett (1996) report that unionisation does not have a direct impact on the probability of 
being a takeover target; instead, firms merge with a firm with the same union status, which 
does not support the wealth transfer hypothesis.     
In the UK only one study – Beckmann and Forbes (2004) – has investigated the direct link 
between shareholder gains and employment losses, using a sample of 62 takeovers. Although 
the study uses a small sample, the advantage of this study is that the employment and wage 
effects of takeovers are estimated taking into consideration the relevant divestments. This 
study reports that employment declines 11% during a five-year period post-takeover, after 
correcting for the divestments. In addition the cost-per-employee growth is larger than the 
expected benchmark wage growths (pre-takeover observations-based estimated wage growth 
and industry average wage growth). The regression of target shareholder gains on job cuts and 
changes in cost-per-employee indicates no significant explanatory power for these variables. 
In addition to union wealth change, some studies have looked at employee layoffs, pension 
fund terminations and other sources of target shareholder gains to test the wealth transfer 
hypothesis. Bhagat et al. (1990) and Bhide (1990) undertake case studies of small hostile 
takeovers, and conclude that although takeovers cause layoffs, the cost savings from these 
layoffs cover only 10-20% of the premium and therefore they are not the driving forces of 
takeovers. In addition to this Pontiff et al. (1990) report that 15% of hostile acquirers and 8% 
of friendly acquirers reverse pension assets and this can account for about 11% of the 
premium in the cases where they actually occur. Although pension plan terminations are 
higher after hostile takeovers than after friendly takeovers, the authors conclude that the size 
of the terminated contracts is not significant enough to explain the shareholders‟ gain. 
3.4.2 Takeover announcement gains of target firm shareholders 
It is now a stylised fact that target shareholders capture the majority of gains from takeover 
activities. In the US target shareholders gain 16-30% (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Bradley et 
al., 1988; Andrade et al., 2001). Franks and Harris (1989) conclude that after controlling for 
the takeover type (tender offer or other), UK and US target shareholders‟ takeover 
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announcement returns are „strikingly similar‟. For example, UK target shareholders gain 25-
30% abnormal returns (Franks and Harris, 1989; Kennedy and Limmark, 1996). European 
target shareholders earn a short-term takeover announcement abnormal return of about 10% 
and a cumulative abnormal return of 23%, including the pre-announcement price run-up over 
two months (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Similarly, Campa and Hernando (2004) report 
9% abnormal returns for target shareholders in Europe. 
3.4.3 Takeover announcement gains of acquiring firm shareholders 
Evidence on short-run bidder returns is mixed. In the US, Jensen and Ruback (1983) report 
positive returns to bidders in successful tender offers (4%) and zero returns in successful 
mergers, and negative returns in unsuccessful tender offers and mergers. However, in contrast 
to this Dodd (1980) reports significant negative abnormal returns in both successful mergers (-
7.25%) and cancelled mergers (-5.5%). Similarly, Malatesta (1983) provides evidence of a 
negative effect of takeovers on bidder shareholders‟ wealth by two measures: abnormal dollar 
return and abnormal rate of return. Andrade et al. (2001) report that the three-day abnormal 
return for an acquirer is -0.7% (-3.8% in a longer window of time), which is not statistically 
significant.  
In the UK, Firth (1980) finds that bidder shareholders lose significantly around takeover 
announcements (-6.7%), while Franks and Harris (1989) report that bidder gains are close to 
zero or modest. Similarly, Limmack (1991) reports that bidders‟ announcement-period 
abnormal returns are insignificant (-0.2%). More recent studies show that upon takeover 
announcement acquirers‟ wealth reduces significantly: 1.4% for the overall sample 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003), 1.5% for friendly and 1.9% for hostile takeovers 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006). Similarly, Conn et al. (2005) report that UK domestic public 
acquirers earn significant negative abnormal returns (-0.99%), while cross-border public 
acquirers earn zero abnormal returns. This study shows that share prices of public companies 
which acquire private companies appreciate significantly (0.86%) upon the announcement of 
takeovers. 
Earlier event studies report that acquirers earn a zero mean abnormal rate of return around a 
takeover announcement. However, there is some evidence that acquirers‟ takeover 
announcement gains become worse over time. Recent studies find small, but statistically 
significant, negative abnormal announcement-period returns for acquiring firm shareholders 
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(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Conn et al., 2005; Cosh et al., 2006) . In Europe bidders gain 
a statistically significant abnormal return of 0.7% upon the bid announcement, but Campa and 
Hernando (2004) report zero abnormal returns.  
3.4.4 Long-run abnormal returns of acquiring firm shareholders  
Early US event studies reveal negative long-run post-takeover abnormal returns for acquiring 
firm shareholders (Travlos, 1987). However, Franks et al. (1991) conclude that previously-
reported post-takeover abnormal returns may be due to deficiencies of the applied benchmark 
models, as their improved methodology does not provide any abnormal returns. As in other 
studies, acquirers earn abnormal returns when conventional benchmarks are used, however, 
these abnormal returns disappear when abnormal returns are regressed on benchmark 
portfolios, matched on firm size, past returns and dividend yield. This study measures 
abnormal returns as the intercept of the regression of the acquiring firm‟s abnormal returns on 
the excess returns of ex-ante mean-variance efficient portfolios, constructed taking into 
consideration different factors, including firm size, dividend yield and past returns. However, 
adjusting for the size effect and dividend yield effect, the results of the Agrawal et al. (1992) 
study show that acquirers‟ wealth is reduced by a significant 10% over the period of five years 
following takeovers. Moeller et al. (2005) report that during the latest takeover wave in 1998-
2001 US acquiring firm shareholders lost 12% of their investment. 
In the UK, Franks and Harris (1989) report that for a large sample of takeovers market model 
produce significant negative abnormal returns (-12.6%), while the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) produces significant positive abnormal returns (+4.5%) for bidding 
companies. Using different asset pricing models, Limmack (1991) and Gregory (1997) 
conclude that in the long run shareholder wealth effect of takeovers is unambiguously 
negative. Comparing domestic and cross-border public and private acquisitions, Conn et al. 
(2005) report that acquisitions of domestic public companies result in significant negative 
returns of 19.78%, while cross-border public acquisitions result in significantly negative 
returns of 32.33%. In contrast, Higson  and Elliott (1998) show that for the sample of 776 
companies which made acquisitions during 1975 – 1990, the abnormal returns in the three 
years following takeover are zero.  
Furthermore, the research provides evidence that the magnitude of bidder returns is related to 
the bidders‟ characteristics (size and valuation), payment mode and takeover mode. Loughran 
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and Vijh (1997) report that in cash-paid acquisitions shareholders gain 19%, whereas in stock-
exchange acquisitions shareholders lose 25% during a five-year post-takeover period. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) report that on average shareholders lose 15% of their wealth 
in the long run and the magnitude of the loss differs according to the type of acquirer. For 
example, glamour (high Price/Earnings ratio) acquirers‟ abnormal returns range from -47% to 
-17%, while value (low Price/Earnings ratio) acquirers‟ abnormal returns range from -9% to -
2%. Takeover mode also affects acquirers‟ post-acquisition performance: Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2006) report that friendly acquirers lose 10%, multiple hostile acquirers lose 5% and 
single hostile acquirers‟ wealth does not change in the long run. 
Consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), Lang et al. (1991) argue that 
cash flow explains US acquirers‟ returns. In the UK, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) provide 
evidence which supports the view that high cash flow is associated with value decreasing 
acquisitions. In contrast to this, conducting similar empirical research to that of Lang et al. 
(1991), Gregory (2005) fails to find support for the free cash flow hypothesis: in the long run 
the acquirers with high cash flow perform better than the acquirers with low cash flow. 
Briefly, these studies report significant long-term negative abnormal returns to the acquiring 
firm shares, which result in a negative wealth effect in combination with the target 
shareholders‟ gain around the bid announcement period (Andrade et al., 2001).  
Slusky and Caves (1991) point out that zero mean combined abnormal rates of return for 
target and bidder need not indicate positive overall gains to shareholders, as such a typical 
bidder is much larger than a typical target, meaning that abnormal dollar returns may be 
negative. The Moeller et al. (2005) study results confirm this proposition; they report that 
acquiring firms on average gain 1.1%, but in dollar terms they lose $25.2 million per 
acquisition. They argue that this contradictory result is due to combining small and large firms 
in one sample. Their analysis shows that shareholders of small firms earn $9 billion from 
acquisition during the period of 1980-2001, whereas the shareholders from large firms lose 
$312 billion. Their results show that the managerial hubris hypothesis is more applicable to 
large firms than to small firms. They conclude that the size effect is robust and persistent over 
time.  
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If bidder returns are not positive why do firms make acquisitions? Schipper and Thompson 
(1983) argue that acquiring firms gain abnormal returns well before the announcement of 
takeovers due to the leakage of information on the corporate expansion programmes. Weston 
et al. (2004) argue that zero mean returns are consistent with the competitive market: in this 
market shareholders should only earn the cost of their capital. An alternative explanation is 
that if a firm does not merge with another firm, then a third firm may take this opportunity and 
in this case the profitability of the first firm will be even worse than in the case of merger. 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) develop a model where they show that even if a merger 
reduces profit when compared to the initial situation, it may increase profits when compared to 
the relevant alternative – in this case, another merger between rival firms. 
3.4.5 Alternative explanations for the distribution of takeover gains  
There are several explanations for the capture of most takeover gains by targets. First, markets 
expect that takeovers facilitate more efficient redeployment of target firm assets. Therefore, in 
a competitive market, a high premium is a fair price, not an abnormal one, to be paid to 
shareholders (Weston et al., 2004). Thus, target shareholders may only be receiving the „fair 
value‟ of their shares, compensating for the past poor performance of managers. In a 
competitive auction this gain can be viewed as the price that the next best efficient 
management team is going to pay to target shareholders, because acquirers believe that they 
can improve the target‟s performance. Thus, this increase in share prices reflects the market‟s 
anticipation of the target‟s future improved performance, i.e. the belief that in the future their 
assets will be used as efficiently as other assets. 
In addition to this, the literature points out three conditions that enable target shareholders to 
capture most of the takeover related gains: „free-riding‟ by target firm shareholders (Grossman 
and Hart, 1980), pre-emptive bidding, that is the possibility of a competitive bidder appearing 
(Fishman, 1988, 1989) and takeover defences
27
. 
 
                                                 
27 There are other views on this. For example, Bradley et al. (1983) argue that to achieve synergy assets should be re-allocated 
and combined with acquiring firm assets. In this process the target shareholders have decision-making power and therefore 
they are capable of capturing most of the takeover gains. When new information is released about the re-allocation of assets, 
the market takes into consideration the revealed opportunities and revises the asset valuation on the basis of the expectation of 
future changes in these variables. In this situation other informed companies may also bid for control over the target, thereby 
enabling the target shareholders to capture most of the gains. 
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The ‘free-rider’ problem 
The „free-rider‟ problem arises in the case of widely dispersed ownership, where every small 
shareholder thinks that his decision to tender his share will not affect the takeover results and, 
therefore, may not tender his shares, expecting higher benefit from the improved firm 
performance after the takeover. As a result a raider may not be able to gain the majority of 
shares that enables him to exert corporate control over the firm. Thus, to secure control over 
target firm assets bidders have to pay a high premium.    
Pre-emptive bidding 
The arrival of a competitor creates an auction-style contest among bidders and enables targets 
to capture the majority of takeover gains. Fishman (1988, 1989) develops models which show 
that for bidders it is more appropriate to put in a high bid from the start of the takeover battle, 
rather than raising it gradually after the arrival of competing bids. According to this model, the 
initial offer made by the first bidder conveys useful information, which can be analysed by 
other possible bidders and constitutes the basis for their decision-making. Acquiring further 
information about the target is costly. The second bidder analyses the first bidder‟s offer and 
compares it with his valuation. Based on this analysis the second bidder decides whether to 
acquire further information, necessary for making a higher offer. In this „strategic interaction 
between bidders‟, the initial high bid of the first bidder signals a high valuation and thereby 
deters possible competition. Therefore the first bidder takes the consequences of this 
interaction into consideration when formulating his initial offer and this leads to a high-bid 
premium. 
Size effect 
One of the reasons why bidder shareholders do not gain significant positive abnormal returns 
is that they are very large in comparison to the acquired firms, so when the value created by 
takeover is divided between large bidder and small target, the effect of the divided gain may 
be insignificant to the large bidder and significant to the small target, depending on the size of 
synergy. Moeller et al. (2005) find a significant size effect on takeover announcement returns 
on shareholders. Small acquirers earn 2% higher abnormal returns than large acquirers. 
Additionally large firms often undertake several acquisitions over time and the market expects 
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new takeover announcements well before the actual announcement. This expectation results is 
a smaller price effect when a particular type of takeover is announced.  
Takeover defences 
Takeovers affect the wealth distribution among different stakeholders. For example, managers 
and employees may lose their jobs or may have slower wage growth. Therefore, an active 
MCC may discourage managers from making investments to develop firm-specific human 
resources or may push them to sacrifice long-term strategic projects for the benefit of short-
term profitable projects. In short, takeover threat may cause the divergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders. Therefore, in order to align managers‟ incentives with the 
shareholders‟ incentives and to prevent the undervalued transfer of assets, it is desirable to 
grant managers some kind of anti-takeover defensive measures. Berglof and Burkart (2003) 
define defensive measures as „changes in the firm‟s assets or liabilities, meant to make 
takeovers unprofitable, to be implemented when control is threatened by an outside bid‟28. 
Strong defensive measures reduce the number of takeovers with their disciplinary role, and 
therefore they should be subject to shareholders‟ approval. At the same time there are a 
number of defensive measures that are not subject to shareholders‟ approval. One example of 
such defence measures is the employee commitment to the business.  
Employment policy can be used as an anti-takeover device. Pagano and Volpin (2005a) 
formally show that it is preferable for the incumbent management enter into implicit contracts 
with the employees, which can serve as takeover defences. When the private benefit of control 
is high and managerial ownership is low, managers may offer high wages to workers, turning 
employees into a „white squire‟29. In addition to this, they may offer long-term contracts, 
which are not subject to re-negotiations in future, thereby transforming employees into a 
„shark repellent‟. At the same time managers do not exert enough effort to monitor employees 
too strictly. Employees fight hostile takeovers to protect their high salaries and long-term 
                                                 
28 The literature distinguishes two types of corporate anti-takeover measures: (1) measures that require shareholders’ 
approval – poison pills, staggered boards, blank check preferred stock, and others; (2) measures that do not require  
shareholders’ ratification – increase in profits, dividends or asset revaluation, corporate restructuring. Jarrell et al. (1988) 
conclude that defence devices that require shareholder approval are less likely to be harmful to shareholders‟ wealth than 
those that can be implemented without shareholders‟ approval. 
29 As discussed in Pagano and Volpin (2005a), „a white squire‟ is a friendly investor who purchases a stake in the target of 
hostile takeover to fend off a raider, without taking control of the company. It differs from a „white knight‟, who is a friendly 
investor that takes over a company instead of the raider. „A shark repellent‟ is an amendment to a company charter to make it 
unattractive to the raiders.  
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contracts. The MCC is expected to correct such managerial behaviour; however, managers use 
such employment policies to defend themselves against being disciplined by takeovers.   
Pagano and Volpin (2005a) suggest that such employment policy-based takeover defences are 
most efficient in those countries with strong employment protection laws. Such laws should 
limit raiders‟ ability to renegotiate labour contracts and as a result hostile takeovers should 
occur less frequently in these countries. In LMEs a strong conflict between managers and 
shareholders may urge managers to make alliances with employees. However, weak 
employment protection laws in these economies may make long-term employment contracts 
an ineffective takeover deterrent. In this case managers may offer employee share ownership 
plans as a means of defence (Pagano and Volpin, 2005a).    
Managers threatened by hostile takeovers are discouraged from undertaking long-term 
projects, such as R&D or employee training. In this case managers may only undertake those 
projects that superficially boost short-term performance or sell off valuable assets to sustain 
periodic financial indicators. Therefore, adoption of anti-takeover measures encourages 
managers and employees to pursue long-term business strategies and investments. At the same 
time, anti-takeover measures lead to substantial bid increases and benefit target shareholders 
by enabling them to get a higher premium. In fact, some research, such as that of Jensen 
(1988), argues that strong defence strategies may result in higher bid offers and protect 
shareholders from selling their shares for unfairly low prices
30
.   
3.4.6 Limitations of prior research and further research issues  
There is a widely accepted consensus in the literature that acquired firm shareholders earn 
economically large and statistically significant share price appreciation on takeover bid 
announcements. Although the effect of corporate takeovers on shareholders is well 
                                                 
30 However, over-adoption of anti-takeover defences may reduce the disciplinary role of takeovers and may negatively affect 
shareholder value. Therefore, it is important to find a balanced trade-off between the benefits of takeovers‟ disciplinary role 
and the benefits of protecting business from being taken over. In this process both shareholders and managers‟ interests 
should be considered. Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) suggest that regulations play an important role in explaining the 
differences in this area. They point out that UK companies are the most vulnerable to hostile takeovers, while in other EU 
countries and in the US the successful completion of a hostile takeover is more difficult. In the US companies are allowed to 
use plenty of defence strategies, including poison pills, greenmails, standstill agreements, golden parachutes or going private. 
In the US the fiduciary duty rule obliges boards of companies to act in the best interests of their investors. On the basis of this 
rule management of the target companies can stop takeovers simply by saying that they are acting in the best interests of their 
shareholders. In the EU concentrated ownership and the presence of large share ownership is a big obstacle in takeovers. 
Moreover, a close bank-firm relationship, dual class shares, pyramiding and cross-holdings prevent takeover activity. In 
contrast, in the UK the anti-takeover defence strategies are limited to financial responses, corporate restructuring, white 
knights, legal or political responses. These differences raise important policy-related research questions. 
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documented, the empirical association between shareholders‟ gains and merger-related 
changes in employee wealth concessions is inconclusive. Understanding this association 
would clarify the reasons for post-merger employee layoffs and would contribute to an 
assessment of the efficacy of the market model of corporate governance.  
As regards the literature on shareholder gains, although the effect of takeovers on target 
shareholders‟ wealth is well documented, the evidence on the effect of takeovers on acquirer 
shareholders‟ wealth is still debateable: early evidence shows insignificant wealth change, 
while more recent studies show negative abnormal returns for acquirers both in the short run 
and the long run. At the same time, it is still unclear whether reported negative long-run 
abnormal returns are the real effect of takeovers or whether they are a result of some type of 
mis-specification of abnormal generating models or testing procedures
31
. Furthermore, prior 
research draws conclusions on the efficacy of the MCC based on the magnitude of abnormal 
stock price returns, assuming capital market efficiency. However, short-run abnormal returns 
are not enough to prove the positive role of takeovers, especially when long-run negative 
abnormal returns exceed these short-run gains. 
Views on the sources of the shareholder gains are also controversial. In spite of the growing 
empirical evidence on the negative wealth effect for acquirers, in practice the volume of 
takeovers is growing by number and value of deals over time. One of the reasons for this 
contradiction between research and practice may be the fact that research has not been able to 
fully explain the sources of takeover gains, and, in particular, it has not been able to explain 
the reasons for the „post-takeover performance puzzle‟ (acquirers‟ performance decline), 
although shareholders‟ wealth change is well documented. In short, there is no consensus 
answer to the question of why the market reacts to takeover announcement in the fashion 
described above. Secondly, the question of how do takeovers create or destroy shareholder 
value is still unanswered and the research has not yet determined the real economic sources of 
takeover gains. 
Another limitation of the literature in this area is that the economic role of takeovers is 
assessed on the basis of accounting or stock price performance, without analysing the 
underlying factors that may lead to success or failure of such transactions. However, assessing 
                                                 
31 The methodology chapter discusses some of the conclusions of the empirical research on this issue. 
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takeovers‟ economic effect on the basis of the abnormal stock price returns requires the 
validity of market efficiency hypothesis, which itself is still being debated among researchers. 
The value-redistribution theory of takeovers suggests that employee wealth concessions 
through job cuts and slower wage growth are a main source of takeover gains. However, most 
empirical work investigating wealth transfer from employees to shareholders can be 
considered as an indirect test of this theory. Only a few studies have investigated the direct 
association between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions post-merger. The 
majority of these studies reject the idea of wealth transfer from workers to shareholders, but do 
not propose an alternative hypothesis to explain shareholder gains. Therefore it can be argued 
that the extant evidence on this issue is inconclusive.  
On the basis of the predictions of the value-creation theory of takeovers it can be argued that 
takeovers should benefit all stakeholders
32
. However, no study has investigated the association 
between acquiring firm shareholders‟ long-run gains and employee wealth concessions.  
To provide further evidence on this issue we directly investigate the association between 
shareholder gains and employment. This thesis examines the following question:  
Q3. Do merger-related shareholder gains explain post-merger changes in jobs and wages?   
Evidence on this issue would contribute to a better understanding of whether capital influences 
labour-related decision-making through ownership change. Such evidence would also help us 
to better understand the efficacy of the corporate governance mechanisms in LMEs.  
3.5 Labour demand effects of takeovers  
According to Cappelli (2000) changes in the input mix within a given production function can 
be used to reduce demand for labour. In its turn, decline in labour demand could be one of the 
main causes of post-takeover workforce reductions. Takeovers, as a main business strategy, 
may be used to bring about changes in the production function input. For example, takeovers 
may eliminate duplicative activities or discipline inefficient management, which may adjust 
the employment level to a more optimal level. Post-merger synergy could be achieved by 
using lower labour input to produce the combined output of merging firms. Similarly, 
                                                 
32 This idea will be further elaborated in the empirical chapters.  
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disciplining inefficient managers or those enjoying a „quiet life‟ may also lead to using a lower 
level of labour input than would be used independently by companies in the case of no merger. 
In other words, in both cases, the organisation of labour may change, as suggested by Conyon 
et al. (2002a). This means that takeovers reduce labour demand and managers should 
undertake post-merger workforce reductions based on the level of labour demand decline. In 
this regard, this thesis investigates whether there is any association between post-merger 
decline in labour demand and workforce reductions.   
Recently there has been significant research which shows that takeovers in fact reduce labour 
demand (Conyon et al., 2001, 2002a, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). This research 
empirically shows that the labour demand decline is higher in related mergers (due to synergy) 
and hostile acquisitions (due to management disciplining and re-allocation of resources to their 
most efficient users), than in unrelated and hostile mergers. Labour demand decline has been 
suggested as one of the main reasons for post-merger workforce reductions.  
Industrial economics research investigates the effect of ownership change on production and 
its components: output and input. Output is measured by sales and input is measured by capital 
and labour. As labour is one of the main inputs of the production function, researchers mainly 
focus on the labour demand effects of ownership change. In this connection we briefly discuss 
below the productivity concept and the Coubb-Douglas production function (Cobb and 
Douglas, 1928), which is used in determining the implications of mergers and acquisitions for 
labour demand. 
3.5.1 Productivity and production function 
Early research in this area analyses the effect of ownership change on productivity that could 
be quantified using different measures. One measure is Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which 
is the ratio of output to all inputs, including labour, capital, raw material and other 
miscellaneous goods and service inputs (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1992). In the literature output 
is usually measured by valued-added in the production process or value of shipments (sales 
value), the latter being the most commonly used measure, as the former is not always 
available. However, it is difficult to measure accurately all relevant inputs at the firm level and 
therefore TFP has been used for plant level studies only. Alternatively productivity could be 
measured for each individual input. For examples, researchers have extensively used the 
labour productivity measure, which is defined as the ratio of total output to labour input. 
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Bartelsman and Doms (2000) suggest that the choice between TFP and the labour productivity 
measurement is fundamental, because increases in labour productivity can result from 
increases in capital-labour ratio, without changing the underlying technology.  
Thus, productivity is measured as the ratio of output to all inputs. After some re-arrangement, 
output can be expressed as a function of labour and capital. Cobb and Douglas (1928) first 
formalised this relationship, showing production as a function of two main inputs – labour and 
capital:  
baCALQ   (1) 
where Q  is production output, L  is labour, C  is capital goods (or fixed assets), which are 
themselves produced goods, and A  is a constant term, which indicates how much output we 
would get if we used one unit of each input (labour and capital). Parameters a and b indicate 
how the amount of output changes if we change labour and capital, respectively. If a+b=1 
there are constant returns to scale, in which case output increases proportionately with an 
increase in inputs. That is to say, if we multiply both labour and capital by a factor of A  then 
P  will be increased by A  times. If a+b>1 there are increasing returns to scale, in which case 
output increases more than proportionately to the increase in inputs. In other words, if we 
scale up both labour and capital by A, we can increase the output by more than A. When a 
merger results in increasing returns to scale, then there are economies of scale, which could be 
achieved by reducing cost per unit through either increasing production or reducing one of the 
inputs. If a+b<1 there are decreasing returns to scale, in which case output increases less than 
proportionately to the increase in inputs: increasing labour and capital by A only increases the 
output by the amount of less than A. In this case there are diseconomies of scale
33
.  
3.5.2 Dynamic labour demand adjustment 
Taking logs of both sides of the Cobb and Douglas (1928) production function produces the 
following linear equation:  
iiii uCLQ lnlnln 21                    (2) 
                                                 
33 Other related concepts from microeconomics are economies of scope and the minimum efficient scale. Economies of scope 
are cost savings that arise when a firm produces two or more outputs using the same set of resources. The minimum efficient 
scale is defined as the output level beyond which the firm can make no further savings in long-run average cost through 
further expansion. In other words, the minimum efficient set is achieved when all economies of scale are exhausted.  
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where variables are as explained under equation (1). As suggested by Conyon et al. (2002a), 
mergers may change employment levels from one optimal level to another, thereby allowing 
firms to optimise profit maximisation. In other words, if two merging businesses exhibit 
economies of scale in the use of labour, then the combined firm should be able to produce the 
combined output with the smaller number of employees, as profit maximising firms produce 
the required amount of output with minimum inputs. This means that profit maximising firms 
should adjust their labour to this new optimal level. If the combined production technology 
exhibits constant returns to scale, the combined firm should maintain the level of output and 
employment equal to the sum of those of the merging firms. Alternatively, if the technology 
exhibits increasing returns to scale then the combined firm should adjust employment level by 
decreasing the total number of employees to maintain the combined output level. The main 
theoretical argument of these studies is that if takeovers result in an optimum employment 
level different from the total employment level, then a profit maximizing firm will adjust its 
labour force to this optimum level. 
However, the movement from one optimal employment level to another may be a dynamic 
process, not an instantaneous one, as there are some costs associated with workforce 
adjustment (Hamermesh, 1993). Therefore acquirers may not change the number of employees 
instantaneously. Hamermesh (1993) suggests that „true dynamic responses to production-
related shocks take time, because it pays employers to adjust slowly to whatever shocks have 
altered equilibrium. This author defines the dynamics of labour demand as the time and the 
paths that the workforce adjustment process takes in moving towards a new steady state.   
Using the equation (2), Conyon et al. (2002a) develop a dynamic labour demand model, which 
estimates a derived demand for labour, controlling for the changes in production and labour to 
capital cost ratio. These authors argue that as labour adjustment is a costly process, 
employment levels adjust to optimal level with a delay. In other words, changes in 
employment levels follow changes in output or labour productivity with a delay. Optimal 
employment levels should be determined on the basis of the production technology 
characteristics. However, it may take several years to achieve the optimal level due to cost.  
As labour demand adjustment is a dynamic process and it may take several years to achieve an 
optimal level of labour demand, prior research suggests to analyse the workforce adjustments 
using a panel dataset (Conyon et al., 2002a). Furthermore, in the dynamic process the current 
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realisation of the dependent variable depends on its own past realisations. In this particular 
case, the current levels of labour may depend on the previous employment levels. Therefore, 
lagged levels of observable variables are included in the model to account for the dynamics in 
the labour demand adjustment to control for the possible exogeneity. Additionally, as it is 
difficult to measure inter-firm variations in the user cost of capital, prior research normalises 
the user cost of capital to unity (Haynes and Thompson, 1999a; Conyon et al., 2001; Amess 
and Wright, 2007).  
After taking into consideration these changes, Conyon et al. (2002a) propose to estimate post-
merger labour demand change using the following panel data based regression model:   
tiititititititi vfMqqwwll ,01,1,01,1,01,, ,        (3) 
where til ,  is the logarithm of employment, tiw ,  is the logarithm of real wages, tiq ,  is the 
logarithm of real output of firm i in period t, M is a merger dummy regressor, which takes 1 
for merged firms and 0 for control firms, if  indicates time constant firm-specific unobservable 
variables, that will be removed after first differentiation using panel data
34
; itv is the usual error 
term. This dummy regressor indicates the difference between the labour demand of the 
merging and non-merging firms, after controlling for changes in output and wages. In order to 
measure the effect of mergers on employment (and wages) this model uses panel data 
Below we discuss some of the prior empirical studies which investigate the labour demand 
change and post-merger workforce adjustments using the similar regression methodology, as 
described in equation (3). Most of these studies use panel datasets, although they use different 
regression estimators.  
3.5.3 Evidence on the labour demand decline and workforce reductions post-merger 
Early studies concentrate on the labour productivity effect of ownership change. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1992) find that low levels of initial productivity are associated with the high 
probability of subsequent ownership change and ownership-changing plants achieve higher 
productivity growth than non-ownership-changing plants during post-takeover years. 
                                                 
34 In econometrics the above model is called an autoregressive distributed lag model, the estimation methods of which are 
discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis.  
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McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) and McGuckin et al. (1998) also show that ownership change 
causes further improvement in labour productivity.  
More recent research concentrates on estimating the changes in labour demand after mergers, 
using the equation (3). Conyon et al. (2002a) find that mergers cause substantial and 
statistically significant reductions in labour demand: related mergers reduce labour demand by 
19%, while this decline is 8% after unrelated mergers; hostile takeovers reduce labour demand 
by 17%, while the decline is 9% after friendly mergers. Therefore these authors conclude that 
takeovers cause „significant rationalisation in the use of labour as firms reduce joint output and 
increase efficiency post-merger‟. These results indicate that related and hostile takeovers lead 
to efficiency improvement, as confirmed by steep labour demand decline after such takeovers. 
Using a similar estimation method, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) report that European mergers 
reduce labour demand by about 10% compared to pre-merger levels.  
However, Conyon et al. (2001) show that hostile and friendly takeovers cause equally high 
levels of labour demand decline, although workforce reductions are greater after hostile 
takeovers than after friendly mergers. Once the above dynamic labour demand estimation 
model is adopted to control for the changes in output and wages, the results show no 
significant difference in the employment effect of hostile versus friendly takeovers. The 
authors explain this as being caused by the higher level of divestments after hostile 
acquisitions. 
As previously discussed, workforce adjustment is a dynamic process and it may take some 
time to achieve the optimal employment level. Therefore prior research also investigates the 
long-run effect of mergers and acquisitions on employment, in addition to their short-run 
effect. Conyon et al. (2002a) show that related acquisitions still reduce labour for two years 
post-acquisitions, while hostile takeovers still reduce labour demand four years after mergers, 
due to dynamic adjustment. 
Using a smaller sample, Conyon et al. (2004) find that employment does not change, but profit 
per employee increases significantly post-merger. Therefore the authors argue that the increase 
in profitability results from increased labour productivity. As profit per employee is higher in 
related acquisitions than in unrelated ones, the authors conclude that the efficiency 
enhancement effect of takeovers is greater in related acquisitions. Furthermore, the mean 
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operating profit per employee increases by about £400 in acquiring firms three years after 
takeovers. The increase is higher for related acquisitions (£944) than in unrelated acquisitions. 
Thus, Conyon et al. (2004) find that both profitability and wages rise post-merger. 
The overall inference from these studies is that mergers improve efficiency in labour usage 
and workforce reductions are justified by post-merger labour decline and improved employee 
profitability (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004) or by asset divestments 
(Conyon et al., 2001). This is further supported by recent evidence coming from the other side 
of the research, exploring the efficiency effects of takeovers when the MCC activity is limited: 
what happens if anti-takeover regulations are strengthened and the MCC activity is restricted? 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that adoption of anti-takeover laws negatively affects 
firm performance: after the adoption of anti-takeover laws total factor productivity and 
profitability decline. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) conclude that takeovers do not involve 
rent transfer from other stakeholders to shareholders, but do improve economic performance.  
At the same time the literature reports that takeovers may alter demand for labour differently 
in different economies. The authors relate these varying effects of takeovers on employment to 
the differences in labour regulations: in the US labour markets are less regulated than in 
Europe. The labour market outcome of takeovers depends on employment protection rules and 
the rigidity of the market. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) argue that high labour adjustment costs 
in Europe force firms to carry excess labour. Only mergers and acquisitions enable firms to 
achieve the desired employment level, as the new management team is less likely to be 
committed to upholding existing contracts with employees. In contrast, in the US low labour 
adjustment costs allow firms to continuously adjust employment levels to optimal levels. 
Therefore firms in the US do not need to change ownership to shed excess labour. Empirical 
results provided by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) confirm this differential effect of mergers on 
labour: mergers and acquisitions reduce labour demand by more in Europe than in the US.  
3.5.4 Limitations of prior research and further research issues  
The value creation theory of takeovers suggests that labour demand decline should be higher 
in related acquisitions (due to the synergy effect) and in hostile takeovers (due to the 
disciplining effect of such takeovers), than in unrelated or friendly acquisitions, respectively. 
In related acquisitions the labour demand decline may occur as a result of elimination of 
duplicative activities. Labour demand decline could be higher in a hostile takeover because of 
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the management disciplining effect of such takeovers. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) show that 
labour demand decline is higher in the tender offer (hostile in nature) acquisitions. Therefore 
they conclude that this is consistent with the breach of trust hypothesis. However, it does not 
need to be about rent transfer; it could still be about the disciplining of inefficient managers 
(for example, those wishing to preserve „quiet life‟).   
However, no prior research has tested whether there is an association between labour demand 
decline and actual employee layoffs. Although previous research compares the employment 
effect of related versus unrelated and hostile versus friendly acquisitions, these studies do not 
investigate the differences in labour demand decline for acquisitions that involve employee 
layoffs and acquisitions that do not involve layoffs. If takeovers are undertaken with value 
enhancing objectives then labour demand decline should be higher in the acquisitions that 
involve layoffs than in the acquisitions that do not involve layoffs. Therefore research in this 
area could be further improved by analysing the association between the reduction in the 
absolute number of employees and labour demand decline post-merger. We investigate the 
following research question: 
Q4. Does labour demand decline cause post-merger employee layoffs?   
This research provides new evidence on the causes of post-merger workforce reductions, in 
particular on whether such reductions are undertaken to realise the synergy gains created by 
mergers. If post-merger workforce reductions are caused by labour demand decline, then the 
labour demand decline should be higher in mergers that involve employee layoffs than in 
mergers that do not. Understanding this issue is important, as previously discussed, because 
managers may undertake post-merger employee layoffs, not only on the basis of labour 
demand decline, but also for many other reasons, such as to cover high premiums or to create 
shareholder value at the expense of labour.   
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the literature related to each of the four research questions to be 
empirically investigated in this thesis. Limitations of prior research in each of these four areas 
have been identified and further research questions have been formulated. On the basis of the 
literature review several possible factors have been identified that might prompt post-takeover 
workforce adjustments. These are poor pre-takeover performance of both acquired and 
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acquiring firms, management disciplining, synergy created by mergers, breach of trust and 
managerial hubris (measured by high premiums paid for targets).  
It has been revealed that post-merger performance decline may also lead to workforce 
reductions. Prior theoretical literature suggests that post-merger workforce reductions may 
negatively or positively affect firm performance. Although the effect of downsizing on firm 
performance is well established, evidence on the performance effect of the merger-related 
workforce reductions is limited. The extant evidence suggests that such workforce reductions 
lead to deterioration in firm performance (Krishnan et al., 2007).  
It has also been discovered that prior theoretical literature suggests that shareholder gains and 
post-merger employee wealth concessions may be negatively or positively related. In 
particular, the value-redistribution theory suggests negative association between these 
variables, meaning that takeovers facilitate rent transfer from employees to shareholders. In 
contrast, the value-creation theory suggests a positive association between these variables, 
meaning that takeovers lead to rent-sharing among different groups of stakeholders. However, 
empirical evidence on the direct association on this issue is limited.  
Finally, it has been revealed that recent empirical research shows that mergers reduce labour 
demand. This decline in labour demand may trigger workforce reductions post-merger. The 
research in the area can be further extended with the new evidence on the association between 
the derived labour demand decline and changes in the absolute number of employees. 
In overall, it has been noted that prior research provides substantial knowledge on the labour 
effects of takeovers. The empirical chapters of this thesis contribute to this research by 
providing new evidence on the issue from different perspectives and attempt to make some 
inference about the effectiveness of corporate governance on the basis of this evidence. Before 
this, the next chapter discusses the research methods to be applied in the empirical chapters.  
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter first describes the sample selection process and presents the characteristics of the 
sample. Next the chapter provides an overview of research strategy and overall research 
methodology. As the main objective of this thesis is to investigate the employment effects of 
takeovers, the chapter synthesizes previously applied research methods on measuring 
workforce and wage changes following mergers. 
The main part of the chapter identifies specific research methods to be applied to investigate 
the research questions outlined in the previous chapter. The first and second research questions 
are concerned with investigating the reasons for merger-related employee layoffs and their 
impact on post-takeover operating performance. In this regard, this chapter discusses 
previously applied research methods of measuring operating performance change following 
mergers. Specifically, we discuss the change method and regression-based method of 
measuring takeovers‟ impact on operating performance.  
The third research question is concerned with investigating the link between shareholder gains 
and changes in both jobs and wages post-merger. For this purpose the chapter introduces event 
study methodology and then discusses the methods for calculation of short- and long-run stock 
price abnormal returns. Specifically, this chapter discusses two models for calculating short-
run cumulative abnormal returns: the market model and the market-adjusted model
35
. 
Similarly, two methods of estimating long-run abnormal returns will be discussed: Buy-and-
hold Abnormal Returns and Calendar Time Abnormal Returns.  
The fourth research question is aimed at examining the post-merger decline in labour demand 
for different types of mergers. Labour demand adjustment may be dynamic. Therefore we use 
a model that includes a lagged employment variable as the dependent variable. Together with 
the existence of the unobservable variable this creates an endogeneity problem and therefore 
we use panel data estimation methods to deal with this problem. This chapter provides an 
overview of panel data estimation methods. 
                                                 
35 In this context the market model is a model used to calculate the short-run CAR, which should not be confused with the 
market model of corporate governance. 
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4.2 Data and sample selection 
4.2.1 Data requirements of the research 
To investigate the labour effect of ownership change we collect data on a sample of UK public 
takeovers. The UK corporate governance system, where the MCC is very active, is a „flagship‟ 
example of the market model of corporate governance. At the same time, as Pagano and 
Volpin (2005b) report, during the 1990s the UK shareholder protection index was the highest, 
but the employment protection index was the lowest, out of 21 OECD countries. Therefore a 
sample of UK public takeovers would be an ideal sample to use to investigate the employment 
effect of takeovers.  
We need to have data on takeover deals, including data on merging firms‟ names, takeover 
announcement dates, takeover completion dates, premiums, takeover mode and payment 
mode. These data have been hand collected from the Acquisitions Monthly journal.  
We need to measure workforce and wage changes as well as changes in both operating and 
stock price performance post-merger. Operational and financial data, including the number of 
workers, average wages, operating performance and share price performance data has been 
collected from Datastream. This data has been collected over a seven-year period (three years 
before and three years after the takeover completion year) for each observation. If data is 
missing from Datastream, then we have obtained the missing data from annual reports of the 
companies, downloaded from Nexis
®
. The board composition and ownership-related data has 
been collected from Hemmington-Scott Corporate Registers.    
4.2.2 Bias arising from unit of observation and firm size effect 
It is obvious that using data on acquired plants produces more accurate results than using the 
firm level data, which aggregates the data from acquired and acquiring plants during a post-
merger period. Such aggregation of data at firm level may distort the effects of mergers on 
operating and financial performance measures, including labour data (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 
1990; McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995a; Harris et al., 2005). Therefore some researchers suggest 
using plant level data in order to accurately measure the effect of mergers on employment.  
However, there may be several sources of potential bias when combined firm level data 
obtained from annual accounts (which is the primary source of Datastream data) is used, 
instead of acquired firm or plant level data, in analysing merger-related workforce change. 
90 
First, as theory suggests, merger-related employee layoffs may usually happen in the acquired 
firms (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). As post-merger annual accounts are combined for the 
acquired and acquiring firms, this merger-related employee layoff data may not be detected. 
Furthermore, after acquisitions some acquirers may make divestments, which may lead to 
workforce reductions, without involving employee layoffs. Thus, the aggregation of acquired 
and acquiring firms‟ workforce may hide true reasons of workforce reductions during post-
merger period.   
As the takeover transaction related data (such as bid value and type of acquisitions) is 
collected from the Acquisitions Monthly journal, which provides data on firm level 
acquisitions (but not on plant level acquisitions), we also collect firm level performance and 
employment data from Datastream. Furthermore, it is difficult to collect separate data on only 
acquired firms, as Datastream also provides firm level data combining performance and 
employment measures of acquired and acquiring firms. Therefore we use data on publicly 
listed companies‟ takeovers, not on acquisitions of individual plants or divisions.  
Secondly, another source of bias may arise due to the size effect of acquiring firms. Prior 
research shows that acquired firms are smaller than their industry average firms, whereas 
acquiring firms are larger than their industry average firm in terms of employment (McGuckin 
et al., 1995, Conyon et al., 2001, Conyon et al., 2002). Furthermore, prior literature shows that 
smaller acquirers make proportionately larger reductions in their labour demand in comparison 
than the labour demand in larger acquirers. In contrast, when large firms buy small firms 
labour demand reduction is not significant (McGuckin et al., 1995, Conyon et al., 2001). 
However, when data is collected from the Acquisitions Monthly journal, there may be some 
size bias in the sample selection process, as this journal provides data on ownership change in 
the large publicly listed firms. In other words, the sample may include large proportion of 
large acquirers, where labour demand reductions may be lower, as above mentioned. 
Therefore, the empirical results based on this sample may not be representative in making 
statistical inferences on the effect of ownership change on employment for all firms.   
It seems that the difference between the acquired firm size and acquiring firm size is the main 
reason of the firm size differences in labour demand decline post-merger. When acquiring firm 
size is small (or when acquired firm is larger, i.e. when the difference between acquired and 
acquiring firm size is small) then there is higher level of scope for synergy that could be 
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achieved through workforce reductions. Post-merger workforce reduction becomes 
proportionately larger in comparison to the combined workforce of the acquired and acquiring 
firm. In contrast, when acquiring firms size is large (or when acquired firm is small, i.e. when 
the difference between acquiring firm size and acquired firm size is large), even large 
workforce reductions in the acquired firms may be small in terms of percentage of the 
combined workforce of acquired and acquiring firms. To deal with this potential sources of 
bias, in the multivariate analysis context we control for the size effect by including the ratio of 
transaction value (as a measure of acquired firms‟ size) to the market value of the acquiring 
firms (relative size variable, log transformed), as a control variable. Furthermore, in analysing 
the labour demand effect of takeovers, we also consider dividing the full sample into large and 
small acquiring firm sub-samples.   
4.2.3 Overview of UK public takeovers occurring from 1990 to 2000  
We have collected data on all acquisitions of UK public companies from the Acquisitions 
Monthly for the period 1990 – 2000, representing the whole populations of UK public 
takeovers for this period. Table 4.1 shows the number of transactions, their total values, 
domestic/foreign and hostile/friendly distributions, by year.  
Table 4.1 UK public takeovers occurring during the period 1990 – 2000 
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
Number in %
1990 125 14,636         72 6,330           53 8,306           14 11.20
1991 89 8,018           60 6,216           29 1,802           13 14.61
1992 60 12,946         43 7,915           17 5,031           7 11.67
1993 58 3,711           42 2,694           16 1,017           5 8.62
1994 64 5,158           40 3,392           24 1,766           8 12.50
1995 87 41,996         58 29,955         29 12,041         10 11.49
1996 87 25,422         59 16,938         28 8,484           11 12.64
1997 123 34,502         69 18,909         54 15,593         4 3.25
1998 162 44,065         104 22,175         58 21,890         10 6.17
1999 197 74,317         156 27,722         41 46,595         10 5.08
2000 113 85,724         74 55,021         39 30,703         8 7.08
Total 1165 350,495       777 197,267       388 153,228       100 8.58
Hostile takeovers of UK 
public companies
Year
Total number of UK 
public takeovers
Takeovers by UK public 
companies
Takeovers by foreign 
companies
Source: Acquisitions Monthly, 1990 - 2000. Notes: The transaction values are in constant prices using 2003 as the base year 
(as this is the last year of performance observation), adjusted by the Composite Price Index (CPI), following the methodology 
described in O‟Donoghue et al. (2004). 
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4.2.4 Sample selection criteria 
From the previously described population we select a sample of domestic takeovers, excluding 
the following transactions: (1) takeovers by foreign companies; (2) acquisitions of less than 
50% of target shares; (3) takeovers with private or newly established companies, including 
management buy-outs or acquisitions by private equity or venture capital firms; (4) takeovers 
involving property and financial companies, including banks, insurance companies, 
investment companies and investment trusts
36
; (5) takeovers involving utility companies 
(including water companies), as these transactions are subject to different takeover 
regulations, since they are in a highly regulated industry. 
For each selected transaction we check the data availability with Datastream. If data is not 
available for either acquired or acquiring company, then this transaction also has been 
excluded from the sample.  
4.2.5 Overlapping events effect 
One of the methodological problems in event studies is the problem of overlapping events. In 
our research the inclusion of multiple acquisitions made by one acquirer in the sample may 
create an overlapping events problem. When an acquirer makes several acquisitions within an 
observation period (within 3 post-merger years) a dependent observations problem arises, 
because this acquirer‟s data (accounting variables or stock price abnormal returns) will be the 
same for those several observations. This may violate OLS regression technique assumptions 
that require each observation to be independent.  
Furthermore, MacKinlay (1997) argues that when event windows overlap, then the assumption 
of zero covariance across stock returns is violated. Lyon et al. (1999) show that when post-
event returns overlap, the long-run abnormal returns calculations method over-rejects the null 
hypothesis of no abnormal returns. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also argue that overlapping of 
long-run post-takeover stock price returns and operational performance indicators causes 
biased results. Therefore these researchers recommend limiting the sample to those firms 
which do not have observations with overlapping returns. For this reason, only one acquisition 
per acquirer within any three consecutive years has been included in the sample. 
                                                 
36 Financial and property companies were excluded from the sample because different requirements for financial statements of 
these companies make it difficult to compare their performance variables with the performance variables of other companies. 
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4.2.6 The sample 
The exclusion described above reduces the number of takeovers included in the sample to 235 
deals, which is about 30% of the total population during 1990-2000
37
. Table 4.2 shows the 
distribution of selected sample companies by year and by takeover mode. Takeovers are 
classified as hostile versus friendly, related versus unrelated and cash-paid versus non-cash 
funded acquisitions
38
.  
Table 4.2 Distribution of the selected sample takeovers 
In numbers TV (£m) In numbers in % In numbers in % In numbers in %
1990 17 2,389         8 47 7 41 6 35
1991 22 4,884         10 45 5 23 6 27
1992 14 2,122         5 36 2 14 2 14
1993 16 1,482         11 69 4 25 4 25
1994 12 1,368         6 50 2 17 0 0
1995 26 18,216       16 62 5 19 4 15
1996 15 1,856         7 47 3 20 6 40
1997 23 5,445         11 48 3 13 5 22
1998 29 8,882         20 69 6 21 15 52
1999 34 11,510       27 79 7 21 11 32
2000 27 12,768       15 56 8 30 9 33
Total 235 70,922       136 58 52 22 68 29
Year
Cash-funded takeoversTotal sample size Related takeovers Hostile takeovers
Source: Acquisitions Monthly, 1990 – 2000. Notes: TV indicates the transaction values, which are in constant prices using 
2000 as the basis year (as this is the last year of performance observation), adjusted by the Composite Price Index (CPI), 
following the methodology described in O‟Donoghue et al. (2004). Definitions of other variables are given in the Appendix 2.    
 
Hostility is defined on the basis of whether an initial bid or winning bid was rejected by the 
target firm management (Franks and Mayer, 1996). Thus, hostile takeovers include all deals 
described as „contested‟ and „later agreed‟, by the Acquisitions Monthly39. In the sample 22% 
of transactions were hostile in nature. Industry relatedness is defined as those acquisitions 
where both acquired and acquirer firms are in the same Datastream Industrial Classification 
                                                 
37 In years t+2 and t+3 the number of observations decreases, depending on availability of data on operating performance, 
stock price and labour. 
38 Another classification is merger versus tender offers. However, on the basis of Acquisitions Monthly information it was 
impossible to distinguish between merger and tender transactions, as the classification of takeovers in this journal is not very 
distinctive. Most deals in Acquisitions Monthly are defined as „agreed bids‟ or „recommended tender offers‟ and only few 
transactions are classified as mergers. Therefore it was impossible to distinguish between tender offers and mergers on the 
basis of this data source. As mentioned by Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), in the UK most offers are made directly to 
shareholders, even if the target management approves the deal during the pre-announcement merger talks.   
39 To distinguish friendly and hostile takeovers we use Acquisitions Monthly information. In addition to this, we undertake 
some content analysis using online resources of the Financial Times and Times to check the mode of takeovers. Following 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), white knight takeovers were classified as friendly takeovers. 
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Level four (INDM4), as in Cosh et al. (2006). In the sample 58% of takeovers were in related 
industries. Cash-paid acquisitions include 100% cash paid deals. The remaining deals are 
classified as non-cash-funded acquisitions (equity swaps and mixed payments). In the sample 
29% of deals were cash-paid.  
4.2.7 Selection of a control group of matched firms 
In addition to the sample of merging firms, we select a sample of 470 non-merging control 
firms, which includes a matched firm for each acquired and acquiring firm. In selecting the 
matched firms we follow the procedure outlined by Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Barber 
and Lyon (1996). The selected matched firm should be in the same industry as the matching 
sample firm,  within a 25% to 200% size range of the matching sample firm and should have 
the closest pre-takeover (at the end of t-1) operating performance to the matching sample firm. 
For this purpose we calculate ROA of all Datastream firms at the end of year t-1 as explained 
above. Next, the pool of the potential matched firms is filtered by industry to select all firms in 
the same industry, for which a matched firm is being selected (industry filter). Then among 
these same industry firms those firms with the market value of between 25% and 200% of the 
market value of the firm, for which a matched firm is being selected, have been determined 
(size filter). Next, among those potential matching firms, which come through industry filter 
and size filter, the firm with closest operating cash flow return has been selected. 
One of the main logic behind using „control firm‟ approach is that to compare the performance 
of acquiring firms with the performance of non-acquiring firms to isolate takeovers‟ effect on 
operating performance. Thus, in this process, the first important criterion is that the matched 
firm should not have been involved in major acquisition activity two years before and three 
years after the sample takeover year. Therefore we analyse the acquisition activity of each 
matched firm during the observation period to make sure that they are non-acquiring firms. In 
other words, in the selection process those firms that have not undertaken any acquisitions 
should be selected as matching firms. Therefore, in the final step of the matching firm 
selection procedure, the selected firm has been checked if it had not undertaken any significant 
acquisition during the period 5 years before and 3 years after the sample takeover completion 
date
40
. 
                                                 
40 Full discussion of industry-, size- and performance-matched firm selection is given as Appendix 4.  
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4.2.8 Data on post-merger workforce change collected from Datastream  
In this thesis data on post-takeover employee change in the acquiring firms have been 
collected from two sources. First, year-to-year change in the employment variables (numbers 
of workers and their salaries) in the acquiring firms were obtained from Datastream and 
Annual Company accounts
41
. Merger related year-to-year change in the combined workforce 
has been calculated by comparing the pre-takeover pro-forma combined workforce of the 
acquiring and acquired firms at the end of year t-1 to the number of employees of the 
acquiring firms during post-takeover years.  
Detailed analysis of Datastream data shows that 127 acquirers reduced their workforce during 
t+1, out of which 87 acquirers further reduced their workforce during the second or third 
years, while 23 acquirers increased their workforce (which means that they temporarily 
reduced workforce after acquisitions) and 17 acquirers were taken over or liquidated during 
this period. Datastream data also shows that 108 acquirers increased their workforce during 
t+1, only 10 of them reduced workforce during t+2 or t+3 relative to pre-takeover level, while 
13 of them were taken over during this period. In overall, according to Datastream, out of 235 
sampled acquirers, 115 acquirers had lower workforce during t+2 in comparison to the pre-
takeover workforce level and 111 acquirers had lower workforce in comparison to the pre-
takeover workforce level during t+3. 
However, as discussed in the section 4.2.2., there may be several sources of potential bias 
when firm level data obtained from annual accounts (which is the primary source of 
Datastream data) is used in analysing merger-related workforce change. First, as theory 
suggests, merger-related employee layoffs may usually happen in the acquired firms (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988). However, as post-merger annual accounts are combined for the acquired 
and acquiring firms, this merger-related employee layoff data may not be detected. Also, when 
large firms buy small firms and layoff substantial number of employee in the small acquired 
firms, the size of such layoff may be hidden in the annual reports, where acquired and 
acquiring firms workforce numbers are combined. Furthermore, after acquisitions some 
acquirers may make divestments, which may lead to workforce reductions, without involving 
employee layoffs. This may hide workforce reductions in acquired firms.   
                                                 
41 As Datastream provides employment information starting from 1993, missing data on these variables for the years 1990-
1993 has been collected from company annual reports, obtained from Nexis® database. 
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4.2.9 Data on post-merger employee layoffs collected from media search  
As discussed above, when Datastream information is used merger-related employee layoffs 
may be hidden in the combined workforce change of acquired and acquiring firms, as there 
may be some workforce growth in other segments of business, while acquired plant employees 
get layoffs. Therefore, in order to gain more accurate information on the merger-related 
employee layoffs, we have also collected data on publicly announced merger-related employee 
layoffs by screening national and regional newspapers, downloaded through the Nexis
®
 
database. In this media-search data collection process, following the methodology adopted by 
prior research (Hillier et al., 2007; Krishnan et al., 2007), we search a number of national and 
regional newspapers for the period of 2 years after the sample merger event month for merger-
related employee layoffs in the acquired firms. The screened newspapers include The 
Financial Times, Times & Sunday Times, Guardian, Daily Mail, Independent, Lloyd's List, 
Observer, Evening Standard and other sources. In the screening process we use the following 
search term through Nexis
®
:  
“acquired or bid or buy or merger or takeover and layoff or redundancy or  
job loss or job cut or dismissal or axe or chop or sack or shed or and (target 
company name) and/or (acquiring company name)” 
As several newspapers concurrently report major post-merger layoffs, it can be confirmed that 
the collected information consistent across newspapers and, therefore, it is possible to 
determine the exact number of job losses. However, there are uncertainties in this process: 
sometimes newspapers report redundancies as part of post-merger annual or semi-annual 
performance analysis, without giving the exact dates of the layoffs or sometimes newspapers 
report that acquirers incur „redundancy costs‟ after mergers, without giving the exact number 
of workers laid off. At the same time, large companies undertake layoffs step by step.  
As several newspapers concurrently report major post-merger layoffs, the data on employee 
layoffs gathered from the newspapers can be considered as reliable data for this research 
purposes. However, in some cases it is difficult to determine the exact date of the layoffs, as 
sometimes newspapers report redundancies as part of the post-merger annual or semi-annual 
performance analysis, without giving the exact dates of the layoffs. In addition to the 
newspapers, occasionally some companies provide employee layoff announcements through 
Regulatory News Services (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange. However, through searching 
RNS reports, we were able to find only a few announcements given by the sample firms. 
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To be classified as an acquirer with significant post-takeover employee layoffs, the acquirer 
should had laid-off at least 1 % of the combined workforce within 2 years period after 
takeover completion month. In the literature different papers choose different cut-off points to 
determine significance of employee layoffs. For example, Hillier et al. (2007) state that to be 
classified as a laying off firm, “the size of the layoff must account for at least 0.1% of the 
firm‟s total employees at the end of the financial year preceding the layoff announcement”. In 
contrast, Ofek (1993) uses 10% cut-off point to classify firms as firms making significant 
layoffs.   
As a result of screening national and regional newspapers, it was possible to find information 
about layoffs occurred in 101 acquiring firms, which consists 43% of sample firms. If no 
layoffs are reported in the press, then we assume that none has occurred. Using this data we 
classify acquiring firms into „layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ sub-samples, as in Krishnan et al. 
(2007) and Hillier et al. (2007). Percentage employee layoffs are computed in comparison to 
the pre-takeover pro-forma workforce of merging firms, computed by combining pre-takeover 
workforce of acquired and acquiring firms. In these acquisitions on average 7.5% (median is 
5.6%) of the combined workforce were laid off within a period of two years after mergers (in 
these percentage calculations we use the pre-takeover pro-forma workforce of merging firms, 
created by combining pre-takeover workforce of acquired and acquiring firms, as above 
explained). Data on the announced employee layoffs include only straight redundancies, not 
workforce reductions related with divestments or other sell-offs. However, a weakness of this 
dataset is that not all employee layoffs may be announced or we may have missed some 
announced layoffs during the newspaper screening process.  
If no press release on merger-related employee layoffs were found, then we assume that no 
employee layoffs were made during post-merger period. Merger-related employee layoff data 
collected from national newspapers should be more accurate and precise measure the 
employment effect of mergers.  
However, there may be several sources of bias in this dataset as well. First, acquirers might 
choose not to voluntarily disclose information about their layoffs in order to reduce the impact 
of market reaction. Job losses may occur in the form voluntary job changes or due to not 
filling open vacancies. Secondly, our search strategy may not capture all announced layoffs. 
However, as discussed elsewhere, we search a wide range of sources and we found several 
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simultaneous reports in several newspapers for each particular layoff announcement. 
Therefore, our search strategy reveals 101 post-merger employee layoffs. In comparison to 
this, Collett (2002) finds 106 layoff announcements in the UK for the period of 1990-1999, 
while Hillier et al. (2007) report 322 layoff announcements for the period of 1990-2000. Both 
Collett (2002) and Hillier (2007) consider search for types of employee layoffs, whereas we 
search for only merger-related employee layoffs made only by our sample acquirers.    
Another source of bias may be due to the fact that announced job losses may not materialize 
during post-merger period, as the media might provide exaggerated information about true job 
losses, giving upward bias in the collected data. Therefore, it was important to collect data on 
layoff announcements from official data sources such as Regulatory News Service (RNS) of 
the London Stock Exchange, where companies may voluntarily publish their layoff 
announcements and other corporate disclosure. Data obtained from unofficial data sources, 
such as media rumors and analysts forecasts, may give some bias in data, as they may not 
officially confirmed by the company. Therefore, we have also searched RNS for official layoff 
announcements. However, we have found that during 1990s only few firms made employee 
layoff announcements through this official source.  
Finally, there may be a potential source of bias due to the size differences of acquiring and 
acquired firms. First, small firms may not be covered by the media, therefore, any merger-
related employee layoffs may not be reported in the media as they are not followed by 
journalist or analysts. To deal with this bias, we also included regional and local newspapers 
in our search. Secondly, when large firms acquire small firms and layoff even substantial 
number of employees in the small acquired firms, the size of such layoffs may be very small in 
terms of percentage of the combined workforce (and also may be hidden in the annual 
reports).  
In sum, we think that the collected data is downward biased, rather than upward biased, 
because firms are more inclined not to report employee layoffs and even to conceal job losses, 
as this may affect to their market value, as discussed in the literature review chapter. 
Therefore, such layoffs in small acquired firms may not be reported in the media. To control 
for the potential bias due to size effect, in multivariate regressions we include relative size 
control variable.  
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4.2.10 Comparison of workforce reduction data from Datastream and employee layoff 
data from the media search  
The analysis reveals that the number of firms which make public announcements on merger-
related employee layoffs (101 acquirers) and the number of firms which reduce workforce 
according to the Datastream (115 acquirers) are comparable. The analysis shows that there is 
about 33% correlation between announced layoffs and Datastream workforce adjustments and 
this correlation (36%) is similar to the correlation (32%) reported by Krishnan et al. (2007). 
Datastream workforce adjustments also include changes due to unrecorded divestments, other 
unrecorded acquisitions and unannounced layoffs. Furthermore, layoff variable does not take 
into consideration employment growth. Therefore the correlation between these two variables 
may not be very strong. 
However, the size of workforce reductions reported in the press is smaller than the Datastream 
reported size. One explanation could be the fact that managers are reluctant to publicise the 
true scale of workforce reductions, as this may affect the market value of their company. Both 
Krishnan et al. (2007) and Hillier et al. (2007) suggest that the measure of layoffs reported by 
the press is more precise than year-to-year changes in employment levels reported by 
databases as the latter may include the effect of divestments or asset disposals. However, 
although layoffs reported in the newspapers are more relevant, they do not give the full picture 
of workforce changes. All workforce reductions may not be reported in the newspapers or all 
announced layoffs may not actually materialize, providing a measurement bias, as suggested 
by Shah (2007). 
The correlation coefficient between Datastream workforce reduction and newspaper-reported 
employee layoffs is 0.36. Although this coefficient is significant, lower level of announced 
employee layoffs indicates the high degree of consciousness of the companies regarding 
making public announcements about employee layoffs, as this may effect to their market 
value. Another reason for the difference between two outcomes could be the fact that acquirers 
make some asset disposals and divestments after acquisitions, which also reduce workforce 
Krishnan et al. (2007) also report 32% correlation coefficient. 
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4.3 Research strategy and overall research methodology 
The literature shows no dominating motive for takeovers and consequently the employment 
effect of such transactions is not predictable. As discussed there are several reasons for post-
takeover workforce adjustments, including the need to improve firm performance, wealth 
transfer from employees to shareholders or decline in post-merger labour demand. We adopt a 
research strategy that attacks the issue of the employment effect of takeovers from several 
different perspectives.  
As an overall research methodology, we adopt quantitative research techniques: univariate 
analysis and multiple regression methods. Specifically, we test operating and stock price 
performance using univariate tests. As some of the variables (such as the premium) are 
observed only once, we can only use cross-sectional regressions to investigate the first three 
questions (Q1, Q2 and Q3). For example, to investigate the role of different factors in 
explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions. Similarly, to examine post-takeover workforce adjustments as a function of target 
firm shareholders‟ short-run abnormal returns (measured by bid premium and short-run 
CARs) and acquiring firm shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns (measured by BHARs), we 
use OLS regressions. However, to examine the fourth question (Q4) we use panel data based 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) regression methods to control for endogeneity and 
measurement errors.    
In all OLS regressions (in Chapters 5, 6 and 7) we undertake the following regression post-
estimation diagnostics to ensure that the estimation meets the Gauss-Markov assumptions on 
the validity of OLS estimates (Wooldridge, 2006). After specifying the model and running the 
initial regression we start the diagnostics by identifying outliers and influential points, using 
Cooks‟ D statistic. If this statistic is larger than 4/n for an observation, where n is the number 
of observations in a particular regression, we exclude such an observation from the regression. 
After deleting outliers, we re-run the regression and estimate standardised residuals. At this 
stage we drop those observations with smaller than -2 or larger than 2 standardised residuals. 
We test the normality of residuals with the Shapiro Wilk test, model specification with 
Ramsey‟s RESET and multi-collinearity with the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. Finally, 
we re-run regressions using the heteroskedasticity robust estimation method to account for the 
serial correlation and report the results of these regressions. Such outlier deletions cause the 
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sample size to change by small degrees from one test or chapter to another. Such outlier 
deletions also cause the sum of observations from the subsample cases not to be equal to the 
number of observations in the full sample case.  
Therefore, in order to check the robustness of the OLS regressions we also run quantile 
(mainly median – 50th percentile) regressions and report their results as a robustness test. 
However, at the moment it is not possible to run panel data based quantile regressions in 
STATA 11 and therefore in Chapter 8 we limit the analysis with the panel data based GMM 
regressions.   
4.4 Methods for measuring post-takeover employment and wage changes 
We measure the effect of ownership change on labour using two variables – number of 
employees and their average wages. Below we discuss some methods for measuring post-
takeover changes in these variables, including: (1) simple pre- and post-event univariate 
tabulation of these variables; (2) difference-in-differences methodology and (3) the regression 
methodology, which controls for lagged values of wage and employment.     
4.4.1 Pre- and post-takeover univariate tabulation  
The simple univariate tabulation estimates the employment (wage) effect of takeovers by 
comparing the annual average pre-takeover number of workers with the annual average post-
takeover number of workers. Pre-takeover pro-forma combined employment is computed by 
summing the target and bidder‟s workforce at the end of t-1. Employment change is measured 
by deducting this pro-forma number of employees from the acquirers‟ actual number of 
employees. This employment change could be considered as an ownership change effect. 
However, this method does not take into consideration the effect of contemporaneous events 
such as macroeconomic changes, technological changes and the dynamics of wages. Therefore 
the resulting quantity could be a biased estimator of the impact of the ownership change 
(Conyon et al., 2002a; Girma and Gorg, 2003). Therefore any conclusion about the 
employment effect of takeovers on the basis of this method would be incorrect
42
. 
                                                 
42 Other limitations of this simple tabulation are that the data is not standardised by industry and it does not take into 
consideration the initial size of the merged firms (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). 
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4.4.2 Difference-in-differences method 
To control for the effect of macroeconomic changes on workforce growth, prior research 
suggests comparing the sample firms‟ workforce change with a control group firms‟ 
workforce change, using the difference-in-differences method (Meyer, 1995; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003; Girma and Gorg, 2003). In using the difference-in-differences method in 
the mergers and acquisitions context an important criterion is that the selected control group 
firms should not experience an ownership change within three years before and three years 
after the sample firm acquisition event year (year t).  
The difference-in-differences method works as follows. First, we combine the pre-takeover 
workforce of the acquiring and acquired firms in order to create the pre-takeover pro-forma 
workforce of the merging firms. Secondly, we determine workforce growth in the sample 
merging firms as the difference between the post-takeover actual workforce of the acquirers 
and the pre-takeover pro-forma workforce (and we define this difference in merging firms‟ 
pre- and post-merger workforce as sE ). In a similar way we determine workforce growth in 
the non-merging control firms (and define this difference in the control firms‟ pre- and post-
takeover workforce as cE ). Finally, we compute the difference between the merging firms‟ 
workforce growth ( sE ) and the control firms‟ workforce growth ( cE ), which gives the 
difference-in-differences estimator: cs EE . 
Within the difference-in-difference methodology context, adjusting the merging firms‟ 
workforce growth for the control firms‟ workforce growth removes the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on employment, leaving only the effect of mergers on workforce 
change. Due to the initial set-ups, these economy-wide conditions would affect equally both 
merging and non-merging control firms. Subtracting the control firms‟ workforce growth from 
the merging firms‟ workforce growth enables to isolate the impact of economy-wide changes 
(such as economic growth or downturns) on employment and to measure the impact of 
ownership change on employment. In a similar manner, it is possible to estimate an unbiased 
effect of mergers on wage growth.  
4.4.3 The regression-based version of the difference-in-differences method 
The difference-in-differences method can be undertaken using a regression technique, as 
implemented in Conyon et al. (2002a), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Girma and Gorg 
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(2003). In other words, the above defined difference-indifference estimator ( ) could be 
estimated using a panel data based regression method: when the same dataset is used both 
methods should produce the same result. The simplest panel data-based regression of the 
difference-in-differences method takes the following form: 
itiit DE ,   (4) 
where E  indicates employment; i is firm index; t is time index; indicates the difference in 
the merging firms‟ workforce growth and control firms‟ workforce growth post-merger; D is a 
merger dummy regressor, which takes 1 for merging firms and 0 for control firms. In this 
regression both merging and control firms are stacked together and the coefficient of the 
dummy regressor ( ), which indicates the difference in employment growth between merging 
and control firms, can be interpreted as the average percentage point growth in employment 
that is attributable to ownership change. Longer period lags of this dummy regressor can be 
included to analyse the effect of takeovers after a longer period, in addition to the 
contemporaneous effect. For example, the lagged dummy regressor indicates the employment 
effect of ownership change after one year.    
4.4.4 The Brown-Medoff regression method 
Brown and Medoff (1988) estimate post-takeover wage and employment change, controlling 
for the lagged variables. Lagged values of wage and employment over a longer period can be 
included in the model as control variables, as specified below: 
DWEX j
t
tk
t
tk
kjkkjkjt
1
3
1
3
, (5) 
where X  indicates the logarithm of average wages per employee per annum in the merging 
firms and control firms in the wage equation and the logarithm of the number of employees in 
the merging and control firms in the employment equation; t  is the takeover completion year; 
j={1, 2, 3} i.e. post-takeover years, W  indicates the logarithm of average wages per employee 
per annum in the merging firms and control firms, E indicates the logarithm of the number of 
workers in the sample firms and control firms; k= {t-1, t-2, t-3}, i.e. pre-takeover years; D  is a 
merger dummy variable, which takes 1 for merging firms and 0 for control firms.   
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In this regression the dummy regressor coefficient indicates the mean employment (or wage) 
growth for merging firms, comparing it with the employment (wage) growth in non-merging 
firms and holding constant the pre-takeover wages and employment of merging and non-
merging firms.  
Most studies use non-merging control firms as a benchmark when measuring changes in 
employment variables, shareholder value and operating performance. For example, Brown and 
Medoff (1988) and Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) use non-merging firms in estimating the 
change in employment variables. Following these studies, we use average industry wage 
growth and matched non-merging control firms‟ employment growth as benchmarks43.   
There are other benchmarks. Previous studies have estimated the expected growth in real 
wages using different methodologies. Rosett (1990) estimates annual real wage growth using 
all immediate and scheduled deferred wage increases and cost-of-living adjustments. Another 
possible benchmark is the historical growth rate for the employment variable for each sample 
firm. For example, Beckmann and Forbes (2004) construct this benchmark on the basis of the 
historical growth rates of employment and wages for both acquired and acquiring firms, using 
data for 5 years prior to takeovers. The authors define the cost-per-employee as the ratio of 
total employment costs to the total number of employees. Using the pre-bid separate growth 
rates in cost-per-employee for the target and bidding firm, they forecast the „expected normal 
level‟ of cost-per-employee for the combined company, taking into consideration the relative 
weights of target and bidder data. 
4.5 Methods for analysing the association between operating performance 
changes and workforce adjustments  
To empirically investigate the first and second questions (Q1 and Q2) we need to measure pre-
takeover performance of both acquired and acquiring firms as well as the change in post-
takeover performance of acquiring firms. Powell and Stark (2005) argue that the research 
conclusions on the performance effects of takeovers are sensitive to the definition of the 
performance measures, deflator choice, benchmark selection and methodology used in a 
particular study. Therefore it is important to select an appropriate performance measure, 
                                                 
43 The methodology on the selection of non-merging matched firms is discussed in the next section.  
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benchmark and abnormal performance detection methods. Below we discuss prior research on 
these issues.  
4.5.1 Operating performance measures 
As accounting earnings measures can be easily manipulated by managers to increase the 
market value of companies around corporate events, such as takeovers, empirical research 
mainly uses cash flow-based performance measures to assess operating performance 
improvements after such events (Healy et al., 1992; Ghosh, 2001; Powell and Stark, 2005). 
For example, earnings-based measures may be affected by accounting distortions, whereas 
cash flow is unaffected by depreciation, goodwill, accounting methods for acquisition and 
acquisition financing methods. Therefore cash flow-based measures provide a more accurate 
explanation of whether the source of improvement is the change in operating performance or 
the reversal of pre-event accruals. In the literature cash flow-based performance measures are 
classified into two groups: the „accruals‟-based cash flow measure, defined as pre-depreciation 
profit and the „pure‟ cash flow measure, defined as pre-depreciation profit adjusted for 
changes in working capital. Healy et al. (1992) argue that unlike other accounting variables 
„accruals‟-based operating cash flow is not affected by accounting distortions such as 
depreciation and goodwill. However, according to Powell and Stark (2005), „accruals‟-based 
cash flow is still likely to be distorted by accounting policies.  
Barber and Lyon (1996) compare the performance of five accounting-based variables and 
conclude that „the choice of performance measure is generally inconsequential‟44. However, 
they point out one important difference: test statistics based on a cash flow return on assets are 
uniformly less powerful than those based on other performance measures.  
In order to obtain a comparable measure across firms, the performance indicators should be 
deflated by another accounting variable to create a return indicator. Prior studies use sales, 
book value and market value of total assets as deflators. Book value of assets is defined as the 
value of total assets reported in company accounts. Market value of assets is defined as the 
market value of equity plus net book value of debt and book value of preferred stock. 
Different values of total assets could be used: beginning of year, average of beginning and end 
                                                 
44 They consider the following five accounting-based performance measures: (1) operating income scaled by the book value 
of assets, (2) operating income scaled by the book value of assets less cash and marketable securities, (3) operating income 
scaled by sales, (4) operating income scaled by the market value of assets and (5) operating cash flow scaled by the book 
value of assets.  
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of year and end of year total assets. Healy et al. (1992) argue that post-takeover market value 
of assets excludes the change in equity values resulting from takeover announcements. If post-
takeover market value does not exclude change in equity value during takeover announcement 
period, it is impossible to detect abnormal cash flows. Powell and Stark (2005) discuss two 
advantages of using total market value: this measure more accurately reflects assets returns 
and simplifies inter-temporal and cross-sectional comparisons, as the market value is not 
affected by distortions resulting from accounting policy changes.  
In short, prior research uses different performance measures, such as Operating Cash Flow 
(OCF) (Powell and Stark, 2005) or Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortisation (EBITDA) (Hillier et al., 2007), deflated by beginning of year book value and 
market value of assets. On the basis the above discussions, in this thesis we use EBITDA, 
deflated by both market value and book value of assets at the beginning of the year. 
4.5.2 The effect of acquisition versus merger accounting on operating performance 
measure 
In the 1990s in the UK Financial Reporting Standards allowed companies to use either 
acquisition or merger accounting in the process of preparing combined financial statements 
after corporate takeovers. Applying either acquisition accounting or merger accounting 
differently affected both operating performance measure reported in the income statement and 
the level of total assets reported in the balance sheet. If a business combination was a merger, 
then the consolidated financial statements of the new company were prepared based on just 
combining net book values of two merging businesses‟ assets, because in this case it was 
considered no company acquired another company‟s assets. Consequently no goodwill (a type 
of intangible asset that could be determined as the difference between net book value of 
acquired assets and purchase price) recorded, as the event could be considered as a pooling of 
resources. Therefore, when a merger accounting was applied, a consolidated balance sheet was 
prepared by simply combining the net book values of the merging firms‟ assets.        
However, under the acquisition accounting, it was required to record acquired assets‟ at their 
net book value, but at the same time it was required to record a goodwill arising as a result of 
acquisition, where goodwill was determined as the difference between net book value and 
purchase price. The recorded goodwill could be amortised over its defined useful life. 
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Subsequently, the resulting amortisation expense reduced the profitability of acquirers during 
post-merger years.   
In this relation, merger accounting was a popular method, as it was possible to create 
provisions for future reorganisations, which might lead to artificially improvement of the 
profitability of acquirers post-merger. As goodwill was not recognised, assets were lower 
under the merger accounting method, post-merger profit would be higher under this method, 
due to lower depreciation/amortisation expenses. Furthermore, under this method it was not 
required to recognise goodwill which could reduce future expected profits through 
amortisation and impairment losses. Such goodwill write-offs could also affect the book value 
of assets, at the same time reducing the profitability of the acquiring firms
45
.    
As merging companies had the choice of selecting between merger and acquisition accounting 
methods during early 1990s, it was important to control the effect of this choice on the 
performance measure – ROA. In this research we control the effect of using different 
accounting methods by applying EBITDA performance measure and using net book value of 
fixed assets and current assets (excluding goodwill and other intangible assets) and market 
value of assets controls for the differences in the acquisition accounting and merger 
accounting. Additionally, we control for the effect of applying different accounting methods 
by distinguish between cash-paid and stock exchange acquisitions. Cash paid acquisitions can 
be considered as true acquisitions and in such business combinations usually acquisitions 
accounting was used.      
4.5.3 Operating performance benchmarks 
In assessing post-takeover performance change it is necessary to determine a benchmark 
which provides an expected level of operating performance in the absence of a takeover event. 
Internal or external benchmarks have been suggested.  
As an internal benchmark, Healy et al. (1992) construct the pro-forma combined performance 
of the merging firms for the period of 5 pre-takeover years. Comparing this pro-forma 
performance with the post-takeover actual performance would show the effect of mergers on 
                                                 
45 To prevent such creative accounting techniques, Financial Reporting Standard 6 was adopted to ensure that merger 
accounting is used only for those business combinations where none of the merging firm dominates the other firm. 
Furthermore, merger accounting was banned in 1994.  
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firm performance. Another internal benchmark is analysts‟ long-run forecasts, where actual 
performance is compared to the combined performance of acquired and acquiring firms, 
forecasted by analysts. Harford (2005) argues that many takeovers occur after economic 
disturbances, which leads to rapid change in performance, including benchmarks. Therefore 
Harford (2005) uses analysts‟ forecasts as a proxy of operating performance, in addition to the 
external benchmarks. 
Prior research uses two external benchmarks: the industry-median firm benchmark and the 
industry-, size- and performance-matched firm benchmark. Some of the post-takeover 
performance change may be a result of economy-wide or industry-wide shocks. To separate 
merger-related performance changes from economy- and industry-wide performance changes, 
it is customary to adjust the sample firms‟ performance using average industry performance 
indicators. In this case, every acquired and acquiring company performance is adjusted, using 
their relevant industry-median firm. According to this benchmark, the expected performance 
of a sample firm is equal to the performance of the industry-median firm, where the industry 
portfolio consists of all Datastream listed companies, except the acquired and acquirer 
companies. 
However, some authors argue that in event studies it is important to take into consideration 
prior performance of firms (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Ghosh, 2001). The mean reverting 
process in accounting performance is well documented in the literature (Penman, 1991; Fama 
and French, 1995). If benchmark models do not follow this mean reverting process and do not 
control for levels of pre-event performance, then they may produce biased results, especially 
when sample firms include unusually high or low performing firms. There are at least two 
reasons indicating that the industry-median may produce biased results as discussed in Ghosh 
(2001). First, there are systematic differences across size of acquiring firms and industry-
median firms, the former usually being larger than the latter. Secondly, firms undertake 
acquisitions after superior operating performance, causing non-random differences in the 
performance of acquiring firms and industry-median firms. Therefore Barber and Lyon 
(1996), Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Ghosh (2001) propose an alternative benchmark – the 
industry-, size- and performance-matched firm benchmark – that accounts for such systematic 
differences. This benchmark estimates a merged firm‟s performance as its past performance 
plus the change in the performance of a control firm. Ghosh (2001) argues that when the 
industry-median benchmark is used the results may incorrectly reveal positive abnormal 
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returns, since this model does not control for acquirer size and prior performance. In contrast, 
the matched firm benchmark takes into account the superior pre-acquisition performance, 
when sample firms‟ performance is unusually high or low. Therefore Ghosh‟ (2001) study 
reveals that the industry-median firm benchmark provides a significant abnormal return, while 
a matched firm benchmark does not detect any abnormal return. Lie (2001) also shows that the 
matched control firm benchmark outperforms other benchmarks. Powell and Stark (2005) 
show that both industry-median and industry-, size- and pre-performance-based benchmarks 
indicate a modest performance improvement following mergers. 
Barber and Lyon (1996) compare the performance of nine benchmarks and conclude that the 
benchmark which takes prior firm performance into consideration outperforms other 
benchmarks by producing well specified test statistics. These authors argue that when the 
sample firms are matched to firms with similar pre-event performance, it will be possible to 
control for the mean-reversion tendency of an accounting performance. Furthermore, 
performance matching is important when sample firms have performed either well or poorly 
during the pre-takeover period. Therefore these authors propose to compare acquirers‟ 
performance to non-acquiring matching firm performance, selected on the basis of industry, 
size and pre-takeover performance criteria, as this method produces unbiased results.  
On the basis of this discussion, the thesis uses two benchmarks of firm performance: the 
industry-median firm and the industry-, size- and performance-matched firm benchmarks. 
4.5.4 Models for detecting post-takeover abnormal operating performance 
Two different research methods have been suggested to assess post-takeover performance: (1) 
regression of post-takeover adjusted performance on pre-takeover adjusted performance (the 
regression model) (Healy et al., 1992); and (2) simple comparison of the post-takeover 
adjusted operating performance with the combined pre-takeover adjusted performance of 
acquired and acquiring firms (the change model) (Ghosh, 2001).  
The first model – the regression model – estimates post-takeover improvement (the difference 
between pre- and post-takeover performance) as a regression intercept, where post-takeover 
performance of the combined firm is regressed on pre-takeover pro-forma performance 
(weighted average performance of acquirer and targets). In this regression slope the coefficient 
indicates the portion of the post-takeover operating performance that can be determined from 
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the pre-takeover operating performance. The unexplained part of the performance change is 
shown by the intercept that can be considered a result of takeover. As the intercept is 
independent of the pre-merger performance, it indicates the effect of the takeover event on 
performance.  
A number of studies use the regression model in detecting abnormal operating performance 
during a post-takeover period, first applied by Healy et al. (1992, 1997). Using this method, 
Manson et al. (2000) report that takeovers improve operating performance. Similarly, Powell 
and Stark (2005) report that takeovers improve performance by 0.8-3.3%, depending on the 
performance variable, deflator and benchmarks. The improvement is stronger when the 
adjusted total market is used as a deflator and an industry-, size- and performance-matched 
firm is used as a benchmark. 
Ghosh (2001) argues that using the regression model (with an industry-median benchmark) is 
likely to produce biased results, as this method does not take into consideration pre-takeover 
superior operating performance of acquiring companies, as most firms tend to undertake large 
investments, including acquisitions, following superior performance (Morck et al., 1990). 
When an industry-median benchmark is used, the measurement error is unlikely to be random 
and this non-random error is captured by the intercept of the regression, showing significant 
abnormal performance.  
Therefore Ghosh (2001) applies an alternative method – the change model – first introduced 
by Barber and Lyon (1996). This method takes into account pre-takeover performance and 
firm size by comparing the merging firms‟ performance to the matched firms‟ performance. In 
the change model performance improvement is defined as the difference between the post-
takeover performance of the combined firm and the pre-takeover pro-forma combined 
performance of merging firms, after adjusting to the performance of „similar‟ firms.   
In the US Linn and Switzer (2001) use the change model and report significant post-takeover 
performance improvement. Ghosh (2001) reports that the regression model using the industry-
median benchmark shows significant performance improvement, while the change model 
using the matched firm benchmark shows no significant performance improvement
46
.  
                                                 
46 According to Ghosh (2001) if, on average, merging firms do not outperform industry-median firms during the pre-takeover 
period, then the regression-based and change methods should provide the same, unbiased, results. 
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In the UK Powel and Stark (2005) compare the performance of the above models using both 
the industry-median firm benchmark and the industry-, size- and pre-performance- matched 
firm benchmark. The results reveal that the regression model shows stronger performance 
improvement in comparison to the change model
47
. The change model shows a significant 
improvement only in one case – when „accruals‟ cash flow is used together with the adjusted 
market value of total assets. Therefore these authors conclude that “takeovers completed in the 
UK over the period 1985 to 1993 result in modest improvements in operating performance”. 
4.5.5 Measuring post-takeover abnormal operating performance using the change 
model 
In this thesis, post-takeover operating performance will be analysed on the basis of the change 
model, using two benchmarks: industry-median firms returns and industry-, size- and 
performance-matched firm benchmarks. For this purpose we calculate pre-merger pro-forma 
performance by combining acquired and acquiring firms‟ performance in year t-1. Then we 
compare this pro-forma performance with the post-merger actual performance of acquiring 
firms. The following diagram describes this process.  
Diagram 4-1. Description of the performance analysis horizon  
Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3
takeover 
event year
(Acquirer + Target) - Benchmark Acquirer - Benchmark
Pre-takeover period Post-takeover period  
The pro-forma pre-merger performance measure is created by combining the acquired and 
acquiring firm performance in year t-1 as follows:  
acquirer
ti
acquired
ti
acquirer
titi
acquired
ti
ti
TATA
EBITDAEBITDA
ROA
2,2,
1,1,
1,   (6) 
                                                 
47 The intercepts from „accruals‟ cash flow-based regressions are significant, although intercepts from „pure‟ cash flow-based 
regression are insignificant 
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where 1,tiROA is the pre-takeover pro-forma performance measure of the acquired and 
acquiring firms at the end of year t-1; acquiredtiROA 1, is i
th
 acquired firm‟s performance measure at 
the end of year t-1; 
acquirer
tiROA 1, is i
th
 acquiring firm‟s performance measure at the end of year t-
1; acquiredtiTA 2, is total market value of the assets of the i
th
 acquired firm at the end of year t-2, 
acquirer
tiTA 2, is total market value of the assets of the i
th
 acquiring firm at the end of year t-2. 
The pre- and post-takeover operating performance indicators of the matched firms are 
combined in the same manner. Then, using the pre-takeover pro-forma performance of the 
merged firms and benchmarks (industry-median firms and matched firms) „abnormal‟ 
operating cash flow performance is determined as follows:  
1,1,1, tititi BenchmarkROAROA   (7) 
Similarly, the post-takeover abnormal operating performance of acquiring firms, relative to the 
benchmarks, will be calculated as follows:  
ktiktikti BenchmarkROAROA ,,, ,  k {1, 2, 3} (8) 
Then the operating performance change from the pre-takeover year to post-takeover years is 
computed as follows: 
1,, tiktii ROAROAROA , k {1, 2, 3} (9) 
This thesis uses the above described methodology to determine the operating performance 
change in both merging and non-merging control firms.  
4.5.6 Modelling the association between operating performance change and workforce 
adjustment  
To model the relationship between changes in employment variables and post-takeover 
operating performance, Krishnan et al. (2007) use methodology based on mediating regression 
analysis. These authors show that when the mediating variable (workforce reduction) is not 
included in the model, the relation between premium and post-acquisition performance is 
statistically significant. However, when the regression model includes the workforce reduction 
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variable, the significance of the relationship between premium and post-acquisition 
performance disappears, but the relation between workforce reduction and post-acquisition 
performance is significant. Therefore the authors argue that workforce reductions mediate the 
relationship between premiums and post-acquisition performance: higher premiums lead to 
more workforce reductions, which in turn lead to a decline in post-acquisition performance. 
The Krishnan et al. (2007) results show that a 3.5% workforce reduction in an acquiring firm 
reduces the performance of this firm by 1.4 units. 
Following Krishnan et al. (2007) we regress workforce adjustments on operating performance 
levels. In addition, we also regress workforce adjustments on the operating performance 
change variable. Barber and Lyon (1996) argue that the change in a firm‟s operating 
performance produces more accurate results than the level of a firm‟s operating performance. 
These regressions test whether there is a systematic association between post-takeover 
workforce adjustments and operating performance change, controlling for other relevant 
variables.   
In sum, to investigate the improvement in post-takeover operating performance, this thesis 
uses the change method, using EBITDA deflated by the market value of assets at the 
beginning of the year. The sample of non-merging firms will be matched to the merging firms 
sample by size, industry and pre-takeover performance. The main objective of this comparison 
is to test whether the merging firms out-perform or under-perform the non-merging firms, 
controlled by industry, size and pre-takeover performance. 
4.6 Methods for analysing the link between shareholder gains and 
employee wealth concessions 
To address the third question (Q3) we need to measure short-run shareholder gains around 
takeover announcement and long-run shareholder gains during post-takeover period. Below 
we discuss some relevant methods to measure the effect of takeovers on shareholder wealth.     
4.6.1 The event study method 
To measure the effects of takeovers on shareholder wealth this study uses the event study 
method, first employed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969). According to this 
methodology the effect of an event (takeover announcement) on shareholder value will be 
analysed by comparing the actual share price returns around the event with the expected share 
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price returns in the case of no takeover being announced. The expected share prices are 
calculated using a benchmark model. The difference between actual share prices and expected 
share prices provide abnormal returns. Cumulating these differences over an event window 
produces Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). We follow the Brown and Warner (1985) 
methodology in calculating short-term CARs using daily share price returns. Below we define 
an event window and a „normal‟ return-generating process. 
4.6.2 Measuring short-run abnormal returns earned around takeover announcements 
As share prices reflect the expected cash flows from holding these shares, a rise in share prices 
upon takeover announcement may indicate an increase in future expected cash flows that 
could be considered as value created by takeovers. Therefore some commentators argue that 
the difference between the actual share price and a share price in the case of no takeover 
indicates takeover gains: an increase in expected cash flows resulting from the takeover-
related efficiency improvements (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The difference between actual 
returns on a stock over the event window and benchmark returns not conditional on the event 
is defined as an abnormal return, attributable to takeovers. 
Event window 
By comparing the actual return accumulated during the short period around the takeover 
announcement date („event window‟) to a market-predicted „normal‟ return, expected if there 
were no takeover event and no new information was released to the market, we test whether 
the gained returns are significantly greater or less than the expected „normal‟ returns. In order 
to capture the full effect of takeover events, the study calculates the abnormal returns using 
three event windows: 11 days (-5, +5), 3 days (-1; +1) and event date windows. Fuller et al. 
(2002) conclude that a five-day event window is wide enough to capture the full market 
reaction to a merger announcement. We use longer windows (11 days) in order to account for 
the full effect of information leakage to the market before the actual announcement and to 
account for the delayed market reaction to the announcement. Also by comparing the shorter 
event date window results with longer-period windows (11 days and 3 days) we can decide 
whether there was an information leakage or market reaction delay. 
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Abnormal return-generating benchmark models 
The selection of a benchmark model to provide the expected share price for the „event 
window‟ period or the construction of benchmark portfolios is one of the most important 
issues in an event study. There are several different models that can be used in calculating the 
expected returns: the market model, the market-adjusted model, the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) and the Fama-French Three Factor model (FFTFM). Furthermore, external 
benchmark portfolios constructed on the basis of pre-determined characteristics (such as size, 
market-to-book ratio, industry) can be used to determine the expected returns.  
Researchers have used different benchmark models to calculate predicted market returns 
during the event period. Brown and Warner (1985) show that a simple mean adjusted return 
model and market model perform no worse than other models which adjust for market-wide 
factors and for risk. On the basis of this we use the following two models to compute CARs. 
The first model is the market model, which determines the takeover announcement period 
abnormal returns as the difference between the actual stock return and the expected return 
relative to the market (such as FTSE All-share Index). The market model parameters are 
estimated by regressing market returns on stock returns using the estimation period (for 
example, from -300 days to – 60 days) return data. Using the relevant parameters from these 
regressions, the market model estimates the expected return as follows: 
mtiiit RMM ,  (10) 
where itMM is the estimated stock return according to the market model, and are the 
market model parameters and mtR  is the return on market portfolio. 
The takeover announcement-period abnormal return is the difference between the actual stock 
return and the expected return estimated by the market model:  
ititit MMRAR ,   (11) 
where itAR is the daily abnormal return, and itR  is the return on stock i
48
. 
                                                 
48 Computation of the return on a stock based on Datastream information is shown in Appendix 5.  
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The second model is the market adjusted model, where market model parameters are adjusted 
as = 0 and =1. Thus, according to this model, the expected return is equal to the market 
return:  
mtit RMA ,  (12) 
This model calculates daily abnormal stock returns as follows: 
ititit MARAR   (13) 
To calculate CARs first we need to aggregate abnormal returns for each firm over the event 
window:  
2
1t
iti ARCAR ,  (14)  
where iCAR is i
th
 stock‟s cumulative abnormal return, 1 is the start date of the event window, 
2  is the end date of the event window.  
Next the event window end-date CARs of all sample firms are summed and divided by the 
number of firms to determine the mean CAR for the sample:  
tN
i
itCAR
N
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1
,  (15)  
where CAR is the sample mean cumulative abnormal return.  
As we exclude overlapping events from the sample, we can use conventional t-statistics. As 
the event window has several days, the statistical significance of short term CARs over the 
event window has been tested using the methodology applied in Brown and Warner (1985), 
Kothari and Warner (1997) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004). According to this 
methodology, the standard deviation of abnormal returns is multiplied by the square root of 
the number of event window days, providing a t-statistic for testing the significance of CARs 
over the event window: 
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where the CAR  is defined as above, T is the number of days in the event window; )(AR is 
the standard deviation of abnormal returns, which is determined using the estimation period 
(for example, from -300 days to -60 days) abnormal returns: 
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4.6.3 Measuring long-run abnormal returns 
Prior research well recognises the limitations of using CARs in calculating long-run abnormal 
returns. Specifically, it points to several major sources of bias in the estimation of long-run 
abnormal returns, including skewness, a new listing and correlated abnormal returns (Barber 
and Lyon, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Kothari and Warner, 2007). When daily or 
monthly abnormal returns are cumulated in the long run, they produce positively skewed test 
statistics (Roll, 1983). Another problem is related with new share listings during a long 
observation period
49
. A new listing bias arises due to significant underperformance after the 
initial public offerings (Ritter, 1991). If a market index and portfolio approach is used, then 
these underperforming new listings may produce higher abnormal returns. Furthermore, in the 
long run returns tend to be cross-sectionally correlated because sample firms have overlapping 
long-term event windows. As a result of this cross-correlation long-term abnormal returns tend 
to be right-skewed. 
Other sources of potential bias are the selection of benchmark model and survivorship bias. 
Together these biases affect the reliability of the sample mean abnormal returns and sample 
                                                 
49 This is a part of wider methodological problem related with detecting abnormal returns attributable for a particular event in 
the long run. In the long run there may occur other corporate events that may also affect share prices. However, it is difficult 
to isolate the sole effect of the event being investigated.   
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standard deviation. Jointly these biases may lead to misspecification and to the violation of 
zero mean abnormal returns (the normality assumption). 
Recognising these limitations, researchers agree that using CAR methodology with a reference 
portfolio or asset pricing models in long-run event studies may produce mis-specified results. 
Kothari and Warner (1997) undertake a simulation study to examine CAR methodology with 
all four asset-pricing models (the market adjusted model, the market model, the CAPM and 
the FFTFM). Their results indicate that all models produce both positive and negative 
abnormal returns too often. The authors argue that in these cases, due to the sources of bias 
discussed above, parametric test statistics do not satisfy zero mean and unit normality 
assumptions. Therefore they suggest applying non-parametric test statistics and bootstrapping 
methodology for testing the long-run abnormal returns. 
Therefore empirical research, investigating post-event long-term abnormal returns, uses Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) 
approaches, although the statistical properties of these approaches are still being debated 
among financial economics scholars. 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
BHAR is the average multiyear return from investing in a portfolio of acquiring firms in 
comparison to investing in a portfolio of non-acquiring firms. This model calculates long-term 
abnormal returns as the simple difference between a realised buy-and-hold investment return 
on an acquiring firm‟s portfolio and the expected return on a buy-and-hold investment in a 
benchmark portfolio. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) advocate calculating BHARs using the benchmark of matched firms‟ 
portfolio, constructed according to the matched size and book-to-market ratio, rather than 
using a reference portfolio, such as a market index. According to these authors, calculating 
BHARs on the basis of a matched firms‟ portfolio is a better methodology, because „it 
accurately measures an investor experience of investment‟. Similarly, Kothari and Warner 
(1997) show that, with the reference portfolio approach or asset pricing models, the BHARs 
could be at least as biased as CARs, as it is difficult to obtain both unbiased mean abnormal 
returns and variance estimates in the long-run to be used to derive reliable t-statistics. 
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However, the problem of BHAR methodology is that it may show a larger abnormal return for 
a longer period. For example, if in fact there exist abnormal returns for the first 6 months and 
no abnormal returns exist during the remaining period of 3 years, it shows that abnormal 
returns exist for whole 3-year period. Furthermore, the above-mentioned sources of bias a new 
listing, the rebalancing of a benchmark portfolio, and the skewness of multiyear returns – still 
apply in the case of BHAR (Barber and Lyon, 1997, Kothari and Warner, 1997). 
Another deficiency of the BHAR methodology is that it ignores the cross-sectional 
dependence of abnormal returns and therefore may produce overestimated test statistics 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). One way of dealing with this problem is to use skewness-
adjusted test-statistics or t-statistics estimated using the bootstrapping methodology. 
The Calendar Time approach 
One of the main requirements of the long-term abnormal return calculation methodologies is 
that such methodologies should adjust for the changes in the relevant risk for each stock. This 
is not required for the short-term abnormal returns calculation. But in the long-run calculation 
any small error in risk adjustment can bring about economically large differences in abnormal 
returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). The CTAR model, which was first introduced by 
Mandelker (1974), takes into consideration the change in risk and subsequent change in 
required rates of return after takeovers
50
.  
Later Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate the CTAR method, as they 
argue that it eliminates cross-sectional dependence in random samples by accounting for them 
in portfolio variances and therefore the distribution of this estimator is better approximated by 
the normal distribution. After accounting for the cross-correlation of sample firm abnormal 
returns, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report no long-run abnormal returns for acquirers. At the 
same time, these authors stress that this result is due to the elimination of cross-sectional 
dependence in sample firm abnormal returns, not due to the construction of benchmark 
portfolios. In contrast to the previous research which suggests that CTAR has little power to 
detect abnormal returns (Loughran and Ritter, 2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that 
the CTAR method has more power than the BHAR method, after accounting for dependence. 
                                                 
50 Appendix 7 explains in detail the procedures of abnormal returns calculation using the CTAR approach. 
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Lyon et al. (1999) show that the control firm benchmark performs well with both BHAR and 
CTAR methods. Furthermore, as CTARs are less skewed than BHARs, conventional t-
statistics yield more reliable statistics. 
In sum, following Ritter (1991) and Barber and Lyon (1997), we apply BHAR methodology to 
measure post-takeover long-run stock price performance, which is specified as follows:  
T
t
T
t
timattii RRBHAR
1 1
,, ),1()1(  (20) 
where tiR ,  is the monthly return on the i
th
 acquiring firm stock for month t, and timatR , is the 
return on matching i
th
 firm for month t. 
As the sample used in this thesis excludes overlapping events, the standard t-statistics can be 
used to test the significance of the abnormal returns, which is calculated as follows:  
,
/)( nBHAR
BHAR
t  (21) 
where BHAR is the sample mean BHAR for a  month period, )(BHAR is the cross-
sectional sample standard deviation of abnormal returns, and n is the number of sample firms. 
4.6.4 The Efficient Market Hypothesis and the validity of return-generating models 
The widely reported long-term negative abnormal returns for acquirers can be explained by 
one of the three possible explanations: (1) takeovers are in fact value-destroying or value-re-
distributing investments; (2) the market may be over-reacting to the announcement of 
takeovers, casting doubts on the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH); (3) the 
abnormal returns-generating models or test statistics may be mis-specified.  
In this regard, the validity of the EMH assumption is crucial in calculating reliable short- and 
long-run abnormal returns. Kendall‟s (1953) results reveal that stock prices follow a random 
walk, which means that future prices are not predictable and current prices fully reflect all 
available information. Only the arrival of new information causes a change (increase or 
decrease) in the share prices. A semi-strong form of market efficiency states that all publicly 
available information should be instantaneously incorporated into the share prices, leaving no 
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opportunity for making abnormal returns in future
51
. Under the EMH any future effect of an 
event should be immediately incorporated into the share price upon announcement of the 
event. Fama (1965) defines an efficient market as follows: 
„In an efficient market, competition among many intelligent participants 
leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual 
securities already reflect the effects of information based on events that have 
already occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take 
place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time 
the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value‟. 
While the extant evidence on the CARs is in compliance with the EMH, the evidence on long-
run abnormal returns casts some doubts on the validity of the EMH, as under this hypothesis 
any effect of takeovers should be immediately incorporated into the share price upon 
announcement of the event and there should not be any abnormal returns in the long run. If 
takeovers are value-destroying investments, then return-generating models may be correctly 
specified, indicating the invalidity of the EMH. In this case, markets react to the takeover 
announcements with a substantial time delay (perhaps only after obtaining performance data).  
Alternatively, negative long-term abnormal returns may indicate overestimation of takeover 
gains by the market (Shleifer, 2000). This alternative explanation is more consistent with the 
phenomenon that takeover announcement gains accumulated to target shareholders are largely 
offset by declines in the combined firm share price. In short, the research has not been able to 
agree on valid empirical models, especially for measuring the long-term effect of takeovers on 
shareholder wealth. 
4.6.5 Modelling the association between shareholder gains and workforce adjustments 
After measuring the post-merger changes in both shareholders‟ and employees‟ wealth, the 
thesis investigates the relationship between these two variables. Changes in employment and 
wages might account for a significant fraction of the takeover-related gains accrued to the 
shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Supporting the idea that takeover gains come 
purely from cost savings, Houston et al. (2001) provide evidence that the main source of re-
valuations is the estimated cost savings, rather than performance improvements. Different 
                                                 
51 Other forms of EMH are the weak form and the strong form. According to the weak form of market efficiency, all past 
information should be reflected in current share prices. According to the strong form of market efficiency, all past, currently 
publicly available and private information should be incorporated into share prices.  
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kinds of cost savings may motivate takeovers, including cost savings resulting from joint 
operation synergies or cost savings from investment cuts and employee layoffs.  
The value-redistribution theory argues that takeovers facilitate wealth transfer from workers to 
shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). In this case, workforce and wage growth should 
be inversely related to target shareholders‟ gains. To investigate this hypothesis we regress 
workforce adjustments on target shareholders‟ gains (CARs). Alternatively, the value-creation 
theory of takeovers suggests that takeovers benefit all stakeholders, including workers, by 
improving efficiency (Manne, 1965). In this case, workforce and wage growth should depend 
on the success of mergers, where success is measured by long-run abnormal returns. To 
investigate this hypothesis we regress workforce adjustments (and wage changes) on 
shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns (BHARs). 
4.7 Methods for analysing the labour demand effects of takeovers 
The fourth question investigates the labour demand impact of takeovers. In estimating the 
labour demand effect we follow the modelling strategy adopted by previous research and use 
the panel data estimation methods. Below we discuss these methods. 
4.7.1 Modelling the association between labour demand and employee layoffs 
As previously discussed, prior research determines the post-merger optimum labour level, 
taking into consideration lagged employment, wages (relative to cost of capital) and output 
(Haynes and Thompson, 1999a; Conyon et al., 2001, 2002a, 2004). Following this research, to 
analyse the labour demand effect of mergers, we estimate an autoregressive distributed lag 
model as described in equation (3). 
When this model includes a merger dummy, it compares the post-takeover labour demand 
shift in merging firms with the labour demand change in non-merging firms. Furthermore, 
when related and unrelated merger dummies are used instead of the merger dummy, the model 
compares related and unrelated mergers‟ labour demand effect with the labour demand change 
in non-merging firms. Similarly, to distinguish the effects of hostile versus friendly takeovers, 
the model includes hostility and friendly dummy regressors.  
The advantage of this methodology is that it controls for output and wages as well as for 
macro-economy-wide changes. In contrast, Brown and Medoff‟s (1988) regression 
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methodology only controls for initial employment and wages. Another advantage of this 
model is that by using panel data structure the effect of unobservable variables, such as 
management quality, can be eliminated. Omitting these unobservable variables creates a 
correlation between explanatory variables and error terms. The effect of unobservable 
variables can be eliminated by first differencing all variables included in the model. However, 
even after first differencing, the lagged dependent variable will still be correlated with the 
error term. 
Under the active market for corporate control, synergy or better labour management should 
reduce post-merger labour demand. Acquirers should make merger-related employee layoffs 
based on the extent of labour demand decline. We investigate whether labour demand decline 
is higher in mergers that involve layoffs than in mergers that do not, using panel data-based 
GMM regression methods. Using the same dynamic adjustment model (equation 3), this thesis 
replaces the merger dummy with the layoff dummy and non-layoff dummy regressors. This 
enables us to compare the labour demand change in acquisitions that involve employee layoffs 
with the labour demand in acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. With this 
estimation it will be possible to test the argument that the post-merger employee layoffs are 
undertaken after those mergers that result in higher labour demand decline. 
In the equation (3) the presence of a lagged dependent variable and an unobservable variable 
causes a correlation between explanatory variables and the error term. To deal with the 
endogeneity issue prior research uses the Instrumental Variable estimation method (Conyon et 
al., 2002a) and the difference GMM method (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). Based on the recent 
recommendations on dealing with the weak instruments problem (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 2000), we use the systems GMM estimation method, which uses more 
reliable instrumental variables. Below we discuss panel data estimation methods and 
Appendix 8 provides extended discussion on this issue.   
4.7.2 Panel data based regression methods 
Cross-sectional regression shows the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables at one point in time. In contrast, panel data-based regression enables us to investigate 
the dynamic effect of independent variables on the dependent variable, using data on several 
years. This is important in analysing the dynamic effect of takeovers on labour demand, as it 
may take several years for the full effect of mergers to materialise. Thus, using panel data-
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based estimation methods, it will be possible to examine the effect of mergers on employment 
several years after takeover. 
The endogeneity issue is one of the main problems of cross-sectional analysis. There may be 
measurement error and simultaneous association between the dependent and independent 
variables. At the same time, the merger event itself may be endogenous: acquirers select 
targets with better performance and high growth (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; McGuckin 
and Nguyen, 2001). Reserve causality is another source of endogeneity: acquirers may adjust 
the workforce taking into consideration the operating performance results, but also they can 
reduce post-merger employment to cover a high premium, as suggested by Krishnan et al. 
(2007). To control for the endogeneity problem, this paper uses dynamic panel data estimation 
methods to analyse the consequence of workforce adjustments for performance. 
In an autoregressive distributed lag model, such as equation 3, some of the independent 
variables may not be strictly exogenous, as they may be correlated with the error term due to 
(1) the presence of the lagged dependent variable and (2) unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, there is the additional possibility that some explanatory variables 
may be endogenous variables. The estimation methods based on cross-sectional data cannot 
deal with the endogeneity problem. Even pooled OLS estimates are inconsistent. Therefore we 
use a panel data-based estimation method to control for firm-specific heterogeneity across 
observations. We remove the effect of firm-specific unobservable variables by first 
differencing. However, a first-differenced lagged dependent variable may still be correlated 
with the error term due to autocorrelation. Therefore we instrument endogenous variables with 
their own lagged dependent variable and lagged first differences
52
. 
Recent research recommends using lagged levels as well as lagged first differences of all 
endogenous variables as instrumental variables to improve the efficiency of an estimator. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that using additional instrumental variables in the context of  
a GMM estimator optimally exploits all available information. Specifically, they suggested 
that the first-differenced lags could be weak instruments and proposed to use all available 
lagged levels as instrumental variables for the differenced variables. If data is available for T 
                                                 
52 Appendix 8 discusses some of the static and dynamic panel data estimation methods. 
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period then a set of available instrumental variables becomes )...( 2,2,1 iTii yyy . A GMM 
estimator that only uses lagged levels as instrumental variables is called a „difference GMM‟.    
The second condition is that instrumental variables should explain some part of the variation 
in the endogenous variable. Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that lagged levels could be poor 
instruments for first differences. In particular, when the correlation between first differences 
and lagged levels to be used as instrumental variables is weak, instruments become less 
informative and the estimates may be biased. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (2000) suggest using the differenced lags along with the lagged levels as instruments for 
the equations in first differences, if they are not correlated with the error term. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) show that both lagged differences 
and lagged levels could be used as instrumental variables to increase efficiency in an 
estimator. This estimator is called a „systems GMM‟ as it combines the lagged level 
instruments with the lagged difference level instruments. To investigate the fourth question 
(Q4), we apply the systems GMM estimation method, which instruments endogenous 
variables with their own lags and lagged first differences. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has identified appropriate research methods to be applied in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. Overall, these research methods come from three academic disciplines 
– accounting, finance and industrial economics – and include univariate and (cross-sectional 
and panel data-based) multiple regression techniques. 
First, to explore the reasons for workforce adjustments, we need to analyse the pre-takeover 
operating performance of both acquired and acquiring firms. Then we use the regression 
methods to analyse different factors that may prompt post-takeover workforce adjustments.  
Secondly, we analyse post-takeover operating performance change using the change method. 
The performance of merging firms will be compared with the performance of non-merging 
firms. We also investigate the association between workforce adjustments and operating 
performance levels, as well as the association between workforce adjustment and operating 
performance change, using the regression methods.  
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Thirdly, we analyse the association between post-takeover workforce adjustments and 
shareholder gains. For this purpose, we need to measure short- and long-run abnormal returns 
for shareholders. To empirically investigate the association between shareholder gains and 
employee wealth concessions, we regress workforce adjustments on target shareholders‟ short-
run abnormal returns and acquirer shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns. These regressions 
provide empirical evidence on the wealth transfer hypothesis.  
Finally, the thesis investigates labour demand and wage effects of takeovers. In particular, we 
are interested in whether labour demand and wage effects of takeovers are different in the 
layoff-involving acquisitions from in the acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. As 
labour demand adjustment could be dynamic, the estimation model includes a lagged 
dependent variable, which is correlated with the error term, creating an endogeneity problem. 
Therefore the final empirical chapter uses panel data estimation methods.  
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5 CAUSES OF POST-MERGER WORKFORCE ADJUSTMENTS 
5.1 Introduction  
5.1.1 Research motivation  
It is well known that mergers and acquisitions lead to substantial workforce reductions. 
However, systematic empirical evidence on the causes of post-takeover workforce reductions 
is inconclusive. In contrast to the common expectation that workforce reductions are 
undertaken to improve firm performance, some commentators argue that such reductions are 
undertaken to create shareholder value and to regain premiums paid to targets. Empirical 
evidence on this question would contribute to an understanding of whether post-merger labour 
management decisions are influenced by market-based mechanisms of corporate governance 
or whether such decisions are made on the basis of independent managerial judgements for the 
purpose of achieving success for the company, as required by company law.      
This chapter empirically investigates the factors underlying post-merger employee layoffs. 
Prior research suggests several conflicting factors that may prompt such layoffs. On the one 
hand, it is argued that efficiency improvement through management disciplining and 
elimination of duplicative activities may reduce demand for labour, which may trigger 
workforce reductions. This argument is supported by recent empirical research, which 
concludes that mergers lead to improvements in efficiency. For example, O'Shaughnessy and 
Flanagan (1998) report that low labour efficiency in acquired firms leads to a high probability 
of post-merger job losses. Using sophisticated econometric models, a number of recent studies 
have shown that mergers reduce labour demand, leading to significant rationalisations in the 
use of labour and thereby increasing efficiency (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2002b; Gugler and 
Yurtoglu, 2004; Amess et al., 2008). Labour demand may decline due to synergy or better 
labour management post-merger.  
On the other hand, post-merger workforce reductions could be undertaken to achieve higher 
returns on capital and/or to cover high premiums paid to target firm shareholders (Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988; Froud et al., 2000; Sirower, 2000). In support of this view, the Krishnan et al. 
(2007) results indicate that managers make post-merger employee layoffs to regain high 
premiums. So, the need for performance improvement, management disciplining, synergy and 
high premiums have all been suggested as possible explanations for post-takeover workforce 
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adjustments, implying that there may be different causes of post-merger layoffs
53
. However, 
no one study has investigated the role of these competing factors in explaining post-merger 
workforce adjustments.   
Identifying factors associated with layoffs may give some insights into causes of such layoffs. 
This chapter not only investigates factors leading to post-merger workforce reductions, but 
also factors that may prompt workforce growth. Therefore, in addition to the full sample 
analysis, we undertake further analysis, splitting the full sample into two sub-samples 
according to post-takeover changes in the number of workers: „the workforce reduction‟ sub-
sample („WFR‟ hereafter), where post-merger combined employment levels decline relative to 
the pre-merger combined employment level, and „the workforce growth‟ sub-sample („WFG‟ 
hereafter), where post-merger employment levels grow relative to the pre-merger employment 
level. Comparing the performance of these two sub-samples provides further evidence on the 
factors that prompt post-takeover workforce changes.  
First, to investigate the causes of post-merger workforce adjustments, the chapter compares 
pre-takeover operating performance of the WFR and WFG sub-samples using a univariate 
analysis. Next it uses a regression technique to examine the role of target firm under-
performance, hostility, relatedness and a high premium in explaining post-takeover workforce 
changes in the full sample as well as in the sub-samples. 
5.1.2 Brief results and contributions 
The results show that post-merger employee layoffs are undertaken in under-performing target 
firms, where there is a need and scope for efficiency improvement. Univariate analysis 
provides weak evidence of under-performance of the WFR sub-sample firms in comparison to 
the WFG sub-sample firms.   
Regressions show that acquired firms‟ prior performance explains both post-takeover 
workforce reductions and workforce growth, while acquirers‟ prior performance only explains 
workforce growth. The full sample regressions show that related acquisitions lead to a higher 
level of workforce adjustments than unrelated acquisitions do. Hostile and related acquisitions 
lead to slower workforce growth in comparison to friendly and unrelated acquisitions, 
                                                 
53 Other factors that may lead to a higher level of workforce adjustments include post-merger asset divestments and cash 
payments during acquisitions. 
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respectively. Furthermore, the results show that high premiums are associated with lower 
workforce reductions. At the same time, high premiums are associated with slower workforce 
growth, possibly due to a higher level of synergy resulting from expensive acquisitions. The 
results imply that managers undertake employee layoffs when there is a need for efficiency 
improvement.  
The chapter contributes to the literature by clarifying the reasons for post-merger workforce 
adjustments. There may be several different reasons for efficiency improvement: the need to 
stop further performance deterioration, the realisation of synergy or the disciplining of 
inefficient management. The results of this chapter suggest that managers undertake post-
merger employee layoffs for efficiency improvement purposes, not to create shareholder value 
at the expense of labour, as suggested by prior research (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). In the 
long run, such efficiency improvements should also benefit employees. Therefore it can be 
concluded that one of the main governance mechanisms for restructuring to maximise 
shareholder value – corporate takeovers – does not necessarily negatively affect labour. 
5.2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
There is growing evidence on the employment losses post-merger. For example, Black et al. 
(2007) show that higher levels of mergers and acquisitions activity leads to shorter job tenure, 
which means that such transactions involve employee layoffs. Deakin and Slinger (1997) and 
Lehto and Böckerman (2008) conclude that almost all changes in ownership lead to job losses. 
Conyon et al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b) show that mergers significantly reduce the absolute 
number of workers. However, the factors that lead to post-takeover employee layoffs are not 
well understood.  
Prior literature suggests several factors that may lead to post-merger workforce reductions. 
Haynes and Thompson (1999a) discuss four possible ways that may enhance efficiency in 
bank mergers, namely: the exploitation of economies of scale, the elimination of duplicated 
capacity, the transfer of control over assets to better management and the opportunity to 
renegotiating explicit and implicit contracts post-merger. Each of these methods may involve 
employee layoffs. On the basis of this literature, we identify several factors that help to 
explain post-merger employee layoffs. These include: pre-takeover poor performance of 
merging firms, the disciplinary role of takeovers, synergy created by mergers and the high 
premium paid to targets. 
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Within the active MCC acquirers target under-performing firms to create shareholder value by 
re-allocating resources to the most efficient users and by improving firm performance (Manne, 
1965). Efficient use of resources may also include enhancing labour efficiency through 
workforce reductions. Therefore it is expected that takeovers of under-performing targets may 
lead to workforce reductions. There are several reasons for workforce reductions after such 
efficiency improving takeovers. 
First, employee layoffs may occur when firms already have declining business opportunities 
and related financial problems, as recovering from poor operating performance may require 
cost savings. In such cases, poor performance may also be associated with more traditional 
factors leading to employee layoffs, such as a decline in product demand, arising as a result of 
general business cycle conditions, technological or other industry-wide changes (Cappelli, 
2000). The extant evidence suggests poor operating performance as one of the main 
antecedents of employee layoffs (Coucke et al., 2007; Hillier et al., 2007). Furthermore, there 
is some evidence showing significant improvement in firm performance after downsizing 
(Elayan et al., 1998; Espahbodi et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2001). Second, low labour 
productivity may precede employee layoffs. Froud et al. (2000) argue that labour cost cuts 
provide relatively easy and unproblematic gains when firms are in a difficult position. 
Therefore layoffs may be to enhance undertaken labour efficiency. O'Shaughnessy and 
Flanagan (1998) report that post-merger employee layoffs are made to improve labour 
efficiency. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) show that acquisitions involve job losses, while at 
the same time they improve labour productivity. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) and 
McGuckin et al. (1998) report that ownership change causes further improvement in labour 
productivity. Conyon et al. (2004) show that mergers cause significant improvement in 
employee profitability.  
In sum, the need for performance improvement may necessitate post-merger employee layoffs, 
because when firms perform poorly shareholders expect managers to undertake some 
restructuring activities (Morck et al., 1989). There may be different reasons for poor 
performance, such as decline in product demand or technological change. This means that 
takeovers undertaken by profit-maximising managers could lead to employee layoffs in the 
short-run, although long-run employee wealth concessions depend on the success of mergers. 
Therefore the extent of the employee layoffs should be a function of acquired firms‟ pre-
takeover performance. On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
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Q1-H1: The pre-takeover performance of both acquired firms and acquiring firms is positively 
associated with post-takeover workforce adjustments.  
It is suggested that synergetic gains are more likely to motivate friendly mergers, whereas 
gains from replacing inefficient management motivate hostile takeovers (Morck et al., 1990). 
This means that hostile takeovers occur to discipline under-performing managers, who may 
avoid corporate downsizing even if it is required for efficiency improvement. If takeovers are 
motivated by disciplinary reasons, then profit-maximizing managers may undertake higher 
cost cuts after hostile takeovers than after friendly mergers. Therefore the extent of workforce 
reductions should depend on the mode of takeovers.  
Similarly, hostile takeovers may occur to discipline managers who have just opted for a „quiet 
life‟, who may have increased employment levels above the optimal level or may not have 
exerted enough control to monitor labour efficiency. In other words, employment levels may 
have been sub-optimal due to the behaviour of the incumbent management, who may have 
entrenched themselves and may have been applying inefficient labour management practices, 
leading to performance deterioration. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that when 
takeover threat is weak, managers may not exert enough effort to monitor workers and to shut 
down inefficient plants, but instead avoid difficult labour management decisions. They prefer 
to lead a „quiet life‟, increasing staffing levels and paying high wages. These arguments imply 
that workforce reductions do not take place, even in under-performing firms, when managers 
are not monitored by external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the MCC. Thus, 
removal of such managers through takeovers should lead to workforce adjustment and to 
acquirers‟ undertaking workforce reductions in under-performing firms.  
Although the primary purpose of hostile takeovers is to discipline inefficient management, 
there is growing evidence showing that targets of hostile takeovers are not always under-
performing firms. This means that hostile takeovers may occur for other reasons. Therefore 
some commentators argue that hostile takeovers do not necessarily occur to correct for 
managerial failure (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). Instead, hostility may 
arise because incumbents expect staff cost cuts and therefore oppose such takeovers to protect 
workers. In other words, hostility may arise due to the incumbents‟ disagreement with the 
proposed restructuring measures, such as employee layoffs (Franks and Mayer, 1996).  
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At the same time, hostile takeovers are more likely to facilitate wealth transfer from 
employees to shareholders and therefore they are more likely to reduce workforce (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988; Pagano and Volpin, 2005a). Hostile takeovers provide high premiums 
(Franks and Mayer, 1996) and generate higher positive abnormal returns for both target and 
bidder shareholders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006). Such 
gains may come from reneging on implicit contracts between the firm and employees. 
Hostile takeovers may lead to excessive senior-level staff dismissal (Franks and Mayer, 1996) 
and higher levels of workforce reductions (Conyon et al., 2001). However, supporting the 
efficiency enhancement role of hostile takeovers, Conyon et al. (2002a) show that such 
takeovers also cause greater reductions in labour demand: hostile takeovers reduce labour 
demand by 17%, while the decline is 9% after friendly mergers. Similarly, Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004) report that tender offers (hostile in nature) produce significantly different 
labour demand effects than other mergers. The Conyon et al. (2001) results indicate that both 
hostile and friendly takeovers are associated with a similar decrease in labour demand, 
averaging 7.5%, after controlling for output and wage changes. On the basis of these results, 
the authors suggest that a steep decline in the absolute number of workers after hostile 
takeovers is mainly due to large asset divestment and the resulting output decline.  
All of these theories imply that a new management team may undertake the required corporate 
downsizing, meaning that employment reductions should be greater in hostile takeovers than 
in friendly mergers: 
Q1-H2: Hostile takeovers are associated with (i) greater workforce reductions and (ii) lower 
workforce growth than friendly takeovers.  
According to Cappelli (2000) corporate downsizing occurs as a result of the search for new 
operational efficiencies in the use of labour. Synergy created by mergers may lead to such 
rationalisations in the use of labour. Synergy may arise due to the elimination of duplicative 
activities. Thus, employee layoffs could be undertaken to materialise operational synergies, 
arising from economies of scale and scope. The extent of workforce reductions should depend 
on the level of synergies arising as a result of combining two businesses.  
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In this regard synergy has been suggested as one of the main rationales for mergers and 
acquisitions (Sirower, 2000). In support of this view, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995a, 2001) 
conclude that synergy is the main motive of takeovers. 
As the scope for integrating two businesses is greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions, the former should provide higher synergy: the scope for elimination of 
duplicative activities and other cost cuts should be greater in such cases. Rumelt (1974) argues 
that related diversifications provide superior performance to unrelated diversifications. Thus, 
related acquisitions should lead to higher levels of workforce reductions than unrelated 
acquisitions. In fact, prior evidence shows that acquirers determine optimal employment levels 
taking into consideration synergy resulting from mergers and the required level of workforce 
to produce the combined output. O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) find that the probability 
of layoff announcements is higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. 
Furthermore, more recent research shows that related acquisitions reduce labour demand more 
than unrelated acquisitions do (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2002b; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). 
In sum, as a result of the elimination of duplicative activities, mergers may reduce demand for 
labour: the combined firm may be able to produce the combined product with a lower level of 
labour. Decline in labour demand may be greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions (Conyon et al., 2002a). On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis 
will be tested:  
Q1-H3: Related acquisitions are associated with (i) greater workforce reductions and (ii) 
lower workforce growth than unrelated acquisitions.  
A growing body of research provides evidence showing that managers pay a high premium for 
acquired firms. Such high premiums require higher returns, which could be achieved through 
labour cost cuts, when other options are limited (Froud et al., 2000). Therefore a high 
premium was suggested as one of the main reasons for post-merger workforce reductions 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Krishnan et al., 2007).   
Acquiring firm managers may pay high premiums as a result of over-optimism: they may 
systematically over-estimate their managerial capabilities and/or expected synergies (Roll, 
1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). In fact, due to information asymmetries and difficulties in 
estimating synergies, even rational managers may overpay for targets. Hayward and Hambrick 
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(1997) empirical work shows a strong relationship between size of premium and CEO hubris, 
measured with several variables, such as acquiring firms‟ recent performance and recent 
media praise for the CEO. Sirower (2000) claims that many of these premium payments have 
created a requirement for performance improvements that are virtually impossible to realize, 
even by the best executives in the best of industry conditions. Thus, one available option for 
managers is to cut costs. Froud et al. (2000) argue that labour cost is the largest cost 
component that can be easily cut. Krishnan et al. (2007) argue that high premiums are the 
main factor leading to post-merger workforce reductions, as their results show that there is a 
positive association between premiums and the number of workers laid off post-merger. 
However, under strong pressure from the MCC to maximise shareholder value, managers may 
pay low premiums for under-performing businesses and subsequently undertake wide-scale 
restructuring to turn these businesses around. Alternatively, managers may increase 
shareholder value by acquiring better performing firms with growing business opportunities, 
which may require higher premiums. Many authors  argue that acquirers target better 
performing firms (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). Franks and 
Mayer (1996) study reveals that targets were not poorly performing firms. In such 
acquisitions, incumbents may reject offers in order to secure high premiums. The following 
hypothesis will be tested:   
Q1-H4: The higher the premium, (i) the higher the workforce reductions and (ii) the lower the 
workforce growth.  
5.3 Data and methods  
5.3.1 Econometric model specification 
To test the above hypotheses, the following model will be estimated: 
BoardLevSizePremRHROAROAE preA
pre
T 87654321  (22) 
where E  is the change in the logarithm transformed number of employees from t-1 to t+3, as 
described in equation (23), 
pre
TROA  and 
pre
AROA  represent the average industry-adjusted 
performance, for acquired and acquiring firms respectively, for the two years prior to 
takeovers; H is a hostility dummy, which takes 1 if the initial offer was rejected and 0 
otherwise; R is a relatedness dummy, which takes 1 if both target and acquiring firms are in 
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the same industry and 0 otherwise; Prem is the premium, measured as the excess amount of 
bid price over share price one month prior to takeover announcement; Size is logarithm of the 
ratio of acquiring firm size to the transaction value (target firm size); Lev is the debt-to-equity 
ratio at the end of the takeover completion year; Board is the ratio of non-executive directors 
to the total number of directors, and  indicates the error term. In extended models we also 
include the interactions of the R and H dummies with pre-takeover performance of target firms 
( preTROA ). 
In the model we control for relative size, leverage and board structure on the basis of prior 
research findings. First, the integration of larger firms may create a greater challenge as well 
as more synergy than the integration of smaller firms. In this respect, McGuckin and Nguyen 
(2001) and Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) find that the impact of acquisitions depends on the 
size of acquisition. Therefore we control for the relative size, measured as the ratio of acquired 
firm size (transaction value) relative to acquirers‟ market value at the end of t-1. Ofek (1993) 
argues that higher leverage following poor performance increases the probability of corporate 
restructuring, including employee layoffs. Therefore in the takeover context higher leverage 
may also force acquirers to cut costs by reducing the workforce. We measure leverage as the 
ratio of debt to total assets at the beginning of the relevant year. Finally, a higher number of 
non-executives on the Board of Directors may force managers to undertake restructuring 
activities that maximise shareholder value and prior research suggests that higher the number 
of non-executive directors, the more effective the Board (Cosh et al., 2006; Yawson, 2006). 
Therefore we control for the Board composition of the acquiring firms. 
5.3.2 Data 
A sample of takeovers of UK public companies occurring during the period 1990-2000 was 
hand-collected from the Acquisitions Monthly journal. Subsequent transactions undertaken by 
multiple acquirers were excluded from the sample: i.e. only one acquisition per acquirer 
within any consecutive five years was included in the sample. After the exclusion of mergers 
involving financial institutions, property companies and utility companies, the sample consists 
of 235 mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, we required availability of financial data for at 
least one year for both acquired and acquiring firms during the pre-takeover period and for at 
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least one year for the acquiring firms during the post-takeover period
54
. Financial data was 
obtained from Datastream, and in some cases complemented with data from sample firms‟ 
Annual Reports, downloaded from the Nexis
®
 database. 
One month premium is usually used to control for rumours about takeovers and to determine 
the true size of the premium. As in other studies this variable is defined as the difference 
between the purchase price and the price 30 days before takeover, divided by the price 30 days 
before takeover (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Sirower, 2000).  
Data on acquirer boards‟ composition has been collected from Hemmington-Scott Corporate 
Registers. Following Cosh et al. (2006) and Yawson (2006), the collected data includes the 
size of board (total number of directors) and composition of boards (number of executive and 
non-executive directors). 
Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the variables used in this thesis. Appendix 3 provides 
pairwise correlation between these variables. Table 5.1 reports summary descriptive statistics 
for the variables. Panel A shows employment and annual average wage rate for acquired firms 
and their matched firms, while Panel B reports similar data for acquiring firms and their 
matching firms. This data reveals that acquirers are nearly four times larger than acquired 
firms in terms of number of employees. The data also reveals that the WFR sub-sample firms 
are larger than the WFG sub-sample firms. Panel C of the table reports other variables used in 
this thesis.  
5.3.3 Measuring post-takeover workforce change 
A firm‟s workforce is measured by the number of employees, using Datastream data, which 
represents the annual average number of both full and part-time employees of the firm. The 
pre-takeover pro-forma combined employment level is computed by summing the target and 
bidder‟s workforce at the end of t-1. Then the post-takeover employee change variable is 
created by deducting this pro-forma number of employees from the acquirers‟ number of 
employees at the end of the third post-takeover year. 
                                                 
54 We collect data for the period of three years before the takeover completion year and three years after the takeover 
completion year. In most cases we have data for all three of the pre-takeover years and the three-year post-takeover periods.  
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We divide the full sample into the WFG and WFR sub-samples on the basis of the percentage 
change in the number of employees over a three-year period after the takeover completion 
year:  
)log()log(% 13 tt EEE , (23)  
where E%  denotes the percentage change in employment, E  denotes the number of 
employees. If, for an acquirer, the employment percentage change is positive, then this 
acquirer is included in the WFG sub-sample; if negative, then the acquirer is included in the 
WFR sub-sample. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Full 
sample
Matched 
firm
WFR sub-
sample
WFG sub-
sample
Panel A: Acquired firms' employment and wage data
Number of employees Mean 3,313       2,088       4,485       1,586       
Median 770          706          1,096       623          
Std. Dev. 9,067       4,729       11,068     4,295       
Annual wage per worker Mean 23.33       25.30       22.39       24.71       
Median 21.58       22.80       21.23       21.81       
Std. Dev. 12.08       13.85       9.80         14.76       
Panel B: Acquiring firms' employment and wage data
Number of employees Mean 13,088     9,214       16,427     8,167       
Median 2,975       2,661       3,285       2,903       
Std. Dev. 27,036     16,740     32,413     15,000     
Annual wage per worker Mean 23.04       23.12       22.77       23.44       
Median 22.11       22.60       21.68       22.96       
Std. Dev. 9.77         9.64         10.53       8.57         
Panel C: Other variables
Hostility dummy (1=hostile, 0=friendly) number 52 34 18
Relatedness dummy (1=in the same industry, 0=otherwise) number 136 72 64
Payment dummy (1=cash, 0=all equity or combination) number 68 40 28
Premium % 39 38 40
Relative size of acquired and acquiring firms ratio 0.60 0.67 0.50
Leverage ratio 0.47 0.48 0.45
Board composition (ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors)ratio 0.44 0.44 0.43
Board ownership % 6.46 5.23 7.76
Number of observations number 235 470 111 95
Notes: In 29 observations there is no data for the second and/or third post-takeover year; these are excluded from the sample 
when the sample is divided into the WFR and WFG sub-samples. Therefore the total number of observations in the WFR and 
WFG sub-samples differs from the full-sample observations.  
 
Alternatively, the full sample could be divided into sub-samples based on specific 
determinants, where the sub-sample membership determinants could be estimated using a 
probit regression. Therefore, we analyse the determinants of sum-sample membership using 
profit regression, as shown in the table 5.2. The results show that target firms‟ pre-takeover 
performance is a significant determinant of post-merger workforce reductions, where 
workforce reductions are determined based on Datastream information. The negative 
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coefficient of this regressor indicates that an increase in the acquired firms‟ performance 
reduces the predicted probability of workforce reduction (so, in acquisitions involving poorer 
performing targets the probability of employee layoffs is higher than in acquisitions involving 
better performing targets). The results also show that acquiring firms‟ pre-takeover 
performance is a significant determinant of publicly announced merger-related employee 
layoffs
55
. Relatedness dummy is a significant determinant of workforce reductions only after 3 
years period. These probit regressions also show that hostility dummy does not affect the 
probability of post-merger workforce reductions. The regressions also show that the higher the 
premium the higher the probability of workforce reductions after three years post-merger. 
Control variables also perform as expected: when acquirers acquire larger firms relative to 
their size, then the predicted probability of workforce reductions is higher; an increase in the 
board ownership in the acquiring firms reduces the predicted probability of post-merger 
workforce reductions. 
In sum, these regressions show that acquired and acquiring firms‟ pre-takeover performance, 
industry relatedness and premiums are all significant determinants of post-merger workforce 
adjustments. Therefore, the full sample could be divided into sub-samples using these 
variables as the sub-sample membership characteristics. However, as there are several 
determinants of the sub-sample membership, dividing the full sample into sub-samples on the 
basis of these characteristics may be a complex process. Therefore, we split the full sample 
into the WFR and WFG sub-samples on the basis of Datastream post-merger workforce 
change.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Unreported results show that when other regressors (acquiring firm pre-takeover performance and dummy variables) are 
excluded from the regression, the acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance becomes significant at 10% significance level in 
this regression as well.  
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Table 5.2 Determinants of the post-merger workforce reductions 
Independent varaibles
Target firm pre-performance - 1.211*** - 0.749** - 0.227 - 0.595
Bidder firm pre-performance - 0.014 0.081 0.099 - 1.321*
Relatedness dummy - 0.237 - 0.245 - 0.458** - 0.245
Hostility dummy 0.296 0.300 0.235 0.243
Premium - 0.222 0.116 0.461* 0.003
Relative size 0.184*** 0.117* 0.128** 0.218***
Leverage 1.035** 0.814 1.08** 1.293**
Board structure - 0.157 - 0.013 - 0.171 - 1.112
Board ownership - 0.033** - 0.024*** - 0.026*** - 0.062***
Constant 0.304 0.227 - 0.113 0.349
Number of observations 235 235 235 235
Workforce 
reduction 
after 1 year
Workforce 
reduction 
after 2 years
Workforce 
reduction 
after 3 years
Announced 
layoffs
Dependent variables
Notes: The estimation method is probit regression. The dependent variable takes 1 if post-merger workforce change is 
negative and 0 otherwise. Post-merger workforce changes are determined as t+1 (t+2 and t+3) year workforce less t-1 year 
combined workforce of acquired and acquiring firm.   
    
5.3.4 Selection of matched firms 
Following the methodology proposed by Barber and Lyon (1996) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997), for each sample firm we select a matching firm at the end of year t-1 on the basis of 
the following criteria: first, we filter all firms in the same industry with the sample firm; 
second, we select all firms within the 25% to 200% size interval of the sample firm‟s size, size 
being measured by total assets; third, we select the non-acquiring firm with the closest 
performance measure to the matching firm. In order to capture the full differences in the 
performance of acquiring and non-acquiring firms, the matched firms should not have 
undertaken any significant acquisition around the sample takeover event which is being 
investigated. Therefore as matched firms we select only those firms which have made 
significant acquisitions during the two years before takeovers and three years after takeovers. 
Matched-firm-adjusted performance is obtained by deducting the matched firm‟s performance 
from the sample firm performance. Appendix 4 discusses in detail the full procedure of the 
matched firm selection procedure.  
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Univariate analysis of merging firms’ pre-takeover performance 
This section reports the results of univariate analysis of acquired and acquiring firms‟ pre-
takeover operating performance. Operating performance is measured using EBITDA, divided 
by Total Assets, (hereafter „Returns On Assets‟, (ROA)). This performance measure is 
adjusted using two benchmarks: industry-median firm and industry-, size- and performance-
matched firm benchmarks
56
.  
Taking into consideration the skewness of operating performance data and in order to control 
for the effects of outliers, it is customary to report median performance values. Therefore this 
thesis reports median values
57
. The null hypothesis tested is that the samples of both merged 
firms and matched firms come from the same population and there is no significant difference 
in the performances of these two samples. Barber and Lyon (1996) compare the performance 
of parametric t-statistics and non-parametric Wilcoxon test statistics in tests designed to detect 
abnormal returns. These authors conclude that non-parametric Wilcoxon test statistics are 
uniformly more powerful than parametric t-statistics. Furthermore, both test statistics are well 
specified only when sample firms are matched to control firms with similar pre-event 
performance. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), in univariate tests we use the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test the significance of median values. The 
significance of the adjusted performance is tested using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test, while the significance of the difference between the WFG and WFR sub-groups is 
tested using the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
As Panel A of Table 5.3 shows, the WFG sub-sample acquired firms‟ performance does not 
differ significantly from their industry-median performance, while they outperform their 
matched firms in year t-1. The WFR acquired firms‟ performance does not differ from their 
industry-median performance either, while they outperform their matched firms only three 
years before takeovers. This suggests that the WFR acquired firms‟ performance declines 
immediately before takeovers and this performance decline may require some restructuring 
                                                 
56 Appendix 4 provides the full procedure on the selection of an industry-, size- and performance-matched firm for each 
acquired and acquiring firm. 
57 Unreported tests of the data show the non-normal distribution of the operating performance data. Therefore it is more 
appropriate to use median values rather than mean values.  
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activities. However, both benchmarks show that there is no significant difference between the 
performance of acquired firms in the WFG and WFR sub-samples.  
Table 5.3 Pre-takeover performance of the acquired and acquiring firms 
Pre-takeover 
years
Unadjusted 
performance
z-stat
Industry median 
firm adjusted 
performance
z-stat
Matched firm 
adjusted 
performance
z-stat
Panel A: Acquired firms' pre-takeover performance
A-1: Full sample acquired firms  
 t-3 0.1942 -0.0084 0.07 0.0125 1.94
 t-2 0.1913 -0.0030 -0.08 0.0121 0.35
 t-1 0.1724 -0.0076 -0.56 0.0030 1.73
A-2: The WFG sub-sample acquired firms  
 t-3 0.1848 -0.0133 -0.28 -0.0036 0.55
 t-2 0.1912 0.0010 0.07 -0.0132 -0.70
 t-1 0.1691 -0.0076 -0.51 0.0064 2.01
A-3: The WFR sub-sample acquired firms
 t-3 0.2044 0.0000 0.37 0.0177 2.11
 t-2 0.2000 -0.0046 -0.14 0.0191 1.09
 t-1 0.1787 -0.0049 -0.36 0.0008 0.63
A-4: Difference between the WFG and the WFR sub-samples acquired firms' performance
 t-3 -0.0196 -1.10 -0.0133 -0.58 -0.0213 -0.89
 t-2 -0.0088 -0.21 0.0057 0.13 -0.0323 -1.25
 t-1 -0.0097 -0.26 -0.0027 -0.21 0.0055 1.09
Panel B: Acquiring firms' pre-takeover performance
B-1: Full sample acquiring firms
 t-3 0.2422 0.0158 2.90 0.0152 0.52
 t-2 0.2303 0.0209 4.32 0.0105 1.06
 t-1 0.2307 0.0432 6.42 0.0053 2.84
B-2: The WFG sub-sample acquiring firms 
 t-3 0.2578 0.0592 3.95 0.0030 -0.13
 t-2 0.2576 0.0522 4.25 0.0063 0.63
 t-1 0.2488 0.0632 5.75 0.0066 2.54
B-3: The WFR sub-sample acquiring firms
 t-3 0.2313 0.0032 0.39 0.0206 0.78
 t-2 0.2146 0.0094 1.96 0.0170 0.89
 t-1 0.2149 0.0270 3.59 0.0038 1.68
B-4: Difference between the WFG and the WFR sub-sample acquiring firms' performance
 t-3 0.0265 1.43 0.0560 3.01 -0.0175 -0.67
 t-2 0.0430 1.78 0.0428 2.59 -0.0108 -0.12
 t-1 0.0339 1.30 0.0363 2.08 0.0028 0.80  
Notes: This table reports pre-takeover performance (ROA, defined as EBITDA/TA) of acquired and acquiring firms. 
Unadjusted performance indicates sample median firm performance. Industry median firm adjusted performance indicates the 
difference between industry median performance and firm performance. Matched firm adjusted performance indicates the 
difference between the sample median performance and matched firms‟ sample median performance. 
 
As Panel B reports, the WFG acquirers outperform their industry-median firms during all three 
pre-takeover years and outperform their matched firms in year t-1. Similarly, the WFR 
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acquirers outperform their industry-median firms during two pre-takeover years and 
outperform their matched firms in year t-1, although it is only significant at the 10% level. 
Furthermore, the results show that the WFG acquirers perform significantly better than those 
WFR acquirers in all three pre-takeover years, when the industry-median firm benchmark is 
used. However, acquirers‟ pre-takeover performances in these two groups do not differ from 
each other, when the matched firm benchmark is used. 
Several important points emerge from this analysis. In general it is believed that acquired 
firms are not underperforming firms (Franks and Mayer, 1996, 1997). However, our analysis 
provides some evidence showing that the WFR acquired firms‟ performance declines 
immediately prior to takeovers. In contrast, the WFG acquired firms outperform their matched 
firms before the takeover event year, whereas the WFR acquired firms perform similarly to 
their matched firms. At the same time, the WFG acquirers‟ performance is significantly better 
that the WFR acquirers‟ performance. These two factors together suggest that managers 
undertake post-merger employee layoffs in underperforming firms. Another point is that 
acquirers outperform both industry-median firms and matched firms immediately prior to 
acquisitions. This confirms the view that acquirers undertake mergers during or immediately 
after high performance years. 
This analysis suggests that managers may make post-merger workforce reductions to stop 
further performance deterioration and/or to improve efficiency in labour usage. Furthermore, 
workforce reductions could be undertaken following hostile takeovers made to discipline those 
managers who enjoy a „quiet life‟. At the same time layoffs could be undertaken to achieve 
synergies through the elimination of duplicative activities, even though the targets‟ 
performance is nor poor. On the other hand, employee layoffs could be undertaken to achieve 
higher levels of cost-savings to premiums paid for acquisitions. The next section investigates 
these reasons for post-merger employee layoffs in the multiple regression contexts.  
5.4.2 Multivariate analysis of the causes of post-takeover employment adjustments 
OLS regression results 
As previously discussed, there may be several reasons for post-merger workforce adjustments. 
This section reports the results of regressions of post-takeover workforce adjustments on 
merging firms‟ pre-takeover performance, hostility (a management disciplining measure), 
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relatedness (a measure of synergy created by mergers) and premium. We are also interested to 
understand the factors leading to workforce reductions. Therefore, we re-run separate 
regressions for the full sample, as well as for the WFR and WFG sub-samples
58
. The extended 
models include the interactions of the hostility (relatedness) dummy variable with the pre-
takeover performance of acquired firms. 
In all regressions we identify outliers and influential points, using Cooks‟ D statistic. If this 
statistic is larger than 4/n for an observation, where n is the number of observations in a 
particular regression, we exclude such an observation from the regression. Such outlier 
deletions cause the sample size to change from one test to another. Such outlier deletions also 
cause the sum of observations from the sub-sample cases not to be equal to the number of 
observations in the full sample case.  
As Table 5.4 shows, acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance is positively related to the post-
takeover workforce changes. In the full sample, a one unit higher performance of acquired 
firms leads to 0.53% higher employment growth. The WFR sub-sample regression indicates 
that there is a negative association between the pre-merger target performance and workforce 
reductions, meaning that the poorer the acquired firms‟ performance, the greater the workforce 
reductions
59
. Specifically, a one unit lower performance causes a 0.38% greater workforce 
reduction. The positive coefficient of the target firm pre-takeover performance variable in the 
WFG sub-sample regression confirms this association: the higher the performance, the higher 
the workforce growth. Therefore the results support the hypothesis that post-takeover 
adjustments are positively associated with the pre-takeover performance of acquired firms.   
The full sample regression shows that acquirers‟ prior performance does not explain the 
changes in employment, though this variable is only significant in the WFG sub-sample. Thus, 
acquirers‟ prior performance only explains workforce growth rather than workforce 
                                                 
58 There may be some issues related with using OLS regression technique in the WFR and WFG sub-samples, as in these 
regressions the dependent variables are split into negative and positive values – in the WFR sub-sample the dependent 
variable is negative workforce change (in absolute values), whereas in the WFG sub-sample the dependent variable is positive 
workforce change. In other words, the dependent variables of these sub-samples are truncated at 0. Therefore, in these sub-
samples we have also run truncated regressions, the results of which are not reported in this thesis, as the overall results 
regarding the main variables of interests are similar in OLS and truncated regressions. Furthermore, the main conclusions of 
the thesis are made on the basis of the full sample results, whereas the sub-sample results are only used to confirm the full 
sample results.  
59 Equation (23) determines the percentage workforce reductions in negative numbers. However, in the WFR sub-sample 
dataset, the percentage workforce reductions are entered in absolute terms. So, in this sub-sample, the workforce reductions 
are given with positive signs, although in the full sample they have negative signs.    
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reductions. In contrast, in the WFR sub-sample, there is no association between acquirers‟ 
prior performance and subsequent workforce change. This partially supports the view that 
workforce adjustments are positively associated with the pre-takeover performance of 
acquiring firms: better performing acquirers further increase the number of their workforce. 
Although the signs of the hostility dummy regressor are negative, the coefficients are not 
significant
60
. In the models that include interaction terms, the results show that workforce 
growth is significantly lower after hostile takeovers relative to workforce growth after friendly 
acquisitions. Only one model provides support for the hypothesis that hostility leads to lower 
workforce growth. In the WFG sub-sample the interaction term between hostility and target 
pre-takeover performance enter the model with significant negative coefficient, meaning that 
there is a significant difference in the effect of pre-takeover performance on workforce growth 
in hostile versus friendly takeovers. In hostile acquisitions a one point higher pre-takeover 
target performance causes 2.1% [= 0.989 – 3.088] slower employment growth. Previous 
research (Conyon et al., 2001) shows that hostile takeovers involve high levels of asset 
divestment during post-merger years, which may result in lower employment growth. 
Table 5.4 OLS regressions explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments.   
Independent variables Full sample WFR WFG Full sample WFR WFG
Acquired firm pre-takeover performance 0.528*** - 0.380*** 0.334** 0.230 - 0.145 0.989***
Acquiring firm pre-takeover performance 0.353 0.145 0.371*** 0.195 0.133 0.412
Hostility dummy - 0.021 - 0.048 - 0.060 - 0.007 - 0.035 - 0.105*
Relatedness dummy 0.133*** - 0.009 - 0.094* 0.176*** - 0.026 - 0.041
Premium 0.001 - 0.107* - 0.165** 0.059 - 0.078 - 0.049
Relative size - 0.017 0.017 0.014 - 0.021 0.023 0.001
Leverage - 0.687*** 0.150 - 0.020 - 0.649*** 0.314** 0.041
Board structure - 0.203 0.068 0.075 - 0.238 0.114 0.123
Hostility dummy · Acquired firm performance - 0.509 0.055 - 3.088***
Relatedness dummy · Acquired firm performance 0.251 - 0.247 - 0.772**
Constant 0.266** 0.240*** 0.401*** 0.188 0.143 0.235*
F-stat 7.12 4.38 4.34 5.75 2.87 7.20
Adjusted R-square 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.21
Number of observations 180 89 86 180 89 83
Notes: Dependent variables are workforce change in the full sample, workforce reduction in the WFR sub-sample and 
workforce growth in the WFG sub-sample. The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
(White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the variables.  
 
The full sample regressions show that related acquisitions lead to higher level workforce 
change during a post-takeover period than unrelated acquisitions, as shown by the significant 
                                                 
60 This may be due to a small number of hostile takeovers in the WFR and WFG sub-samples. Another argument is that after 
controlling for under-performance, hostile takeovers may not be able to explain workforce adjustments. 
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and positive coefficient of the relatedness dummy regressor. However, although the 
relatedness dummy regressor coefficient is negative in the WFR sub-sample, it is not 
significant
61
. The WFG regression shows that related acquisitions cause a significantly lower 
increase in the number of workers than unrelated acquisitions. These results are consistent 
with prior research. For example, O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) report that the 
probability of employee layoffs is higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. 
Similarly, decline in labour demand is greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions due to the existence of synergy in such mergers. In contrast, in the WFG sub-
sample the interaction term between the relatedness dummy and acquired firm pre-takeover 
performance enters the model with significant negative coefficient, meaning that there is a 
significant difference in the effect of pre-takeover performance on employment growth in 
related versus unrelated takeovers. For example, in unrelated acquisitions a one point higher 
pre-takeover performance causes 1% higher employment growth, while in related acquisitions 
this effect is 0.2% [= 0.989 – 0.772].  
The negative coefficient of the premium regressor implies that highly paid acquisitions lead to 
lower levels of workforce reductions. This result supports the view that acquirers pay lower 
premiums for under-performing firms, but subsequently undertake employee layoffs as a part 
of corporate restructuring to turn around acquired businesses. In contrast to this, the WFG 
regression shows that there is an inverse relationship between premium and workforce growth. 
This negative association suggests that acquirers pay high premiums for the targets with high 
expected synergy arising from merging the human resources of two businesses. One of the 
sources of synergy may be the scope for elimination of duplicative activities, as a result of 
which there will be high cost savings. This higher scope for synergy results in lower 
employment growth in such acquisitions where high premium have been paid.  
Among the control variables, only leverage is significantly associated with post-takeover 
workforce change: higher leverage leads to lower employment growth. The other two control 
variables – relative size and board structure – do not significantly affect workforce change. 
                                                 
61 In this regression the intercept shows the expected post-merger workforce change for unrelated acquisitions, when the 
relatedness dummy takes 0. When the relatedness dummy takes 1, the sum of the intercept and the relatedness dummy shows 
the expected post-merger workforce change. The positive coefficient in the relatedness dummy indicates a higher level of 
post-takeover workforce change in the case of related acquisitions, after controlling for other relevant variables.    
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In sum, the regression results indicate that acquired firms‟ performance explains both the 
extent of workforce reductions and workforce growth, while acquirers‟ pre-merger 
performance explains only workforce growth. There is some evidence showing that hostile 
takeovers cause lower workforce growth, while related acquisitions lead to higher workforce 
adjustments. At the same time, the premium is inversely related to both workforce reduction 
and workforce growth. This means that a higher premium is associated with lower workforce 
reductions. At the same time, a higher premium is also associated with lower workforce 
growth. Thus, the results of this chapter show that high premiums do not cause excessive post-
merger employee layoffs, which contradicts prior research results. 
Overall, the sub-sample results confirm the full sample results. As in the WFR sub-sample the 
dependent variable – the workforce reduction – is in absolute values, the negative coefficient 
of the acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance variable supports the full sample results: the 
lower the performance the higher the workforce reductions. Similarly, in the WFG sub-sample 
the positive coefficient of the acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance indicates that the 
higher the pre-takeover performance of the acquired firms the higher the workforce growth. 
Similarly, in the full sample, the relatedness dummy indicates that workforce adjustments are 
higher after related acquisitions than after unrelated acquisitions. At the same time the WFG 
sub-sample results indicate that workforce growth is lower after related acquisitions than after 
unrelated acquisitions. In sum, the sub-sample results confirm the full sample results and in 
some cases provide additional evidence on the factors leading to workforce reductions and 
workforce growth post-merger.  
However, as the full sample is divided into the WFR and WFG sub-samples on the basis of 
Datastream workforce change, the conclusions from this comparative analysis may be biased. 
The reason for such possible bias from this comparative analysis is that the Datastream 
workforce change may not represent “true” merger-related workforce change, as the 
workforce changes during post-merger period may occur due to a number of other reasons, 
including divestments, changes in macroeconomic conditions or other factors, although we 
have controlled for the effects of subsequent acquisitions
62
. In other words, workforce 
reductions could be due to employee layoffs without asset divestments or could be due to 
                                                 
62 In the sample, selection process we excluded those acquires which make multiple acquisitions with three year period after 
the sample acquisition.  
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divestment of unprofitable businesses. In this relation, the WFR and WFG sub-samples may 
also differ with other characteristics, not only with their merger-related workforce change 
variable. On the other hand, based on the qualitative search of the data on post-merger 
employee layoffs, we could argue that Datastream provides a fairly accurate representation of 
merger-related workforce change. Furthermore, the sub-sample results are only used to 
confirm the full sample results and the main conclusions of this thesis are based on the full 
sample results. Thus, recognising the problems associated with the sub-sample results, the full 
sample regression results are considered as the main findings of the thesis.    
Qunatile regression results  
OLS regression model the relationship between a set of independent variables and the mean 
conditional distribution of the dependent (response or quantity being predicted) variable. This 
conditional mean only measures the central location of the conditional distribution of this 
dependent variable. However, when the conditional distribution is not normal, asymmetric and 
heavy-tailed, such modelling of the central location may not represent the whole distribution 
and, therefore, may not be informative. For example, when the conditional distribution is 
heavy tailed the central tendency measure – mean – may not be satisfactory to represent the 
tail behaviour of such distributions. Also one of the main assumptions of the OLS regression – 
homoscedasticity assumption may fail, invalidating the empirical results. Furthermore, outlier 
deletions involved in OLS regressions may distort the results.   
In such situations, an alternative estimation method – quantile regression – is useful. Quantile 
regression enables to estimate various quantile functions of the conditional distribution. In 
particular, quantile regressions may indicate different coefficients for the independent 
variables in various locations of the conditional distribution of the response (in different 
quantiles). For example, 50
th
 quantile regression produces a median line under which 50% of 
the dependent variable are located, while 75
th
 quantile regression produces a regression line 
under which 75% of the dependent variable are located. This implies that the different 
regressors may have different impacts on the dependent variable at different locations of the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable. In other words, the rate of change of the 
dependent variable may be different in various quantiles. As quantile regressions provide 
detailed information about relationships between independent variables and the dependent 
variable in each quantile, this method of analysis gives a complete picture about the full 
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conditional distribution, including heavy tailed distributions. Furthermore, quantile regressions 
are robust to outliers. Thus, quantile regressions are useful where extreme values are important 
and when homoscedasticity assumption fails. Therefore, as a robustness check of the OLS 
regressions we also run quantile regressions.   
Using quantile regressions, we investigate the factors leading to post-merger workforce 
reductions, the results of which are reported in table 5.5. In the full sample regressions the 
number of observations is 206, because we have workforce data for this number of 
observations for 206 acquirers, whereas 29 acquirers were themselves were taken over or 
liquidated during post-merger second or third year.  
These quantile regressions show that the acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance regressor 
is only significant determinant of workforce adjustments in 25
th
 percentile regression for the 
full sample and significant in the median (50
th
 percentile) regression in the WFG sub-sample. 
This implies that the acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance is an important determinant in 
lower tails of the workforce adjustment variable (possible due to the fact that the acquired 
firms are smaller firms than the acquiring firms), but this variable is not an important predictor 
of the higher level post-merger workforce adjustments (in 50% and 75
th
 percentiles of the 
dependent variable). These results also imply that the OLS results on the significance of the 
acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance in determining post-takeover workforce adjustments 
depend on assumptions about the statistical distribution.  
Another determinant of post-merger workforce adjustments – industry relatedness dummy 
regressor is significant in both 25
th
 and 50
th
 percentile regressions, using the full sample. 
Acquiring firms‟ pre-takeover performance is significant only in 75th percentile regression 
using the WFG sub-sample. This means that the acquiring firms‟ pre-takeover under- or over-
performance leads to higher level workforce adjustments post-takeover and this makes sense if 
we take into consideration that acquirers are larger firms than the acquired firms.  
25
th
 percentile and median regressions indicate that at lower tails of the workforce adjustment 
variable the related acquisitions lead to a higher level of post-merger workforce adjustments 
than unrelated acquisitions (possible due to higher level of rationalisations in the industry 
related acquired firms). But 75
th
 percentile regressions show that, when post-merger workforce 
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adjustments are higher then there is no difference between related versus unrelated 
acquisitions.  
Table 5.5 Quantile regressions explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments. 
Independent variables
Full 
sample
WFR WFG
Full 
sample
WFR WFG
0.25 Quantile regressions
Acquired firm pre-takeover performance 0.502* - 0.219 0.234 0.068 - 0.203 1.025
Acquiring firm pre-takeover performance - 0.010 0.078 0.064 - 0.001 0.075 - 0.106
Hostility dummy 0.030 - 0.046 - 0.016 0.004 - 0.054 - 0.068
Relatedness dummy 0.144** - 0.016 - 0.095 0.099 - 0.035 - 0.047
Premium - 0.004 0.010 - 0.086 0.039 0.005 - 0.138
Relative size - 0.039* 0.001 - 0.005 - 0.045* 0.000 0.007
Leverage - 0.905** 0.214 - 0.117 - 0.758* 0.221 - 0.087
Board structure - 0.346 - 0.061 - 0.144 - 0.282 - 0.046 0.161
Hostility dummy · Acquired firm performance - 0.107 - 0.083 - 0.026
Relatedness dummy · Acquired firm performance 0.546 - 0.304 - 0.822
Constant 0.110 0.107 0.212 0.024 0.102 0.215
0.50 Quantile regressions
Acquired firm pre-takeover performance 0.219 - 0.238 0.373* 0.208 - 0.191 0.637
Acquiring firm pre-takeover performance - 0.090 0.044 0.263 - 0.088 0.026 0.232
Hostility dummy - 0.005 - 0.061 - 0.033 - 0.003 - 0.091 - 0.040
Relatedness dummy 0.176*** - 0.025 - 0.183** 0.175** - 0.02 - 0.173**
Premium - 0.056 - 0.114 - 0.060 - 0.048 - 0.125 - 0.08
Relative size - 0.030 0.013 0.020 - 0.031 0.019 0.023
Leverage - 0.633*** 0.127 - 0.164 - 0.627** 0.158 - 0.228
Board structure - 0.123 0.384 0.291 - 0.118 0.352 0.266
Hostility dummy · Acquired firm performance - 0.029 0.089 - 1.229
Relatedness dummy · Acquired firm performance 0.060 - 0.423 - 0.291
Constant 0.145 0.172 0.384* 0.135 0.184 0.428*
0.75 Quantile regressions
Acquired firm pre-takeover performance 0.402 - 0.490 0.111 1.201 - 0.330 0.243
Acquiring firm pre-takeover performance 0.484 - 0.040 0.539** 0.175 - 0.043 0.425*
Hostility dummy - 0.129* 0.049 - 0.113 - 0.105 - 0.007 - 0.214
Relatedness dummy 0.145 0.039 - 0.044 0.109 0.020 - 0.045
Premium - 0.063 - 0.145 - 0.068 0.003 - 0.134 - 0.090
Relative size - 0.024 0.038 0.046 - 0.039 0.017 0.026
Leverage - 0.551** 0.237 - 0.008 - 0.596** 0.451 - 0.183
Board structure - 0.175 0.762* 0.253 0.117 0.858* 0.551*
Hostility dummy · Acquired firm performance - 2.159 - 0.063 - 1.455
Relatedness dummy · Acquired firm performance - 0.557 - 0.906 0.014
Constant 0.483*** 0.195 0.529*** 0.366 0.036 0.436**
Number of observations 206 111 95 206 111 95  
Notes: Dependent variables are workforce change in the full sample, workforce reduction in the WFR sub-sample and 
workforce growth in the WFG sub-sample. The estimation method is Quantile regression. Significance levels: *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the variables.  
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Some further differences emerge between the OLS regression results and quantile regression 
results. For example, in contrast to the theoretical expectations, hostility dummy indicates that 
post-merger workforce adjustment (may be workforce growth, as the workforce growth may 
be positive or negative) is smaller after hostile acquisitions (in the 75
th
 percentile regression 
using the full sample). Furthermore, OLS regressions show that premium is negatively 
associated with both workforce reductions in the WFR sub-sample and workforce growth in 
the WFG sub-sample, although it is not significant in the full sample. However, quantile 
regression results do not confirm these sub-sample results and, similar to the OLS results, 
premium is not an important determinant in the full sample, implying that post-merger 
workforce adjustments do not depend on the level of premium paid at acquisitions. 
The full sample regressions show that high level of debt financing negatively associated with 
the workforce adjustments in all three quantiles, although this variable is insignificant in sub-
samples. In general, as we make the main conclusions of the thesis on the basis of the full 
sample results, on the basis of the quantile regressions it can be concluded that in general 
acquired firms‟ pre-takeover performance (25th quantile regression), industry relatedness and 
leverage are all significant determinants of post-merger workforce adjustments in the full 
sample. However, the behaviour of these variables is significantly different from the 
performance of the corresponding variables in the WFR and WFG sub-samples. Furthermore, 
in contrast to OLS results, these quantile regressions show that premium is not an important 
determinant of post-merger workforce adjustments in both full sample and sub-samples. 
Therefore, it seems that OLS results, which are highly dependent on the normality assumption 
and outlier deletion process, may be misleading in some cases, especially when the sample 
size is small as in the WFR and WFG sub-samples.    
5.5 Discussion 
The results of this chapter support the hypothesis that both acquired and acquiring firms‟ prior 
performance determines post-takeover workforce adjustments (Q1-H1). Univariate analysis 
shows that workforce reductions are undertaken in under-performing acquired firms. 
Regression analyses indicate that acquired firms‟ prior performance explains both post-
takeover workforce reductions and workforce growth. In particular, post-takeover workforce 
adjustments are positively related to acquired firms‟ prior performance. This means that in the 
WFR sub-sample acquired firms‟ low performance is associated with higher post-takeover 
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workforce reduction, while in the WFG sub-sample acquired firms‟ higher performance is 
associated with faster post-takeover workforce growth.  
Regarding the acquiring firms‟ pre-takeover performance, the univariate analysis shows that in 
the WFR sub-sample their performance does not differ from the industry median and control 
firm performance, while in the WFG sub-sample they outperform control firms. Regressions 
show that acquirers‟ prior performance only explains post-takeover workforce growth.  
There is some evidence supporting the hypothesis that hostility leads to higher levels of 
employee layoffs (Q1-H2). The WFG sub-sample regressions show that hostile acquisitions 
lead to slower workforce growth in comparison to friendly acquisitions. However, although it 
is negative, the coefficient of this dummy regressor is not significant in the WFR sub-sample.  
The full sample regressions show that post-takeover workforce adjustment is significantly 
higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. The WFG sub-sample regressions 
also show that related acquisitions also lead to slower workforce growth in comparison to 
unrelated acquisitions (Q1-H3). This is consistent with prior research conclusions suggesting 
that related acquisitions lead to a higher level of rationalisation in the use of labour than 
unrelated acquisitions do (Conyon et al., 2002a, 2004). 
However, the results do not support the hypothesis that high premiums lead to higher post-
merger employee layoffs (Q1-H4). This contradicts prior research conclusions. The results 
show that high premiums are associated with lower workforce reductions, but are also 
associated with slower workforce growth, possibly due to the wider scope for synergy arising 
from good acquisitions. In brief, such associations imply that managers do not undertake 
employee layoffs to cover high premiums, as suggested by prior empirical evidence (Krishnan 
et al., 2007). The inverse relationship between premium and workforce reduction implies that 
acquirers do not pay high premiums for under-performing targets or for businesses with 
declining product demand that require corporate restructuring, including downsizing. But 
acquirers may pay high premiums for acquisitions that create a wider scope for synergy. In 
support of this view, the results show that premiums negatively affect workforce growth.  
Overall, the results imply that post-merger labour management decisions are not affected by 
the shareholder value creation requirements of the market model of corporate governance. 
Instead, management decisions are made on the basis of independent managerial judgments to 
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provide success and viability for their businesses through efficiency enhancement, as 
suggested by Gospel and Pendleton (2003) and Pendleton (2009). 
One limitation of this study is that we do not control for asset divestments, which may be one 
of the reasons for workforce reductions. Workforce levels may decline due to divestments, 
while employment growth could be due to new acquisitions. Although we controlled for 
multiple acquisitions, it was not possible to control for divestments due to data limitations.  
5.6 Conclusions 
Although it is generally agreed that takeovers lead to workforce reductions, the reasons for 
such post-merger layoffs are debatable. While some authors argue that mergers reduce labour 
demand and consequently managers undertake workforce reductions to improve labour 
efficiency and to derive operating synergy (Conyon et al., 2002a), other authors argue that 
managers undertake excessive employee layoffs to cover high premiums paid for acquisitions 
and that these negatively affect operating performance (Krishnan et al., 2007).  
Analysing the factors leading to post-takeover workforce changes, this chapter concludes that 
post-merger employee layoffs are undertaken to improve firm performance, not to create 
shareholder value. The results do not support the view that takeover premiums lead to 
excessive job losses. Instead, a high premium is associated with lower workforce reductions 
and slower workforce growth. Layoffs are undertaken on the basis of acquired firms‟ pre-
takeover performance: the poorer the targets‟ performance, the greater the reduction in 
employment, and the higher the target performance, the higher the growth in post-takeover 
employment levels. Furthermore, on the basis of the results it can be concluded that related 
acquisitions cause higher levels of workforce adjustments. 
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6 CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POST-
MERGER PERFORMANCE CHANGE AND WORKFORCE 
ADJUSTMENTS 
6.1 Introduction  
6.1.1 Research motivation  
Prior empirical research provides substantial evidence showing that mergers and acquisitions 
lead to operating performance deterioration (Ghosh, 2001). At the same time such transactions 
involve workforce reductions, as reported in the public media. However, systematic empirical 
evidence on the association between operating performance and workforce adjustments is 
inconclusive. On the one hand workforce reductions may be undertaken to improve efficiency 
and firm profitability (Cascio et al., 1997) or to arrest further performance deterioration 
(Hillier et al., 2007). On the other, post-takeover layoffs may be undertaken to create 
shareholder value and to regain premiums paid to targets. Consequently, it is suggested that 
such layoffs destroy the human capital of acquired firms and thereby negatively affect firm 
performance post-merger (Krishnan et al., 2007). Thus, the answers to (1) whether post-
takeover performance decline leads to workforce reductions and (2) whether such layoffs 
positively or negatively affect firm performance are unknown. This chapter aims to provide 
new empirical evidence on these two questions. Empirical evidence on these questions would 
clarify whether post-merger labour management decisions are made to further enhance 
efficiency and firm profitability. 
Although there is well established research of the antecedents and consequences of workforce 
downsizing, it is still unclear whether prior poor performance determines subsequent 
downsizing decisions and whether such workforce reductions lead to performance 
improvement (Datta et al., 2010). There is evidence that supports the view that firm 
performance is an important factor in explaining workforce reductions (Coucke et al., 2007; 
Hillier et al., 2007). At the same time, there is also some evidence showing no link between 
prior performance and downsizing (Perry and Shivdasani, 2005). Similarly, empirical 
evidence on the consequences of workforce adjustments for firm performance is inconclusive. 
A general conclusion of this research is that employee layoffs positively affect performance 
only when there is a slack to cut (Cappelli, 2000; Love and Nohria, 2005). 
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Although empirical research that investigates the factors leading to post-merger workforce 
reductions is long established (O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan, 1998; Conyon et al., 2001, 
2002a; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004), empirical research investigating the consequences of post-
merger workforce adjustments is still in its infancy. There are very few studies on this issue: 
Krishnan and Park (2002) and Krishnan et al. (2007) show that in related acquisitions 
excessive layoffs, which are made to cover large premiums, lead to organisational 
performance deterioration. 
The situation is complicated by the requirement that the association between operating 
performance and workforce reductions should be analysed within the broader context of 
takeovers‟ effects on firm performance. Although research on the effect of takeovers on firm 
performance is well established, evidence on this issue is mixed: some studies report modest 
operating performance improvement after takeovers, other studies report performance decline 
over a two-to-five year period following acquisitions, yet other studies report indistinguishable 
operating performance improvement in comparison to a sample of non-merging benchmark 
firms (Martynova et al., 2007). Taking into consideration post-takeover operating performance 
change is important, as failure of business integration and post-takeover deterioration in 
operating performance may lead to employee layoffs. 
This chapter investigates the role of post-takeover operating performance decline as a factor 
leading to workforce reductions. Then it investigates the consequences of such workforce 
reductions for firm performance. The empirical work of this chapter links three strands of 
literature: (1) research on antecedents and consequences of workforce downsizing, (2) 
research on performance consequences of employee layoffs following mergers and (3) 
research on performance consequences of takeovers. Using research methods from these 
strands of literature, we measure performance change and workforce change following 
mergers and investigate the association between these two variables. In addition to the full 
sample analysis, we compare the performance of the WFG and WFR sub-samples
63
. In the 
multiple regression context, first we examine the association between post-takeover operating 
performance changes and post-takeover workforce changes in order to understand whether 
performance decline leads to workforce reductions. To examine whether workforce 
                                                 
63 These terms are explained in the previous chapter.  
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adjustments negatively or positively affect performance, we then regress workforce changes 
one year after mergers (from t-1 to t+1) on operating performance change over three years. 
6.1.2 Brief results and contributions 
Using the full sample, the univariate analysis reveals that acquirers operating performance 
does not improve after takeovers, but, on the contrary, declines, which is consistent with most 
of the research in this area. When the sample is split, the results show that the performance 
decline is steeper in the WFR sub-sample during the first two post-takeover years, while the 
performance decline is steeper in the WFG sub-sample during the third post-takeover year.    
The regressions show a strong positive association between operating performance change and 
workforce change following mergers, which means that performance deterioration is an 
important factor in explaining employee layoffs post-merger. In terms of operating 
performance consequences of workforce reductions, the results show that workforce changes 
are inversely related to operating performance change. Therefore it can be concluded that 
post-merger workforce reductions positively contribute to operating performance change.  
The results of this chapter contribute to the literature on the antecedents and consequences of 
merger-related employee layoffs by providing new evidence on the positive role of corporate 
downsizing in the mergers and acquisitions context. The results suggest that post-takeover 
performance decline could be one of the reasons for workforce adjustments. The conclusion 
that post-merger workforce reductions positively contribute to operating performance change 
implies that labour management decisions are made in order to improve efficiency and to 
maintain the viability of the firms.   
6.2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
One factor that may lead to post-takeover workforce reductions is firm performance decline 
after such transactions. Mergers may negatively affect firm performance for several reasons, 
such as unsuccessful business integration, inadequate strategic fit or cultural differences 
between merging firms.  
Although accounting studies do not investigate the issues of why firm performance may 
deteriorate post-merger, these studies thoroughly measure performance change post-merger. 
However, the extant evidence on the operating performance consequences of takeovers is 
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mixed: some empirical research shows that takeovers cause only modest improvement (Healy 
et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005) or no improvement (Ghosh, 2001), while other studies 
report significant decline in firm performance (Martynova et al., 2007). Reviewing the 
literature in this area, Martynova et al. (2007) find that 14 out of 25 studies report significant 
decline in post-takeover operating performance, 6 studies report insignificant change, while 5 
studies report significant improvement in operating performance after takeovers. For example, 
Meeks (1977) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) report that profitability of merging firms 
declines significantly. Thus, most evidence indicates that acquirers‟ performance deteriorates 
post-merger.  
The conventional view is that firm performance is an important factor in downsizing 
decisions. Prior research concludes that performance decline often leads to employee layoffs 
(Iverson and Pullman, 2000; Chen et al., 2001). For example, Hillier et al. (2007) find that 
layoffs follow a period of poor operating and stock price performance. Coucke et al. (2007) 
report that firms make redundancies after a decline in return on equity. Therefore it is 
reasonable to expect workforce reductions following performance deterioration during a post-
takeover period. Such a performance decline may necessitate workforce reductions. On the 
basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis will be tested
64
:  
Q2-H1: Post-takeover decline in operating performance leads to workforce reductions. 
Although corporate downsizing is usually undertaken to cut costs and to further enhance 
efficiency, it may negatively affect firm performance, especially when it follows mergers. 
Recent evidence presented by Krishnan et al. (2007) shows that excessive employee layoffs 
after related acquisitions, undertaken to cover high premiums, lead to significant performance 
deterioration. There are several reasons for this adverse effect of labour cost cuts within the 
mergers and acquisitions context. 
The success of an acquisition depends on the ability of firms to effectively integrate acquired 
intangible capital in the form of human resources, which embody valuable tacit knowledge 
(Seth et al., 2002). First, managers may not be able to correctly estimate the required level of 
employee layoffs to achieve the optimal employment level. Second, in this process some 
                                                 
64 Post-takeover firm performance decline could be another reason for post-merger employee layoffs, as acquirers undertake 
labour cost cuts to stop further performance deterioration. This hypothesis could be tested by regressing workforce 
adjustments on post-takeover performance.   
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senior key staff of acquired firms may voluntarily leave due to disagreement with the new 
management (Walsh, 1988). In support of this, Martin and McConnell (1991) and Franks and 
Mayer (1996) show that management turnover is significantly higher after acquisitions than in 
normal periods. Third, in the case of workforce reductions it may be difficult to determine 
whom to layoff, especially when most managers and „white collar‟ workers of an acquired 
company leave the combined business. Finally, the post-layoff morale of surviving staff may 
be low due to uncertainties about their own future. Cascio (1993) argues that downsizing may 
lead to poor morale in the surviving employees, creating „survivors‟ syndrome‟ and decreasing 
labour productivity.  
Furthermore, the resource-based view of the firm can be used to explain the negative effect of 
downsizing in the mergers and acquisitions context. According to this theory human capital is 
one of the three main resources that enable firms to implement value-creation strategies, along 
with physical capital resources and organisational capital resources (Barney, 1991). This 
theory suggests that the departure of key staff destroys acquired firms‟ strategic capabilities 
and this leads to poor performance. Among other things, human capital includes training, 
experience, relationships and insights of individual managers and workers. If, in the 
integration process, this resource is destroyed, then the strategic competitiveness of the firm is 
no longer sustainable. Moreover, as the resource-based view considers a firm as a bundle of 
the above resources, routines and capabilities, the role of mergers and acquisitions is to 
facilitate the exchange of these firm-specific resources and capabilities that are otherwise 
costly to imitate and are not tradable (James, 2002).      
In sum, mergers and acquisitions may negatively affect human capital, destroying one of the 
most important strategic capabilities of the firm that is difficult to imitate. Therefore 
employees view such transactions as destructive events, because they increase job uncertainty, 
risk and stress, which in their turn may negatively affect the firm‟s performance. Such changes 
in the work environment may also change employees‟ work attitude, which in its turn may 
negatively affect employee performance and subsequently may lead to firm performance 
deterioration. 
In contrast, it has been shown that post-merger workforce reductions lead to rationalisations in 
the use of labour and increased efficiency (Conyon et al., 2002a) and improve employee 
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profitability (Conyon et al., 2004). Thus, post-merger downsizing should lead to improvement 
in firm performance. 
Post-merger employee layoffs are a part of wider corporate downsizing activity. Although the 
effect of corporate downsizing on firm performance has been researched extensively, the 
extant evidence is inconclusive. Palmon et al. (1997) show that downsizing inversely affects 
firm performance, while Elayan et al. (1998), Espahbodi et al. (2000), and Chen et al. (2001) 
report significant firm performance improvement and an increase in labour efficiency after 
downsizing. However, Cascio et al. (1997), Denis and Kruse (2000) and Love and Nohria 
(2005) report that downsizing does not alter firm performance in general. Cascio et al. (1997) 
conclude that only those firms that combine downsizing with asset sales improve profitability. 
Cappelli (2000) argues that downsizing makes sense only when establishments experience 
excess operating capacity. Otherwise, downsizing may hurt firm performance, as trying to cut 
slack when there is no slack to cut may negatively affect organisational capabilities. The Love 
and Nohria (2005) results show that downsizing only improves performance when there is a 
good deal of organisational slack and when downsizing is a part of broad corporate 
restructuring and is done during the periods of stability or performance improvement. 
Even though employee layoffs positively affect performance, their full effect might only be 
felt after some time – 2 to 3 years after downsizing (Palmon et al., 1997; Espahbodi et al., 
2000; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005). Meanwhile the downsizers‟ performance level may still be 
low in comparison to that of non-downsizers, even though there is positive performance 
change during early periods after layoffs. Hillier et al. (2007) show that layoff-making firms 
continue to under-perform their industry benchmark three years after the event. In other 
words, the extent of performance change in layoff-making acquirers may be different from 
that of acquirers that do not make layoffs, due to the positive effect of labour rationalisations. 
Therefore we investigate the association between post-merger employee layoffs and 
performance change:  
Q2-H2: Post-takeover workforce changes are inversely associated with operating 
performance changes.  
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6.3 Data and methods  
6.3.1 Econometric model specification 
To test the hypothesis Q2-H1 the following model will be estimated:   
BoardLevSizePremRHROAE 43
post
tt 7552213  (24) 
where E  is the change in the logarithm transformed number of employees from t-1 to t+3, as 
described in equation (23), posttROA 2 is the first post-takeover two years‟ (t+1 and t+2) 
average change in operating performance of acquiring firms; H is a hostility dummy, which 
takes 1 if the initial offer was rejected and 0 otherwise; R is a relatedness dummy, which takes 
1 if both target and acquiring firms are in the same industry and 0 otherwise; Prem is the 
premium, measured as the excess amount of bid price over share price one month prior to 
takeover announcement; Size is the ratio of acquiring firm size to the transaction value (target 
firm size); Lev is the debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the takeover completion year; Board is 
the ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of directors, and  indicates the error 
term. In extended models we also include the interactions of the R and H dummies with the 
operating performance change variable. 
To test the hypothesis Q2-H2 the following model will be estimated:   
RHBoardLevSizeROAPremEROA ct
post
t 8765432113  
 (25) 
where posttROA 3  is the performance change during three post-takeover years (from t-1 to t+3); 
E  is the change in the logarithm transformed number employees from t-1 to t+1, as 
described in equation (23), cROA is the change in matched firm performance during the 
corresponding period, and other variables are as explained above.  
In these models we control for relative size, leverage and board structure on the basis of prior 
research. First, the integration of larger firms may create a greater challenge as well as more 
synergy than the integration of smaller firms. In this relation, McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) 
and Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) find that the impact of acquisitions depends on the size of 
acquisition. Therefore we control for the relative size measured as the ratio of acquired firm 
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size (transaction value) relative to acquirers‟ market value at the end of t-1. Ofek (1993)  
argues that higher leverage following poor performance increases the probability of corporate 
restructuring, including employee layoffs. Therefore in the takeover context higher leverage 
may also force acquirers to cut costs by reducing the workforce. We measure leverage as the 
ratio of debt to total assets at the beginning of the relevant year. Finally, a greater number of 
non-executives on the Board of Directors may force managers to undertake restructuring 
activities that maximise shareholder value and prior research suggests that the higher the 
number of executive directors, the more effective the Board (Cosh et al., 2006). Therefore we 
control for the Board structure of the acquiring firms. 
6.3.2 Data and measuring post-takeover workforce adjustments 
This chapter uses the same sample and data as described in the previous chapter. Post-merger 
workforce change is measured using the same technique as in the previous chapter.  
6.3.3 Measuring post-takeover operating performance change 
The operating performance measure (ROA), has been adjusted using two benchmarks: 
industry-median firm and industry-, size- and performance-matched firm benchmarks, selected 
on the basis of methodology recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996). Industry-adjusted 
performance is obtained by deducting industry-median firm performance from the sample firm 
performance
65
.  
The industry-, size- and performance-matched firm benchmark is one of the most frequently 
used performance benchmarks in contemporary accounting and finance research (Espahbodi et 
al., 2000). This benchmark performs better than the industry-median firm benchmark, 
especially when sample firms have performed either unusually well or unusually poorly 
(Barber and Lyon, 1996). As firms may undertake acquisitions during better-performing years, 
matching on pre-takeover performance controls for the potential bias arising due to mean 
reversion in earnings. 
                                                 
65 We also scaled EBITDA by Total Market Value (TMV), which is defined as the market value of outstanding shares plus 
preferred stock and book value of total liabilities at the beginning of each year. In addition to this we use Operating Cash 
Flow (OCF) defined as operating income plus depreciation, depletion and amortisation expense, scaled by TMV and TA. 
Barber and Lyon (1996) conclude that test statistics on the basis of OCF are uniformly less powerful than those on the basis of 
other performance measures. Therefore we only report the results on the basis of EBITDA scaled by the TA measure. 
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Using the methodology proposed by Barber and Lyon (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1997), 
for each sample firm we select a matching firm at the end of year t-1 as follows: first, we filter 
all firms in the same industry with the sample firm; second, we select all firms within the 25% 
to 200% size interval of the sample firm‟s size, size being measured by total assets; third, we 
select the non-acquiring firm with the closest performance measure to the matching firm. In 
order to capture the full differences in the performance of acquiring and non-acquiring firms, 
the matched firms should not have undertaken any significant acquisition around the sampled 
takeover event. Therefore as matched firms we select only those firms which do not make 
significant acquisitions during the two years before takeovers and three years after takeovers. 
Matched-firm-adjusted performance is obtained by deducting the matched firm performance 
from the sample firm performance. 
Following Ghosh (2001) we use „the change method‟ to measure the operating performance 
effect of takeovers. Ghosh (2001) argues that this method is superior to the regression method 
suggested by Healy et al. (1992), which identifies the performance change as the intercept of 
the regression of post-takeover performance on pre-takeover performance. As firms undertake 
acquisitions after superior performance, acquirers outperform industry medians during pre-
takeover years. Ghosh (2001) points out that this non-random measurement error will result in 
a biased intercept in the regression, showing the positive effect of acquisitions. If, on average, 
merging firms do not outperform industry-median firms, then the regression method and the 
change method should provide identical unbiased estimates. Following other studies (Healy et 
al., 1992), the pre-takeover pro-forma combined performance measure is constructed by 
summing the target and acquirer performance measures at the end of year t-1. This pro-forma 
performance is subtracted from the post-takeover performance to identify the change in the 
industry (or industry, size and pre-takeover performance) adjusted performance. 
6.4 Results  
6.4.1 Univariate analysis of post-takeover performance change 
Table 6.1 reports performance change during post-takeover years relative to the pre-takeover 
level for the whole sample as well as for the WFR and WFG sub-samples. As reported in 
Panel A, the full sample, acquirers‟ unadjusted firm performance declines significantly during 
the post-merger years relative to the pre-merger level. This is consistent with the Powell and 
Stark (2005) and Martynova et al. (2007) results. The results also show that full sample 
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acquirers outperform their industry-median firms during the first two post-takeover years and 
outperform their matched firms during the first post-takeover year. However, acquirers‟ 
industry-adjusted performance declines significantly relative to the pre-merger level during all 
three years: the three-year median industry-adjusted performance is 1.1% lower than the pre-
merger level. Similarly, matched-firm-adjusted performance shows that performance declines 
during the third post-takeover year. The above results suggest that takeovers at best do not 
improve operating performance, which is consistent with most of the prior research 
(Martynova et al., 2007). This performance decline could be due to the fact that firms 
undertake acquisitions during or immediately after better-performing periods.  
As Panel B shows, the WFG sub-sample acquirers outperform their industry-median firms 
during three post-takeover years and outperform their matched firms during two post-takeover 
years. Both benchmarks show that the WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ performance does not 
differ from the pre-takeover level during the first two post-takeover years. However, both 
benchmarks show that this sub-sample acquirers‟ performance declines relative to the pre-
takeover level during the third post-takeover year. The third year industry-adjusted (matched-
firm-adjusted) ROA is 2% (1%) lower than the pre-takeover level.  
In contrast, Panel C shows that the WFR sub-sample acquirers‟ performance does not differ 
from their industry-median performance and matched firm performance during all three years. 
The WFR sub-sample acquirers‟ industry-adjusted performance declines during the first two 
years, but the third year performance does not significantly differ from the pre-takeover level. 
This sub-sample acquirers‟ matched-firm-adjusted measure shows no significant change 
during the post-takeover years relative to the pre-takeover level. 
Finally, Panel D reports that the WFG sub-sample acquirers outperform the WFR sub-sample 
acquirers by the unadjusted firm performance measure and matched-firm-adjusted 
performance measures. One explanation for the continuous under-performance of the WFR 
sub-sample firms may be the fact that the full effect of labour rationalisation might only be felt 
after some time. Therefore the WFR sub-sample performance may still be lower than the 
WFG sub-sample performance during the early post-takeover years. However, the WFR sub-
sample‟s operating performance change from the pre-takeover level to the post-takeover level 
could be significantly different from the corresponding change in the WFG sub-sample 
operating performance due to the positive effect of the workforce reductions.  
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Table 6.1 Post-takeover operating performance 
Year around merger
Unadjusted 
performance
z-stat
Industry median 
firm adjusted 
performance
z-stat
Matched firm 
adjusted 
performance
z-stat
Panel A: Full sample
t-1 0.2139 0.0255 4.99 0.0080 2.76
t+1 0.1700 0.0127 2.98 0.0145 1.95
t+2 0.1511 0.0113 1.71 0.0144 1.31
t+3 0.1429 0.0102 1.16 -0.0052 -0.34
Median for t+1, t+2 and t+3 0.1528 0.0115 2.55 0.0048 0.99
t+1 less  t-1 -0.0388 -6.56 -0.0043 -1.73 -0.0070 0.24
t+2 less  t-1 -0.0688 -8.37 -0.0209 -3.22 0.0013 -0.53
t+3 less  t-1 -0.0801 -8.89 -0.0174 -3.23 -0.0056 -2.07
Post median less  t-1 -0.0532 -7.73 -0.0111 -2.53 -0.0089 -1.12
Panel B: The WFG sub-sample
t-1 0.2296 0.0527 4.58 0.0195 2.97
t+1 0.1980 0.0340 4.57 0.0197 2.11
t+2 0.1755 0.0331 3.84 0.0268 2.24
t+3 0.1515 0.0243 2.21 -0.0005 -0.11
Median for t+1, t+2 and t+3 0.1680 0.0302 4.43 0.0184 1.70
t+1 less  t-1 -0.0277 -2.89 0.0019 -0.25 -0.0011 0.12
t+2 less  t-1 -0.0399 -3.25 -0.0010 -0.48 0.0098 0.47
t+3 less  t-1 -0.0661 -4.96 -0.0200 -1.98 -0.0101 -1.91
Post median less  t-1 -0.0399 -3.93 -0.0062 -0.92 0.0002 -0.45
Panel C: The WFR sub-sample
t-1 0.1980 0.0171 0.11 0.0021 0.60
t+1 0.1531 0.0012 -0.27 -0.0007 1.02
t+2 0.1398 0.0014 -1.49 -0.0080 0.14
t+3 0.1312 0.0004 -0.64 -0.0086 -0.39
Median for t+1, t+2 and t+3 0.1425 0.0007 -0.71 -0.0067 0.29
t+1 less  t-1 -0.0505 -6.21 -0.0071 -1.91 -0.0088 0.79
t+2 less  t-1 -0.0933 -6.84 -0.0319 -3.17 -0.0058 -0.75
t+3 less  t-1 -0.1031 -5.53 -0.0142 -1.54 -0.0035 -0.73
Post median less  t-1 -0.0644 -6.57 -0.0137 -2.03 -0.0143 -0.46
Panel D: Difference between the WFG and WFR sub-samples
t-1 0.0317 2.02 0.0356 -1.1 0.0175 1.46
t+1 0.0449 3.24 0.0329 0.65 0.0203 2.44
t+2 0.0357 3.71 0.0317 -0.42 0.0348 1.93
t+3 0.0203 1.40 0.0239 -0.88 0.0081 2.18
Median for t+1, t+2 and t+3 0.0255 3.24 0.0295 -0.42 0.0251 2.66
t+1 less  t-1 0.0228 2.21 0.0090 1.14 0.0077 -0.37
t+2 less  t-1 0.0535 2.40 0.0309 1.73 0.0156 0.96
t+3 less  t-1 0.0370 -0.39 -0.0058 -0.42 -0.0066 1.08
Post median less  t-1 0.0246 1.70 0.0075 0.67 0.0145 -0.09
Notes: This table reports change in acquirers‟ post-takeover performance (ROA, defined as EBITDA/TA). Unadjusted 
performance indicates sample median firm performance. Industry median firm adjusted performance indicates the difference 
between industry median performance and firm performance. Matched firm adjusted performance indicates the difference 
between the sample median performance and matched firms‟ sample median performance. 
Consistent with this view, the above results imply that the WFR acquirers‟ performance 
further deteriorates during the first two post-merger years, necessitating the need for efficiency 
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improvements and cost savings through labour cost cuts. Therefore although their performance 
is significantly low during the first two post-takeover years relative to the pre-takeover level, 
in the third year there is no difference between pre- and post-takeover performances. In 
contrast to this, in the WFG sub-sample both industry-adjusted and matched-firm-adjusted 
performance shows significant performance deterioration in the third year. Thus, these 
univariate results suggest that employee layoffs are undertaken in under-performing firms
66
. 
Overall, all three performance measures show that firm performance deteriorates post-merger. 
In this case the related question is whether this performance deterioration explains workforce 
reductions post-merger. The next section analyses this question using the regression technique.  
6.4.2 Post-takeover performance decline as a factor leading to workforce reductions 
OLS regression results  
To investigate the role of post-takeover performance decline in explaining employee layoffs, 
we regress post-takeover workforce adjustments on performance change. As the dependent 
variable, we use workforce adjustments during three post-takeover years and as the main 
independent variable we use the two-year average industry-adjusted operating performance 
change (for t+1 and t+2)
67
.  
As reported in Table 6.2, the regression results show that there is significant positive 
association between workforce adjustments and operating performance change. In the full 
sample, a 1% higher ROA during the first two post-takeover years leads to 1.78% greater 
workforce growth. This suggests that in the WFR sub-sample the association should be 
inverse, meaning that the lower the ROA, the higher the workforce reduction. In contrast, in 
the WFG sub-sample the association between these two variables should be positive: the better 
the performance, the higher the workforce growth. The WFR and WFG sub-sample 
                                                 
66 We also experiment with the above univariate analysis, splitting the full sample into „layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ sub-samples, 
using merger-related layoff information. This analysis leads to similar conclusions. One explanation for less performance 
deterioration in the „layoff‟ sub-sample could be the fact that layoffs arrest further performance deterioration. Both 
benchmarks show that „layoff‟ combinations performance does not change significantly during the post-takeover years. In 
contrast to this, the performance of the „non-layoff‟ sub-group firms significantly declines during post-takeover years. „Non-
layoff‟ acquirers‟ industry-adjusted performance is significantly lower relative to the pre-takeover level during two post-
takeover years, while matched-firm-adjusted performance is lower in year t+3. These results indicate that employee 
reductions may contribute to halting further performance deterioration. 
67 The results are similar when we use the operating performance change after one year and the change after two years 
individually in the above regression. 
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regressions confirm these associations. In the WFR sub-sample, operating performance is 
negatively associated with workforce reduction: a 1% lower ROA leads to 1.04% greater 
workforce reduction. In the WFG sub-sample the workforce growth variable is positively 
associated with the operating performance: a 1% higher operating performance leads to 0.7% 
greater workforce growth
68
. 
These regressions show insignificant difference between the impact of performance change on 
post-merger workforce change following hostile takeovers and friendly takeovers. However, 
related acquisitions cause significantly higher workforce adjustments than unrelated 
acquisitions do, as shown by the full sample results. Consistent with the Krishnan et al. (2007) 
results, a high premium negatively affects workforce growth, although it is only significant in 
the WFG sub-sample. In this sub-sample a 1% higher premium leads to 0.16% slower 
workforce growth. The negative coefficient of the relative organisational size indicates that the 
larger the acquired company, the lower the post-takeover workforce growth. This is consistent 
with the view that when a larger company is acquired there will be more duplicative activities 
to integrate this company into the existing business, thus providing greater scope for 
workforce reductions. Although signs of the leverage variable are negative in all regression 
models, the coefficients are not significant. Finally, consistent with the prior research, the 
signs of the Board structure variable indicate that outside directors play an important 
governance role in layoff decision-making (Yawson, 2006). The full sample regressions 
indicate that the lower the proportion of outside directors, the higher the workforce growth 
and, in contrast, the higher the proportion of outside directors, the greater the workforce 
reductions. The WFR sub-sample regressions confirm this association:  the positive coefficient 
of the Board structure variable means that when boards include a higher proportion of outside 
directors, they become more effective in taking layoff decisions
69
.  
When the models include interactions of the dummy regressors with the performance change 
variable, the results show that the difference between the slopes of hostile versus friendly 
acquisitions‟ operating performance effect is not significant. The full sample results indicate 
that in friendly acquisitions a 1% greater performance change is associated with a 2% higher 
                                                 
68 These results do not change if we control for the matched firm performance. As expected, industry-adjusted matched firm 
performance is strongly positively associated with merging firm performance. 
69 Leverage becomes significant when we use the performance change variable after one year and the performance change 
after two years individually. But it becomes insignificant when we use a two-year average performance variable.  
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workforce adjustment, while in hostile takeovers a 1% higher ROA is associated with a 1% 
[=1.999 – 0.932] greater workforce adjustment. Furthermore, in the WFG sub-sample the 
interaction term implies that in hostile acquisitions a 1% higher ROA would cause 0.36% 
[=1.149 – 1.484] lower workforce growth. So, the effect of operating performance on 
employment growth is smaller after hostile takeovers than after friendly mergers. However, 
the results show no difference between the slopes of related versus unrelated acquisitions‟ 
operating performance effect on workforce growth. 
Table 6.2 OLS regressions explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments  
Independent variables Full sample WFR WFG Full sample WFR WFG 
Acquirers' post-takeover performance change 1.782*** - 1.035*** 0.704***  1.999*** - 1.235*** 1.149**
Hostility dummy - 0.010 - 0.046 - 0.093 - 0.007 - 0.041 - 0.020
Relatedness dummy 0.137*** - 0.030 - 0.096*  0.121** - 0.017 - 0.105*
Premium - 0.005 - 0.077 - 0.161** - 0.017 - 0.073 - 0.080
Relative size - 0.043*** 0.030** 0.018 - 0.044*** 0.030** 0.023
Leverage - 0.273 - 0.046 - 0.007 - 0.271 - 0.063 - 0.126
Board structure - 0.333** 0.257* - 0.038 - 0.325** 0.220 - 0.023
Hostility ·  Performance change - 0.932** 0.118 - 1.484***
Relatedness ·  Performance change - 0.337 0.454 - 0.046
Constant 0.079 0.303*** 0.464***  0.094 0.317*** 0.498***
F-stat 17.06 5.37 4.15 13.91 5.82 3.53
Adjusted R-square 0.36 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.35 0.19
Number of observations 183 98 83 183 98 86  
Notes: The dependent variable is workforce change three years after takeovers (from t-1 to t+3). Acquirers‟ post-takeover 
performance change is the average of the change after one year and the change after two years. The estimation method is 
OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
 
In sum, the results show that one of the factors that may lead to post-takeover workforce 
adjustments could be the performance decline following takeovers: there is a significant 
positive association between post-takeover performance change and workforce change. 
Qunatile regressions  
We also investigate the role of post-merger operating performance change in explaining post-
merger workforce adjustments using quantile regressions, the results of which are given in 
table 6.3. In these regressions the dependent variable is post-merger workforce adjustment and 
the main variable of interest is the post-takeover operating performance change variable. The 
full sample results consistently show that acquirers‟ post-merger performance change is 
positively associated with post-merger workforce adjustments in all three quantile regressions. 
This positive association indicates the better the performance change, the higher the workforce 
growth; the worse the performance change the lower the workforce growth. Thus, on the basis 
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of these quantile regressions it can be concluded that post-merger performance decline may 
also lead to workforce reductions. In addition, the WFR sub-sample regressions show that 
post-merger performance changes are negatively associated with workforce reduction 
variables in the 50
th
 and the 75
th
 percentile regressions, confirming the OLS regression results.  
Table 6.3 Quantile regressions explaining post-takeover workforce adjustments  
Independent variables
Full 
sample
WFR WFG 
Full 
sample
WFR WFG 
0.25 Quantile regression
Acquirers' post-takeover performance change 0.855** - 0.453 - 0.063 1.703*** - 0.741 0.103
Hostility dummy - 0.056 - 0.010 - 0.059 - 0.035 - 0.031 - 0.032
Relatedness dummy 0.024 0.013 - 0.046 0.072 0.016 - 0.074
Premium 0.075 - 0.071 0.014 0.043 - 0.056 - 0.017
Relative size - 0.053* 0.006 - 0.004 - 0.048*** 0.016 0.008
Leverage - 0.588* - 0.109 0.167 - 0.500** 0.149 - 0.134
Board structure - 0.284 0.172 - 0.098 - 0.247 - 0.140 0.228
Hostility ·  Performance change - 0.184 0.606 - 0.041
Relatedness ·  Performance change - 1.195** 0.163 - 0.191
Constant - 0.065 0.160 0.131* - 0.094 0.180 0.139
0.50 Quantile regression
Acquirers' post-takeover performance change 1.283*** - 0.956*** 0.045 1.569*** - 1.339** 0.636
Hostility dummy 0.001 - 0.017 - 0.010 0.019 - 0.046 0.034
Relatedness dummy 0.136* 0.002 - 0.127 0.160*** 0.025 - 0.138
Premium - 0.019 - 0.099 0.009 - 0.068 - 0.063 - 0.041
Relative size - 0.054* 0.026* 0.013 - 0.052** 0.025 0.012
Leverage - 0.187 0.359 0.026 - 0.336 0.026 - 0.268
Board structure - 0.317 0.077 - 0.362 - 0.067 0.342 0.000
Hostility ·  Performance change - 1.277** 0.927 - 0.944
Relatedness ·  Performance change - 0.410 0.114 - 0.368
Constant - 0.009 0.189 0.507*** - 0.044 0.193 0.503**
0.75 Quantile regression
Acquirers' post-takeover performance change 1.335** - 1.323*** 0.928 2.504*** - 1.699** 0.590
Hostility dummy - 0.129 0.052 - 0.152 - 0.086 0.050 0.007
Relatedness dummy 0.094 0.102 - 0.086 0.033 0.137 - 0.135
Premium 0.057 - 0.046 - 0.035 0.006 0.056 - 0.099
Relative size - 0.008 0.053 0.054** - 0.018 0.048 0.051
Leverage 0.050 0.912*** 0.493* - 0.323 - 0.207 - 0.018
Board structure - 0.442 0.007 0.088 0.022 0.914** 0.444
Hostility ·  Performance change - 1.697*** 0.635 - 2.149
Relatedness ·  Performance change - 0.986 0.097 0.546
Constant 0.308 0.128 0.400* 0.328 0.159 0.529*
Number of observations 206 111 95 206 111 95
Notes: Dependent variables are workforce change in the full sample, workforce reduction in the WFR sub-sample and 
workforce growth in the WFG sub-sample. The estimation method is Quantile regression. Significance levels: *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the variables.  
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In contrast to this, other control variables are not consistent in all three quantile regressions. 
For example, the relatedness dummy regressor is significant only in the median (50
th
 
percentile regression) in the full sample regressions. The relative size variable is significant in 
the 25
th
 percentile and median regressions, while leverage is only significant at 25
th
 percentile 
regression.  
Furthermore, in these regressions Board structure (composition) variable becomes 
insignificant in all specifications, implying that this variable is highly dependent on the 
normality assumption and outlier deletion. 
6.4.3 Consequences of post-merger workforce adjustments for operating performance  
OLS regressions 
To investigate the effect of workforce change on operating performance, we use operating 
performance change instead of operating performance levels, as the dependent variable in the 
regression analysis. In order to control for reverse causality between dependent and 
independent variables, in these regressions we use workforce change during the first post-
takeover year as the main independent variable and operating performance change three years 
after the takeover completion year as the dependent variable. 
The results of these regressions are given in Table 6.4. The full sample regressions indicate 
that the workforce change variable is inversely related to operating performance change: 1% 
employment growth leads to a 0.07% smaller change in ROA. This means that greater 
workforce reductions are associated with more positive operating performance change, while 
higher workforce growth is associated with more negative performance change. The WFR 
regressions show that a 1% workforce reduction during the first post-takeover year leads to a 
0.15% greater change in ROA after two years. The WFG regressions imply that the higher the 
workforce growth, the more negative the operating performance change: 1% workforce 
growth leads to a 0.09% smaller change in ROA. One interpretation of these results is that 
post-merger workforce reductions at least arrest further performance deterioration, whereas 
accelerated employment growth may negatively affect performance. Thus, these results 
support the hypothesis that workforce reductions positively contribute to operating 
performance change. 
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Regarding the control variables, the full sample results show that the premium is positively 
associated with the change in operating performance: in acquisitions for which high premiums 
are paid operating performance decline is smaller. This is consistent with the view that 
acquirers pay high premiums for better-performing firms. However, further analysis shows 
that the premium may affect operating performance differently for different sub-groups. In the 
WFR sub-sample, the premium positively affects the change in operating performance, which 
is consistent with the full sample results. In contrast, in the WFG sub-sample, the premium is 
negatively associated with operating performance change, indicating that in this sub-sample 
paying a higher premium for the target firms leads to lower operating performance.  
Table 6.4 OLS regressions explaining post-takeover performance change  
Independent variables Full sample WFR WFG Full sample WFR WFG 
Workforce change from t-1 to t+1 - 0.068*** - 0.086***
Workforce reduction from t-1 to t+1 0.060 0.146**
Workfroce growth from t-1 to t+1 - 0.090** 0.025
Premium 0.048** 0.049 0.028 0.042* 0.079** - 0.001
Control firm performance 0.320*** 0.374*** 0.220*** 0.316*** 0.358*** 0.340***
Relative size - 0.003 0.004 - 0.014** - 0.004 0.006 - 0.016**
Board composition 0.112** - 0.095 - 0.046 - 0.092** - 0.120* - 0.019
Leverage - 0.037 - 0.119* 0.045 - 0.012 - 0.126* 0.071
Hostility dummy 0.020 0.016 0.021 0.034* 0.022 - 0.010
Relatedness dummy 0.032** 0.041* 0.034 0.036** 0.091** 0.096***
Hostility dummy · Workforce change 0.061 - 0.026 0.017
Relatedness dummy · Workforce change 0.001 0.193** - 0.291**
Constant - 0.001 0.044 - 0.070 - 0.027 0.024 - 0.112**
F-stat 6.72 3.14 3.97 5.35 3.33 3.11
Adjusted R-square 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.27
Number of observations 181 104 79 186 103 79
Notes: The dependent variable is the ROA change three years after the merger completion year. Workforce change (reduction 
or growth) is the change one year after the merger completion year (change from t-1 to t+1). The estimation method is OLS, 
using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 
provides the definitions of the variables. 
 
As expected, control firm performance change is positively associated with acquiring firm 
performance change in all models. The results show that high leverage leads to more negative 
performance change. Relative size is also inversely related to operating performance change in 
the WFG regressions: acquiring large firms affect performance change more negatively. The 
board composition variable is negatively associated with operating performance change.  
The models that include dummy regressors and their interactions with the workforce change 
variable confirm the positive influence of workforce reductions on operating performance 
change. For example, in the WFR sub-sample a 1% workforce reduction leads to a 0.15% 
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greater change in ROA. The interaction term coefficients indicate that the effect of workforce 
adjustments on operating performance is significantly different in related and unrelated 
acquisitions, while it is not significantly different for hostile versus friendly acquisitions. In 
the WFR sub-sample, a 1% higher workforce reduction in unrelated acquisitions causes a 
0.15% greater operating performance change, while in the related acquisitions this effect is 
0.34% [= 0.146 + 0.193]. In the WFG sub-sample, 1% higher workforce growth causes a 
0.27% [= 0.025 – 0.291] smaller operating performance change. Thus, in related acquisitions, 
workforce reductions lead to materialisation of post-merger synergy and positively contribute 
to operating performance change, while excessive workforce growth negatively affects 
performance change. In sum, these results imply that post-merger workforce reductions 
positively affect firm performance.  
Quantile regressions  
We also investigate the effect of post-merger workforce adjustments on the subsequent post-
merger operating performance, using quantile regressions, which controls for the effect of 
outliers. It is important to control for the effect of outliers in these regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the change in operating performance (ROA), which can be negative or 
positive and therefore was not transformed into logarithmic form. The results of these 
regressions are given in table 6.5. In these regressions the main variable of interest is 
workforce change from t-1 to t+1 in the full sample, workforce reduction in the WFR sub-
sample and workforce growth in the WFG sub-sample. 
The 50
th
 percentile (median) regressions and the 75
th
 percentile regressions confirm the OLS 
regression results: the full sample regressions indicate that the workforce change variable is 
inversely related to operating performance change. This means that 1% employment growth 
leads to a 0.06% smaller change in ROA, as indicated in the median regression. Thus, the 
workforce change variable is not an important predictor at lower levels of operating 
performance change.   
However, only leverage is significant at 75
th
 percentile regression and all other variables, such 
as premium, Board composition and relatedness dummy variables, are insignificant within this 
semi-parametric test specification (quantile regressions), while they are significant within 
parametric test specification (OLS regressions). There may be several reasons for this. One 
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possible explanation is that outlier deleition in the OLS regression framework significantly 
impact the results. Alternatively, highly non-normality of the dependent variable – operating 
performance change measure – may impact the results. As this variable was constructed as the 
difference between post-takeover and pre-takeover performance (which may be positive or 
negative) we could not use logarithmic transformation of this variable, which would be ideal 
normality transformation. 
Table 6.5 Quantile regressions explaining post-takeover performance change  
Independent variables Full sample WFR WFG Full sample WFR WFG 
0.25 Quantile regression
Workforce change from t-1 to t+1 - 0.030 - 0.032
Workforce reduction from t-1 to t+1 - 0.003 - 0.013
Workfroce growth from t-1 to t+1 - 0.124 - 0.123
Premium 0.040 0.035 - 0.054 - 0.038 0.025 - 0.143**
Control firm performance 0.393** 0.285 0.503 0.358 0.112 0.330
Relative size - 0.016 - 0.001 - 0.026 - 0.015 0.003 - 0.020
Board composition 0.020 - 0.280 0.185 0.043 - 0.212 0.075
Leverage 0.102 - 0.090 0.319 0.020 - 0.111 0.256
Hostility dummy 0.067** 0.042 0.099*
Relatedness dummy 0.063** 0.068 0.019
Constant - 0.189** 0.078 - 0.336* - 0.189*** 0.005 - 0.265**
0.50 Quantile regression
Workforce change from t-1 to t+1 - 0.055*** - 0.064
Workforce reduction from t-1 to t+1 - 0.012 - 0.003
Workfroce growth from t-1 to t+1 - 0.083 - 0.081
Premium 0.023 0.046 0.026 0.007 0.049 - 0.006
Control firm performance 0.338** 0.402*** 0.324 0.314* 0.374 0.363**
Relative size - 0.003 0.007 - 0.009 - 0.003 0.005 - 0.011
Board composition - 0.093 - 0.146 - 0.062 - 0.134 - 0.198* - 0.109
Leverage 0.036 0.066 0.039 0.058 0.049 0.081
Hostility dummy 0.012 0.012 0.010
Relatedness dummy 0.036* 0.020 0.036
Constant - 0.006 0.027 - 0.026 - 0.020 0.034 0.042
0.75 Quantile regression
Workforce change from t-1 to t+1 - 0.087** - 0.072
Workforce reduction from t-1 to t+1 0.007 0.014
Workfroce growth from t-1 to t+1 - 0.141*** - 0.120*
Premium 0.027 0.034 0.040 0.012 0.039 0.021
Control firm performance 0.546*** 0.505*** 0.235 0.519*** 0.482** 0.219
Relative size 0.000 0.012* - 0.011 0.002 0.016 - 0.022***
Board composition - 0.080 - 0.098 - 0.067 - 0.087 - 0.097 - 0.089
Leverage - 0.082* - 0.163* - 0.043 - 0.075 - 0.153 - 0.075
Hostility dummy 0.017 0.020 0.020
Relatedness dummy 0.021 0.009 0.037
Constant 0.115*** 0.199*** 0.076 0.104** 0.179** 0.055
Number of observations 206 113 93 206 113 93  
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6.5 Discussion 
Does post-takeover performance deterioration lead to workforce adjustments? We fail to 
reject the hypothesis that post-takeover performance deterioration leads to workforce 
reductions, as there is significant positive association between these two variables, shown by 
both full sample and sub-sample regressions (Q2-H1). This evidence implies that acquirers 
take into consideration post-takeover performance change while making downsizing decisions. 
This evidence also supports the view that such layoffs are undertaken for efficiency 
improvement purposes, as suggested by Conyon et al. (2002a).  
What are the consequences of post-takeover workforce adjustments for operating 
performance? Firstly, the univariate analysis indicates the WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ 
performance does not differ from the pre-takeover levels during the first two post-takeover 
years, but significantly declines during the third post-takeover year. In contrast, the WFR sub-
sample acquirers‟ performance declines during the first two post-takeover years, but does not 
differ from the pre-takeover levels during the third post-takeover year. In other words, both 
benchmarks show that the WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ performance declines, while the WFR 
sub-sample acquirers‟ performance does not, during the third post-takeover year. This means 
that workforce reductions may halt further performance deterioration.  
As the full effect of employee layoffs might only be felt several years after downsizing, we 
use performance change after three years as a dependent variable. The results reveal an inverse 
relationship between workforce change and operating performance change (Q2-H2). This 
suggests that workforce reductions are associated with more positive operating performance 
change. The results also indicate that the extent of post-merger workforce adjustments is 
greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. The interaction of the relatedness 
dummy with the workforce adjustment variable is significant in both sub-samples. In the WFR 
sub-sample, a 1% employment reduction in related acquisitions leads to significantly better 
performance than a 1% employment reduction in unrelated acquisitions. Similarly, in the 
WFG sub-sample, workforce growth hurts more those acquirers who acquire firms in the same 
industry. This is consistent with the view that related acquisitions provide more synergy, 
facilitating a large reduction in labour demand in comparison to unrelated acquisitions.  
In other words, using the operating performance change variable, we are not able to further 
support the hypothesis that excessive employee layoffs lead to operating performance 
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deterioration, as suggested by Krishnan et al. (2007). Instead, the results indicate that 
workforce reductions contribute to positive operating performance change, while accelerated 
workforce growth may lead to steeper decline in operating performance. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the role of post-merger performance deterioration in explaining 
workforce reductions. It has also examined whether post-merger employee layoffs arrest a 
decline in performance or whether they cause further performance deterioration.  The results 
support the view that firm performance deterioration after acquisitions also plays an important 
role in explaining post-takeover workforce reductions. Both univariate and regression analyses 
indicate that post-merger decline in performance may also lead to the workforce reductions.  
Using a US sample, Krishnan and Park (2002) and Krishnan et al. (2007) show that managers 
undertake excessive post-merger employee layoffs to cover high premiums, which may lead to 
subsequent firm performance deterioration. However, a counter-argument exists: a primary 
reason for downsizing is to improve operating performance. The objective of downsizing is to 
stop further performance deterioration and it may take some time to materialise the effect of 
downsizing. Therefore workforce change is expected to positively affect firm performance 
change. In support of this, the results show an inverse relationship between workforce change 
and operating performance change, which implies that workforce reductions halt further 
performance deterioration, given the fact that takeovers in general lead to a decline in 
operating performance. On the basis of this, we argue that post-merger workforce reductions 
are associated with more positive operating performance change.  
We could not support the Krishnan and Park (2002) and Krishnan et al. (2007) findings using 
a sample of UK acquisitions. In contrast to the results of these papers, our results show that 
workforce reductions do not negatively affect operating performance: post-merger workforce 
change is inversely related to operating performance change. This association suggests that 
post-merger employee layoffs contribute to materialising post-merger synergy and, thereby, 
positively affect firm performance. Furthermore, our results show that the need for 
performance improvement necessitates workforce reductions. So, it can be concluded that 
managers do not put shareholders‟ interests above the labour forces‟ interest. Therefore 
managers can be seen as active participants in governance and make decisions to improve firm 
performance. 
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7 SHAREHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES: RENT TRANSFER OR 
RENT SHARING IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 
7.1 Introduction  
7.1.1 Research motivation  
The introduction of the ideology of maximising shareholder value and the rise of institutional 
investors in LMEs contributed to the development of an active MCC, which threatens 
managers with replacement if they do not act in the best interests of shareholders. However, 
some authors argue that excessively pressurising managers to undertake corporate 
restructuring through the MCC may negatively affect labour (Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan, 2000). It is suggested that such corporate governance practices may discourage 
employees from investing in firm-specific human capital and may pressurise managers into 
taking short-term profit-maximising actions instead of investing in long-term sustainable 
projects (Blair, 1995).  
Specifically, it is suggested that ownership change through takeovers facilitates wealth transfer 
from employees to shareholders by allowing acquirers to renege on intrinsic contracts with 
employees, such as promises of extra-marginal wage payments (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). 
These renegotiations may result in more favourable value redistribution for shareholders. In 
expectation of the advantages of this bargaining process, acquiring firm managers pay high 
premiums, leading to a significant rise in share prices. In short, this value-redistribution theory 
suggests that takeovers may be undertaken with the purpose of rent transfer from employees 
to shareholders. This implies that post-takeover employee welfare should be inversely related 
to shareholder gains earned at the time of the takeover announcement.  
Alternatively, the value-creation theory of takeovers suggests that shareholder gains come 
from expected efficiency improvements arising as a result of shifting target firm assets to more 
efficient users (Manne, 1965)
70
. Under this theory, post-takeover workforce and wage changes 
should depend on the success of mergers, which may be characterised by successful 
integration, higher profitability and better business opportunities. Such positive changes in 
                                                 
70 As outsiders‟ cash flow expectation from using target assets is higher than the cash flow expectation of incumbent 
managers, their valuation of these assets is higher than the incumbent‟s valuation. This higher valuation enables outsiders to 
make a higher bid. This higher bid (or expectation of such a bid) causes an increase in the market value of the target shares. 
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firm performance should be incorporated into acquirers‟ share price post-merger. Such 
efficiency improvements should also benefit employees (Holmstrom, 1988; Conyon et al., 
2004). In short, takeovers may be undertaken with the purpose of improving the welfare of all 
stakeholders, leading to rent sharing between them. This implies that post-takeover changes in 
labour welfare should depend on the success of mergers, where the success could be measured 
by acquiring firm shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns.  
Despite extensive research on the effect of takeovers on shareholder value and employee 
wealth, the question of whether there is any association between these two variables remains 
unanswered. There is little prior empirical evidence which directly tests this association. At 
the same time, this small body of literature provides mixed conclusions on the validity of the 
rent transfer argument: there is evidence both rejecting and supporting the rent transfer 
hypothesis (Rosett, 1990; Gokhale et al., 1993; Becker, 1995; Beckmann and Forbes, 2004).  
To assess these competing hypotheses one needs to analyse the changes in both owners‟ and 
employees‟ wealth around the time of takeover announcements and then test the relationship 
between these variables. We measure the impact of takeovers on labour using changes in two 
items of labour data: number of workers and their annual wages. We consider changes in two 
sets of owners: target firms‟ short-run abnormal returns surrounding the takeover 
announcement and acquiring firms‟ long-run abnormal returns as possible explanations of 
post-takeover changes in labour welfare
71
. Takeover announcement share price changes 
should also reflect efficiency gains arising as a result of mergers, in addition to the wealth 
transfer from employees to shareholders. In fact, as discussed above, the main motivations of 
takeovers are to derive a synergy from merging business or to discipline underperforming 
managers which eventually should lead to an improvement in operating performance of 
merged businesses. However, such efficiency improvements should be incorporated in 
acquiring firm share prices, rather than target firm share prices. In this regard, we only use 
target firm shareholders abnormal returns and premiums paid to target firm shareholders as 
merger-related wealth transfer measures.  
                                                 
71 After mergers some target firm shareholders may become shareholders of acquiring firm, if payment was in the form of 
stock.  
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In addition to the full sample analysis, we measure the shareholder wealth effect of takeovers 
in the WFR and WFG sub-samples
72
. According to the value-redistribution theory, the WFR 
sub-sample shareholders should earn higher abnormal returns than the WFG sub-sample 
shareholders. To test these predictions, first, we compare short-run shareholder abnormal 
returns for the WFR and WFG sub-samples. Furthermore, wage growth should depend on 
target firm shareholder gains. To test this prediction, we regress post-takeover employment 
and wage changes on target firm shareholders‟ gains.  
According to the value-creation theory, the WFG sub-sample shareholders should earn higher 
long-run abnormal returns than the WFR sub-sample shareholders. Therefore we compare 
long-run share price abnormal returns of acquiring firms for the WFG and WFR sub-samples. 
Furthermore, workforce and wage growth should depend on the value created by mergers, 
which could be measured with the acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns. Therefore we test 
whether post-takeover long-run abnormal returns are associated with the changes in workforce 
and wages by regressing long-run abnormal returns on employment and wage growth. 
7.1.2 Brief results and contributions 
We find that around takeover announcements the WFR sub-sample shareholders earn lower 
abnormal returns than the WFG sub-sample shareholders. This contradicts the predictions of 
the rent transfer argument. Interestingly, the WFR sub-sample acquirers lose significantly, 
while the WFG acquirers‟ wealth does not change much. Similarly, in the long run the WFR 
sub-sample acquirers earn significant negative abnormal returns, while the WFG sub-sample 
acquirers‟ performance does not differ from the performance of non-merging control firms.   
Furthermore, the regressions show a positive association between target shareholders‟ 
abnormal returns and workforce growth, while the premium is positively associated with wage 
growth. Only in cash-financed acquisitions higher abnormal returns are associated with lower 
wage growth, while in hostile takeovers a higher premium is associated with lower wage 
growth. Similarly, in related acquisitions a high premium leads to slower employment growth.     
In contrast, the results support the rent-sharing argument: there is significant positive 
association between shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns and post-takeover changes in 
                                                 
72 The WFR and WFG sub-samples are explained in the chapter 5.   
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both workforce and wage, meaning that in acquisitions with low shareholder returns, wage and 
employment growth is also low. Thus, we conclude that in corporate takeovers employee 
wealth concessions do not depend on the rent expropriating behaviour of shareholders, but 
post-takeover jobs and wages depend on the value created by takeovers; if shareholders gain 
from takeovers, then employees also benefit from such transactions; if shareholders lose from 
the acquisitions, then employees also suffer from them.  
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides new evidence on the relationship 
between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions around takeover transactions. 
Although there is well established research on the shareholder wealth effect of takeovers on 
the one hand, and the effect of takeovers on labour on the other hand, the research on the 
direct relationship between these two effects of takeovers is limited to a few papers only 
(discussed in the next section). 
Secondly, the chapter clarifies takeover motivations and sources of gains arising from such 
transactions. The value-redistribution theory suggests rent transfer from other stakeholders to 
shareholders as a source of takeover gains. Alternatively, the value-creation theory suggests 
efficiency improvements as a source of takeover gains. So empirical evidence on these two 
competing theories clarifies the issues related with the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices in LMEs. 
Shareholder gains around takeover announcements are well documented: in the short run 
target shareholders earn significant abnormal returns, while bidder shareholders‟ wealth does 
not change much.  At the same time there is growing evidence showing that in the long run 
acquiring firm shareholders lose significantly. However, the source of these gains is 
controversial and, more importantly, the reasons for the long-run stock price 
underperformance, termed as the „post-takeover performance puzzle‟ in corporate finance, is 
unknown. In short, the question of how takeovers create or destroy shareholder value is still 
unanswered. Therefore the results of this chapter also clarify the matter of whether acquirers‟ 
underperformance could be related to the changes in employment and wages. 
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7.2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
7.2.1 Target shareholders’ gains and post-takeover changes in employee wealth 
It is suggested that market mechanisms such as the „exit‟ strategy, used in LMEs to discipline 
managers, excessively pressurise them into maximising shareholder value. As a result, 
managers may take actions to increase shareholder value at the expense of other stakeholders. 
Specifically, ownership change may also lead to a change in management control, where new 
management may not be responsible for adhering to the implicit contracts between incumbent 
management and employees. Being themselves under market pressure, new management have 
incentives to breach those implicit contracts and renegotiate them in favour of shareholders. 
On the basis of this Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that gains to target shareholders at 
least partially come at the expense of labour, in the form of job losses, wage cuts and other 
forms of rent reductions for employees. Under the „nexus of contracts‟ view of the firm, long-
term contracts between shareholders and employees could be implicit, providing a trust-based 
framework to employees for investing firm-specific capital. Although ex ante such contracts 
are valuable for both shareholders and employees, ex post shareholders may derive some 
benefit from reneging on such contracts by firing more senior workers, whose wage exceeds 
their marginal product and who were underpaid when they were young. As these implicit 
contract holders are mainly incumbent managers, shareholders can breach these contracts by 
replacing the incumbent management through ownership change. Chemla (2005) suggests that 
even friendly mergers may involve breach of trust between shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and hence the existence of a takeover threat reduces the ex-ante investments of 
other stakeholders. Therefore all takeovers may affect long-term labour relations.       
In such cases, incumbent management and workers form alliances against shareholders. 
Hellwig (2000) argues that incumbent management and workers are natural allies against non-
controlling shareholders and therefore they have incentives to make implicit contracts. Pagano 
and Volpin (2005a) develop a model formally showing that managers and employees have 
incentives to make alliances against shareholders. Managers transform employees into anti-
takeover defence mechanisms by offering them long-term employment contracts, paying high 
wages and not monitoring too strictly, when they have small ownership stakes. The reason for 
such a coalition is that managers value the private benefits of a „quiet life‟, while employees 
fight hostile takeovers to protect their long-term contracts and high salaries. Thus, a generous 
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employment policy can serve as an entrenchment instrument for the incumbent management 
and it may be preferable for shareholders to discipline such behaviour through „exit‟.    
At the same time, many other authors argue that acquiring firm managers pay high premiums 
to target shareholders and subsequently cover these by cutting labour costs (Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997; Sirower, 2000). This also suggests post-takeover employee layoffs, induced 
by target firm shareholders‟ gains in the form of a takeover premium (Krishnan et al., 2007).  
The empirical tests of the value-redistribution theory include analysing union wealth change, 
wage growth or labour demand adjustments after takeovers. Some authors have provided at 
least partial support for the rent transfer argument. Becker (1995) finds that the mean 
difference in target shareholder returns for unionised and non-unionised firms was statistically 
significant and economically large. Shareholder returns in unionized target firms were 14-16% 
larger than average target shareholder returns of 37%, supporting the rent expropriation 
theory. Rosett (1990) provides evidence showing that 10% (5%) of shareholder gains in 
hostile (friendly) takeovers could come from labour losses over a period of 18 years after 
takeovers. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) estimate that workforce growth in ownership-
changing auxiliary (production) units is 17% (4.5%) lower than in non-ownership-changing 
units. However, Brown and Medoff (1988) report a 5% increase in employment, while 
McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) report an insignificant 3% growth in employment. 
The results of Gokhale et al. (1993) suggest that hostile takeovers reduce employment for 
more senior workers than other workers. Bhagat et al. (1990) find that in 28 of 62 hostile 
takeover cases on average 5.7% of workers were laid off, which provided cost savings to 
cover only 10-20% of the takeover premium. Using a small UK sample, but adjusting for the 
effect of relevant asset divestments, Beckmann and Forbes (2004) report an 11% employment 
decline during the five years post-takeover. Gugler and Yurtoglu‟s (2004) results reveal that 
US tender offer takeovers reduce employment by 8%, while other takeovers do not change 
employment. Such differential effect has been interpreted as being consistent with the rent 
transfer hypotheses as tender offers can be assumed to cause a larger element of hostility than 
other takeovers. However, interestingly, their results show that UK tender offer takeovers do 
not significantly change employment, while other deals reduce employment by 14%. In short, 
according to the rent transfer hypothesis, post-takeover workforce changes are predicted to be 
an inverse function of target shareholders‟ gains (share price abnormal returns or premium): 
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Q3-H1: Target firm shareholders’ short-run abnormal returns surrounding takeover 
announcements are negatively associated with post-takeover workforce growth. 
Q3-H2: The takeover premiums paid to target firm shareholders are negatively associated 
with post-takeover workforce growth. 
In addition to employee layoffs, the rent transfer could also involve slower wage growth and 
cuts in other rents to workers. Several empirical studies report that unexplained extra-marginal 
wage differentials exist even amongst firms within the same industries with similar financial 
indicators (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Lazear (1979) suggests that it is preferable for both 
firms and workers to agree to a long-term wage stream that pays workers less than the value of 
their marginal product when they are young and more than the value of their marginal product 
when they are older. Such an extra-marginal wage provides long-term incentives, urging 
workers to make firm- specific human capital investment. However, it may be beneficial for 
shareholders to reverse such payments through ownership change that facilitates the 
renegotiation of such extra-marginal wage payments. 
As discussed above, the Pagano and Volpin (2005a) model predicts that incumbent managers 
have incentives to pay higher wages to protect the private benefits of their own „quiet life‟. In 
contrast, post-takeover new managers have incentives to cut wages as much as possible and to 
introduce more intensive monitoring of workers to maximise takeover gains. Their model 
predicts that such wage cuts cause an increase in the company‟s share price in proportion to 
the share of the total wage bill that is paid to employees with renegotiable contracts. 
Gokhale et al. (1993) analyse extra-marginal wage payments to workers in the form of 
employer-specific wage differentials and steeper-than-average seniority wage payments. 
Analysing the pre-event characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the probability of 
subsequent hostile takeovers, they could not find any significant relationship between these 
two variables. The Gokhale et al. (1993) results reveal that senior employees‟ wage profiles 
flatten for firms with an initially high concentration of senior workers, indicating the wealth 
expropriation after such takeovers. Neumark and Sharpe (1996) argue that if the highest wage 
premia and the steepest wage profiles for more-tenured workers reflect extra-marginal wage 
payments, then hostile takeovers should target firms with these characteristics. However, 
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logistic regressions do not show that the likelihood of being a hostile takeover target is related 
to such characteristics. 
However, only one UK study in this area – that of Beckmann and Forbes (2004) - reports that 
wage growth is also higher than a benchmark wage growth
73
. In their study the regressions of 
premiums on job cuts and wages indicate no significant association between these variables.  
In brief, many authors agree that a substantial part of shareholder gains results from employee 
losses. For example, Pontiff et al. (1990) report that pension fund revisions are higher after 
hostile takeovers (15%) than after friendly takeovers (8%), consisting of on average 11% of 
target shareholders‟ takeover announcement gains. Takeover gains could come in the form of 
wage cuts (covering 10% of gains, as reported by Rosett (1990)), pension fund revisions 
(covering 15% of gains, as reported by Pontiff et al. (1990))
74
 and employee layoffs (covering 
10-20% of gains, as reported by Bhagat et al. (1990)). On the basis of this discussion, the 
following hypotheses will be tested:  
Q3-H3: Target firm shareholders’ short-run abnormal returns surrounding takeover 
announcements are negatively associated with post-takeover wage growth. 
Q3-H4: The takeover premiums paid to target firm shareholders are negatively associated 
with post-takeover wage growth. 
7.2.2 Acquirer shareholders’ gains and post-takeover changes in employee wealth  
As discussed above, a strand of literature suggests that in LMEs managers shift risks onto 
labour during hard times (Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). According to 
this view managerial actions will be dictated by the market and managers under market 
pressure favour shareholders‟ interests over labour interests. However, a recently emerging 
strand of literature argues that such a view does not fully represent the reality of labour 
management (Deakin, 2005). Gospel and Pendleton (2003) and Pendleton (2009) argue that 
the existing evidence does not support the above hypothesized negative effect on labour of 
restructuring for shareholder value. Instead the labour management practice in the publicly 
                                                 
73 Beckmann and Forbes (2004) estimate the wage growth benchmarks on the basis of pre-takeover historic wage growth and 
industry average wage growth. 
74 However, Pontiff et al. (1990) report that this type of rent cut occurs only in about 10% of cases of takeovers.  
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listed firms in LMEs could also be considered as more favourable towards labour and 
Pendleton (2009) discusses several reasons for a such management style. Institutional 
investors have started to use relational forms of governance rather than market forms of 
governance as the latter is becoming more costly. This gives managers a greater degree of 
„strategic choice‟ and autonomy from shareholders in decision-making. At the same time, 
corporate law requires managers to exercise independent judgement and to promote the 
success of the company, balancing the interests of all stakeholders involved, including 
shareholders and employees.  
On the basis of this it can be argued that wages and workforce growth depend on the value 
created by takeovers. In other words, post-takeover employee wealth concessions should be 
determined by a successful outcome of business integration process that enhances firm 
profitability and creates new growth opportunities. Such changes should alter post-takeover 
operating performance and gradually raise the share price of acquiring firms. Thus, one of the 
measures of merger success is the acquiring firms‟ long-run stock price abnormal returns. 
Workforce reductions may occur after unsuccessful takeovers, resulting from poor acquisition 
strategy, mis-match of acquired and acquiring business or failure of business integration. In 
contrast, only those acquisitions that create high business growth opportunities may benefit 
workers with new jobs and accelerated wage growth. Therefore we argue that success of 
mergers is measured by acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns. Furthermore, post-takeover 
wage and employment growth should be associated with acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the WFR sub-sample acquirers‟ abnormal returns should be 
more negative than WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ abnormal returns. 
There may be several reasons for faster wage growth during a post-merger period. First, 
workers may earn higher wages as a result of changes in the wage setting process and a post-
merger profitability increase. Conyon et al. (2004) report that both profitability and wages rise 
following mergers, where related acquisitions increase wages faster than unrelated 
acquisitions due to increased efficiency in labour usage. Alternatively, managers may become 
more entrenched after mergers, having more control rights. Cronqvist  et al. (2009) show that 
managers with more control pay their workers more. While wage cuts are expected after 
hostile takeovers involving management turnover, it is reasonable to expect wage growth after 
friendly takeovers. The reason is that managers may prefer a „quiet life‟, as discussed in 
Pagano and Volpin (2005a) and Pendleton (2009). Previously Bertrand and Mullainathan 
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(1999, 2003) showed that when the takeover threat is weak, managers pay high wages. 
Mergers enlarge firms, making them less vulnerable to takeover threats. As a result managers 
of such firms become more entrenched and start paying higher wages. Pendleton (2009) also 
suggests that the high visibility of publicly listed companies may encourage managers to adopt 
a more labour friendly management style in such companies.   
A growing number of empirical studies provide evidence showing that takeovers are value 
enhancing transactions, benefiting both shareholders and employees. Some of the value 
enhancements come in the form of economies of scale through decline in labour demand. The 
Conyon et al. (2002a, 2004) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) results indicate that during the 
first two post-takeover years labour demand declines by about 12-20%. This decline in labour 
demand is interpreted as evidence of efficiency improvement and significant rationalisations 
in labour use. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) report that after adopting anti-takeover laws, 
the total factor of productivity and profitability declines. At the same time, worker wages, 
especially wages of „white-collar‟ workers rise after the adoption of anti-takeover rules. 
Therefore the authors conclude that takeovers do not involve rent transfer to shareholders, but 
improve economic performance through management disciplining. On the basis of this 
discussion, the following hypotheses will be tested:   
Q3-H5: Acquiring firm shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns are positively associated 
with post-takeover workforce changes. 
Q3-H6: Acquiring firm shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns are positively associated 
with post-takeover wage growth. 
7.3 Data and methods 
7.3.1 Econometric modelling 
To test hypotheses Q2-H1 and Q2-H3, we estimate the following model:  
ControlCARX T1  (26) 
where X is either the change in the logarithm of number of employees from t-1 to t+3 in the 
employment equation or the change in the logarithm of average wages per employee per 
annum in the wage equation. The number of employees represents the average number of both 
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full- and part-time employees during the relevant year. Wages represent annual staff costs paid 
to all employees and directors of the firms
75
, scaled by the number of employees. It includes 
wages and salaries, social security costs and other pension costs
76
. TCAR is the target firm 
shareholders‟ short-run abnormal returns around takeover announcement, and  is the error 
term. Control variables include: 
- Change in acquirers’ operating performance, measured as change in the ratio of EBITDA to 
Total Assets (hereafter ROA);  
- Change in control firm workforce (in the employment equation), where the control firm is 
selected on the basis of industry, size and pre-event performance criteria, as recommended by 
Barber and Lyon (1996)
77
;  
- Change in industry average wage (in the wage equation), calculated as the change in 
industry-median wage rate;  
- Relative size, which is the ratio of acquiring firm size to the transaction value (target firm 
size). Previous research shows that larger firms pay higher wages, because they hire higher 
quality workers (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995a) confirm that the effect of mergers is different for small and large firms: in 
small firms wages rise more quickly than wage rise in large acquirers;  
- Leverage, which is the debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the takeover completion year; 
- Board ownership; prior research argues that Board ownership reduces agency problems and 
induces managers to make shareholder value maximizing decisions (Cosh et al., 2006). 
                                                 
75 The most direct test of the rent transfer hypothesis should be undertaken on the basis of the analysis of individual worker 
wages in both target and acquiring firms, using employee-employer linked data. However, we do not have such a dataset and 
therefore we use information on firm level staff costs, obtained from Datastream. Firm level staff cost data represents wages 
paid to all employees and officers of the firm. It also includes other employee benefits such as insurance and contributions to 
pension plans.   
76 These variables have been collected for the period of three years before and three years after the takeover completion year, 
taking into consideration the fiscal year end of the sample firms. 
77 For each acquired and acquiring firm we select a matching firm at the end of year t-1 on the basis of the methodology 
recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996): first, we filter all firms in the same industry with the sample firm; second, we 
select all firms within the 25% to 200% size interval of the sample firm‟s size, size being measured by total assets; third, we 
select the non-acquiring firm with the closest operating performance measure (EBITDA scaled by total assets) to the matching 
firm. In addition to this, the matched firm should not be involved in major mergers or acquisitions two years before the 
sample takeover year and three years after the sample takeover year. 
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Lewellen et al.(1985) conclude that takeovers initiated by directors with small ownership are 
more likely to have negative bidder stock returns;  
- Relatedness dummy regressor, which takes 1 if both target and acquiring firms are in the 
same industry and 0 otherwise. Prior research suggests that the scope for synergy, and 
subsequent value created by mergers, differs depending on the relatedness of merging 
businesses. In related mergers there are more opportunities for achieving a greater level of cost 
savings by eliminating duplicative activities (Rumelt, 1974);  
- Hostility dummy regressor, which takes 1 if the management of the target company rejects 
the initial offer made by any acquirer and 0 otherwise; Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue 
that the rent transfer hypothesis is especially true in the case of hostile takeovers.  
- Cash paid dummy regressor, which takes 1 if all payments are made with cash and 0 
otherwise; Franks et al. (1988) show that premiums are higher in cash acquisitions than in 
equity acquisitions. At the same time, the payment means provides the market with some 
information about the quality of the mergers: prior research shows that in cash acquisitions 
shareholders‟ long-term abnormal gains do not differ from zero, while in equity acquisitions 
shareholders incur significant abnormal losses (Franks et al., 1988; Bhagat et al., 1990).  
To test hypotheses Q2-H2 and Q2-H4, we estimate the following model:  
ControlX Premium1  (27) 
where Premium is the excess of bid price over share price one month prior to takeover 
announcement, and other variables are as explained above.   
To test hypotheses Q2-H5 and Q2-H6, we estimate the following model:  
ControlBHARX 1  (28) 
where BHAR is long-run share price abnormal returns for acquiring firm shareholders, and 
other variables are as explained above.   
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7.3.2 Data and measuring post-merger changes in workforce and wages 
This chapter uses the same sample and data as described in Chapter 5. Similarly, post-merger 
changes in the workforce and wages are measured using the same technique as described in 
Chapter 5.    
7.3.3 Measuring shareholders’ short- and long-run abnormal returns 
To measure target firm shareholders‟ gains, we use two measures: takeover premium and 
target firm shareholders‟ abnormal share price returns around takeover announcement dates. A 
one-month premium is usually used to control for the rumours about takeovers and to 
determine the true size of the premium. As in other studies, this variable is defined as the 
difference between the purchase price and the 30 day pre-takeover price divided by the 30 day 
pre-takeover price. 
We use daily stock price return data to calculate short-term abnormal returns and monthly 
stock price return data to calculate long-term abnormal returns. Daily stock returns are 
calculated using Stock Returns Index data, downloaded from Datastream. For this purpose, 
for both targets and bidders, 300 daily Stock Return Indexes for both target and buyer firms 
have been downloaded around the takeover announcement date: 294 days before the 
announcement date and 5 days after the announcement date. Similarly, FTSE All-Share Index 
figures for 300 days have been downloaded for each takeover‟s announcement dates. 
Consistent with the previous research, daily stock returns from -300 days to -60 days have 
been used to estimate market model parameters and to calculate the variance for abnormal 
returns.  
To calculate long-term abnormal returns, for each acquirer the monthly stock return index for 
the period of 37 months following the takeover completion month has been downloaded from 
Datastream. Similarly, for each matching firm (selected on the basis of industry, size and 
performance) the corresponding 37 monthly return index figures have been downloaded. 
We estimate short-run stock price abnormal returns using CAR calculation methodology, and 
long-run abnormal returns using BHAR methodology, described in Chapter 4. 
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7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Univariate analysis of post-takeover changes in workforce and wages 
Table 7.1 reports the percentage changes in workforce and wages during post-takeover years 
relative to the pre-takeover year, controlling for the workforce and wage changes in the 
matched firms, using the Brown and Medoff (1988) regression methodology. We ran separate 
regressions for each dummy regressor (all takeovers, hostile, related, cash-paid and employee 
layoff-making takeovers). The table only provides the coefficients of the relevant dummy 
variables, without reporting the coefficients of pre-takeover wage and employment variables. 
Panel A reports the employment effect of takeovers. During the transaction completion year all 
takeovers reduce the workforce by 12% and by 3.2% one year after mergers. However, in the 
second and third post-takeover years the change in employment levels is not significantly 
different from the employment growth in non-merging control firms. Both related and 
unrelated acquisition show a 12% decline during the merger year and related mergers result in 
a 4.1% lower workforce growth in comparison to non-merging firms during the first post-
takeover year. In contrast, the results show that hostile takeovers reduce employment levels 
more than friendly takeovers do. During the merger year hostile takeovers reduce employment 
by about 15%, while friendly mergers reduce employment by 12%. Furthermore, hostile 
acquisitions reduce employment by 6% during the first post-takeover year. Conyon et al. 
(2001) suggest that this steep decline in employment levels should not lead to the view that 
hostile takeovers destroy jobs, as their results show that, after controlling for the pre-takeover 
wage, employment and output variables, this distinctive effect of takeovers disappears. This 
indicates that the significant decline in employment in the case of hostile takeovers is the 
result of output decline, possibly due to high levels of divestments after such takeovers. The 
results show that the employment effect of cash-financed takeovers does not differ from the 
employment effect of non-cash-financed takeovers. 
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Table 7.1 Post-takeover percentage change in workforce and wages 
Post-takeover years t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Panel A: Change in employment relative to the pre-takeover level
All takeovers - 0.123*** - 0.032* - 0.013 - 0.009
Related takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.041* - 0.007 0.027
Unrelated takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.025 - 0.05 - 0.078
Hostile takeovers - 0.153*** - 0.062* - 0.06 0.036
Friendly takeovers - 0.119*** - 0.026 - 0.006 - 0.013
Cash financed takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.056 - 0.027 0.024
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.026 - 0.012 - 0.026
Panel B: Change in wage rate relative to the pre-takeover level
All takeovers - 0.006 - 0.012 0.019* 0.033**
Related takeovers - 0.01 0.002 0.014 0.032*
Unrelated takeovers - 0.005 0.033*** 0.031** 0.039**
Hostile takeovers - 0.027* 0.044** 0.029 0.047*
Friendly takeovers - 0.001 0.005 0.018 0.031**
Cash financed takeovers 0.031*** 0.001 0.008 0.028
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.018** 0.019* 0.025* 0.035**   
The above mean percentage changes were calculated on the basis of Brown and Medoff (1988), which estimates percentage 
changes, controlling for the lagged variables, on the basis of the following equation:  
DWEX j
t
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t
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,   (29) 
where X indicates the logarithm of average wages per employee per annum in the merging firms and control firms in the wage 
equation and the logarithm of number of employees in the merging and control firms in the employment equation; t is the 
takeover completion year;  j={1, 2, 3}, i.e. post-takeover years, W indicates the logarithm of average wages per employee per 
annum, E indicates the logarithm of number of workers; k={t–1, t–2, t–3} , i.e. pre-takeover years; D is a merger dummy 
variable, which takes 1 for merging firms and 0 for control firms. In this regression the dummy variable coefficient indicates 
the mean wage (or employment) growth for merging firms, comparing the wage (employment) growth in merging firms with 
the wage (employment) growth in non-merging control firms. Models also include year and industry dummies in addition to 
pre-takeover levels of employment and wage. The estimation method is the Ordinary Least Square estimation method. In 
these regressions a newspaper information-based layoff dummy variable is used. 
 
Panel B reports the wage effects of takeovers. The results show that takeovers lead to higher 
levels of wage growth than is the case in non-merging firms. For the full sample, the results 
indicate that wages rise by 1.9% after two years and 3.3% after three years, indicating that 
employees in the merged firms earn higher wages on average than in the case of no merger. 
Unrelated acquisitions cause higher wage growth than related mergers: although the signs of 
the related merger coefficients are positive for all three years, the increase is only significant 
in the third year, while for unrelated mergers they are significant in all three years. After 
unrelated mergers employees earn about 3-4% higher wages on average than if mergers did 
not occur. After hostile takeovers employees earn about 4-5% higher wages than they would 
earn in the case of no merger, while friendly mergers cause 3% wage growth during the third 
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post-takeover year. The results show that during post-takeover years non-cash-financed 
acquisitions increased wages 2-3.5% faster than non-merging firms, while wages after cash-
financed acquisitions do not differ from wages in non-merging firms.  
The above simple percentage change in workforce and wages during post-takeover years 
shows no support for the rent transfer hypothesis: post-takeover employment growth does not 
differ much from workforce growth in control firms, while wage growth is higher in acquiring 
firms in comparison to wage growth in control firms. Although the results of the above 
regressions are informative, these models do not control for the effect of output changes and 
other relevant variables. It is still possible that there may be a negative relationship between 
shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions. Specifically, higher shareholder gains 
may be associated with lower growth in wages and employment, after controlling for other 
relevant variables. The next section investigates this association.  
7.4.2 Evidence on the rent transfer hypothesis 
Univariate analysis of shareholders’ short-run abnormal returns 
To investigate the association between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions, 
first we calculate CARs for 11 days (5 days before the announcement date and 5 days after the 
announcement date), for 3 days (1 day before the announcement date and 1 day after the 
announcement date) and for the announcement date alone. Table 7.2 reports the mean CARs 
for both acquiring and acquired firms and associated t-statistics for the full sample as well as 
for the WFR and WFG sub-samples.  
Panel A reports the market model estimates. In the full sample target firm shareholders gain 
significant abnormal returns, whereas acquiring firm shareholders‟ wealth does not change 
significantly. On the takeover announcement date target shareholders gain on average 17%, 
which increases up to 25% within the 11 days surrounding takeover announcement. On the 
takeover announcement date acquirers gain small negative abnormal returns, which are 
significant at 10% level only. Both the magnitude and significance of the CARs are generally 
consistent with the previous research: for example, Franks et al. (1991) report a 23.3% total 
abnormal return for the announcement month. 
The results show that although target firm shareholders in both WFR and WFG sub-samples 
earn positive significant abnormal returns, in the former case their gains are 3-5% lower than 
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in the latter case. In contrast, the WFG acquirers earn very small and insignificant positive 
abnormal returns, while the WFR sub-sample acquirers earn significantly negative CARs 
during the 3-day and 1-day event windows
78
. 
Panel B reports the market-adjusted model estimates of CARs, which are very similar to the 
above discussed market model estimates. Under both models, acquisitions involving layoffs 
produce negative short-run abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders. Market efficiency 
implies that news regarding a firm‟s earnings should quickly reflect in its share price. Ball and 
Brown (1968) show that an unexpected change in future expected earnings causes rapid 
changes in share prices. Employee layoff announcements may also provide new information to 
the market about the expected changes in earnings. In this respect, announcement of layoffs 
involving takeovers may reveal a decline in earnings and therefore markets will negatively 
adjust prices to take account of this new information. Consistent with this, the results show 
that workforce reducing acquirers earn negative short-run abnormal returns on takeover 
announcement.  
Several points emerge from this analysis. First, these results do not support the value-
redistribution theory of takeovers: according to this theory shareholders should have earned 
higher abnormal returns after acquisitions that involve employee layoffs than after acquisitions 
that do not. The above results show the opposite of this prediction: in acquisitions involving 
layoffs, both target and bidder shareholders earn lower gains than in acquisitions that do not. 
Secondly, the results suggest that markets correctly forecast employee layoffs for certain types 
of acquisitions, and negatively react to the announcement of such events. Previous research 
shows that on takeover announcement acquirers‟ wealth does not change (Andrade and 
Stafford, 2004). The results of this chapter not only confirm this conclusion, but also show that 
firms making layoffs earn significant negative abnormal returns at the time of the takeover 
announcement. These results suggest that on announcement of a takeover markets distinguish 
layoff-making acquisitions from those acquisitions that do not make employee layoffs. Thus, 
                                                 
78 The results are similar when we divide the full sample into workforce growth and workforce reduction sub-samples using 
the employment change during a 1-year period after takeovers.  
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the results support the market efficiency hypothesis, given the fact that employee layoffs may 
occur well after takeovers
79
.  
Table 7.2 Shareholders short-run abnormal returns around takeover announcements  
CARs t-stat CARs t-stat CARs t-stat
Panel A: Market Model
Full sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1652 11.37 0.2158 14.32 0.2519 15.59
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0043 -1.39 -0.0044 -0.94 0.0106 0.96
The WFG sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.2009 8.26 0.2401 10.09 0.2784 12.01
Bidder firms mean CARs 0.0006 0.10 0.0064 0.79 0.0090 0.92
The WFR sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1578 7.95 0.2096 9.78 0.2442 9.69
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0088 -2.11 -0.0127 -1.95 0.0171 0.80
Panel B: Market Adjusted Model
Full sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1647 11.36 0.2145 14.12 0.2485 15.32
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0048 -1.54 -0.0056 -1.22 0.0074 0.67
The WFG sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.2003 8.29 0.2374 9.94 0.2726 11.72
Bidder firms mean CARs 0.0001 0.01 0.0037 0.46 0.0032 0.35
The WFR sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1576 7.92 0.2092 9.65 0.2408 9.55
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0090 -2.17 -0.0129 -1.99 0.0141 0.65
Days (-5;+5)Days (-1;+1)Day 0
Event Windows
Notes: This table reports the mean values of CARs and relevant t-statistics. There are 140 observations in the WFR sub-
sample and 95 observations in the WFG sub-sample.  
 
Finally, prior research shows that the short-run market reaction to layoff announcements is 
negative in general, as markets consider such events as reactions to poor operating 
performance (Hillier et al., 2007). However, prior research also suggests that market reactions 
to employee layoffs should depend on the underlying reasons for such events, the information 
provided to investors and pre-layoff performance: layoffs undertaken to respond to adverse 
market effects should generate a negative market reaction, while layoffs undertaken to 
                                                 
79 Some takeover announcements include information about future expected redundancies. However, it is in managers‟ 
interests to minimise such information about negative labour effects of mergers.     
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improve efficiency should cause a positive market reaction (Elayan et al., 1998). Chen et al. 
(2001) also show that markets react negatively to layoffs caused by product demand decline, 
but react positively to efficiency improvement layoffs. The Hillier et al. (2007) results indicate 
that layoffs following poor operating performance generate more negative market reaction 
than layoffs caused by restructuring or cost cutting. In this regard, negative market reactions to 
layoff-involving acquisitions suggest that markets consider such acquisitions as reactions to 
adverse market conditions.   
Multivariate regression analysis 
Managers may cut costs not only by dismissing employees, but also by reducing wages or 
slowing wage growth. Therefore we use two variables as the dependent variables in the 
multiple regressions: change in workforce and wages
80
. Prior theoretical research suggests that 
wages and employment growth may be different in related versus unrelated, hostile versus 
friendly and cash-financed versus non-cash-financed mergers. Therefore we also use 
relatedness, hostility, cash-financed and employee layoff dummy regressors and their 
interactions with CARs and the premium.  
Table 7.3 reports the regression results for the employment equations. The sign of the first 
main variable of interest – CARs – is positive and it becomes significant in the model which 
includes dummy regressors and their interactions with the CARs. One unit increase in CARs 
would cause 0.34% higher employment growth in unrelated (friendly and non-cash) 
acquisitions. In contrast, in related acquisitions, one unit increase in CARs would cause 0.02% 
[= 0.336 – 0.357] lower employment growth. 
While the premium is not associated with post-takeover workforce change, its interaction with 
the relatedness dummy variable is significant and negative, implying that in related 
acquisitions a one percentage point increase in the premium would cause a 0.1% [= 0.177 – 
0.273] reduction in employment growth. This is consistent with the view that acquirers pay a 
higher premium for the targets that create more synergy (for example, in the form of steeper 
                                                 
80 However, we do not use the wage change variable as the explanatory variable in the employment equation and the 
employment change variable in the wage equation. The reason is that when we included employment change in the wage 
equations, the results showed that there was a significant negative relationship between wage growth and employment growth. 
However, the regression diagnostics indicate that there may be some specification error with that model, as the F-value for the 
RESET test is very high and the p-value is low. Therefore in wage equations we report the models excluding the employment 
change variable and in the employment equations we report the models that exclude the wage change variable.       
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decline in labour demand). The Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and McGuckin and Nguyen 
(2001) results show that firms acquire better-performing firms, which may require a high 
premium
81
. The interactions of other dummies with the premium are not significant, 
suggesting that the effect of paying a high premium on employment is the same in hostile 
versus friendly and cash-paid versus non-cash acquisitions.  
Table 7.3 OLS regressions of post-merger workforce change on target shareholders’ gains  
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Target CAR 0.146 0.336**
Change in acquirers' operating performance 0.025 0.065 0.028 - 0.031
Change in control firm workforce 0.128*** 0.105*** 0.129*** 0.113***
Relative size - 0.034** - 0.037* - 0.043*** - 0.044**
Leverage - 0.602*** - 0.678*** - 0.644*** - 0.612***
Board ownership 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005**
Relatedness 0.205** 0.273***
Hostility - 0.025 0.123
Cash paid - 0.123 - 0.212**
Relatedness · CAR - 0.357*
Hostility · CAR 0.158
Cash paid· CAR 0.067
Premium - 0.010 0.177
Relatedness · Premium - 0.273*
Hostility · Premium - 0.190
Cash paid · Premium 0.254
Constant 0.138 0.082 0.187** 0.034
F -statistic 12.84 8.01 11.10 5.79
Adjusted R-square 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.18
Number of observations 182 180 187 183
Notes: The dependent variable is post-takeover workforce change. The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions 
of the variables. 
 
The sign of the relative size variable is negative. This suggests that the acquirers that buy large 
firms slow down further firm size growth during post-takeover years. Similarly, high leverage 
inversely affects workforce growth. The results imply that 1% point higher leverage causes 
0.6% lower employment growth. The Board ownership variable has a positive coefficient, 
which is significant at the 0.01% level. These results suggest that higher ownership by boards  
lead to faster employment growth, possibly due to business growth resulting from better 
strategic management: one percentage point higher board ownership causes 0.8% higher 
                                                 
81 If post-merger business growth opportunities are high, providing high expected cash flows, then it is reasonable to assume 
that some of the cash flows should accrue to target firm shareholders, enabling them to earn a high takeover announcement 
gain. 
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employment growth during the post-takeover years. Finally, as expected, control firm 
workforce change is positively associated with acquirers‟ workforce growth.  
The estimation results of the wage equations are given in Table 7.4. Model 1 shows that 
targets‟ CARs do not explain post-takeover wage change. However, model 2 indicates a 
negative and significant slope coefficient for the cash-paid dummy and the CAR interaction 
term
82
. This indicates that, consistent with the rent transfer argument, in cash acquisitions a 
one unit increase in CARs would result in 0.13% [= 0.013 – 0.138] lower wage growth83. In 
non-cash acquisitions CARs do not explain post-takeover wage growth. At the same time there 
is no significant difference in the association between CARs and wage growth in related 
versus unrelated acquisitions and hostile versus friendly acquisitions. 
Model 3 shows that the second variable of interest – premium – does not explain post-takeover 
wage growth. However, when the model includes dummy regressors and their interactions 
with the premium, the main effect of the premium variable becomes significant, indicating that 
in friendly (unrelated and non-cash) acquisitions a higher premium is associated with higher 
wage growth. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in premium leads to 0.07% higher 
wage growth in such acquisitions. At the same time, the slope coefficient of the interaction 
term between hostility dummy and premium is negative, meaning that in hostile acquisitions a 
one percentage point increase in premium would lead to 0.05% [0.071 – 0.120] lower wages. 
Other interaction terms indicate no differential effect of the CARs on wages in related versus 
unrelated and cash-paid versus non-cash acquisitions. 
The control variables behave as expected. Wage growth in acquiring firms is strongly related 
to the industry-wide wage changes. The greater the acquired company size relative to the size 
of the acquiring company, the higher the wage growth, which is consistent with previous 
research that suggests that larger firms pay higher wages (Brown and Medoff, 1989). 
Moreover, high leverage inversely affects wage growth, as indicated by the negative 
coefficient. The results on the association between Board ownership and wages confirm the 
                                                 
82 In the models that include interaction terms we do not interpret the lower level variable coefficients, because they only 
provide limited information. For example, in model 2, a significant cash-paid dummy variable would indicate that wage 
growth is 5.5% higher in cash-paid acquisitions than in non-cash acquisitions, but only when CARs are equal to zero. 
However, in reality CARs are rarely equal to zero. Therefore we only interpret the coefficients of the interaction terms.    
83 The effect of this variable is calculated taking into consideration the main effect and the interaction term effect.  
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Pagano and Volpin (2005a) model predictions: higher ownership by Boards lead to lower 
levels of wage growth
84
.  
Table 7.4 OLS regressions of post-takeover wage growth on target firm shareholders’ gains 
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Target CAR 0.017 0.013
Change in acquirers' operating performance 0.065 0.037 0.062 0.069
Change in industry average wage 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.176***
Relative size 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.013*
Leverage - 0.060 - 0.043 - 0.059 - 0.038
Board ownership - 0.002** - 0.002** - 0.002*** - 0.002***
Relatedness - 0.048* - 0.009
Hostility 0.024 0.067**
Cash paid 0.058* 0.048
Relatedness · CAR 0.112*
Hostility · CAR - 0.036
Cash paid· CAR - 0.138**
Premium 0.008 0.071**
Relatedness · Premium - 0.033
Hostility · Premium - 0.120**
Cash paid · Premium - 0.079
Constant 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.096***
F -statistic 3.76 2.61 3.77 3.43
Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
Number of observations 182 182 182 181
Notes: The dependent variable is post-takeover wage change. The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the 
variables. 
In sum, the results in general do not support the predictions of the value-redistribution 
hypothesis, except on the following points, which provide partial support for this hypothesis. 
First, higher CARs are associated with wage cuts, when acquisitions are made with cash 
payments. Secondly, a higher premium is associated with wage cuts, when acquisitions are 
hostile in nature. Thus, the effect of hostile takeovers on wage growth is distinguishable from 
the effect of friendly takeovers, as predicted with the rent transfer argument. This evidence 
shows that in hostile takeovers where a high premium is paid the rent allocated to labour (in 
the form of lower wages) is less favourable than in the case of friendly takeovers.  
At the same time, higher CARs and premiums are associated with slower workforce growth in 
related acquisitions. However, we argue that this evidence does not suggest rent transfer. 
Specifically, slower workforce growth in related acquisitions does not necessarily show job 
                                                 
84 When the model is in log – level form (i.e. the dependent variable in the logarithm form and the independent variable in the 
level form (could be in percentage or proportions), the coefficient of the log transformed independent variable indicates that 
one unit change in the independent variable leads to a percentage change in the dependent variable, where the direction and 
magnitude of the change is shown by the coefficient of the independent variable. For example, the CAR variable is entered 
into the model in decimal form. The Board of ownership is entered in percentage form. 
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losses, but indicates higher levels of synergy realization after such acquisitions. For other 
types of acquisitions (friendly or non-cash-paid) there is a positive association which 
contradicts the predictions of the rent transfer hypothesis. 
Quantile (median) regression analysis 
In addition to the OLS regressions, we also investigate the relationship between employee 
wealth change and shareholder wealth change post-merger using quantile regressions. 
However, as 25
th
 percentile and 75
th
 percentile regression results are similar to the median 
regression results, we only report these median regression results. The median regression is an 
important type of quantile regressions, which enables to control for the effect of outliers. 
Similar to OLS regression, median regression represent the relationship between the central 
location of the dependent variable and a set of independent variables. However, the advantage 
of the median regression is that when the conditional distribution is highly skewed, the mean 
may not be representative to characterise whole distribution, while the median is still 
informative. Table 7.5 shows the results of the median quantile regressions, explaining post-
merger workforce change (Panel A) and post-merger wage change (Panel B) by the target firm 
CARs and premium paid to target firm shareholders. 
Consistent with the OLS results reported in table 7.3, Panel A shows that the target firm CARs 
are positively associated with post-merger workforce change: the higher the target firm 
shareholder returns, the higher the workforce growth post-merger. This contradicts with the 
rent transfer arguments. Similarly, these regressions also show that high premium is not 
significantly associated with workforce reductions. Furthermore, the significance and 
magnitude of other variables, such as relative size, leverage, board ownership and relatedness, 
are exactly the same as in OLS regressions, except change in control firm workforce variable. 
The negative sign of the relative size variable indicates that the higher the relative size (the 
ratio of transaction value to acquirers size) the lower the post-merger workforce growth. In 
other words, when large firms are acquired, then the subsequent workforce growth is slower. 
Similarly, a higher level of leverage leads to a lower workforce growth. The positive sign of 
the board ownership variable indicates, that the higher the board ownership the higher the 
workforce growth. 
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Table 7.5 Median regressions of post-takeover workforce and wage growth on shareholders’ short-run 
abnormal returns and premium 
Panel A: 0.50 Quantile regressions explaining post-merger workforce change
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Target CAR 0.211* 0.474**
Change in acquirers' operating performance 0.068 0.062 0.115 0.079
Change in control firm workforce 0.064 0.057 0.073 0.060
Relative size - 0.042** - 0.043* - 0.054*** - 0.058**
Leverage - 0.488** - 0.577*** - 0.443** - 0.532**
Board ownership 0.009** 0.007* 0.008*** 0.009***
Relatedness 0.221** 0.149
Hostility 0.008 0.027
Cash paid - 0.069 - 0.174
Relatedness · CAR - 0.500*
Hostility · CAR - 0.054
Cash paid· CAR 0.045
Premium 0.047 0.010
Relatedness · Premium - 0.099
Hostility · Premium - 0.069
Cash paid · Premium 0.288
Constant 0.003 - 0.046 0.009 0.021
Panel B: 0.50 Quantile regressions explaining wage change
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Target CAR 0.036 0.051
Change in acquirers' operating performance 0.078 0.052 0.075 0.047
Change in industry average wage 0.175** 0.184 0.165* 0.250***
Relative size 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.009
Leverage - 0.124* - 0.121 - 0.104* - 0.069
Board ownership - 0.002 - 0.002* - 0.002 - 0.002
Relatedness - 0.042 - 0.002
Hostility 0.032 0.098*
Cash paid 0.058* - 0.015
Relatedness · CAR 0.1
Hostility · CAR - 0.031
Cash paid· CAR - 0.172*
Premium 0.022 0.067**
Relatedness · Premium - 0.043
Hostility · Premium - 0.153
Cash paid · Premium - 0.004
Constant 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.143*** 0.103**
Number of observations 206 206 206 206   
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Notes: The dependent variables are post-takeover workforce change and post-takeover wage change. The estimation method 
is Quantile regression method. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the 
variables. 
Similar to the OLS regressions results, Panel B also shows that target firm CARs is positively 
associated with post-merger wage growth. However, the coefficients are not significant. But, 
the second measure of value transfer – premium variable – is significantly positively 
associated with post-merger wage growth (model 4), contradicting with the rent transfer 
argument. The effect of industry average wage on post-merger wage growth is positive and 
significant. However, some differences emerge between the OLS and median regression 
results, especially in terms of the relative size, leverage and board ownership variables. For 
example, the quantile regressions show that the relative size variable does not explain post-
merger wage change. In contrast, in these regressions leverage variable becomes significant, 
while they are insignificant in the OLS regressions. Although the magnitude of the Board 
ownership is exactly the same in the OLS and median regression, this variable is significant 
only in one specification (model 2). Both OLS and median regressions show that wage growth 
is higher after cash paid acquisitions.   
In sum, the results do not support the rent transfer argument: in most cases targets‟ CARs and 
labour rent are positively related. In the next section, we investigate the validity of the rent 
sharing argument by investigating the association between long-run shareholder gains and 
post-takeover wage and employment growth. 
7.4.3 Evidence on the rent sharing hypothesis 
Univariate analysis of acquiring firm shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns 
This section investigates whether shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns are different in the 
WFR and WFG sub-samples. Table 7.6 reports the long-term share price performance of 
acquiring firms. The long-run stock price abnormal returns are computed on the basis of 
BHAR methodology using industry, size and pre-takeover performance-matched firms
85
. 
Consistent with previous research, the results indicate that during the post-takeover 12 months 
acquiring firms earn 6% less than their matching firms and this underperformance increases to 
24% in a 36-month period. Thus, the full sample results indicate that an average acquirer 
shareholder‟s wealth significantly declines during post-takeover years. The results of this 
                                                 
85 The results of the Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) approach are given in the Appendix 7.  
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analysis confirm the „under-performance‟ puzzle, documented by the existing empirical 
research (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). For example, on the basis of the BHAR approach using 
size and B/M matched firms, Conn et al. (2005) report that in the period of 36 post-takeover 
months domestic public firm acquisitions result in significantly negative returns of 20 %.  
Table 7.6 Long-run shareholder wealth effect of takeovers   
BHAR t-stat BHAR t-stat BHAR t-stat
Full sample acquirers' BHAR -0.0616 -1.84 -0.1970 -3.41 -0.2361 -2.42
The WFG sub-sample acquirers' BHAR -0.0182 -0.31 -0.0174 -0.20 0.0488 0.32
The WFR sub-sample acquirers' BHAR -0.0798 -1.69 -0.2269 -2.81 -0.2938 -2.19
12 months 24 months 36 months
Event Windows
 
Notes: This table reports the mean values of BHARs and relevant t-statistics. There are 140 observations in the WFR sub-
sample and 95 observations in the WFG sub-sample.        
 
Further analysis reveals that there is a clear difference in the long-run stock price performance 
of the WFG and WFR sub-sample acquirers, indicating that much of the underperformance 
could be linked to the employee layoff-making acquirers. The WFG acquirers‟ performance 
does not significantly differ from the non-merging firms‟ performance. In contrast, the WFR 
acquirers earn 8% less after 12 months, 22% less after 24 months and 29% less after 36 
months in comparison to the non-merging firms. 
Thus post-takeover employee workforce reductions could be suggested as one explanation for 
the acquiring firms‟ long-run „under-performance‟ puzzle. On the one hand, these results 
imply that those acquirers who make excessive employee layoffs earn significant negative 
abnormal returns, because such layoffs may destroy human resource capital of acquired firms. 
On the other hand, the results suggest that acquirers may layoff employees after performance 
deterioration. Although there is a large body of literature on the market reaction to employee 
layoff announcements, only a few studies have analysed long-run abnormal returns after 
employee layoffs. Chen et al. (2001) report that although layoff-making firms‟ prior 
performance is poor, during the post-layoff period their share price returns are not different 
from market returns. In contrast, Hillier et al. (2007) report significant long-run share price 
underperformance for employee layoff-making firms. 
 
200 
Multivariate regression analysis 
Both short and long-run univariate analyses indicate that the WFR acquirers‟ wealth declines 
significantly, while the WFG acquirers‟ wealth does not change much. This section 
investigates whether these variations in acquirers‟ abnormal returns explain changes in 
workforce and wages, using the multiple regression analysis that controls for other relevant 
variables.  
The OLS regression results are given in Table 7.7. The results show a strong positive 
association between workforce changes and long-run abnormal returns
86
. This positive 
association implies that the lower the shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns, the greater the 
employment reductions. For example, model 1 shows that a one point lower BHAR causes a 
0.10% higher employment reduction. Model 2 indicates that in cash-paid acquisitions the 
regression slope is significantly smaller than the regression slope for the non-cash 
acquisitions. In cash-paid acquisitions, a one percentage point increase in BHAR would lead 
to 0.003% [= 0.116 – 0.113] higher employment growth.  
Both relative size and leverage is inversely related to employment growth. Acquiring larger 
firms slows down further workforce growth during the three years after takeovers. Similarly, 
high levels of debt negatively affect firm growth. In contrast to this, higher ownership by 
Boards leads to accelerated growth, possibly due to the better operating performance of 
management.  
These results are consistent with the previous research. For example, Cascio et al. (1997) 
report a significant positive association between stock returns and employment change, 
interpreting this as evidence that firms with employment growth produce higher abnormal 
returns during the three years after the workforce adjustment. 
Model 3 shows that wage growth is positively associated with acquirers‟ long-run stock price 
abnormal returns, implying that a one point increase in BHARs leads to 0.02% higher wage 
growth. Acquiring firms‟ wage growth is positively associated with industry wage growth. 
Acquiring larger firms also leads to faster wage growth. This is consistent with the previous 
                                                 
86 As there is a high correlation between the layoff dummy variable and the employment change variable, these models 
exclude the layoff dummy variable.  
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research which shows that larger firms pay higher wages. Board ownership is inversely related 
to wage growth.   
Table 7.7 OLS regressions of post-takeover workforce and wage change on shareholders’ long-run 
abnormal returns  
Dependent variable
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
BHAR 0.099*** 0.116*** 0.022*** 0.032**
Change in control firm workforce 0.172*** 0.130***
Change in industry average wage 0.237*** 0.209***
Relative size - 0.041*** - 0.057*** 0.011* 0.010
Leverage - 0.645*** - 0.769*** - 0.055 - 0.083
Board ownership 0.008*** 0.009*** - 0.002** - 0.001
Relatedness 0.059 - 0.014
Hostility - 0.022 0.005
Cash paid - 0.089* 0.007
Relatedness · BHAR 0.024 - 0.010
Hostility · BHAR 0.020 0.003
Cash paid · BHAR - 0.113*** - 0.009
Constant 0.194** 0.205*** 0.116*** 0.114***
F -statistic 17.45 9.61 10.19 3.69
Adjusted R-square 0.29 0.36 0.16 0.13
Number of observations 180 176 183 183
Wage changeEmployment change
Notes: The dependent variables are post-takeover workforce change and wage change. The estimation method is OLS, using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 
provides the definitions of the variables. 
  
Model 4 reports the differential wage growth effect of different types of takeovers. The 
significant main coefficient for BHAR and non-significant coefficients for its interactions with 
the related, hostile and cash-paid dummies indicate that this variable is positively associated 
with wage growth in the absence of such conditions.  
Quantile (median) regression analysis  
Table 7.8 report median regressions of post-merger workforce and wage changes on 
shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns. Similar to the OLS regression results, these 
regressions show strong positive association between long-run abnormal share price returns of 
acquiring firms and post-merger workforce growth (models 1 and 2) and long-run abnormal 
share price returns of acquiring firms and wage growth variables (models 3 and 4). This 
positive association implies that the higher the shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns, the 
greater the employment growth and wage growth, suggesting that if takeovers create value for 
shareholder, they also benefit workers. In these median regressions the coefficients and signs 
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of other control variables are very similar to the coefficients and signs of the variables in the 
OLS regressions.   
In these median regressions control variables behave exactly as in the OLS regressions, 
although in some cases the significance levels are weaker.  
In brief, the results show that there is a significant positive relationship between acquirers‟ 
long-run abnormal returns and changes in both workforce and wage growth. This suggests that 
takeovers which benefit shareholders also benefit employees: employees can have higher rent 
from improved performance. This strong relationship between post-takeover wage growth and 
long-run shareholder abnormal returns is consistent with the rent sharing between different 
stakeholders. Thus, in the case of successful mergers, the resulting efficiency improvements 
benefit both major groups of stakeholders: employees and shareholders. 
Table 7.8 Median regressions of post-takeover workforce and wage change on shareholders’ long-run 
abnormal returns  
Dependent variable
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
BHAR 0.065** 0.050 0.021*** 0.034*
Change in control firm workforce 0.092 0.099**
Change in industry average wage 0.242*** 0.214**
Relative size - 0.056*** - 0.055** 0.014 0.014
Leverage - 0.487** - 0.586** - 0.089 - 0.121*
Board ownership 0.012*** 0.011*** - 0.002*** - 0.001
Relatedness 0.066 - 0.023
Hostility - 0.030 0.036
Cash paid - 0.023 - 0.008
Relatedness · BHAR 0.042 - 0.014
Hostility · BHAR 0.051 0.000
Cash paid · BHAR - 0.042 - 0.017
Constant 0.045 0.079 0.137*** 0.151***
Number of observations 206 206 206 206
Employment change Wage change
 
Notes: The dependent variables are post-takeover workforce change and post-takeover wage change. The estimation method 
is Quantile regression. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the 
variables. 
 
In brief, the results show that there is a significant positive relationship between acquirers‟ 
long-run abnormal returns and changes in both workforce and wage growth. This suggests that 
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takeovers which benefit shareholders also benefit employees: employees can have higher rent 
from improved performance. This strong relationship between post-takeover wage growth and 
long-run shareholder abnormal returns is consistent with the rent sharing between different 
stakeholders. Thus, in the case of successful mergers, the resulting efficiency improvements 
benefit both major groups of stakeholders: employees and shareholders.          
7.5 Discussion 
Two points form the basis for the rejection of the hypotheses that acquired firm shareholders‟ 
gains (CARs and premium) negatively affect post-takeover employment (Q3-H1 and Q3-H2). 
First, the WFG sub-sample firms gain higher takeover announcement abnormal returns than 
the WFR sub-sample firms. Second, the regressions show that target firm shareholders‟ CARs 
are positively associated with post-takeover workforce change, while the premium is 
positively associated with wage growth.  
Similarly, the results reject the hypotheses that acquired firm shareholders‟ gains (CARs and 
premium) are negatively associated with post-takeover wage growth (Q3-H3 and Q3-H4) in 
friendly mergers. In contrast to the predictions, target firm shareholders‟ gains (both CARs 
and premium) do not explain post-takeover wage change. First, wage growth in the merging 
firms is higher than in non-merging firms. Second, the regressions show no significant 
(negative) association between target firm shareholder gains and wage growth. In sum, an 
analysis of short-run shareholder wealth shows that, although there is some support for the 
rent transfer hypothesis in hostile and cash-financed acquisitions, the evidence is more 
consistent with the argument for rent sharing between shareholders and employees in friendly 
mergers.  
However, we fail to reject the hypotheses that acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns are 
positively associated with post-takeover workforce and wage growth (Q3-H5 and Q3-H6). In 
the long run the WFG sub-sample acquirers earn zero abnormal returns, while the WFR sub-
sample acquirers underperform. The regressions show a strong positive association between 
acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns and post-takeover workforce and wage changes. Thus, 
better performing firms do not make employee layoffs, while firm performance deterioration 
may lead to workforce reduction. This is consistent with the view that firm under-performance 
is one of the main factors that may lead to employee layoffs (Hillier et al., 2007). These results 
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imply that if takeovers benefit shareholders, labour also gains from such transactions; if 
shareholders suffer from a takeover, labour also suffers from such transactions.  
We conclude that the evidence contradicts the rent transfer hypothesis, but it is consistent with 
an alternative explanation: takeovers affect both shareholders and employees in the same 
direction. We argue that employment growth and wage growth depend on the success of the 
mergers, measured by the long-run abnormal returns of acquiring firms. If BHAR is negative, 
then the employment change is negative, if BHAR is positive then the employment change is 
also positive. Thus, managers may act for the success of the companies, not only for the best 
interests of shareholders as discussed in Pendleton (2009). The results of this chapter imply 
that in LMEs the MCC does not negatively affect labour and therefore does not discourage 
long-run firm-specific human capital investments.  
One of the limitations of using long-term analysis in assessing the effect of takeovers on 
shareholders and employment is that many other events may occur during this period, such as 
asset divestment and other acquisitions. Although we control for multiple acquisitions, it was 
not possible to analyse the effect of divestments. Another possibility is that there may be 
reverse causality between share price changes and workforce changes. For example, Hillier et 
al. (2007) report that firms experience significant negative abnormal returns (-0.81%) after 
employee layoffs. However, it makes more sense to think that economic factors drive share 
prices, not that share prices lead to changes in economic factors. Thus, we assume that poor 
operating performance leads to stock price decline and then acquirers undertake employee 
layoffs to arrest further performance deterioration.  
7.6 Conclusions  
It has been suggested that takeovers may be motivated by the objective of wealth re-
distribution from employees to shareholders. Specifically, Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue 
that a considerable part of merger-related shareholder gains comes at the expense of 
employees, especially in hostile takeovers. Alternatively, post-takeover workforce and wage 
growth could be determined by the success of mergers. This chapter empirically investigates 
these competing views. In brief, the results support the view that managers act for the success 
of the company, balancing the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.   
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The univariate regressions show that mergers and acquisitions do not change employment 
levels in the long run, although the immediate effect is negative, with steep job losses. The 
results also show that wages grow faster in merging firms than in non-merging firms. 
Next, the WFR sub-sample shareholder gains are smaller than the WFG sub-sample 
shareholder gains, which contradicts value-redistribution theory predictions. In particular, the 
WFR sub-group acquirers earn significantly negative abnormal returns, while the WFG sub-
group acquirers‟ wealth does not change much. This suggests that the market can distinguish 
acquisitions of bad targets, which may involve employee layoffs, from the acquisitions of 
good businesses with growth opportunities.  
To directly investigate the value-redistribution theory we regress target firm shareholders‟ 
short-run abnormal returns and premium on post-takeover workforce and wage changes, 
controlling for other relevant variables. The results do not show that high shareholder gains 
(CARs and premium) cause subsequent workforce reductions and wage cuts. Instead, while a 
high premium is associated with faster pay rises, higher CARs are associated with 
employment growth. However, the results also show some evidence supporting the wealth 
transfer hypothesis: in cash acquisitions high CARs are associated with lower wage growth, 
while in hostile takeovers a high premium is associated with lower wage growth. At the same 
time, in related acquisitions a high premium leads to slower employment growth.     
The WFG sub-sample acquirers‟ long-run share price performance does not differ from the 
non-merging firms‟ performance, while the WFR sub-sample acquirers significantly 
underperform their non-merging matching counterparts. The regression results indicate a 
significant positive relationship between BHARs and post-takeover workforce changes as well 
as between BHARs and wage changes. This means that post-takeover workforce and wage 
changes depend on acquirers‟ performance: if shareholders‟ long-run abnormal returns are 
low, workforce growth and wage growth are low. Thus, wage growth does not depend on the 
rent expropriating behaviour of shareholders, but depends on how managers promote the 
success of their company. This means that if shareholders gain from takeovers, then 
employees earn higher salaries; if shareholders suffer from the acquisitions, then employees 
also suffer from them.  
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8 LABOUR DEMAND AND WAGE EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS 
THAT INVOLVE EMPLOYEE LAYOFFS 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Research motivation 
The issue of whether mergers and acquisitions lead to economic efficiency is divisive, as is 
confirmed by mixed empirical evidence. There is no general agreement on the dominating 
motive for such transactions. Consequently, the sources of takeover gains are unknown.  
Synergy realisation and management disciplining have been suggested as the main driving 
forces of efficiency improvements. However, it is not well understood how such factors may 
create value. One suggestion is that better labour management and more efficient labour usage 
reduces demand for labour during post-takeover years (Conyon et al., 2002a). Profit 
maximising managers may undertake workforce reductions to realise the synergetic and better 
labour management gains created by mergers. However, any workforce reduction should be 
undertaken on the basis of the level of decline in labour demand. This implies that decline in 
labour demand should be steeper in mergers that involve employee layoffs than in mergers 
that do not.  
To contribute to the growing body of literature on the employment effect of takeovers, this 
chapter empirically investigates the following three interrelated questions. First, recent 
empirical studies show that mergers significantly reduce labour demand (Conyon et al., 2002a; 
Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). A related question in this case is: what factors lead to this decline 
in labour demand? Labour demand could be decreased through elimination of duplicative 
facilities (synergy) and/or better labour management (discipline). There is some empirical 
support for both synergetic and disciplining sources of efficiency improvement. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1987) argue that the main reason for efficiency improvement is management 
disciplining, as targets were poorly-performing plants and their performance is improved 
significantly after mergers. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) conclude that one of the important 
motives of mergers could be synergy, as acquired plants were well-performing companies 
before acquisition and they further improved their performance after acquisition. Conyon et al. 
(2002a) report that related and hostile acquisitions increase efficiency post-merger, as such 
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acquisitions cause large falls in labour demand, in comparison to unrelated and friendly 
acquisitions, respectively.     
To contribute to this literature the chapter investigates whether post-merger demand for labour 
to produce the combined output is lower in merging businesses than in non-merging 
businesses. We analyse the effect of mergers on labour demand, holding output and wages 
constant as well as controlling for firm-specific fixed effects and industry-wide changes. We 
assess synergy and the disciplining role of takeovers by investigating the labour demand effect 
of related versus unrelated and hostile versus friendly mergers. We also investigate whether 
merger-related employee layoffs can be linked to the fall in labour demand arising from 
efficiency improvement.  
As a main question of interest, this chapter examines whether there is any relationship 
between decline in labour demand and reductions in the absolute number of workers post-
merger. In other words, we are interested in understanding whether managers undertake 
employee layoffs on the basis of decline in labour demand. If decline in labour demand is the 
major factor in this decision-making process, then mergers that involve employee layoffs 
should lead to a different level of decline in labour demand from that in mergers that do not.  
Finally, a related question is: what is the wage growth effect of mergers that involve employee 
layoffs? Efficiency enhancement relating to labour usage should significantly improve firm 
profitability, as suggested by the positive feedback mechanism of labour demand (Vietorisz 
and Harrison, 1973). In turn, improved firm profitability may also benefit employees, among 
other stakeholders, through increased wages and better work conditions. Therefore takeovers 
should benefit employees by proportionately increasing their share of the rent (assuming that 
there is a fair bargaining mechanism within the businesses). Thus, increased labour 
productivity and firm profitability should eventually benefit employees through wage 
increases, better work places and pension schemes. In this regard, the chapter investigates 
whether wage growth in merging firms is different from wage growth in non-merging firms. 
Mergers may lead to efficiency improvement in labour usage, which could be achieved 
through synergies (for instance, elimination of duplicative activities) or by instituting better 
labour management. Thus, mergers may also affect wages by improving employee 
profitability resulting from decline in labour demand. Decline in labour demand should also 
benefit employees in the long-run.  
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To empirically examine these questions we divide the full sample into two sub-samples 
depending on whether an acquisition involves employee layoffs, on the basis of employee 
layoff information reported in newspapers: the „layoff‟ sub-sample (hereafter „layoff‟ 
acquisitions), which includes acquisitions that involve merger-related employee layoffs during 
two post-takeover years, as reported by newspapers, and the „non-layoff‟ sub-sample 
(hereafter „non-layoff‟ acquisitions), which includes acquisitions that do not involve employee 
layoffs. Data on the merger-related employee layoffs is collected by screening major national 
newspapers. On the basis of this data, we use a „layoff‟ dummy to investigate the difference in 
the labour demand and wage effects of „layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ acquisitions.  
In sum, understanding the issues of whether there is a merger-related shift in labour demand is 
the key factor in understanding the motivations behind corporate takeovers. However, there is 
very little empirical evidence on this issue. An innovation of this chapter is that it attempts to 
link decline in labour demand with the reduction in the absolute number of workers. With this 
evidence the chapter also contributes to a better understanding of the objectives of the 
decision-makers in undertaking these transactions.  
8.2 Related literature and hypotheses development 
8.2.1 The effect of ownership change on labour demand 
Although both theoretical and empirical research on mergers and acquisitions are well 
established, there is no widely accepted theory that explains the labour market outcome of 
such corporate transactions. Merger theories are inconclusive on the link between ownership 
change and labour market outcome. The value-creation theory of takeovers predicts that 
takeovers will negatively affect jobs in the short run, although the long-run effect depends on 
the complementarities of the merging businesses and success of the merging business. In 
contrast, the value-destruction theory predicts that takeovers should not negatively affect 
employment levels in the short run, but in the long run such takeovers could destroy jobs, as 
businesses eventually decline due to bad management. The value-redistribution theory 
predicts that takeovers will negatively affect employment by causing the implicit contracts to 
be breached (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  
As discussed above, one of the main motives of mergers and acquisitions is to achieve 
efficiency improvement through economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale could be 
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achieved through altering the input – output relationship in the production process. One of the 
main inputs that can easily be altered to extract more synergetic gains is the labour input. As 
summarised by Conyon et al. (2002a), if merged businesses require a different optimal 
employment level from that produced by simply combining the individual workforces, then 
any profit-maximising firm will need to adjust its employment levels during the post-merger 
period. Recent empirical results indicate that mergers cause significant rationalisation in the 
use of labour and the authors interpret this as being consistent with the value-creating theory 
of takeovers (Conyon et al., 2002, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
In contrast, efficiency improvement and better asset performance under the new ownership 
may create new jobs and lead to better work conditions (Holmstrom, 1988). Using plant level 
data from the US food industry, McGuckin et al. (1998) show significantly higher 
employment growth (16%) for an average acquired plant in comparison to an average non-
acquired plant. However, when firm level data is used this difference between acquired and 
non-acquired firm employment becomes insignificant. Using the OLS method, McGuckin and 
Nguyen (2001) report that ownership-changing plants increase their workforce 19% (3.3% 
when the IV estimation method is used) faster than plants having no ownership change. 
However, there is a size effect: non-ownership-changing larger plants (plants in the top 15 
percentile of the size distribution) increase their labour force faster than larger ownership-
changing plants.   
Post-merger workforce adjustment does not need to occur instantaneously and the speed of 
movement to the new equilibrium depends on the costs of this adjustment. In addition, the 
type of workforce adjustment (increase or decrease) depends on the returns to scale of the 
production technology of the combined firms. If the production technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale, then mergers should not change output and employment levels. If the 
production technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, then the merged firm should be 
able to use a smaller amount of combined labour to produce the output amount equal to the 
combined individual outputs of the merging firms. However, the merged firms may not 
achieve this synergy instantaneously and labour adjustments may take several years to achieve 
the new equilibrium, meaning that the effect of takeovers on labour and the labour output 
relationship could be dynamic. We test the following hypothesis:    
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Q4-H1. Takeovers reduce demand for labour, as merged businesses gradually achieve 
synergy and improve labour management. 
Early studies consider employment and wage growth in merging firms relative to non-merging 
firms and conclude that mergers improve labour productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; 
McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). However, one limitation of these studies is that they do not 
investigate the factors that may lead to such efficiency improvements. Furthermore, these 
studies consider all ownership change as homogenous. More recent studies suggest that 
synergy or management disciplining may improve labour efficiency and therefore they 
investigate the labour demand effect of related versus unrelated, and hostile versus friendly 
mergers (Conyon et al., 2002a; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
The scope of synergy, and the subsequent value created by takeovers, differs depending on the 
relatedness of the merging businesses. If related businesses merge, then there are more 
opportunities for achieving synergies and a greater level of cost savings by eliminating 
duplicative activities. Consequently, related takeovers lead to a higher increase in productivity 
than unrelated takeovers (Rumelt, 1974). Therefore it is reasonable to expect that related 
acquisitions may lead to a higher level of decline in labour demand and a subsequent higher 
level of workforce reductions, as confirmed by recent empirical research (Conyon et al., 
2002a; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
As there is more scope for synergy in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions, it is 
possible to achieve higher levels of labour demand reduction in the former than in the latter. 
Therefore the labour demand effect of takeovers should be more pronounced in related 
acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. Hence we classify mergers in terms of relatedness 
(related versus unrelated) to test the following hypothesis: 
Q4-H2. Decline in labour demand is greater in related acquisitions than in unrelated 
acquisitions. 
Similarly, the management disciplining theory also predicts staff downsizing, possibly in the 
auxiliary establishments and among white-collar staff. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) 
distinguish between the effects of takeovers on auxiliary establishment employees and 
production establishment employees. In ownership-changing auxiliary establishments 
employment declines by 16.7%, while in production establishments this reduction is only 
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4.5%. As hostile takeovers are associated with management disciplining, it is reasonable to 
expect that such takeovers improve efficiency more than friendly takeovers do. Similarly, we 
expect labour productivity to be higher after acquisitions involving employee layoffs than 
acquisitions not involving workforce reductions.  
Recent studies distinguish between related and unrelated takeovers as well as between hostile 
and friendly takeovers. The Conyon et al. (2002a) results indicate that related mergers cause 
significantly higher labour usage rationalisations than unrelated mergers. Rejecting the 
popular proposition that hostile takeovers lead to job destruction and wage cuts, Conyon et al. 
(2001) report that both hostile and friendly takeovers reduce demand for labour at the same 
level (7.5%). However, the reduction in the absolute number of employees is significantly 
higher after hostile takeovers than after friendly takeovers, as such takeovers are followed by 
substantial falls in output as a result of divestments and other types of asset re-sale, as reported 
by Haynes et al. (2000). In addition to this, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) report that mergers 
reduce employment even after controlling for divestments and these authors confirm the US 
versus UK differences described above in the employment effect of mergers: in the US 
mergers do not adversely affect employment, while in Europe employment declines by 10% 
and in  the UK in particular employment declines by 12% during the merger year
87
. Therefore 
we test the following hypothesis:  
Q4-H3. Decline in labour demand is greater in hostile acquisitions than in friendly mergers. 
8.2.2 The association between decline in labour demand and workforce reduction 
Cappelli (2000) argues that one of main reasons for post-merger workforce reduction is the 
decrease in labour demand. According to this argument, there should be a link between decline 
in labour demand and reductions in absolute number of employees post-merger. In other 
words, decrease in labour demand should be greater after „layoff‟ acquisitions than after „non-
layoff‟ acquisitions. However, no study has compared the labour demand and wage effects of 
these two types of acquisitions.   
                                                 
87 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) suggest that such a differential effect of mergers is the result of „sclerotic‟ and rigid labour 
markets in the EU countries. In the EU, labour markets are regulated more strictly than in the US and therefore firms have 
higher labour adjustment costs in the EU than in the US. Different labour adjustment costs in the EU and US imply that 
mergers and acquisitions have different effects on labour demand in these economies. Specifically, mergers result in higher 
levels of employee layoffs in the EU than in the US, as  in the US firms can continuously make labour adjustments to optimal 
levels and do not need to use mergers and acquisitions for this purpose. 
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Briefly, in contrast to the view that a substantial proportion of takeover gains comes from 
labour restructuring, such as employee layoffs and wage cuts, the recent research shows that 
mergers cause labour productivity improvement. However, it is unclear whether merger-
related employee layoffs lead to labour productivity improvement. For example, McGuckin 
and Nguyen (1995a) report that ownership-changing plants experience improvement in labour 
productivity, measured as relative labour productivity (RLP), where this improvement is not 
necessarily related to the employment reduction
88
. Using the same sample with plant level 
data, McGuckin et al. (1998) provide evidence indicating that employment increases by 16% 
and labour productivity increases by 16% in a typical acquired plant.   
Under an active market for corporate control, synergy or better labour management should 
reduce post-merger labour demand. Acquirers should undertake employee layoffs depending 
on the changes in labour demand. We investigate whether decline in labour demand is greater 
in acquisitions with employee layoffs than in acquisitions that do not involve layoffs. We also 
investigate the differences in employee profitability and the wage effect of takeovers in the 
„layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ sub-samples. 
Q4-H4. Decline in labour demand is greater in the ‘layoff’ acquisitions than in the ‘non-
layoff’ acquisitions. 
8.2.3 The effect of ownership change on wage growth 
A related issue is whether this improvement in shareholders‟ wealth (high profitability) is at 
the expense of other stakeholders, for example, employees. In their seminal paper Shleifer and 
Summers (1988) argue that mergers may reduce wage growth by eliminating extra-marginal 
wage payments through layoffs of older workers. Several empirical studies provide evidence 
supporting this argument. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that wage growth in ownership- 
changing auxiliary establishments is 9.2% lower, while in production establishments wage 
growth is 2.1% lower than in non-ownership-changing production establishments. Thus, these 
authors conclude that ownership change diminishes wage growth, although the relative wage 
decline in production establishments is only about one third of that in auxiliary establishments. 
                                                 
88 In the literature labour productivity is defined as the ratio of output to the number of employees, output being measured as 
either value-added in the production process or value of shipments (sales value). As the value-added measure is not always 
available, usually in practice sales value is used to proxy for output. However, price differentials among different firms and 
inflation over time do not allow reliable comparison of labour productivity among different firms. Therefore some studies use 
the Relative Labour Productivity (RLP) measure, defined as the ratio of an individual firm‟s labour productivity to average 
industry labour productivity.    
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In contrast to this, McGuckin et al. (1998) find that a typical acquired plant increases its 
workers‟ wages 12% faster than a non-acquired plant in the US food industry. McGuckin and 
Nguyen (2001) report that for the entire US manufacturing sector ownership change causes a 
4.2% faster increase in wages for workers at a plant of average size. But there is an inverse 
relationship in the case of larger plants: wages increase faster in large plants that undergo 
ownership change. Ownership change in bigger plants negatively affects wage growth: a 
typical worker in bigger acquired plants has lower wage growth in comparison to other 
workers in non-acquired plants. Thus, even if the wage effect of takeovers is positive for a 
worker of an average size typical plant, its effect may not be positive for a typical worker, as 
most people work in large plants. More recently, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) have provided 
evidence showing that tender-based takeovers reduce employment by about 8% in the US, 
while mergers do not change employment. These authors interpret this as being consistent 
with the „breach of trust‟ hypothesis.  
However, in contrast to this, it can be argued that improvements in firm-level efficiency 
should also benefit employees, among other stakeholders. As a result of elimination of 
duplicative activities and better labour management, mergers may cause efficiency gains, 
which should be manifested in firm performance improvement. Both synergy and management 
disciplining theories postulate that mergers should improve firm performance. Both decline in 
labour demand and increase in labour productivity may lead to a higher level of profitability 
per employee. For example, Conyon et al. (2004) suggest that post-merger labour efficiency 
causes change in firm profitability (measured as the profit per worker). In the UK Conyon et 
al. (2004) report that the ceteris paribus impact of acquisitions on wages is positive: mergers 
increase wages by 11% within two years after mergers. Thus, these authors argue that merger-
related restructurings boost employees‟ share in the business rent as well. 
On the basis of this discussion, we predict that, along with the owners, the employees of 
merged firms will also be able to benefit from the overall performance improvement in the 
form of better wage and work conditions. Firms with an increasing market share and 
improving labour productivity may achieve higher levels of profitability. Strong unions may 
be able to increase the employees‟ share of the rent through higher levels of wages. As 
Conyon et al. (2004) suggested, wages may increase due to increased profits, even if  the wage 
formation process does not change. Thus there may be two possible sources of wage change in 
merged firms. Mergers may change firm profitability, which in turn leads to the change in 
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wages. Alternatively, mergers may simply cause a change in the wage formation process. 
Thus, we test the following hypotheses regarding the wage effect of mergers:  
Q4-H5. Wage growth is higher in merged firms than in non-merging firms. 
Q4-H6. Wage growth is higher in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. 
Q4-H7. Wage growth is higher in hostile acquisitions than in friendly mergers. 
Q4-H8. Wage growth is higher in ‘layoff’ acquisitions than in ‘non-layoff’ acquisitions. 
8.3 Data and methods 
8.3.1 Econometric modelling 
In modelling the labour demand effect of takeovers, we follow the strategy adopted by 
previous research (Conyon et al., 2002, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004), which uses a 
model developed on the basis of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Specifically, to test 
hypotheses Q4-H1, Q4-H2, Q4-H3 and Q4-H4, the following model will be estimated: 
itiititititititit vfDqqwwll 615413211  (30) 
where itl  is the logarithm of employment, itw  is the logarithm of real wage relative to user 
cost of capital
89
, itq  is the logarithm of real output of firm i in time t, tD  is a dummy variable, 
taking one of the following four dummies: merger, relatedness, hostility and employee layoffs. 
The merger dummy takes 1 if firm i is involved in a merger at time t and 0 otherwise, the 
relatedness dummy takes 1 if both target and acquiring firms are in the same industry and 0 
otherwise, the hostility dummy takes 1 if the management of the target company rejects the 
initial offer made by an acquirer and 0 otherwise, and finally the layoff dummy takes 1 if 
acquisitions involve employee layoffs and 0 otherwise; if  indicates time constant firm-
specific unobservable variables, that will be removed after first differentiation using panel 
data
90
; itv is the usual error term.  
                                                 
89 User cost of capital is assumed to be equal to one to provide comparability across firms. 
90 In econometrics the above model is called an autoregressive distributed lag model, the estimation methods of which are 
discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis.  
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The above equation only indicates the contemporaneous impact of mergers on labour demand. 
To investigate the long-run effect of mergers on labour demand we include lagged levels of 
the dummy variable. For example, 1itD takes 1 if firm i was involved in a merger at time t-1 
and 0 otherwise and 2itD takes 1 if firm i was involved in a merger at time t-2 and 0 otherwise.  
To test the above hypotheses we use four types of dummy regressors in different estimations. 
First, we use a Merger dummy that differentiates merged firms from control firms. Second, we 
use Related and Unrelated merger dummies that differentiate post-takeover changes in the 
performance of these types of merger from the changes in the non-merging control firms. 
Related mergers are classified as those mergers where both acquired and acquiring firms are in 
the same industry, while unrelated mergers indicate those transactions that involve firms in 
different industries. Third, we use Hostile and Friendly merger dummies. Hostile takeovers 
indicate those takeovers where the initial bid was rejected by the incumbent managers. Finally, 
we use Layoff and Non-layoff dummy variables, where the Layoff dummy indicates those 
acquisitions involving layoffs of more than 1% of the combined workforce within two years 
after completion of transactions, as reported by the newspapers
91
. 
The basic issue underlying equation (30) is whether changes in takeovers have a significant 
effect on employment, controlling for changes in wages and output. Bresson et al. (1996) 
derive the optimal level of employment conditional on the changes in expected output and the 
wage to capital ratio. In this regard, to isolate mergers‟ effect on labour demand the model 
includes both one period lagged level and contemporaneous sales and wage variables, as the 
labour demand changes could occur due to the changes in these variables. Wages should be 
relative to user cost of capital and it is common in the relevant literature to assume that the 
cost of capital remains constant over time and therefore to be equal to one for all companies. 
As discussed above, labour demand adjustment may not be instantaneous, but may occur 
gradually, meaning that there may be a time lag between the merger event and labour demand 
adjustment. Labour demand may also depend on lagged output and wages. Therefore it is 
customary to include lagged variables, also called initial variables: last year‟s variables are the 
most important predictors of current year variables. By including the lagged variables we 
                                                 
91Data on the post-merger employee layoffs are explained in detail in 8.3.2 section. 
216 
control for the full history of the right-hand size variables, so any new shock in the dependent 
variable comes from the takeover event.  
In equation (30) the main interest is the coefficient of the dummy variable 6 , which indicates 
the contemporaneous effect of mergers on labour demand. Where lagged dummies are used, 
the merger dummies indicate the effect of mergers on employment after one and two years 
respectively. To support the above hypotheses, we expect negative coefficients for these 
merger dummies.  
This estimation directly tests whether the changes in profitability are caused by the increased 
labour productivity and reduced labour demand. This can be linked to the basic discussion of 
the economic role of mergers in improving efficiency.    
To test hypotheses Q4-H4, Q4-H5, Q4-H6 and Q4-H7, the following model will be estimated:  
itiititititititit vfDpkliwww 651413211  (31) 
where itw  is the logarithm of wage rate per worker in firm i in time t, itiw is the logarithm of 
firm i average industry wage in time t, itl is the logarithm of employment, itk is the logarithm of 
capital per employee in firm i at time t, itp is the logarithm of profit per employee, itM is the 
post-merger dummy variable that takes 1 in all three post-merger years, tD is a dummy 
variable (as explained above), if  indicates time constant firm-specific unobservable variables, 
that will be removed after first differentiation using panel data. To investigate the long-run 
effect of mergers on labour demand up to three period lagged dummy variables will be 
included in the above equation.  
As a result of post-takeover operating performance rationalisation, elimination of duplicative 
activities and cost savings, mergers may cause efficiency improvement, which should be 
manifested in a performance improvement. As discussed above, the value creation theory of 
takeovers (synergy and management disciplining) postulates that mergers improve firm 
performance. Both the decline in labour demand and increase in labour productivity may lead 
to a higher level of profitability per employee. For example, Conyon et al. (2004) suggest that 
post-merger labour usage efficiency causes change in firm profitability (measured as the profit 
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per worker). In the models we include profitability per employee a measure of firm 
performance.   
As the change in wages may be conditional on the alternative wages, we include an industry 
average wage to the model. Wages may change due to changes in employee profitability. 
Therefore we include employee profitability as well as interaction of this variable with the 
merger dummy. Conyon et al. (2004) show that wage changes in merging firms are strongly 
associated with profitability changes. Vietorisz and Harrison (1973) discuss the positive 
feedback theory of the labour market, which postulates that high wages cause adoption of 
labour-saving innovations, that lead to high productivity and a further increase in wages. On 
the other hand, low wages cause the persistence of more labour-intensive techniques that lead 
to low labour productivity and wage stagnation. This contrasts with the negative feedback 
theory of labour markets, which predicts that high wages will lead to the adoption of capital 
intensive techniques, reducing labour demand and wages. Arai (2003) reports that wages are 
positively correlated with both profits and capital intensity after controlling for a number of 
other variables. Therefore we also control for capital intensity. Finally, the dummy variables 
indicate the contemporaneous effect of mergers (also classified as relatedness, hostility and 
employee layoffs) on wages. To analyse the long-term effect of mergers we also include 
lagged levels of the dummy variables.  
The above models are autoregressive lag models, which include the lagged level of the 
dependent variable (employment and wage) and therefore the error term may be correlated 
with the explanatory variables. The model includes the lagged dependent variable, because the 
employment and wage effect of mergers may not be instantaneous, but may follow a dynamic 
adjustment process. One of the main characteristics of the above autoregressive distributed lag 
models is that some or all explanatory variables may be correlated with the error term due to 
the presence of the lagged dependent variable and unobservable variables, which may affect 
both the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. Examples of unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity in this research context could be such variables as firm i management 
performance, its overall workforce quality or unique customer relations. Such unobservable 
variables are usually time-invariant and allow for heterogeneity in the dependent variables 
across observations. For example, the management quality unobserved variable is negatively 
correlated with other inputs in the above models and positively correlated with the output 
variable, since a high quality management will probably result in more efficient use of inputs 
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and achieve a higher level of output. Another reason for the correlation of explanatory 
variables with the error term is that the relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variable could be simultaneous: the output may explain the employment level but, 
at the same time, employment levels may explain output. The third reason is that there may be 
some measurement error in the variables used
92
.      
When explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance term OLS estimates are 
inconsistent. In this case pooled OLS is subject to the same omitted variable bias as OLS in 
the single cross-section. First differencing eliminates unobservable firm-specific fixed effects, 
but it introduces another problem: the first-differenced lagged dependent variable may be 
correlated with the differenced disturbance term. Therefore,  following Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991), we use Instrumental Variables estimation, using lagged 
levels and lagged differences of all explanatory variables as instruments. As our dataset 
includes more than three time periods, the efficiency of the estimates could be improved by 
using two or more periods lagged variables as instrumental variables. Thus, we use a systems 
GMM technique to estimate the above models, using both two and more periods lagged levels 
and lagged first differences of all available periods as instruments, as suggested by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000). Harris et al. (2005) use the systems GMM 
approach to analyse the effect of management buyouts on economic efficiency.  
All three variables in the model - employment, wage and output - are considered as 
endogenous variables, as they are determined in the system. Efficient firms with good labour 
organisation use lower levels of employment and achieve higher levels of sales. The previous 
literature indicates that wages are different even within industries: wages may be historically 
high in some firms. For example, Krueger and Summers (1988) report that unexplained wage 
                                                 
92 In addition to the above, there may be simultaneity in the model: the merger dummy may be correlated with the error term: 
prior performance of merging firms may determine the occurrence of a takeover event. McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) argue 
that plant productivity and ownership change positively correlated, whereas Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) argue that plant 
productivity and ownership change are negatively correlated. In addition to this, the merger event may itself negatively affect 
the employee work attitude and this may start to negatively affect performance. The pre-merger productivity measure and 
wage levels may also influence the probability of the merger event itself, and it is possible that the merger indicator itself may 
be endogenous. For example, the McGuckin and Nguyen (1995b) results indicate that plants with high productivity were the 
most likely to experience ownership change, Therefore previous research also uses estimated probabilities of merger events as 
an instrumental variable to proxy the merger dummy variable, estimated on the basis of a panel probit model. However, the 
results of using both merger dummy and probability of merger event are qualitatively the same. Because of data limitations, 
we use only the merger dummy variable.      
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differences exist among firms even within the same industries with similar financial 
indicators. Therefore we use lagged levels and lagged differences of these variables as 
instrumental variables, as suggested by the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(2000) systems GMM estimation methodology
93
. The one-step systems GMM estimation 
method uses two-year and earlier lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments for 
the endogenous variables. This estimation method corrects for simultaneity and allows us to 
control for firm-specific fixed effects by first differencing, and then it instruments the 
differenced variables with their own two or more period lagged levels and lagged differences. 
One of the main assumptions of using the instrumental variables estimation method is that 
there should be first order serial correlation between the error terms, but not second order 
serial correlation. These assumptions are tested using Arellano–Bond tests for the first AR(1) 
and second AR(2) order serial correlations in first differences. In addition, the validity of 
instrumental variables is tested using the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions
94
. We 
also control for changes in macro-economic factors by including time-dummies and for 
industry wide differences by including industry dummies
95
. 
8.3.2 Data 
This chapter uses the same sample and data as that described in Chapter 5. In addition to this 
we collected data from national newspapers on merger-related employee layoffs in order to 
more precisely measure the employment effect of mergers, following the methodology 
adopted by prior research (Hillier et al., 2007; Krishnan et al., 2007). In particular, we 
collected data on takeover related workforce layoffs undertaken during the two-year period 
after takeovers, as reported in the public media. To collect this data we screened all major 
national and regional newspapers, downloaded through Nexis
®
.  
                                                 
93 In addition to the one-step systems GMM, we also experiment with the two-step systems GMM estimation methods, 
because this method corrects for small sample bias. In this case the coefficients are smaller. However, Windmeijer (2005) 
argues that two-step systems GMM estimates can be invalid due to small sample biases. Therefore we base our discussions on 
the one-step systems GMM estimation results. In the latter case, the coefficients are smaller. 
94 The Sargan test usually over-rejects, when it is used with the heteroscadesticity robust option. Therefore we use the Hansen 
test.  
95 McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) suggest considering the merger dummy as an endogenous variable, as the profitability of 
firms may affect the occurrence of a merger. Therefore they estimate the probability of a merger event by a probit regression 
methodology using several explanatory variables. However, as we do not have enough data to calculate this probability, we 
treat the merger as an exogenous dummy.    
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To be considered as a layoff acquirer, an acquiring firm should lay off at least 1% of the 
combined workforce during the two-year period after the takeover completion date. If no 
layoffs are reported in the press, then we assume that none has occurred. Out of 235 sample 
acquirers 101 (43%) acquirers made merger-related employee layoffs, on average dismissing 
about 7.5% of the combined workforce. Using this data we classify acquiring firms into 
„layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ sub-samples. The mean number may be biased downwards, because 
companies may not disclose all layoffs or reported data in the newspapers may be incomplete. 
Alternatively, acquiring firms can be classified into „layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ firms, on the 
basis of merger-related layoff information, collected from newspapers, as in Krishnan et al. 
(2007) and Hillier et al. (2007). In this regard, we collect data from newspapers on merger-
related layoffs undertaken during the two-year period after takeovers, by screening all major 
national and regional newspapers, downloaded through Nexis®. We find a strong positive 
correlation between newspaper-reported layoffs and year-to-year workforce change, reported 
by Datastream (34%). However, the size of workforce reductions reported in the press is 
smaller than the Datastream reported size. One explanation could be the fact that managers are 
reluctant to publicise the true scale of workforce reductions, as this may affect the market 
value of their company. Both Krishnan et al. (2007) and Hillier et al. (2007) suggest that the 
measure of layoffs reported by the press is more precise than year-to-year changes in 
employment levels reported by databases as the latter may include the effect of divestments or 
asset disposals. However, although layoffs reported in the newspapers are more relevant, they 
do not give the full picture of workforce changes. All workforce reductions may not be 
reported in the newspapers or all announced layoffs may not actually materialize, providing a 
measurement bias, as suggested by Shah (2007).  
Appendix 5 explains the full procedure of data collection on post-merger employee layoffs. 
8.3.3 Description of the variables 
This chapter uses two employment-related variables. The first variable is the number of 
employees, which represents the average number of both full- and part-time employees during 
the accounting year, taking into consideration seasonal workers. The second variable is staff 
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cost, which represents wages paid to the employees and directors of the firms
96
. It includes 
wages and salaries, social security costs and other pension costs.  
For output we use total sales. Following Conyon et al. (2004), employee profitability is 
computed by dividing annual profits by the annual average number of employees
97
. As the 
measure of profit we use EBITDA. Capital intensity is computed as the ratio of net book value 
of fixed assets to the average annual number of employees. Similarly, average industry wage 
for each industry is computed on the basis of Datastream information. For this purpose, for 
each industry we compute the median performance, including all contemporaneously listed 
UK firms in the same industry, defined on the basis of Datastream Industrial Classification 
Level Four.   
For the control group we selected 470 matched firms (one for each acquired and acquiring 
firm). These firms were selected on the basis of the methodology proposed by Barber and 
Lyon (1996), matching on the basis of the same industry, size and pre-takeover performance 
measures. For each sample firm we selected a matching firm at the end of year t-1 on the basis 
of the following criteria: first, we filtered all firms in the same industry with the sample firm; 
second, we selected all firms within the 25% to 200% size interval of the sample firm‟s size, 
size being measured with total assets; third, we selected the non-acquiring firm with the 
closest EBITDA scaled total assets to those of the matching firm.  
To distinguish the difference in performance between acquiring and non-acquiring firms, the 
matched firms should not have undertaken any significant acquisition around the sample 
takeover event which is being investigated
98
. Therefore we selected only those matching firms 
which had neither been acquired nor had made any significant acquisitions during the two 
years before takeovers or the three years after takeovers. To construct the non-merging firms‟ 
                                                 
96 The most direct test of „the wealth transfer‟ hypotheses should be on the basis of the analysis of individual workers‟ wages 
in both target and acquiring firms, using employee – employer linked data. However, we do not have such a dataset and 
therefore we concentrate on aggregate wages at the firm level. 
97 Ideally productivity should be measured by Total Factor Productivity, which is defined as the ratio of total output to total 
input. However, we do not have data on total input, such as materials and cost of capital. Alternatively, productivity can be 
measured for each individual input: for example, labour productivity can be defined as the ratio of output to the number of 
employees. Thus, labour productivity could be measured using the ratio of value-added to number of employees, where value 
added could be measured as the difference between sales and material inputs. However, it is not always possible to collect an 
accurate measure of output and therefore sales are used instead. 
98 However, it is unclear whether the previous studies select non-acquiring firms as matching firms (Ghosh, 2001, Powell and 
Stark, 2005). 
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sample, we selected as matching firms only non-acquiring firms that had not been involved in 
any acquisitions during the five-year period from t-2 to t+3.  
Table 8.1 provides descriptive statistics for a number of variables, including mean and median, 
for merging and matching firms at the end of the last pre-takeover financial year. The 
descriptive statistics show that variables come from a non-normal distribution and are highly 
positively skewed. Therefore in the regression analysis we use log transformations of these 
variables. As the employment variable shows, acquiring firms are nearly 4 times larger than 
acquired firms
99
. 
Table 8.1 Employment, wage, sales, profit and fixed assets per worker at the end of t-1  
Acquiring 
firms
Matched 
acquiring 
firms
Acquired 
firms
Matched 
acquired 
firms
Number of employees Mean 13,088        9,214          3,313          2,088          
Median 2,975          2,661          770             706             
Annual wage per worker Mean 23.04          23.12          23.33          25.30          
Median 22.11          22.60          21.58          22.80          
Sales per worker Mean 133.85        145.82        147.05        153.30        
Median 97.86          94.00          94.89          94.00          
Profit per worker Mean 26.17          23.60          22.41          20.85          
Median 12.29          11.84          9.30            10.17          
Fixed assets per worker Mean 126.04        87.55          97.02          99.26          
Median 23.57          24.88          21.26          21.86          
Notes: All financial figures are in real terms (2003 currency) and in £‟000. Number of employees represents the number of 
both full- and part-time employees of the company. Profit is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA). Annual wage per worker is computed by dividing the employment cost by the number of employees. 
Employment cost represents wages paid to employees and officers of the company. 
 
8.3.4 Measuring changes in the variables 
To measure the changes in the above variables, we compute a pro-forma pre-takeover variable 
by combining the target and buyer firms. For example, pro-forma combined values of 
employment and sales are calculated by combining respective values for acquired and 
acquiring firms.  
                                                 
99 Other variables - sales, fixed assets and profits - also show that the acquired firms are 3-4 times smaller than the acquiring 
firms. 
223 
The average pre-takeover wage is calculated by dividing the combined staff costs of acquired 
and acquiring firms by their combined number of employees as follows:  
BtiTti
BtiTtipre
ti
NN
WW
W  (32) 
where pretiW  is pre-takeover pro-forma wage rate per employee, TtiW is i
th
 acquired firm‟s staff 
cost in year t; BtiW is i
th
 acquiring firm‟s staff cost in year t; TtiN is total number of workers 
employed by i
th
 acquired firm at the end of year t, BtiN  is total number of workers employed 
by i
th
 acquiring firm at the end of year t. 
Similarly, pro-forma pre-takeover values of other variables, such as profitability per employee 
and capital per employee are calculated in the same manner. Table 8.2 provides percentage 
changes in the employment, wages, output and employee profitability variables during the 
post-takeover years relative to the pre-takeover year (t-1). These percentage changes have 
been computed on the basis of the Brown and Medoff (1988) regression methodology, that 
includes both time and industry dummies. These results show that mergers reduce 
employment levels significantly during the merger year, but not during the post-takeover 
years. However, when the sample is split into layoff and non-layoff sub-samples, then the 
results show that layoff-making acquirers significantly reduce employment levels during all 
three post-takeover years, while non-layoff-making acquirers increase their employment levels 
relative to the pre-takeover period.  
These preliminary univariate results also show that mergers cause faster wage growth relative 
to non-merging firms: wages grow 7% faster in merging firms in comparison to non-merging 
firms during the three post-takeover years. Unrelated, friendly and layoff- involving mergers 
cause higher levels of wage growth in comparison to non-merging firms, whereas related, 
hostile and non-layoff mergers do not cause different wage growth.  
The results also show that in the full sample, output levels do not change during post-takeover 
years. However, after acquisitions that involve layoffs, output levels significantly decline 
every year during the three post-takeover years, while after acquisitions that do not involve 
layoffs, output levels increase every year during the three post-takeover years. These 
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preliminary results indicate that employment levels decline due to the decline in output levels, 
while employment growth is a function of the output growth. 
 
Table 8.2 Post-takeover changes in employment, wage, output and profit per worker  
Post-takeover years t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Panel A: Change in employment relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers - 0.123*** - 0.032* - 0.013 - 0.009
Related takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.041* - 0.007 0.027
Unrelated takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.025 - 0.05 - 0.078
Hostile takeovers - 0.153*** - 0.062* - 0.06 0.036
Friendly takeovers - 0.119*** - 0.026 - 0.006 - 0.013
Cash financed takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.056 - 0.027 0.024
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.026 - 0.012 - 0.026
Layoff involving takeovers - 0.181*** - 0.164*** - 0.176*** - 0.192***
Non-layoff involving takeovers - 0.069*** - 0.064*** - 0.099*** 0.135***
Panel B: Change in wage rate relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers - 0.006 - 0.012 0.019* 0.033**
Related takeovers - 0.01 0.002 0.014 0.032*
Unrelated takeovers - 0.005 0.033*** 0.031** 0.039**
Hostile takeovers - 0.027* 0.044** 0.029 0.047*
Friendly takeovers - 0.001 0.005 0.018 0.031**
Cash financed takeovers 0.031*** 0.001 0.008 0.028
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.018** 0.019* 0.025* 0.035**   
Layoff involving takeovers 0.008 0.037*** 0.030* 0.052***
Non-layoff involving takeovers - 0.015* - 0.006 0.011 0.016
Panel C: Change in output (sales) relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers - 0.098*** - 0.001 0.03 0.008
Related takeovers - 0.089*** 0.011 0.026 0.036
Unrelated takeovers - 0.128*** - 0.026 0.011 - 0.066
Hostile takeovers - 0.141*** 0.018 0.009 0.071
Friendly takeovers - 0.102*** 0.006 0.032 - 0.009
Layoff involving takeovers - 0.188*** - 0.115*** - 0.144*** - 0.133***
Non-layoff involving takeovers - 0.051*** 0.083*** 0.131*** 0.067*
Panel D: Change in employee profitability relative to the pre-takeover level (t-1)
All takeovers 0.064*** 0.080** 0.084** 0.065
Related takeovers 0.096*** 0.114*** 0.161*** 0.068
Unrelated takeovers - 0.015 0.009 - 0.017 0.067
Hostile takeovers 0.061* 0.039 0.073 0.137*
Friendly takeovers 0.062** 0.083** 0.084* 0.058
Layoff involving takeovers 0.092*** 0.128*** 0.124** 0.161***
Non-layoff involving takeovers 0.048* 0.036 0.067 0.012  
Notes: The percentage mean change in the employment, wages, output and employee profitability variables have been 
computed using the Brown and Medoff (1988) regression methodology. The estimates are obtained using OLS regression. 
The omitted group is the control group of non-merging firms. The regressions include year and industry dummies. The table 
reports only the coefficients of the relevant dummy variables. 
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Finally, analysis of employee profitability indicates that mergers cause 13% faster growth in 
comparison to non-merging firms, which is significant at the 10% significance level. In this 
process, related mergers cause a 21% improvement in employee profitability relative to the 
pre-takeover levels, controlling for changes in the non-merging control firms. The employee 
profitability change after hostile takeovers is also 21%, which is significant at the 10% 
significance level only. In contrast to this, employee profitability changes in layoff and non-
layoff sub-samples are not different from those in the non-merging firms.  
 
8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Short-run impact of mergers on labour demand  
As the descriptive statistics given in Table 8.2 show, mergers do not cause significant changes 
in employment levels during the post-takeover years. However, as a result of materialising 
synergies or instituting better labour management during the post-merger period, labour 
productivity may change in a positive direction. For example, after some mergers output may 
increase much faster than employment growth or, alternatively, job cuts may happen much 
faster than output decline. This disproportionate change in output and labour input may 
subsequently cause change in labour productivity during the post-takeover years.   
To empirically investigate this relationship, we estimate equation (30). Table 8.3 reports the 
results of the estimation using all four dummy variables. The estimates of control variables – 
lagged employment, wages and sales – are consistent with the predictions of the dynamic 
labour theory. The current year employment levels should be positively related to the previous 
year employment levels, as confirmed by positive and significant coefficients of the lagged 
level employment, which indicates the existence of inertia in the employment levels. Next, 
according to the dynamic theory of labour, the direction of the change in the employment 
levels should be inversely related to the employment cost, meaning that the higher the required 
compensation for labour, the lower the use of labour. Consistent with this, the wage variable 
coefficient is negative and significant. The next control variable - output - is positively related 
to the employment levels: increasing output levels require higher levels of labour input. 
Turning to the estimates of the main variables of interest, dummy variables, the negative 
coefficients of merger dummies indicate that acquiring firms reduce their labour demand in 
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comparison to non-acquiring firms, depending on output and wages. The merger dummy 
variable indicates that the immediate effect of mergers on employment is to reduce the 
demand for labour by about 8.5% during the event year in merging firms in comparison to 
other non-merging firms. Although these results are consistent with the previous research 
findings, the size of the derived decline in labour demand is smaller: both Conyon et al. 
(2002a) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) report that UK public takeovers reduce labour 
demand by about 12% during the merger year.  
Table 8.3 Short-run labour demand effect of mergers 
Dependent variable: Employment
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Employment (t-1) 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.843*** 0.678***  
Wages (t) - 0.273** - 0.270** - 0.071 - 0.273**   
Wages (t-1) 0.166* 0.164* - 0.002 0.167*    
Output (t) 0.774*** 0.774*** 0.517*** 0.772***  
Output (t-1) - 0.417*** - 0.418*** - 0.371*** - 0.416***  
Merger (t) - 0.085***                 
Related (t) - 0.098***                 
Unrelated (t) - 0.068*                 
Hostile (t) - 0.081*                 
Friendly (t) - 0.082***                 
Layoff (t) - 0.113**   
Non-layoff (t) - 0.065**   
Interaction of Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant - 1.483*** - 1.483*** - 0.288 - 1.480***  
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.86 0.88 0.98 0.87
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test p-value 0.33 0.21 0.65 0.40
No. of observations 4127 4127 4127 4127
No. of firms 705 705 705 705
Notes: The dependent variable is employment. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the 
definitions of the variables. 
 
Due to the existence of synergy and cost savings opportunities arising as a result of related 
mergers, these mergers should reduce labour demand more than unrelated mergers. Consistent 
with this prediction, the results indicate that the decline in labour demand is higher in related 
acquisitions (9.8%) than in unrelated acquisitions (6.8%). Conyon et al. (2002a) and Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2004) show that related mergers reduce employment by more than unrelated 
mergers. However, Amess et al. (2008) report that the magnitude of the labour demand 
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reduction is the same for both related and unrelated mergers: related mergers reduce 
employment by 15.8% and unrelated merger reduce employment by 15.5%.  
Hostile takeovers may also result in a larger decrease in labour demand, because management 
disciplining may lead to efficiency improvement in labour usage. However, the results indicate 
that the magnitude of the labour demand reduction in hostile and friendly acquisitions is 
almost the same: hostile takeovers cause an 8.2% drop in labour usage in comparison to non-
merging control firms, while friendly mergers cause an 8.1% drop in labour demand. This 
could be due to the small number of hostile takeovers in the sample.      
Finally, we investigate whether there is a differential effect on labour demand of the 
acquisitions that involve employee layoffs and acquisitions that do not involve employee 
layoffs. Empirical evidence on this issue is important in understanding the reasons for 
employee layoffs: whether managers cut employment costs to cover takeover premiums or to 
eliminate duplicative activities that arise due to business combinations. As the results show, 
the employee layoff-involving acquisitions reduce labour demand by nearly twice (11.3%) as 
much as those acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs (6.5%). 
8.4.2 The long-run labour demand impact of mergers 
Consistent with the dynamic labour demand theory, labour demand adjustments may take up 
to several years to materialise. As reported in Table 8.4, the results show that mergers reduce 
labour demand by 8.7% two years after mergers. However, the long-run coefficients of related 
versus unrelated and hostile versus friendly dummy variables are insignificant, although in 
some cases they are negative and very large. In contrast to this, layoff-involving acquisitions 
continue to adjust their employment levels in the long run by reducing labour demand by 
another 17.8% after two years following acquisitions, while the non-layoff sub-sample 
mergers‟ long-run employment effect is insignificant. 
These results are consistent with prior research. For example, the results of Conyon et al. 
(2004)  show that mergers reduce labour demand by about 2% during the second year after 
mergers. Conyon et al. (2002a) report that related mergers reduce derived labour demand 
every year by 6.8% for two years after mergers, while the effect of unrelated mergers is 
insignificant. 
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Table 8.4 Long-run labour demand effect of mergers 
Dependent variable: Employment
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Employment (t-1) 0.854*** 0.861*** 0.854*** 0.855***  
Wages (t) - 0.060 - 0.053 - 0.066 - 0.040
Wages (t-1) 0.010 - 0.009 0.010 - 0.009
Output (t) 0.467*** 0.463*** 0.455*** 0.463***  
Output (t-1) - 0.325*** - 0.330*** - 0.312*** - 0.328***  
Merger (t) - 0.099***                 
Merger (t-1) 0.008                 
Merger (t-2) - 0.087***                 
Related (t) - 0.116***                 
Related (t-1) 0.006                 
Related (t-2) - 0.02                 
Unrelated (t) - 0.072*                 
Unrelated (t-1) 0.015                 
Unrelated (t-2) - 0.174                 
Hostile (t) - 0.106**                 
Hostile (t-1) 0.145                 
Hostile (t-2) - 0.017                 
Friendly (t) - 0.100***                 
Friedly (t-1) - 0.035                 
Friendly (t-2) - 0.110                 
Layoff (t) - 0.134***  
Layoff (t-1) - 0.057
Layoff (t-2) - 0.178*    
Non-layoff (t) - 0.061**   
Non-layoff (t-1) 0.070
Non-layoff (t-2) 0.005
Interaction of Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant - 0.373 - 0.315 - 0.398 - 0.322
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.39
Sargan test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test p-value 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.89
No. of observations 3469 3469 3469 3469
No. of firms 705 705 705 705
Notes: The dependent variable is employment. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the 
definitions of the variables. 
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8.4.3 Labour demand effect of mergers by firm size 
Previous research shows that there is significant variation in the firm performance effect of 
mergers depending on firm size: the effect of mergers is less pronounced in large firms than in 
small firms (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001; Conyon et al., 2002a). 
To analyse the role of the size factor in the labour demand effect of mergers, we divide the 
overall sample into two sub-groups according to the firm size distribution: large firm and 
small firm sub-groups. We use median employment to divide the sample into two sub-
samples. Table 8.5 reports the results of estimating the equation (30) separately for the two 
firm size sub-samples to investigate the short-run employment effect of mergers. Consistent 
with the Conyon et al. (2002a) findings, the results show that smaller firms derive higher 
levels of efficiency improvement in labour usage than large firms. In the large firms sub-
sample the merger dummy coefficient is not significant, while in the small firms sub-sample 
the results indicate that mergers reduce labour demand by 12.6%. Thus mergers lead to a 
higher level of efficiency improvement in small firms than in larger firms.  
The same picture emerges with related and unrelated acquisitions – the effect of mergers on 
labour demand is stronger in small firms than in large firms. In this case only related 
acquisitions cause lower labour demand. The size distribution effect is insignificant in the case 
of hostile takeovers, possibly due to the small number of hostile takeovers in the sample. The 
size distribution of friendly takeovers also indicates a differential effect of mergers, which is 
consistent with the general picture described above.  
When mergers are classified into layoff and non-layoff acquisitions, both the layoff and non-
layoff dummies indicate that small firms reduce labour demand during the merger year, but 
not in the long run. Small acquisitions involving employee layoffs reduce labour demand three 
times more than large acquisitions involving employee layoffs. In comparison to this the effect 
of non-layoff acquisitions is approximately the same for the two size distributions and neither 
small nor large acquirers adjust labour usage in the long run. 
In sum, the reported results of mergers‟ effect on labour demand are similar to those presented 
by Conyon et al. (2002a), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) and Amess et al. (2008), although the 
size of the employment decline is different. This could be due to the difference in sample or 
the use of different estimation methods in different samples. For example, Conyon et al. 
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(2002a) use Generalized Instrumental Variable Estimation after first differencing (GIVE), 
while Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) use the one step difference GMM. The contemporaneous 
effect of mergers indicates that there is synergy between the operations of merging firms. The 
long-run labour demand reductions indicate that it takes some time to materialize merger-
related synergy. 
Table 8.5 Short-run labour demand effect by firm size distribution  
Dependent variable: Employment
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 model7 model8
Employment (t-1) 0.971*** 0.971*** 0.974*** 0.982***  0.820*** 0.823*** 0.821*** 0.821***  
Wages (t) - 0.703*** - 0.702*** - 0.699*** - 0.680***  - 0.063 - 0.067 - 0.061 - 0.063
Wages (t-1) 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.660*** 0.652***  0.060 0.063 0.059 0.061
Output (t) 0.911*** 0.912*** 0.903*** 0.886***  0.421*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.410***  
Output (t-1) - 0.882*** - 0.883*** - 0.877*** - 0.867***  - 0.283** - 0.286** - 0.283** - 0.273**   
Merger (t) - 0.017                 - 0.126***                 
Related (t) - 0.017                 - 0.174***                 
Unrelated (t) - 0.017                 - 0.038                 
Hostile (t) - 0.019                 -0.108                 
Friendly (t) - 0.018                 -0.129***                 
Layoff (t) -0.025 - 0.183**   
Non-layoff (t) -0.015 - 0.103**   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant - 0.009 - 0.01 - 0.007 - 0.01 - 0.465 - 0.447 - 0.458 - 0.469
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.87
Sargan test p-value 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen test p-value 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.35
No. of observations 2065 2065 2065 2065 2062 2062 2062 2062
No. of firms 353 353 353 353 352 352 352 352
Large firms (upper half) Small firms (lower half)
Notes: The dependent variable is employment. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the 
definitions of the variables. 
8.4.4 Wage effects of mergers 
We analysed two possible sources of wage change after mergers: mergers‟ ceteris paribus 
effect on wages due to changes in the wage formation process and the possibility of wage 
increase due to improvement in employee profitability, as suggested by Conyon et al. (2004). 
First, mergers may immediately alter the wage formation process by introducing structural 
changes in rent sharing among different stakeholders. The underlying source of this immediate 
impact of mergers could also be the fact that mergers may induce immediate efficiency 
improvement in labour usage, resulting from elimination of duplicative activities. This effect 
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of mergers is confirmed by the labour demand analysis (discussed above): in the short run 
mergers significantly reduce labour demand.  
The second source of wage change depends on the long-term profitability change in merging 
firms, resulting from long-run organisational restructuring and operating performance 
rationalisations. The Conyon et al. (2004) results show that mergers improve employee 
profitability. As a result of improved profitability, employees should be able to increase their 
share in the enhanced profit. If mergers cause profit enhancement that only benefit 
shareholders, leaving the employee share unchanged, then this supports one form of Shleifer 
and Summers‟ (1988) „breach of trust‟ argument: employees work harder after mergers, but 
receive the same wages as before mergers. We test the contemporaneous effect of mergers and 
improved employee profitability on wages by estimating equation (31), which includes both 
employee profitability and merger dummies. The results are given in Table 8.6.  
The lagged dependent variable – wage is positive and highly significant. As expected, wage 
growth is strongly positively associated with average industry wage growth. Similarly, 
employee profitability is positively associated with the wage change: the higher the employee 
profitability, the higher the increase in wages. However, the effect of the second source of 
mergers is not clear: there is no evidence indicating that wages grow faster in merging firms 
due to increased profit per employee, as indicated by the insignificant interaction of the 
profitability variable with the post-merger dummy. Although the interaction term between 
profitability and merger dummy is positive, it is not significant. 
The results indicate the clear impact of mergers on wage formation through structural changes: 
mergers on average increase wages by 4.9% two years after mergers and 9.8% three years 
after mergers, when they are considered as homogenous. However, when year and industry 
dummies are included these coefficients become insignificant. Both relatedness and hostility 
dummy variables indicate that there is no significant difference in wage growth. Wage growth 
is higher in „non-layoff‟ sub-sample acquisitions than in „layoff‟ sub-sample acquisitions. This 
could be explained by the fact that layoff sub-sample firms are underperforming firms and 
therefore wage growth is lower than the wage growth in „non-layoff‟ sub-sample firms, which 
are assumed to be highly profitable both before and after acquisitions. 
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Table 8.6 Wage effects of mergers  
Deapendent variable: Wage
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 model7 model8
Wage (t-1) 0.490** 0.832*** 0.793*** 0.796***  0.481** 0.824*** 0.780*** 0.785***  
Industry average wage (t) 0.380* 0.145* 0.150** 0.157**   0.525** 0.214** 0.229*** 0.246***  
Employment (t-1) - 0.021** - 0.009* 0.008 0.005 - 0.018** - 0.007 0.035 0.033
Capital per employee (t-1) - 0.020** - 0.017*** - 0.022** - 0.020***  - 0.003 - 0.012 - 0.020* - 0.015
Profit per employee (t) 0.094*** 0.052*** 0.066*** 0.061***  0.095*** 0.055*** 0.078*** 0.073***  
Merger (t-1) 0.036                 0.023                 
Merger (t-2) 0.049*                 0.023                 
Merger (t-3) 0.098**                 0.083                 
Related (t-1) - 0.224                 - 0.253                 
Related (t-2) 0.001                 - 0.026                 
Related (t-3) - 0.003                 - 0.026                 
Unrelated (t-1) 0.368                 0.379                 
Unrelated (t-2) 0.060                 0.026                 
Unrelated (t-3) 0.128                 0.079                 
Merger (t-1) 0.047                 0.006                 
Merger (t-2) 0.194                 0.311                 
Merger (t-3) - 0.028                 - 0.072                 
Friendly (t-1) 0.018                 0.008                 
Friendly (t-2) - 0.019                 - 0.081                 
Friendly (t-3) 0.086                 0.076                 
Layoff (t-1) - 0.082 - 0.110
Layoff (t-2) 0.024 - 0.015
Layoff (t-3) - 0.043 - 0.070
Non-layoff (t-1) 0.129*    0.115*
Non-layoff (t-2) 0.059 0.046
Non-layoff (t-3) 0.138**   0.112*    
Interaction of Year and Industry dum. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.396 0.083 0.036 0.031 - 0.029 0.015 - 0.448 - 0.451
ar1p 0.000 0.037 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.030 0.006 0.006
ar2p 0.685 0.994 0.292 0.895 0.641 0.953 0.423 0.939
sarganp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
hansenp 0.092 0.212 0.300 0.271 0.074 0.451 0.539 0.631
N 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485
N_g 695 695 695 695 695 695 695 695
Notes: The dependent variable is wage. The estimation method is the one step SYSTEM GMM, using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 2 provides the definitions of the 
variables. 
8.5 Conclusions 
The value-creation theory suggests that most takeovers are motivated by the desire to gain 
synergies resulting from the combination of two businesses, or to discipline underperforming 
management. According to this theory, mergers should reduce the derived labour demand, 
controlling for wages and output. Also employee profitability should be improved, enabling 
employees to earn higher salaries after mergers. Decline in labour demand should be greater in 
acquisitions that involve layoffs than in acquisitions that do not. 
The results of this analysis show that mergers significantly reduce the derived labour demand 
during the merger year. In the merger year merging firms experience 8.5% decline in labour 
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demand. Furthermore, the results reveal that mergers cause long-run adjustment in the use of 
labour input: mergers reduce labour demand by another 8.7% two years after completion of 
such transactions. The difference between the performance of  related versus unrelated 
mergers indicates the existence of a wider scope for synergy in the former: during the merger 
year decrease in labour demand is larger in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions, 
while in the long run neither related nor unrelated acquisitions change labour demand. 
However, both hostile and friendly mergers lead to approximately the same size of labour 
demand reduction in both the short and the long run. Thus we conclude that merger-related 
synergy is one of the main sources of decline in labour demand. 
One of the main contributions of this chapter is that it provides further evidence showing that 
employee layoffs are motivated by merger-related efficiency improvements in labour usage. 
The results show that the derived decline in labour demand is greater in „layoff‟ acquisitions 
than in „non-layoff‟ acquisitions: short-run decline in labour demand is greater in the former 
case than in the latter, while in the long run only „layoff‟ acquisitions cause lower labour 
demand, while „non-layoff‟ acquisitions do not change labour demand. Overall, these results 
indicate that layoffs were undertaken at least to arrest further deterioration in firm 
performance. 
Furthermore, the results show that mergers accelerate wage growth: wage growth in merging 
firms is higher by 5% two years after the merger completion year and 10% three years after 
the merger completion year. Neither the relatedness nor the hostility classification reveals any 
difference in wage growth, but classification of mergers into „layoff‟ and „non-layoff‟ sub-
samples reveals a significant difference between the wage growths in these two sub-samples. 
„Non-layoff‟ acquirers‟ wage growth is significantly higher than the wage growth in non-
merging firms, while „layoff‟ acquirers‟ wage growth is not different from the wage growth in 
non-merging firms. This confirms the view that employee layoffs are undertaken in firms with 
financial and operational difficulties. 
Overall, the results of this chapter do not show a significant adverse effect of mergers on 
employees, taking into consideration both long-run employment and wage growth after 
mergers. The absolute number of employees does not fall, but acquiring firms achieve 
efficiency in labour usage. At the same time, mergers benefit employees by accelerating their 
wage growth. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction  
This thesis has investigated the effects of takeovers on labour: what factors prompt post-
merger workforce adjustments and whether labour suffers from takeovers. The results of this 
thesis contribute to advancing our understanding of whether post-merger labour management 
decisions are influenced by market mechanisms of corporate governance or whether they are 
made for efficiency enhancement purposes, balancing the interests of shareholders and 
workers.   
The shareholder-value oriented corporate governance system is concerned with protecting 
dispersed and „weak‟ shareholders from „entrenched‟ managers. Within this system 
management disciplining is undertaken by means of market mechanisms, primarily through 
the „exit‟ strategy, which may lead to replacement of poorly performing management. 
However, critics of this governance model argue that it favours shareholders‟ interests over 
those of other stakeholders and excessively pressurise managers to adopt those strategies that 
create short-term shareholder returns.  
One of the main corporate governance mechanisms – corporate takeovers – performs a vital 
external disciplining function, by appropriately punishing managers who do not act in the best 
interests of shareholders. However, at the same time, it is suggested that this governance 
mechanism enables shareholders to gain power vis-à-vis employees and to press managers to 
create shareholder value at the expense of workers. Specifically, the MCC may facilitate 
wealth transfer from employees to shareholders. If this claim is true, then several types of 
inefficiencies would arise: (1) ex-ante employees may be discouraged from making long-term 
firm-specific investments and entering into implicit contracts with shareholders, because 
employees expect that they will be dismissed by new owners; (2) ex-post dismissed 
employees‟ firm-specific investments may be wasted, as they may not be able to use them in 
other work contexts. Furthermore, a strong MCC may encourage managers to favour those 
projects that bring short-term returns for shareholders, rejecting those projects that may be 
vital for the businesses‟ long-term sustainability. In this regard, within the current corporate 
governance debate a key question is how managers behave under the pressure of the MCC 
transactions, occasionally observed in LMEs (Pendleton, 2009).  
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Therefore a better understanding of the effects of takeovers on labour would make an 
important contribution to the knowledge on governance systems in LMEs. The extant 
empirical evidence on this issue is mixed: some commentators argue that takeovers are a 
wealth re-distributive exercise (Shleifer and Summers, 1988), while other commentators argue 
that takeovers promote efficiency enhancement in labour utilisation (Conyon et al., 2002a). To 
contribute to this debate four empirical chapters of this thesis have investigated causes and 
consequences of merger-related workforce adjustments. The first empirical chapter has 
explored the factors underlying post-merger employee layoffs (general management 
perspective). The second empirical chapter has examined decline in post-merger operating 
performance as a factor leading to workforce adjustments, and the performance consequences 
of such workforce adjustments (accounting perspective). The third empirical chapter has 
investigated „breach of trust‟ as a main reason for employee layoffs and has analysed the 
association between post-merger shareholder wealth change and employee wealth concessions 
(finance perspective). The fourth empirical chapter has examined the decline in labour demand 
as a main factor leading to post-merger employee layoffs (industrial economics perspective). It 
also analyses wage growth after mergers. The unifying theme for all of these four chapters is 
the effect of restructuring for shareholder value on labour.  
9.2 Summary of findings and contributions 
9.2.1 Causes of post-takeover workforce adjustments 
Prior research suggests several reasons for post-takeover workforce reductions. While some 
authors argue that managers undertake workforce reductions to improve labour efficiency and 
to derive operating synergy (Conyon et al., 2002a), other authors argue that managers 
undertake workforce reductions to cover high premiums paid to target firm shareholders, that 
may negatively affect operating performance (Krishnan et al., 2007). On the basis of this, 
chapter 5 has considered the role of four factors in explaining post-takeover workforce 
adjustments – the need for performance improvement, the need to discipline inefficient 
management, the requirement to synergy realisation and the need to cover high premiums paid 
for targets.  
Univariate analysis of merging firms‟ pre-takeover performance shows that employee layoffs 
are undertaken in under-performing firms: the WFR sub-sample targets‟ performance 
deteriorates immediately before takeovers, whereas the WFG sub-sample targets outperform 
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their matched firms during that period. Furthermore, regressions show that acquired firms‟ 
prior performance explains both post-takeover workforce reductions and workforce growth, 
while acquirers‟ prior performance only explains workforce growth. In the WFR sub-sample, 
acquired firm performance is inversely associated with greater workforce reductions, meaning 
that low performance leads to workforce reductions. In contrast, in the WFG sub-sample, 
acquired firm performance is positively associated with faster workforce growth. Regressions 
also show that acquirers‟ pre-takeover performance only explains workforce growth.  
Although the coefficients for hostile takeover dummies are negative, they are not significant. 
This means that after controlling for pre-takeover performance and other factors, hostility in 
acquisitions does not explain post-merger employee layoffs. The full sample results indicate 
that related acquisitions cause greater workforce change than unrelated acquisitions. 
However, in contrast to prior evidence, the results show that higher premiums are associated 
with smaller workforce reductions. This association implies that acquirers do not pay high 
premiums for targets that may subsequently require major corporate restructuring, which may 
involve workforce downsizing. Instead, high premiums are associated with slower workforce 
growth. This claim is supported by the evidence of a negative association between high 
premiums and workforce growth. Therefore it can be concluded that acquirers pay high 
premiums for the businesses that generate higher levels of synergy, which may require lower 
levels of labour input during post-takeover years. The finding that low, not high, premiums are 
associated with large workforce reductions does not support the notion that managers favour 
shareholders‟ interests over those of labour. In other words, high premiums do not induce 
excessive employee layoffs. Altogether, these results suggest that managers undertake 
employee layoffs when there is a need for efficiency improvement, not to create shareholder 
value at the expense of labour.  
The findings discussed above contribute to the literature by clarifying the underlying factors in 
post-takeover workforce adjustments. It can be concluded on the basis of these findings that 
the optimal employment levels are determined taking into consideration the pre-takeover 
performance of acquired firms: the lower the acquired firms‟ performance, the greater the 
reduction in the workforce; the higher the performance of the acquired firm, the higher the 
workforce growth post-merger. Thus workforce reductions are made in underperforming 
acquired firms. Synergy (relatedness) leads to greater workforce adjustments, but also slower 
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workforce growth. The results do not support the view that high premiums lead to excessive 
job losses. In contrast, workforce growth is slower after acquisitions involving high premiums. 
In sum, these results imply that managers undertake post-takeover employee layoffs to 
promote the success for their companies and not to create shareholder value or to cover high 
premiums at the expense of labour. 
9.2.2 Cause and effect relationship between post-takeover operating performance 
change and workforce adjustment 
Chapter 6 has explored the role of post-takeover performance decline in explaining workforce 
adjustments and the operating performance consequences of such workforce adjustments. It is 
well documented that acquisitions may negatively affect firm performance. However, the 
association between performance decline and workforce reductions has not been well 
researched. Regarding the performance consequences of such workforce reductions, there are 
two contradicting hypotheses: (1) layoffs at least arrest further performance deterioration 
(Chen et al., 2001, Hillier et al., 2007); (2) merger-related employee layoffs destroy human 
resources in acquired firms and lead to organisational performance decline (Krishnan et al., 
2007). Such outcomes of workforce reductions could be linked to the motives of corporate 
downsizing within the mergers and acquisitions context: if employee layoffs are undertaken to 
cover high premiums through labour cost cuts, then we would expect the consequences of 
such layoffs to be negative; alternatively, if employee layoffs are undertaken to stop further 
performance deterioration or to materialise operational synergy, then we would expect the 
performance consequences of such layoffs to be positive. 
The univariate analysis indicates that the performance of the WFR sub-sample firms declines 
significantly relative to pre-takeover levels during the first two post-takeover years, while the 
performance of the WFG sub-sample firms does not change relative to pre-takeover levels 
during these years. This decline in performance, together with low pre-takeover operating 
performance of acquired firms, necessitates cost cuts. The univariate analysis also reveals that 
in the third post-takeover year performance decline is more severe in the WFG sub-sample, 
while in the WFR sub-sample performance does not differ significantly from the pre-takeover 
level.   
First we investigate whether post-takeover decline in operating performance leads to 
workforce reductions. The regressions show that performance decline has significant power in 
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explaining workforce reductions: performance change is positively associated with workforce 
change. This implies that if performance declines post-merger, then acquirers undertake 
workforce reductions.  
Next we explore whether post-takeover workforce adjustments alter operating performance. 
The results show that there is an inverse relationship between workforce growth and operating 
performance growth. The full sample results show that there is an inverse relationship between 
workforce adjustments and performance change. In particular, the inverse relationship 
between workforce growth and performance change in the WFG sub-sample implies that 
higher workforce growth leads to more negative performance change. In contrast, the positive 
relationship between workforce reduction and performance change in the WFR sub-sample 
implies that greater workforce reduction leads to more positive performance change. On the 
basis of this, we conclude that post-takeover workforce reductions at least arrest further 
performance deterioration. These results do not support the conclusions of the prior research 
which argue that mergers destroy human capital in acquired firms.  
Thus in the mergers and acquisitions context, the results are consistent with the conclusions of 
the general research on employee layoffs: workforce reductions positively contribute to 
performance change. This contradicts prior research results which suggest that merger-related 
employee layoffs destroy human capital in acquired firms and negatively affect firm 
performance. 
A key finding of this chapter is that post-merger performance decline may induce workforce 
reductions. Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the literature by clarifying the long-run 
operating performance consequences of post-takeover workforce adjustments. In this regard, 
another key finding of this chapter is that workforce change is inversely related to operating 
performance change: workforce reductions cause more positive performance change, while 
accelerated workforce growth causes more negative performance change. Thus merger-related 
workforce reductions positively affect firm performance by arresting further performance 
deterioration. This contradicts the theory that mergers destroy human capital in acquired firms.  
9.2.3 Shareholders and employees: rent transfer or rent sharing in corporate takeovers 
As discussed above, one of the key questions in contemporary corporate governance is 
concerned with the issue of how takeover events affect managerial behaviour: to what extent 
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these events push managers to create shareholder value at the expense of labour (Pendleton, 
2009). The „shareholder primacy‟ view suggests that under market pressure managers put 
shareholders‟ interests above labour‟s interests. In takeover cases managers may pay high 
premiums to target firm shareholders, expecting to recover this with some of the quasi-rents 
being paid to target employees. According to the value-redistribution theory, takeovers 
facilitate rent transfer from employees to shareholders, by causing the breach of implicit 
contracts between them. Specifically, Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) argue that a considerable part of takeover announcement shareholder gains come at the 
expense of employees, especially in hostile takeovers. According to this theory, post-takeover 
workforce and wage changes should depend on target shareholders‟ takeover announcement 
gains. In other words, post-takeover workforce and wage changes are predicted to be an 
inverse function of the shareholder gains at takeover announcement. On the other hand, 
corporate laws require managers to promote the success of the company (Deakin, 2005; 
Pendleton, 2009) and managers should undertake takeovers to promote the success of their 
companies. This complies with the value-creation theory of takeovers, according to which 
takeovers benefit both shareholders and employees through operational synergy or by 
disciplining inefficient management. In this case post-takeover workforce and wage growth 
should depend on the success of mergers, measured by the long-run abnormal returns of 
acquiring firms. 
Chapter 7 has examined the role of these two competing theories in explaining post-takeover 
employee wealth concessions. The results show that the CARs in the WFR sub-sample are 
smaller than the CARs in the WFG sub-sample, which contradicts the predictions of the rent 
transfer hypothesis. In particular, acquiring firm shareholders in the WFR sub-group earn 
significantly negative abnormal returns, while in the WFG sub-group acquiring firm 
shareholders‟ wealth does not change much. This suggests that the market can distinguish the 
acquisitions of bad targets, which may involve employee layoffs, from the acquisitions of 
good businesses with growth opportunities.  
To further test the value-redistribution theory we regress target firm shareholders‟ short-run 
abnormal returns and premiums on post-takeover employment and wage changes, controlling 
for other relevant variables. The results do not show that shareholder gains in the form of 
CARs and premiums cause subsequent wage cuts and employment reductions. Instead, a high 
premium is associated with faster pay rises and employment growth. However, the results also 
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show some evidence supporting the wealth transfer hypothesis: in cash acquisitions high 
CARs are associated with lower wage growth, while in hostile takeovers a high premium is 
associated with lower wage growth. At the same time, in related acquisitions a high premium 
leads to slower employment growth.     
Thus, the results show that around takeover announcement the workforce-reducing sub-sample 
shareholders earn lower abnormal returns than the workforce growth sub-sample shareholders. 
This contradicts the predictions of the value-redistribution theory. Furthermore, the 
regressions show a positive association between target firm shareholders‟ abnormal returns 
and workforce growth, while the premium is also positively associated with wage growth. 
Only in cash-financed acquisitions higher abnormal returns are associated with lower wage 
growth, while in hostile takeovers a higher premium is associated with lower wage growth. 
Similarly, in the long run the workforce-reducing sub-sample acquirers earn significant 
negative abnormal returns, while the workforce growth sub-sample acquirers‟ performance 
does not differ from non-merging firms‟ performance. The WFG sub-sample acquirers long-
run share price performance does not differ from the non-merging firms‟ performance. In 
contrast, the WFR sub-sample acquirers significantly underperform their non-merging 
counterparts. Furthermore, the regressions show that there is a significant positive association 
between acquirers‟ long-run abnormal returns and both post-takeover workforce and wage 
changes.  
Overall, the results show that takeovers do not necessarily involve rent transfer from workers 
to shareholders, as post-takeover labour wealth concessions do not depend on short-run 
takeover announcement shareholder abnormal returns. Instead, post-takeover labour welfare 
depends on the long-run performance of acquiring firms, suggesting that managers balance the 
interests of both shareholders and employees. Thus we conclude that post-takeover employee 
wealth concessions do not depend on rent-expropriating behaviour on the part of owners, but 
on value created by takeovers: if shareholders gain from takeovers, then employees also 
benefit from such transactions; if shareholders lose from takeovers, then employees also suffer 
from them. This implies that managers are not passive victims of corporate governance 
practices, but make corporate decisions balancing the interests of shareholders with the 
interests of other stakeholders, including employees. Therefore using different research 
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approaches, we come to the same conclusions as Conyon et al. (2002a), who argue that the 
view that takeovers facilitate wealth transfer is a partial one.  
9.2.4  Labour demand and wage effects of takeovers that involve employee layoffs 
Recent research suggests that mergers reduce labour demand, which means that merged firms 
may produce a combined output with less labour as a result of better labour management or 
synergy realisation. This decline in labour demand may cause merger-related employee 
layoffs. If this is the case, then labour demand decline should be greater in layoff-involving 
acquisitions than in acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. Similarly, the wage 
effect of layoff-involving mergers may be different from the wage effect of acquisitions that 
do not involve employee layoffs. Chapter 8 has empirically examined this issue. 
In this chapter we follow the research methodology applied in the prior research, which 
estimates the dynamic labour demand effect of takeovers, controlling for initial conditions of 
employment, wage and output (Conyon et al., 2002a). As the labour demand effect of 
takeovers may follow a process of gradual adjustment, the econometric model includes a 
lagged dependent variable, which is correlated with the error term. Furthermore, due to 
unobservable variables, some important factors may be omitted. As these omitted variables 
may be correlated with explanatory variables, there may be some endogeneity problem in the 
model. To control for the endogeneity issue, we apply the panel data based GMM estimation 
method (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 2000).  
The results show that in the short run (during the merger event year) mergers significantly 
reduce the derived labour demand. In the merger year merged firms‟ labour demand declines 
by 8.5%. Related acquisitions lead to greater decline in labour demand (9.8%) than unrelated 
acquisitions do (6.8%), while both hostile and friendly mergers lead to approximately the 
same size of labour demand reduction (8%). The difference between the performances of the 
related versus unrelated mergers indicates the existence of synergy.  
Recent research shows that one of the main reasons for employee layoffs is the decrease in 
labour demand. To test this argument we examine whether the decrease in labour demand is 
greater after acquisitions that involve employee layoffs than after acquisitions that do not. As 
an important contribution this chapter shows that, in fact, decline in derived labour demand is 
greater in acquisitions that involve employee layoffs than in acquisitions that do not. The 
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regressions show that layoff-involving acquisitions reduce labour demand by about 11.3%, 
while non-layoff acquisitions reduce labour demand by 6.5%. Furthermore, the results show 
that „layoff‟ acquisitions continue to reduce labour demand two years after the merger 
completion year, while „non-layoff‟ acquisitions do not alter employment in the long run. 
Finally, the results show that decline in labour demand is stronger in the small firms sub-
sample than in the large firms sub-sample.   
The results also show that mergers cause faster wage rises: the wage rise is 5% higher after 
two years and 10% higher after three years in merging firms in comparison to non-merging 
firms. While the results show that there is no difference in wage growth between related 
versus unrelated and hostile versus friendly acquisitions, wage growth after „non-layoff‟ 
acquisitions is higher than wage growth after „layoff‟ acquisitions. For example, wage growth 
in „layoff‟ acquirers is significantly higher relative to wage growth in non-merging control 
firms, whereas wage growth in „non-layoff‟ acquirers does not differ from wage growth in 
non-merging control firms. This also confirms the view that layoffs are undertaken in firms 
with financial difficulties. 
This chapter contributes to prior research with new evidence on the positive association 
between post-merger decline in labour demand and reductions in the absolute number of 
employees. The results show that decline in labour demand is greater in layoff-involving 
acquisitions than in acquisitions that do not involve employee layoffs. This greater decrease in 
labour demand in the „layoff‟ sub-sample may justify workforce reductions. In contrast, wage 
growth is higher in non-layoff acquisitions than in layoff acquisitions. Overall, these results 
confirm that merger-related layoffs are undertaken to improve efficiency and to safeguard the 
financial position of the firms. 
9.3 Summary of overall findings 
This thesis contributes to the growing body of literature on the employment effects of 
takeovers by providing new empirical evidence on this issue from several different 
perspectives. The general conclusion of this thesis is that labour does not always suffer from 
takeovers, but instead may gain from such transactions in the long run. Although there are 
some job losses in the short run, value-enhancing acquisitions should benefit employees in the 
long run by providing better jobs and accelerated wage growth. The following main findings 
form the basis for this conclusion: (1) workforce reductions are undertaken for efficiency 
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improvement purposes; (2) workforce reductions positively contribute to post-takeover 
operating performance change; (3) not all takeovers involve wealth transfer from employees to 
shareholders, although there are some evidence of wealth transfer in hostile takeovers and 
cash-financed acquisitions; (4) labour demand decline is one of the main reasons for employee 
layoffs and wage growth is higher in merging firms than in non-merging firms.  
These empirical results are more consistent with the conclusions of an emerging body of 
literature on labour management practices in LMEs (Armour et al., 2003; Gospel and 
Pendleton, 2003). For example, reviewing the literature, Pendleton (2009) concludes that the 
market model of corporate governance „needs to be revised, though not entirely rejected‟, as 
the existing evidence does not support these predictions. In contrast, labour management 
practices are more employee-friendly in public companies within LMEs. He discusses several 
points that may differentiate current ownership and governance systems from the prescriptions 
of the market model: (1) dispersed ownership gives more power and discretion to managers; 
(2) corporate law requires managers to promote the success of the company, balancing the 
interests of all involved stakeholders; (3) managers may pursue a „quiet life‟ by adopting 
labour-friendly management, and (4) the public visibility of listed companies encourages 
managers to adopt employee-friendly practices. These factors contribute to the adoption of 
more labour-friendly management.       
Finally, the overall findings of the thesis also contribute to assessing the appropriateness of the 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance practices. The results are not completely consistent 
with the view that shareholder-value oriented corporate governance prioritises shareholders‟ 
interests over those of labour. Therefore it can be concluded that such a governance system is 
less institutionalised than is often assumed, as suggested by Armour et al. (2003).    
9.4 Policy implications 
The findings of this research could be used in a number of policy-making areas. First, on the 
basis of empirical findings, some inference could be made on the role of the MCC in LMEs: 
do policy-makers need to encourage the MCC transactions to allow efficient re-allocation of 
assets or do they need to limit such transactions in order to protect employee rights? If the 
MCC transactions facilitate „breach of trust‟, then workers do not have enough incentives to 
make firm-specific human capital investment and they do not enter into long-term contracts, 
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which may diminish efficiency in the long run. Therefore there is an ongoing debate on the 
long-term efficiency implications of the MCC transactions.  
For example, more recently there have been strong calls to reform some aspects of corporate 
takeover rules. Critics argue that contemporary takeover rules allow shareholders to sell 
perfectly viable and profitable businesses for high premiums despite opposition from other 
stakeholders. The hostile takeover of Cadbury by Kraft for a premium of about 50% has 
strengthened such arguments. Even the UK Takeover Panel has criticized Kraft when they 
announced that they would close a Cadbury plant which, during the takeover negotiation 
process, they had promised to keep open (Takeover Panel 2010/14 Statement). On 01.06.2010 
the Code Committee of the Takeover Panel published a public consultation paper reviewing 
certain aspects of the regulation of takeover bids (Takeover Panel public consultation paper - 
PCP 2010/2). In addition to this, some are calling for the creation of a new takeover 
framework – the „Cadbury Law‟ – that would make it more difficult for „opportunistic‟ 
takeovers, allowing only disciplinary takeovers. However, the question is what aspects of 
takeover rules should be revised and whether mergers and acquisitions activity should be 
restricted on the grounds of its negative employment effect. The results of this research would 
contribute to the discussion by providing new evidence that not all mergers and acquisitions 
have a negative effect, but some types of takeovers, such as hostile and cash paid acquisitions, 
should be regulated more rigorously. 
Furthermore, the results could be used to assess the appropriateness of the shareholder value 
maximisation principle as well as to assess the activities of managers: whether they behave in 
compliance with their fiduciary responsibilities, defined in the company laws. In particular, 
the empirical results provide policy-makers with evidence showing that restructuring for 
shareholder value through mergers and acquisitions does not necessarily negatively affect jobs 
and wages. On the contrary, such transactions enhance efficiency in the use of labour, which 
may be vital for the business sustainability and, therefore, should benefit both shareholders 
and employees in the long run. Thus managers‟ behaviour could be considered as in 
compliance with their fiduciary duties: they promote the success of their companies and 
balancing the interests of both shareholders and employees in making decisions related to such 
transactions.   
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9.5 Limitations of the thesis 
There are a number of data-related factors that limit the scope of this empirical work. First, 
although we control for multiple acquisitions in order to limit the effects of subsequent 
acquisitions on employment growth, the empirical work does not take into consideration post-
takeover asset divestments. As asset divestments may also affect employment decline, some of 
the employment reductions, reported by Datastream, could be due to such sell-offs.  
Secondly, there are some data limitations related to the sample period and sample size. As the 
data was hand-collected, we had to limit the sample period. Furthermore, due to the strict 
requirement on data availability for both acquired and acquiring firms and the restriction of 
multiple acquisition activity, the sample size became smaller.  
The effect of acquisitions on firm performance would be better understood if data on acquired 
units‟ post-merger performance was used, instead of on consolidated firm performance. 
However, after acquisitions, companies report consolidated annual statements and therefore 
acquiring and acquired firm data is combined. Therefore it was not possible to collect data on 
acquired firms‟ post-merger performance. Furthermore, the value-distribution theory of 
takeovers would be best tested by using data on wages of individual workers and also data on 
employee ages. However, it was not possible to collect such data using data sources to which 
we have access.  
Finally, data on post-merger employee layoffs has also been hand-collected from the public 
press. Although there is a high correlation between this employee layoff data and workforce 
reductions reported by Datastream, there is some risk that not all layoffs may be announced or 
some announced layoffs may not materialize. Therefore the availability of databases on 
merger-related employee layoffs would improve the quality of this research.  
9.6 Future research  
Future research could analyse the performance consequences of workforce adjustments using 
panel data estimation methods. As in this research several variables (such as premiums) are 
observed only once, it was not possible to use panel data estimation methods.   
Future research could also consider the interactions of takeovers with other governance 
mechanisms, such as the functioning of boards. The recent literature suggests that corporate 
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governance is concerned with the power relationships among three main stakeholders of the 
firm: owners, managers and employees. Therefore empirical examination of the interactions of 
these three main stakeholders within the MCC context and related workforce downsizing is 
one of the key areas of research. For example, exploring the role of the Board of Directors in 
promoting both shareholders‟ and employees‟ interests within the mergers and acquisitions 
framework would provide interesting clarification on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices in LMEs. The results of this thesis have shown that Board composition 
affects firm performance and Board ownership affects employment growth. Such associations 
between board characteristics and firm performance could further be investigated using panel 
data based estimation methods. In addition to this, the role of large shareholders in 
management disciplining through market mechanisms or through relationship-based 
governance mechanisms could also be examined. Such a study would require a complete set of 
data on board structure, inside ownership and large shareholdings. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, employee share ownership is one of the most important takeover defence measures. 
Depending on the availability of data, the effect of using employee share ownership plans as a 
takeover defence could be tested. 
The endogeneity issue is one of the main problems of a cross-sectional regression analysis. 
There may be measurement error and simultaneous association between the dependent and 
independent variables. At the same time, the merger event itself may be endogenous: acquirers 
may select targets with better performance and high growth (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; 
McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). Reserve causality is another source of endogeneity. To control 
for the endogeneity problem, future research could apply more advanced dynamic panel data 
estimation methods in analysing the performance consequences of workforce adjustments. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1  Stock market mis-valuation theory of takeovers 
Pre-takeover stock market valuation of both target and bidder shares may motivate takeovers. 
Specifically, the literature considers two types of mis-valuation: targets undervaluation and 
acquirers overvaluation. In this relation two different theories attempt to relate valuation 
discrepancies to the takeover intensity over industries and over time. The first mis-valuation 
theory - the neoclassical theory - states that economic disturbances increase the asset valuation 
variance, by changing the business environment (Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). 
Economic disturbances, such as technological, regulatory and environmental changes, increase 
the likelihood that an outside management team gives higher value for an asset than the 
incumbent management. According to this theory the main source of increase in valuation 
variance resulting from the economic shocks facilitates the efficient asset re-allocation through 
takeovers.  
The second mis-valuation theory - the behavioural market theory - states that overall stock 
market overvaluation creates conditions for intense merger activity. For example, according to 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) irrational investors behaviour and managers‟ rational timing of 
stock valuation create conditions for stock-financed takeovers. Similarly Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) argue that rational managerial use 
overvalued stocks to acquire relatively undervalued firms. When overall market valuation is 
high, overvalued stocks buy relatively less overvalued stocks, providing abnormal returns for 
the target shareholders. The argument of stock market mis-valuation is different from the 
target undervaluation argument, as such the latter argues that changes in business environment 
economic disturbances and regulatory or technological shocks create conditions for takeovers. 
In other words, takeover gains may arise as a result of re-valuation of previously undervalued 
assets. If targets are undervalued we should observe significant deviation from intrinsic values 
and increased net present value for the acquiring companies. 
In terms of stock market mis-valuation hypothesis, Ang and Cheng (2006) show that 
overvalued firms are more likely to acquire with stock and that acquirers‟ overvaluation is 
greater than their target‟s premium-adjusted valuation. Dong  et al. (2006) show that bidders 
have significantly higher valuation than targets‟ valuation, providing lower takeover gains for 
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higher valued bidders and higher gains for lower valued targets. In contrast, Harford (2005) 
empirically compares both neoclassical and behavioural explanation and based on this 
comparison concludes that economic shocks facilitate efficient re-allocation of assets. Harford 
(2005) show that overvaluation does not explain the post-takeover long-run abnormal returns, 
as the empirical evidence shows that there is no difference between takeover wave and non-
wave bidder‟s long-run returns. This contradicts with the main prediction of the stock market 
mis-valution theory, which postulates that the long-run returns of bidders after takeover waves 
should be significantly lower than non-wave bidders‟ long-run returns. 
So far in the UK only one study, a study by Bild et al. (2005), analyses the pre-takeover 
valuation of bidder and target firm. They investigate (1) whether the market values of target 
and bidding firm fairly reflect their fundamental values and (2) whether takeovers are positive 
net present value projects for the acquiring company shareholders. These authors argue that 
fundamental value analysis has distinct advantages over share price and accounting studies, as 
it takes into account the paid premium, the timing and discounted value of post-takeover 
expected earnings. Bild et al. (2005) compares fundamental value of acquiring company 
before acquisition with the fundamental valuation after acquisition, in addition to the 
analysing the profitability and share price performance of acquiring companies. This study 
finds significantly negative long run share returns, but significant improvement in profitability 
and insignificant positive effect on fundamental value. However, using discounted valuation 
models in assessing acquirers‟ performance has its drawbacks: how to correctly determine the 
discount factor, taking into consideration the changes in the operations and business 
environment after mergers. 
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Appendix 2  Definitions of the variables 
Variables Definition Source 
Panel A: Labour data 
Employment Employment is measured with the number of employees, which represents 
the annual average number of both full and part time employees of the 
company.  
Datastream and 
Company Annual 
Reports 
Wages Wages represent annual staff costs divided by average annual number of 
employees. Staff costs is defined as the total wages paid to all employees 
and officers of the company, including all employee benefits such as health 
insurance and contributions to pension plans, divided by the number of 
employees.  
Datastream and 
Company Annual 
Reports 
Employee layoffs Employee layoffs represent post-merger layoffs reported by a newspaper 
within 2 years period after takeovers. This variable is measured as the 
percentage reduction in the number of employees relative to the pro-forma 
combined number of employees of acquired and acquiring firms at the end 
of t-1.   
Nexis® 
Layoff dummy Layoff dummy is created on the basis of data collected from public press 
(newspapers). Layoff dummy regressor takes 1 if the acquirer laid of at least 
1% of the combined workforce based on the newspapers and 0 otherwise. 
Nexis® 
Panel B: Transaction related data 
Hostility dummy Dummy variable takes 1 if the initial offer was rejected and 0 otherwise. Acquisitions 
Monthly 
Relatedness dummy Relatedness dummy takes 1 if both target and acquiring firms are in the 
same industry and 0 otherwise. Industry relatedness of acquiring and 
acquired companies in accordance with the Datastream industry code. 
Datastream 
Payment dummy Payment dummy takes 1 if payment is 100% cash and 0 if the payment is 
stock swap or mix of cash and stock. 
Acquisitions 
Monthly 
Premium One month premium is defined as the difference between the purchase price 
and the price 30 days before takeover, divided by the price 30 days before 
takeover.  
Acquisitions 
Monthly 
Panel B: Performance-related data 
Return on Assets 
(ROA)  
ROA is measured as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and 
Depreciation (EBITDA) for the year t to the Total Assets (TA) at the 
beginning of year t. EBITDA represent the earnings of a company before 
interest expense, income taxes and depreciation. It is calculated by taking 
the pretax income and adding back interest expense on debt and 
depreciation, depletion and amortization and subtracting interest capitalized.  
Computed based on 
Datastream data 
Acquirers‟ pre-
takeover ROA 
Acquiring firms industry adjusted EBITDA for the year t divided by TA at 
the beginning of t-1. 
Datastream  
Acquired firms‟ pre-
takeover ROA 
Acquired firms industry adjusted EBITDA for the year t divided by TA at 
the beginning of t-1. 
Datastream  
Output Output is measured with annual sales value. Datastream 
Panel A: Share price variables 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) 
CAR is calculated based on the share price change 5 days before the 
announcement date and 5 days after the announcement date, using the daily 
Return Index. Return Index for each company is the growth in value of 
shares, assuming that dividends are re-invested. 
Computed based on 
Datastream Return 
Index 
Buy-And-Hold-
Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs)  
BHAR is the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the acquiring firms less 
the return on a buy-and-hold in an asset/portfolio with an appropriate 
expected return.  
 
Computed based on 
Datastream Return 
Index 
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Panel E: Control variables 
Acquirer size Acquirer size is the market value at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
acquisition completion year. Market value is defined as share price 
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. 
Datastream 
Relative size Relative size is the transaction value (obtained from the Acquisitions 
Monthly) divided by acquirers‟ size.  
Datastream 
Leverage The ratio of Total Debt at the end of year t to TA at the end of year t. Datastream 
Board composition Board composition is defined as the ratio of the number of non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors in the board.  
Hemmington-Scott 
Corporate Registers 
Board ownership Board ownership indicates percentage of shares owned by all Board 
members, including CEO, executive and non-executive directors of the 
acquiring firms at the last accounting year-end prior to takeover.  
Hemmington-Scott 
Corporate Registers 
Industry average wage Industry median wage per employee Computed based on 
Datastream 
Capital intensity Capital intensity is computed as the ratio of net book value of fixed assets to 
the average annual number of employees.  
Computed based on 
Datastream 
Profit per Employee Employee profitability is computed by dividing annual profits for the year t 
by the number of average workers employed during this year. Profit is 
measured by EBITDA, defined as above.   
Computed based on 
Datastream  
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Appendix 3  Correlation table  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 1
2 -0.2983*  1
3 0.3629*  0.0417 1
4 -0.0835  0.0873 0.1377* 1
5 0.0707 -0.0771 -0.0775 -0.0019 1
6 -0.0653 -0.0176 0.0905 0.0215 0.0313 1
7 0.0102 -0.0231 -0.0248 0.2185* 0.0914 0.0232 1
8 -0.0319  0.1794* -0.001 0.0967 0.0953 0.1166 -0.1026 1
9 0.1403*  0.0352 -0.1119 -0.1326* 0.0141 -0.1053 0.054 -0.0717 1
10 0.0146 0.0085 -0.0918 -0.0669 0.0498 -0.056 -0.005 0.0252 -0.0004 1
11 0.7872*  0.0861 -0.3503* 0.0501 0.1187 -0.0505 -0.0014 0.2280* 0.1477* 0.0933 1
12 0.0753 -0.0022 -0.0062 -0.0069 0.0188 0.103 0.5229* -0.0575 0.0801 -0.0043 0.0523 1
13 0.2049*  0.1852* 0.0036 0.0615 0.1062 0.0727 -0.0653 0.1018 0.057 -0.1969*  0.2330* 0.015 1
14 -0.1247 0.0978 0.1996* 0.1056 -0.0583 -0.4343* -0.1002 0.0174 0.0112 0.0835 -0.0859 -0.1440* -0.0404 1
15 -0.2157*  -0.1903* 0.2163* 0.069 0.1444* -0.0264 -0.0582 0.0064 0.0439 -0.0225  -0.2642* -0.0453 -0.0267 0.0669 1
16 -0.0467  0.0151 -0.0456 0.064 0.0853 0.0028 0.0143 -0.0522 -0.0114 -0.0359 -0.0311 -0.051 -0.0163 0.0288 0.0015 1
17 0.1212 -0.047 -0.2598* -0.0201 0.0016 -0.0957 0.0059 0.0014 0.01 0.072 0.0952 -0.0433 -0.0978 0.1672* -0.1414* -0.1539 1  
 
Notes: 1 – Employment change from t-1 to t+3, 2 – Wage change from t-1 to t+3; 3 – Layoff dummy; 4 – Hostility dummy; 5 – Relatedness dummy; 6 – Cash payment dummy; 7 – Premium; 8 – 
ROA change from t-1 to t+3; 9 – Acquired firm pre-takeover ROA; 10 – Acquiring firm pre-takeover ROA; 11 – Output change from t-1 to t+3; 12 – Acquired firm CARs; 13 – BHARs;  14 – 
Relative size; 15 – Leverage; 16 – Board composition; 17 – Board ownership; 
* – indicates that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level or better.  
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Appendix 4  Selection of industry, size and performance matched firms 
To apply „industry-, size- and performance-matched firm‟ benchmark, for each target and 
buyer firm a matched firm has been selected, on the basis of the following procedure 
recommended by Loughran and Ritter (1997): 
Using all Datastream firms, including the official lists of dead UK public firms from 
“DEADUK1” to “DEADUK7” and the list of currently operating firms “FBRIT”, 
contemporaneously “live” firms have been selected for every sample period year t, i.e. all 
firms included to the pool of potential matching firms should have operating performance 
indicators during the period from year t-3 to year t+3. 
ROA of all „contemporaneously‟ live firms have been calculated for the end of year t-1 as 
explained above. Next, the pool of the potential matched firms is filtered by industry to select 
all firms in the same industry, for which a matched firm is being selected (industry filter). 
Then among these same industry firms those firms with the market value of between 25% and 
200% of the market value of the firm, for which a matched firm is being selected, have been 
determined (size filter). 
Next, among those potential matching firms, which come through industry filter and size filter, 
the firm with closest operating cash flow return has been selected.  
One of the main logic behind using „control firm‟ approach is that to compare the performance 
of acquiring firms with the performance of non-acquiring firms to understand takeover effect 
on operating performance. In this relation, in the selection process those firms that have not 
undertaken any acquisitions should be selected as matching firms. Therefore, in the final step 
of the matching firm selection procedure, the selected firm has been checked if it had not 
undertaken any significant acquisition during the period 5 years before and 3 years after the 
sample takeover completion date.  
As the first step, the selected matched firm name is analysed to see whether the company was 
functioning with its current name during the investigation period (from t-5 to t+3). The reason 
is that Datastream usually gives companies current name and searching The Financial Times 
with this name may not give full information about this company‟s history.  
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Then a dataset prepared based on the information of UK Public takeovers section of the 
Acquisitions Monthly have been used to search for major acquisitions of the selected matching 
firms. However, as this source does not report acquisitions of local private companies or 
foreign companies by UK public companies, the Financial Times have been screened for the 
full acquisition performance of the matching firms. In particular, in this process the using the 
following three main steps have been undertaken to investigate the acquisition performance of 
the firms being selected:  
1. UK Public acquisitions section has been searched for the period 5 years before and 3 years 
after takeover completion date; 
2. „Mergers and Acquisitions Publications‟ section of the Nexis® have been searched using 
„Company name‟ search criteria; 
3. The Financial Times headlines were screened using the following search criteria: „Company 
name and Headline (merger or merged or acquire or acquired or takeover or buy or expand)‟;  
If these three search steps do not show any significant acquisition of the firm being selected 
then this firm has been selected as a matched firm
100
. If the firm acquired another UK public 
firm(s) (based on the Acquisition Monthly) and/or significant local private or foreign 
acquisitions (based on the Financial Times screening), then another firm with the next closest 
operating cash flow return was selected as a matching firm.   
In addition to the above, following Conyon et al. (2002) the matched firms‟ annual total assets 
growth rates have been analysed. If a matched firm‟s total assets grew more than 100% in any 
one of the observation period (5 years before and 3 years after takeover) then this firm is 
replaced with another matching firm, which meets the above explained criteria.  
As stated above all data for the merging firms are collected taking into consideration fiscal 
year-end dates of both acquired and acquiring firms. However, for the matched firms data has 
been collected for three consecutive years before and three consecutive years after takeover 
completion year (excluding the takeover completion year). Similarly, the size of the potential 
                                                 
100 In most cases the above three searches gives a clear picture – it is possible to select a „non-acquiring‟ matched firm. But in 
case of large companies, it is difficult to find a matched firm that had not undertaken any acquisition during consecutive 8 
years. All large companies do some type of acquisition (public, private or foreign firm) during such as long time period. 
Therefore some small acquisitions of large companies have been ignored, as the transaction values of these acquisitions were 
very small in comparison to the contemporaneous market value of matching firms.    
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matching firms is measured at the end of the calendar year immediately prior to takeover 
completion year. As Zao (2002) investigates the effect of using calendar year-end dates 
instead of fiscal year-end dates in downloading data for the sample of UK takeovers and 
concludes that this does not alter the empirical analysis results.   
A limitation of the literature in the area is that previous studies either do not take into 
consideration the acquisition performance of the matching firms or the authors do not clearly 
describe the non-acquiring firm selection procedure. Some previous researchers who 
investigate takeovers long-run operating performance do not clarify whether they take into 
consideration the acquisition performance of the matching firms in the selection process, 
although they clearly state that they use industry, size and pre-takeover performance criteria in 
this process. For example, both Ghosh, (2001) and Powel and Stark (2005) do not clarify 
whether they select only non-merging firms as matching firms or whether they do not take into 
account this criterion. Ghosh (2001) points that the main objective of the selection of matching 
firms based on industry, size and performance is to control for the superior pre-takeover 
performance of acquirers. If cash flow ratios for acquiring firms are unusually high during the 
pre-takeover performance, then the similar pre-takeover ratios and change rates in these ratios 
of the matched firms should be the same over time. So, according to Ghosh (2001) the main 
objective of using matched firm approach is to control for the superior pre-takeover 
performance, not to control for the acquisition performance of the matched firms. In contrast, 
Conn et al. (2005) and Cosh et al. (2006) select those firms in the same industry, similar size 
and performance that have not acquired within 5 years before and 5 years after takeovers. 
As both post-takeover accounting performance and more importantly abnormal stock 
performance is assessed relative to matching firms‟ performance, these firms should be non-
acquirers: i.e. matching firms should not have undertaken any significant mergers and 
acquisitions before and after the takeover completion year. As we do not have a full list of 
acquisitions (including public, private and foreign firm acquisitions) by UK public firms, the 
only currently available option is to screen the Financial Times for the acquisition 
performance of the firms being selected.  
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Appendix 5  Collection of data on post-merger employee layoffs  
Previous studies use two methods to collect data on employee redundancies. The first method 
is to collect unofficial data on employment layoffs through screening major newspapers. The 
second method is to collect official data from Regulatory News Services of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). In accordance with the transparency rules all companies need to inform LSE 
about any major corporate events that may cause change in share prices. Within the 
framework of this transparency rule, the listed firms need to issue an official announcement 
about the planned downsizing and employee layoffs. The data collected through the second 
method is more accurate and informative, as it is from official sources. However, not all 
companies make official layoff announcements and, therefore, this method provides less data 
(fewer number of announcements) than the first method, as not all companies make official 
announcements about their redundancies. 
Both US and UK studies use unofficial data on layoff announcements, collected through 
newspapers. In the UK, screening major newspapers through Nexis
®
 database Hillier et al. 
(2007) collect information about 322 layoffs occurred during 1990-2000. The authors report 
that managers most frequently report reorganisation as a reason of layoffs (42%), while cost 
cutting was mentioned in 13% cases and mergers and acquisitions were mentioned in only 4% 
cases as the main reason of layoffs. Krishnan et al. (2002) use workforce reductions 
undertaken during 1 year period after takeover completion date.  
In this thesis data on post-takeover employee change in the acquiring firms have been 
collected from two sources. First, year-to-year change in the employment variables (numbers 
of workers and their salaries) in the acquiring firms were obtained from Datastream and 
Annual Company accounts
101
. Merger related year-to-year change in the combined workforce 
has been calculated by comparing the pre-takeover pro-forma combined workforce of the 
acquiring and acquired firms at the end of year t-1 to the number of employees of the 
acquiring firms during post-takeover years.  
Second, data on post-takeover employee layoffs in the acquired firms have been gathered 
through screening national and regional newspapers using Nexis
®
 database. To be classified as 
an acquirer with significant post-takeover employee layoffs, the acquirer should had laid off at 
                                                 
101 As Datastream provides employment information starting from 1993, missing data on these variables for the years 1990-
1993 has been collected from company annual reports, obtained from Nexis® database. 
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least 1 % of the combined workforce within 2 years period after takeover completion month. 
In the literature different papers choose different cut-off points to determine significance of 
employee layoffs. For example, Hillier et al. (2007) state that to be classified as a laying off 
firm, “the size of the layoff must account for at least 0.1% of the firm‟s total employees at the 
end of the financial year preceding the layoff announcement”. In contrast, Ofek (1993) uses 
10% cut-off point to classify firms as firms making significant layoffs.   
The Financial Times, Times & Sunday Times, Guardian, Daily Mail, Independent, Lloyd's 
List, Observer, Evening Standard and other sources have been screened using the following 
search term:  
“acquired or bid or buy or merger or takeover and layoff or redundancy or 
job loss or job cut or dismissal or axe or chop or sack or shed or and (target 
company name) and/or (acquiring company name)” 
As several newspapers concurrently report major post-merger layoffs, it can be confirmed that 
the collected information consistent across newspapers and, therefore, it is possible to 
determine the exact number of job losses. However, there are uncertainties in this process: 
sometimes newspapers report redundancies as part of post-merger annual or semi-annual 
performance analysis, without giving the exact dates of the layoffs or sometimes newspapers 
report that acquirers incur „redundancy costs‟ after mergers, without giving the exact number 
of workers laid off. At the same time, large companies undertake layoffs step by step.  
As a result of screening national and regional newspapers, it was possible to find information 
about layoffs occurred in 101 acquiring firms, which consists 43% of sample firms. As several 
newspapers concurrently report major post-merger layoffs, the data on employee layoffs 
gathered from the newspapers can be considered as reliable data for this research purposes. 
However, in some cases it is difficult to determine the exact date of the layoffs, as sometimes 
newspapers report redundancies as part of the post-merger annual or semi-annual performance 
analysis, without giving the exact dates of the layoffs. In addition to the newspapers, 
occasionally some companies provide employee layoff announcements through Regulatory 
News Services (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange. However, through searching RNS 
reports, we were able to find only a few announcements given by the sample firms. 
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Appendix 6  Collection of data on daily stock price returns 
We use daily stock price return data for short-term abnormal returns and monthly stock price 
return data for long-term abnormal returns calculation. To estimate short-run abnormal gains, 
daily returns are calculated using stock Return Index (RI) data. For this purpose, for both 
targets and bidders 300 daily stock Return Indexes (RI) for both target and buyer firms have 
been downloaded around the takeover announcement date: 294 days before the announcement 
date and 5 days after the announcement date. Similarly, 300 days FTSE All-Share Index have 
been downloaded for each takeover‟s announcement dates. Consistent with the previous 
research daily stock returns from -300 days to -60 days have been used to estimate market 
model parameters and to calculate variance for abnormal returns.  
The stock price daily returns for each target and buyer are calculated as follows:  
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where itR is daily stock price return for stock i on day t, itP is price of stock i on day t, itP is 
price of stock i on day t-1, itD is dividend payment for stock i associated with day t. 
The above formula can be re-written as follows: 
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Datastream defines a stock Return Index as follows: 
1
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where itRI is Return Index for a stock i at the date t. 
Based on this definition of a stock Return Index, we can substitute 
1it
itit
P
DP
 with 
1it
it
RI
RI
, for 
which the required data to calculate a stock‟s price return is available. So, daily stock returns 
for each sample firm are determined as follows:  
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where itR is daily stock return for stock i on day t, itRI is Return Index for a stock i at the date t. 
Appendix 7  Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
To calculate 36 (24, 12) months CTARs, in each calendar month we form a portfolio of all 
sampled acquiring firms, which acquired another public firm during the last 36 (24, 12) 
months. Then we calculate the equally-weighted average return for that portfolio for each of 
36 (24, 12) calendar months by dividing the total return for the portfolio to the number of 
acquirers included in the portfolio. Each month we rebalance the portfolio by including new 
acquiring firms and dropping the acquiring firms which undertook an acquisition more than 36 
months ago. In total we form 166 calendar monthly portfolios for acquiring firms. 
Table 9.1 Construction of the calendar time portfolios 
Period Number of Portfolios
Mean number of stocks 
in a portfolio
Minimum number of 
stock in a portfolio
Maximum number of 
stocks in a portfolio
12 months 142 20 2 45
24 months 154 38 2 75
36 months 166 52 2 100  
In a similar way we also form portfolios of corresponding matching firms for each calendar 
month and calculate equally-weighted average return from holding these portfolios. Mean 
monthly calendar time abnormal returns are calculated as follows. First, we compute the 
difference between the return on every acquiring firm portfolio and the return on 
corresponding portfolio of matching firms for each calendar month: 
mat
t
ap
tt RRCTAR ,  (A-5) 
where, returns on acquiring and matching firms‟ portfolios are computed as follows: 
n
i
i
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1
,   (A-6) 
where, aptR is the return on acquiring firms portfolio on month t, iR is the stocks included in the 
t month calendar portfolio. 
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where, mattR is the return on matching firms portfolio on month t, iR is the stocks included to 
the t month calendar portfolio. 
Then mean CTAR ( CTAR ) is the time series average of monthly abnormal returns, i.e. the 
sum of all monthly abnormal returns divided by the number of calendar months (portfolios). 
Following the conclusions of Lyon et al. (1999), who recommend using time series t-statistics 
to test the significance of mean monthly abnormal returns, we also calculate abnormal returns 
based on a calendar time portfolio approach. These authors show that a time series t-statistic is 
a well-specified test statistic in random samples, which can be determined as follows:  
TCTAR
CTAR
CTARt
t /)(
)( ,  (A-8) 
where CTAR is the mean monthly calendar time abnormal returns and T is the number of 
calendar months.  
Table 9.2 reports shareholder wealth effect of takeovers, measured using the CTAR method. 
Consistent with the BHAR method, this method also shows underperformance of acquiring 
firms, although the magnitude of the underperformance in this method is smaller than the size 
of the underperformance, reported using buy-and-hold approach. 
CTAR method indicates that on average acquirers earn -0.47% negative abnormal returns in 
every calendar month during 36 months, following takeover completion month. The 
magnitude of this result if very close to other researches results, which use different methods 
and different benchmarks. For example, using the CTAR method, Conn et al. (2005) report 
that acquirers exhibit average abnormal returns of -0.40% per month, which is significant at 
5% significance level (t-statistics is -1.97). The difference in significance levels may be in the 
sample size: Conn et al. (2005) use 576 acquisitions occurred during 1984-1998.  
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Table 9.2 Results based on Calendar Time Abnormal Returns approach 
Abnormal returns t-stat Abnormal returns t-stat Abnormal returns t-stat
Mean CTAR -0.77% -2.37 -0.65% -2.44 -0.47% -1.90
12 months 24 months 36 months
Event Windows
 
At the same time, the 36 months post-takeover abnormal returns (0.47% per calendar month) 
are very similar to those reported by Conn et al. (2005) (0.41% per calendar month), who use 
size and B/M matched control firms approach. Cosh et al. (2006) use only industry and 
performance matched control firms and report similar results. 
Appendix 8  Panel data based regression methods 
This appendix first discusses static panel data models, which enable researchers to control for 
firm-specific heterogeneity. Next, this appendix discusses dynamic panel data methods, which 
enable to control for both the effect of unobservable variables and heterogeneity arising as a 
result of including lagged dependent variables to the model. These discussions are based on 
Baltagi (2001), Wooldridge (2002), Verbeek (2008) and other below referenced materials.  
Static panel data estimation methods 
There are three main reasons that explanatory variables may be correlated with the errors. 
First, the most common reason is that the error term may include unobservable variables. Such 
unobserved variables may affect to both dependent variable and explanatory variables. 
Examples of unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in this research context could be such 
variables as firm i management performance, its overall workforce quality or unique customer 
relations. Such unobservable variables are usually time-invariant – thus allows for 
heterogeneity in the dependent variables across observations. For example, management 
quality unobserved variable is negatively correlated with other inputs in the above models and 
positively correlated with the output variable, since a high quality management will probably 
result in a more efficient use of inputs and achieve a higher level of output.  
The second reason of the correlation of explanatory variables with error terms is the 
relationship between dependent variable and independent variable could be simultaneous: the 
output may explain the employment level, but at the same time employment levels may 
explain output. Another example is that, while takeovers may alter operating performance of 
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firms, their pre-takeover performance may also determine merger event: McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995b) argue that acquired plants are usually better performing plants. The third 
reason is that there may be some measurement error in the used variables.      
There are three main panel data estimation methods in the static context: Pooled OLS 
regression model, Random effects model and Fixed effects model. Selection of a particular 
method depends on the assumptions regarding the relations between unobservable firm 
specific heterogeneity and other explanatory variables.  
To discuss these methods one by one, we start with the explaining the error term and 
assumptions on the relationship between explanatory variable(s) and the error term. The error 
term of the above equations consists of two components as follows:  
itiit vu   (A-9) 
i - denotes the unobservable individual firm specific effect (heterogeneity), which is time 
invariant; itv - denotes the remainder disturbance.  
First, we can ignore the individual heterogeneity and estimate the model with the pooled OLS 
estimator that minimises the sum of squared residuals. Under this estimation method the 
assumption is that there is neither significant firm nor time effect: i is the same as itv . Two 
main fundamental assumptions of OLS are that (1) the average of the error term in the 
population to be zero and (2) the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term (in 
this case explanatory variables are called exogenous variables):  
0)(uE  (A-10) 
0)|( xuE   (A-11) 
These assumptions imply that the population expected value of the error term does not depend 
on the value of the explanatory variables. However, often the second assumption is violated 
and the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, especially when the error term 
includes unobserved variables (in this case explanatory variables are called endogenous 
variables). Thus, pooled OLS is subject to the same omitted variable bias, as OLS in the single 
cross-section.  
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In the cross-sectional data context when the model includes endogenous variables, 
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator can be used, which replaces the endogenous variable 
with another variable that are uncorrelated with the error term but are correlated with the 
explanatory variable to be replaced. Thus, if we find an instrumental variable, for example z, it 
should explain part of the variation in the endogenous variable to be replaced (i.e. it should be 
correlated with that variable) and should not be correlated with the error term: 
0)|( zuE  (A-12) 
0)(xzE   (A-13) 
In the cross-sectional analysis context this instrumental variable could be used to obtain 
unbiased and consistent estimates using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation method. 
However, in the panel data context the omitted variable problem can be solved with other 
estimation methods discussed below. Availability of panel data allows controlling for 
individual firm specific unobservable variables that are constant over time.  
The main underlying assumption of the second panel data estimation method - Random effects 
model – is that it considers unobservable individual firms specific heterogeneity variables as 
random variable and includes it to the error term. Thus, under this assumption individual 
heterogeneity is not problematic and it could be dealt as usual error term, which is assumed to 
be random with the expected value of zero and independent of other explanatory variables. 
This method is valid estimation method under the assumption that unobservable variables are 
uncorrelated with other explanatory variables (i.e. if all observable variables are exogenous):  
0)( iE  (A-14) 
0)|( iti xE   (A-15) 
If the above assumptions are valid then simple OLS on the pooled data produce unbiased 
results, but not efficient estimates as the estimated standard errors are wrong, as it does not 
take into account the correlation among residuals of the same cross-sectional unit. Random 
effects estimator – Generalised Least Square (GLS) estimator takes this correlation into 
account and produce unbiased and efficient estimates. GLS requires that all explanatory 
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variables to be uncorrelated with the individual effects and uses quasi-demeaned 
transformation, estimated by OLS.  
Sometimes unobserved individual specific effect can not be assumed to be random, but should 
be assumed as individual specific fixed effect, which correlated with other explanatory 
variables:  
0)|( iti xE  (A-16) 
In this case both pooled OLS and Random Effects (GLS) estimator produce biased results. In 
the levels equation OLS estimator is inconsistent, as such one of the main assumptions of this 
estimator is violated: explanatory variables should not be correlated with the error term.  
If we have to assume unobservable variables as individual specific fixed effect then we need 
to use the third panel data estimation method - Fixed Effects models, which ahs three different 
versions: Least Square Dummy variable, Within group and First differencing. The assumption 
under this model is that the unobservable firm-specific effects are correlated with other 
observable variables; however they are constant over time. In other words, individual firm 
specific effects - i are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated. First, these parameters 
can be estimated by including time constant intercept for each observation by Least Square 
Dummy Variable Estimation method. This method addresses the individual firm specific 
heterogeneity effect by including an individual specific intercept in the model. The Second, 
Within group method uses the time series of panel data and provides internal instrument for 
the elimination of endogenous variables by taking the deviations of all variables included to 
the model from the means. Specifically, the method takes mean values of all variables for T-1 
period and deducts these mean values from the values of variables ate t. As the mean value of 
unobservable variable is constant over-time, the Within group method eliminates such 
variables from the model. The transformations of original variables (in the form of deviations 
from their means) are uncorrelated with firm specific unobservable variable, even if original 
variables are correlated with them. In this way this estimator eliminates the unobservable 
variable from the model as mean of this constant is equal to itself. Therefore, this estimator 
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only estimates the effects of variables that change over time, leaving the unobservable 
constant out of the model and it can be estimated by OLS
102
.  
Third method First differencing estimator also eliminates unobservable variables that are 
assumed to be constant over time. By removing the unobservable variable this estimator 
mitigates the correlation between differenced explanatory variables and disturbance terms. 
Specifically, the method takes the first differences of all variables included to the model. 
However, while this estimator eliminates the individual fixed effects, it creates another 
problem of correlation, namely correlation between first differenced explanatory variables and 
first differenced error terms. These differences may be correlated because of endogeneity (the 
explanatory variable is correlated with the error terms) or the explanatory variables may be 
determined based on lagged errors, meaning that there is some feedback from the past error 
term to the explanatory variables.  
In the Within group model the dependence of itu  on 1itu  implies that OLS estimator is 
inconsistent. However, if we have instrumental variables that are correlated with the 
dependent variables and uncorrelated with the error term, then using these instrumental 
variables instead of endogenous variables with the 2SLS estimator produces consistent 
estimates.  
Thus, in selecting an estimation method in the panel data context, assumptions about the 
properties of initial conditions – whether it is fixed effects or random effects play an important 
role. Baltagi (2001) suggests that random effects estimation method is more appropriate if the 
sample includes N individuals randomly selected from a large population (such as household 
panel data), whereas fixed effects estimation method is an appropriate specification if the 
sample includes a specific set of firms or countries. In the former case inference is based on 
the population from which the sample was randomly drawn, in the later case the inference is 
based on the behaviour of the selected firms or countries. In some cases unobserved variables 
are firm specific and they can not be viewed as random variables, rather they should be 
viewed as fixed, meaning that they are correlated with other explanatory variables. Especially, 
in the dynamic panel data context it is more appropriate to assume that unobservable variables 
                                                 
102 This Fixed Effects estimator is also called as the Within group estimator and the estimates are exactly identical to the Least 
Square Dummy Variable estimates. 
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as fixed, as the set of explanatory variables include lagged dependent variable, which is 
correlated with unobservable by the model construction
103
. 
Dynamic panel data estimation methods 
In the dynamic panel data context the relationship between observable variables and 
unobserved firm specific heterogeneity should be considered as fixed effect rather than 
random effect. As individual heterogeneity is assumed to be constant over time and also time 
period of the study is short, it is appropriate to assume that firm specific heterogeneity is fixed 
effect. As discussed in Baltagi (2001) there are two sources of persistence over time in 
dynamic panel data models. First, the model includes the lagged dependent variable, which is 
correlated with the error term. Secondly, as above discussed, the explanatory variables may be 
correlated with the error term due to individual heterogeneity.  
In many economic situations, current level of variables depends on the previous period level. 
By including lagged dependent variable, we could control for whole past information of the 
explanatory variables (Greene, 2008). However, even after first differencing the lagged 
dependent variable will be correlated with the error term. In this way we could estimate the 
effect of mergers on labour, firm productivity and wages, controlling for the effect of other 
variables. In the dynamic panel data context individual effects are treated as being stochastic, 
which means that they are necessarily correlated with the lagged dependent variables. As the 
dependent variable is a function of the individual firm specific effects, the lagged dependent 
variable used as the explanatory variable is also a function of the error term. In the dynamic 
panel data context the relationship between explanatory variables and disturbances could be in 
three different types: (1) Explanatory variables could be endogenous, if they are correlated 
with contemporaneous disturbances and earlier shocks, but they are not correlated with 1itu  
and subsequent shocks; (2) Explanatory variables could be pre-determined, if they are 
uncorrelated with the disturbances, but they may still be correlated with 1itu and earlier 
                                                 
103 Decision on the use of random effects and fixed effects estimation method should be based on Hausman test, which tests 
the null hypothesis of that random effects estimator would be consistent and efficient estimator against the alternative 
hypothesis that random effects estimator would be inconsistent. If unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the 
explanatory variables, then it can be considered as random variable, in which case both random effects and fixed effects 
estimators are consistent, but the random effects estimator is efficient. If the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the 
regressors, then only the fixed effects estimator is consistent. If we reject that h (Hausman) statistic comes from chi-square 
distribution based on low p-value, we select the fixed effects estimator as the preferred estimator.   
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shocks; (3) Explanatory variables could be strictly exogenous, if they are uncorrelated with all 
past, present and future disturbance terms.  
To illustrate this correlation, we consider the following simple model which includes only one 
explanatory variable in addition to the lagged dependent variable. If we take the first 
difference of the above model, we have the following:  
)()()( 11211 itititititititit vvxxllll  (A-17) 
We use itx as an example of explanatory variable
104
. In the dynamic panel data context, OLS 
estimates are biased because right hand side regressors are correlated with the error term. The 
Random effects GLS estimator is also biased because quasi-demeaned lagged dependent 
variable will be correlated with the error term. Next, the Within group (the Fixed effects 
estimator) eliminates the individual fixed effects, but demeaned lagged dependent variable 
will be correlated with the demeaned error terms.  
Finally, the First differencing also eliminates the individual fixed effects and produces 
unbiased and consistent estimates when the model includes strictly exogenous variables. 
However, when the model includes predetermined explanatory variables (i.e. the variables that 
are correlated with one period lagged and earlier error terms), the First differencing creates 
another problem: differenced predetermined variables become endogenous, as they correlate 
with the differenced errors.  
In the dynamic panel data context lagged dependent variable 1itl  is correlated with the 
individual firm specific effects and is not strictly exogenous. In this context, the only 
assumption is that dependent variable is uncorrelated with the subsequent disturbances. In this 
case the two lagged level dependent variable will be uncorrelated with itv , which means that 
this variable can be used as the instrumental variable. As 1itl is correlated with 1itv , 
explanatory variable is correlated with the error term in this first differenced model. Therefore, 
in a model that includes first lag of the dependent variable, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
                                                 
104 In fact there may be many explanatory variables in this model. These contemporary variables may be correlated with the 
unobservable variable. For example, management efficiency is one of the unobservable firm specific variables. Efficient 
management may be correlated with both employment levels and sales volume: more efficient managers may use lower levels 
of labour (negative correlation) and achieve higher levels of sales (positive correlation).  
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suggest to instrument the endogeneous differenced explanatory variable )( 211, ititti lll  
with the lagged difference )( 322, ititti lll  or simply with the lagged level 2itl . As long as 
the error terms are not serially correlated over time, these instrumental variables (one period 
earlier lagged difference and lagged values of the explanatory variables) will not be correlated 
with the differenced errors )( 211, ititti vvv  and therefore they can be used as instruments 
for the endogenous differences. In other words the correlation between these lagged levels and 
differenced error terms are assumed to be zero: 
0))(( 12 ititit vvlE  (A-18)  
The Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 2SLS estimators that use the lagged difference or simple 
lagged level produces both consistent and efficient estimates if T = 3. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) suggest that if T>3, then this estimator provides consistent, but not necessarily efficient 
estimates, as it does not use all moment conditions. Efficiency of this estimator can be 
improved when data is available for more than three periods, as further valid instruments 
become available in this case. Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend to use further lagged 
levels (such as 3itl , 4itl , 5itl ) as instrumental variables, as this estimator has smaller variance 
than using lagged differences as instruments. In sum, in the autoregressive distributed lag 
models the lagged dependent variable (used as an explanatory variable) is predetermined then 
one and more lags can be used as instruments. If the lagged dependent variable is endogenous, 
then two step and higher level lags can be used as instruments. 
As there are some efficiency gains from using more than one instrumental variable, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) argue that using additional instrumental variables in the context of  
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator that optimally exploits all available 
information. Specifically, they suggested that the first differenced lags could be weak 
instruments and proposed to use all available lagged levels as instrumental variables for the 
differenced variables. If data is available for T period then a set of available instrumental 
variables becomes )...( 2,2,1 iTii yyy . GMM estimator that only uses lagged levels as instrumental 
variable is called as “difference GMM”.    
The second condition is that instrumental variable should explain some part of variation in the 
endogenous variable. Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that lagged levels could be poor 
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instruments for first differences. In particular, when the correlation between first differences 
and lagged levels to be used as instrumental variables are weak, instruments become less 
informative and the estimates may be biased. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) suggest to use the differenced lags along with the lagged levels as instruments for 
the equations in first differences, if they satisfy the following condition:  
0)( 2ii lE  (A-19) 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that both lagged differences 
and lagged levels could be used as instrumental variables, that in combination increases 
efficiency. This estimator is called as “SYSTEM GMM” as it combines the lagged level 
instruments with the lagged difference level instruments.  
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